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Abstract 
This thesis is a comparative analysis of nationalism in Quebec, Scotland, and 
Catalunya and the perspectives of nationalist parties towards questions of constitutional 
change within the broader Canadian, United Kingdom, and Spanish states. It is the goal of 
this thesis to analyse how minority national groups view themselves within the constitutional 
framework of multinational states and what arguments they make for greater recognition for 
their national communities. All of the nationalist parties under discussion argue that the 
distinct position of the minority national group is not sufficiently recognised within the state. 
How this recognition can be achieved is of primary concern to nationalists and shapes their 
approach towards constitutional dialogue. Nationalist parties adopt various approaches 
towards constitutional reform in an effort to achieve either a reform of the existing state or 
the secession of the minority national group's territory from the state. This thesis analyses 
these approaches as advocated by the parties themselves and by other political and academic 
participant-observers. In examining the Catalan, Quebecois, and Scottish cases this thesis 
compares the unique asymmetrical arrangements that each state has adopted as a means to 
accommodate the minority national groups. Many nationalists argue that this evolving 
asymmetry is insufficient to meet the goal of greater recognition, leading to their advocating 
various federal, con federal, and secessionist options. After considering the various 
constitutional options that are presented this thesis argues that promoting a higher degree of 
constitutional and administrative asymmetry is an effective means of bringing greater 
recognition to Scotland, Quebec, and Catalunya within the state. 
The qualitative analysis in this thesis is based upon original research and a review of 
available secondary source material. The original research consists largely of data obtained 
from personal interviews and from an analysis of party documents. The personal interviews 
were conducted in Scotland, Quebec, and Catalunya with political participant-observers, 
including members of nationalist parties and individuals involved in developing 
constitutional policy and with academic participant-observers who specialise in 
constitutional politics. The thesis is divided into four sections. The first section includes 
the introduction that outlines the research method and Chapter 1 that examines various 
theoretical approaches to nationalism. The second section lays the groundwork for the 
following two sections. It consists of chapters two to four, which examine the historical 
evolution of nationalism in Quebec, Catalunya, and Scotland from its antecedents to the late-
twentieth century, paying particular attention to the evolution of nationalist political thought. 
The third section consisting of chapters five to seven is the main analytical section. In each 
of these chapters the constitutional framework of each state and the nationalist response are 
analysed through an examination of constitutional documents and party manifestos, leaders' 
speeches, and other policy material. Data obtained from interviews is analysed here. The 
fourth and final section is made up of the conclusion and a comparative analytical chapter 
that draws the three cases together through an analysis of various constitutional options in 
the three multinational states. 
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Introduction 
This thesis is a qualitative and comparative analysis of nationalism in Scotland, 
Quebec, and Catalunya and the link between nationalism and constitutional change within 
the broader nation-states of the United Kingdom, Canada, and Spain. This thesis addresses 
issues and controversies that surround this topic and analyses the particular understanding 
that nationalists have of the position of nations within states. The thesis adopts the position 
that Scotland, Quebec, and Catalunya exist as minority nations within multinational states, or 
as certain commentators have described them, nations without states. The central argument 
of the thesis is that in the multinational states of Canada, the United Kingdom, and Spain a 
particular phenomenon is present where there is a conflict between rival conceptions of the 
nation. Nationalists in the three minority nations make a distinction between the nation, 
Catalunya, Scotland, or Quebec, and the state, thus in certain cases holding a dual identity. 
This is in conflict with a view held by many outside the minority nation who identify much 
more strongly with the state as the nation. The goal of the thesis is to provide an explanation 
and greater understanding as to why this phenomenon exists. 
The arguments and analysis in this thesis have very much been shaped by the 
constitutional events ofthe late 1990s in Canada, the UK, and Spain. 1997 ushered in a 
period of momentous constitutional change in the United Kingdom with the Labour 
Government embarking upon a programme of devolution to Scotland, Wales, Northern 
Ireland, and London. The UK government has also begun to reform the House of Lords, the 
first step of which was the elimination of hereditary peerage and the removal of all but a few 
of the hereditary peers from the house. In Canada, the period following the 1995 referendum 
on Quebec sovereignty has been characterised by a reorienting of the Federal Government's 
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national unity strategy. The Supreme Court of Canada's decision in the Reference Case on 
Quebec Secession and the Federal Government's response to it in the Clarity Act have been 
two significant developments that have affected the relationship between Ottawa and 
Quebec. The year 2000 in Spain saw the re-election of Jose Maria Aznar's Partido Popular 
with a majority in the lower house of the Spanish Parliament, in Catalan the Congres dels 
Diputats. This result has ended the hold on the balance of power in Madrid exercised by the 
dominant Catalan nationalist party Convergencia i Uni6 (CiU) and the moderate Basque 
nationalists of the Partido Nacionalista Vasco. The ability to have researched and, indeed, 
confronted issues surrounding nationalism and constitutional reform during these periods of 
significant change helps to make this thesis a valuable contribution to the study of 
comparative constitutional politics. 
Research Method 
The research in this thesis is exclusively qualitative and is based on data obtained 
from a variety of primary sources including personal interviews with political and academic 
participant-observers, as well as constitutional documents and publications from the various 
political parties. A wide selection of secondary literature was also consulted in the fields of 
nationalism studies, political theory, constitutional law, history, and language policy. 
Information and analyses from these secondary sources was used to help provide greater 
background to the debates being considered here and to highlight particular issues and 
controversies. 
Interviews 
The principal focus of the research was to seek out the views held by various 
particpant-observers on the issue of the perspectives of nationalists in Catalunya, Scotland 
and Quebec on constitutional change taking place within the larger state. This was achieved 
through a series of personal interviews conducted with political and academic participant-
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observers in the three nations. The interview subjects were selected based on their 
experience and involvement with the topic. This experience could include being a noted 
commentator on nationalism or constitutional issues, being a civil servant or political actor 
involved with the development of constitutional policy, or having played an active role in 
constitutional disputes. Of the academic particpant-observers interviewed the majority were 
either political scientists or constitutional lawyers. The group of political participant-
observers was more diverse including civil servants who had drafted constitutional 
documents, senior government officials, and both partisan and non-partisan political 
activists. 
The interview method adopted was one that was appropriate to a survey of this 
unique set of participant-observers. Since most, if not all, of the interviewees were familiar 
with interview styles and the forms of questioning usually employed, an open-ended, flexible 
interview style was used. The set of questions chosen varied from person to person, but was 
generally grouped into five key categories: the idea of 'nation', the character of the specific 
national ism in their own area, constitutional structures, issues and controversies relating to 
national ism, and issues and controversies relating to constitutional change. Interviews were 
conducted using a microphone and tape recorder which allowed for a more relaxed, 
conversational style of interviewing. Tape recorded interviews were then transcribed 
verbatim. 1 In general, it was found that interviewees revealed more information and were 
more willing to expand on a specific idea or issue if they were not constrained by questions 
that were too narrowly construed. Some of the problems that arose in the process of 
interviewing are discussed in chapter eight along with the analysis of data obtained from the 
interviews. The number of interviewees was limited by the willingness of participant-
observers to be interviewed and difficulties of access. In interviewing Catalan and 
1 In the case ofnon-English speakers interviewed in Catalunya and Quebec, their grammar and diction 
was edited in transcription for the purposes of clarity and flow. 
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Quebecois participants no significant language comprehension problems were experienced 
since all of them were able to express themselves to a reasonable or high degree in either 
French or English, as appropriate. In addition, the interviewer was able to pose questions in 
French and sometimes in Catalan thanks to a proficiency in the first language and a good 
understanding of the second. This often helped to elicit more information from the 
participant or to clarify certain points in the interview. 
Document Analysis 
A second level of primary research involved the analysis of various constitutional 
documents, party manifestos from nationalist parties, speeches made by nationalist leaders 
on constitutional issues, and constitutional policy papers of the parties. The constitutional 
documents analysed were those that establish in each case the current constitutional 
arrangements. These documents include for Quebec in Canada the Constitution Act, 1867 
and the Constitution Act, 1982; for Catalunya in Spain the Spanish constitution of 1978 and 
the Catalan Statute of Autonomy of 1980; and for Scotland and the UK the Scotland Act, 
1998. In analysing these documents, particular attention was paid to the division of powers, 
the conception of the state, issues of sovereignty, and how the position of the minority nation 
within the state is constitutionally conceived. 
Party documents were analysed to provide an understanding of the individual 
parties' positions on constitutional reform and what particular constitutional option they 
favoured for their nation. These documents were also illustrative of the parties' broader 
ideology and positions on economic and social issues. In the case of Catalunya, party 
manifestos for elections to the Catalan Parliament, the Corts Generals in Madrid, and the 
European Parliament were analysed, as well as party platforms adopted at party congresses 
and speeches by nationalist leaders. Catalan nationalist parties have also entered into a series 
of accords with nationalist parties in Euskadi (the Basque country) and Galicia. These 
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accords are indicative of a broader pan-nationalist strategy being adopted by the self-styled 
historic nations of Spain. In Scotland, Scottish National Party (SNP) party manifestos for the 
first elections to the Scottish Parliament were analysed as were the party's programmes for 
the 1997 General Election and the 1999 European Parliament election. In the cases of the 
Parti Quebecois (PQ) and Bloc Quebecois (BQ) in Quebec, the documents analysed were 
party programmes from party congresses and recent election campaigns and speeches by 
prominent PQ leaders. 
Definition of Terms 
When employing a comparative approach in research and making use of a wide 
variety of primary and secondary source materials, in three or four different languages, there 
frequently arises some overlapping of terminology and the use of some terms that can appear 
ambiguous. Or, the terms used can have a different meaning in different territories and at 
different times in history. The goal of this section is to identify several of these terms that 
appear throughout the thesis, and to account for the different contexts in which they are used. 
Due to the variation in constitutional and political traditions in Spain, Canada, and the UK, 
different nomenclature exists to describe one particular concept. A clear example of this is 
all of the various terms that are utilised by commentators and nationalists to describe the 
concept of self-government for the minority nation. The most commonly used terms here are 
autonomy, devolution, sovereignty, and independence. Independence can be understood as 
taking place when the minority nation leaves the larger state to establish itself as a separate, 
self-governing polity, either as part of a supra-state body such as the EU or not, with powers 
over all areas of policy including defence, foreign affairs, and monetary policy. In the 
present context the term 'independence' is most commonly used by the SNP and Esquerra 
Republicana de Catalunya who qualify it by arguing for 'independence in Europe' for 
Scotland and Catalunya, hence the establishment of separate Scottish and Catalan states with 
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membership in the European Union. Both the PQ and BQ favour an independent Quebec, an 
independence from the current constitutional arrangement with the rest of Canada. The 
preferred term employed by these two parties is 'sovereignty' or 'sovereignty-association', 
which refers to their goal of achieving independence for Quebec but with a negotiated 
economic and political partnership with what would remain of Canada. As will be 
discussed in chapter eight, this use of the term sovereignty is problematic given the various 
legal and other definitions ascribed to that term 
'Devolution' is the process by which legislative, administrative, or other powers are 
transferred, i.e. devolved, from one level of government to another within a state. 
Devolution is used in the Scottish context to define the process by which the power to 
legislate in a wide range of areas has been transferred from Westminster to the new Scottish 
Parliament at Holyrood. Devolution is viewed by its supporters as implying greater self-
government for Scotland in devolved areas and by many as leading towards the creation of a 
new centre of political power in the Scottish Parliament. Devolution has, in effect, given 
Scotland greater legislative autonomy from Westminster, yet autonomy is not the term 
regularly used to define the outcome of devolution. 
'Autonomy' is used in the Spanish context to define the status of Catalunya as a self-
governing, autonomous community within Spain. Catalunya's autonomy has been achieved 
through a devolution of power from the state to the principal institution ofCatalan self-
government, the Generalitat. The process of devolving jurisdiction over a broad field of 
subjects has been ongoing since the enactment of the Catalan Statute of Autonomy in 1980. 
The two parties that have governed Catalunya in coalition since the granting of autonomous 
status, Convergencia Democnltica de Catalunya and Uni6 Democratica de Catalunya, 
describe themselves as autonomist parties as they support greater autonomy for Catalunya 
within the Spanish state. 
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A significant term that is utilised throughout this thesis to describe the Canadian, 
Spanish, and UK states is 'multinational.' The term is fully defined in chapter one and is 
used to describe states that consist of more than one nation. These nations with in the state 
need not necessarily be recognised by the state in order to term the state multinational. 
Indeed, as will be discussed further, the failure of the state not to acknowledge the presence 
of these nations in the cases of Canada and Spain is central to the claims made by Catalan 
and Quebecois nationalists for greater recognition. 'Piurinational' is often used instead of 
'multinational' as a descriptor, especially by Spanish and Catalan commentators.2 However, 
since 'multinational' is more commonly employed in English-language sources this will be 
the term used in this thesis. The term 'multinational' when applied to states must not be 
confused with its other applications, particularly in a business context where large, trans-
global corporations who have operations in numerous countries are frequently labelled 
'multinational.' A discussion of multinational states and the theory pertaining to them, as 
advanced by Canadian political theorist Will Kymlicka in his 1995 book Multicultural 
Citizenship, is found in chapter one. 
Thesis Outline 
The thesis is organised broadly into four sections. The first section is comprised of 
the introduction and chapter one. The first chapter discusses and gives a brief analysis of the 
key theories of nationalism and Kymlicka's theory pertaining to minority national groups 
within multinational states. The aim of this chapter is to lay the foundation for the 
subsequent discussion and analysis of nationalist movements in Scotland, Quebec, and 
Catalunya by placing them in a theoretical context. 
2 The tenns plurinacional (plurinational) and plurinacionalitat (plurinationality) are employed 
frequently in Catalan literature on nationalism and constitutional questions in Spain, for example in 
Miquel Caminal, Nacionalisme i partits nacionals a Catalunya (Barcelona: Editorial Empuries, 1998) 
and in Ferran Requejo i Coli, Federalisme, per a que? (Barcelona: L'Hora del Present Edicions, 1998). 
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The second section consists of chapters two to four that examine the historical 
evolution of nationalism in the three nations. These three chapters illustrate the roles played 
by nationalist leaders and polemicists in the development of contemporary nationalism and 
make extensive use of primary source material, in particular the writings of many of these 
leaders and polemicists. In each chapter various strands of nationalist thought are 
highlighted and analysed. Chapter two traces the evolution of French-Canadian nationalism 
from 1759 and the conquest of New France by the British and its transformation to a 
specifically Quebecois nationalism by the mid-twentieth century. The chapter discusses the 
impact ofthe Quiet Revolution ofthe 1960s on nationalism's growth, the rise of the PQ, and 
finally the role of nationalism in the last era of constitutional reform, and attempted reform, 
from 1981-1992. Chapter three adopts a similar approach in examining the development of 
contemporary nationalism in Catalunya from the flowering of Catalan literary nationalism in 
the 1860's to its rebirth in the late 1970s and 1980s following the repression of Catalanism 
under Franco. Chapter four is somewhat different in its treatment by examining conceptions 
of Scottish nationality within the United Kingdom following the Union of the Parliaments in 
1707. The chapter then proceeds to examine the emergence of the home rule movement in 
the 1880s, the gradual growth in Scottish nationalism from the 1930s onwards, nationalism 
and devolution in the 1970s, and finally devolution and the creation of the Scottish 
Parliament in the late 1990s. The goal of this section is to set the scene and give an 
understanding of the development of nationalist and constitutional debates in Scotland, 
Quebec, and Catalunya. 
Section three is made up of chapters five, six, and seven which discuss and analyse 
the constitutional positions of Quebec, Catalunya, and Scotland within the larger nation-state 
and nationalist perspectives on constitutional change. These chapters incorporate substantial 
analysis of interview data, constitutional documents, and documents of the various 
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nationalist parties. A particular focus of these chapters is developing an explanation for the 
phenomenon of a conflict between rival conceptions of the nation within the multinational 
state. This is accomplished by contrasting the nationalist views of the nation vis a vis the 
state with the view that is dominant at the level of the state. 
Section four consists of chapter eight and the conclusion. Chapter eight analyses the 
comparative approach adopted and the research claim being made. It argues that a pattern 
emerges in comparing the three cases and in attempting to explain the presence of the 
phenomenon discussed above. The chapter argues that the pattern consists of a number of 
concepts: sovereignty, recognition, and asymmetry, which emerge from the research data 
and provide a greater understanding of the conflict between rival conceptions of the nation 
than has existed hitherto. It should be noted that the research for this thesis was completed 
in the autumn of 2000 and thus does not cover the 2001 General Election in the United 




The most readily identifiable political unit at the beginning of the twenty-first 
century is the nation-state. In broad terms, the world in 2001 is divided into essentially 
sovereign states, states which are recognised both by their own members and by other states 
as territorially defined, making allowances of course for border disputes which do exist. The 
nation at the start of the third millennium is a politically and culturally constructed 
community that inspires loyalty among its self-defined members. The quest to define the 
nation as it has come to be accepted in modem times has been the goal of sociologists, 
political theorists, and philosophers since Rousseau first postulated on the existence of 
modern nations in the late eighteenth century. The concept of the nation has also engendered 
its own peculiar "ism". Nationalism has emerged as a tremendous political force, as well as 
a rallying cry, a focus for cultural expression, a builder of community, and a means of 
oppression. The nation-state, the nation, and nationalism are phenomena which greatly 
affect our perception of the world and how it is organised. If some sense is to be made of 
how this situation came about it is essential to examine some of the key theories and 
arguments that have been presented on these subjects. 
This chapter will introduce some of the principal debates in the study of nations and 
nationalism and assess how far they have fostered a greater understanding of this complex 
issue. In general, the arguments presented below are focussed on attempting to define the 
nation and how nationalism emerged as such a potent force in the modem world. Many 
theorists have been unable to provide an accurate, all-encompassing definition of the nation; 
others have thrown up their hands and argued that no definition is possible. The goal of this 
chapter is not to define the nation or explain away the existence of nationalism; instead it is 
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to develop an understanding of nationalist theory. Consideration will also be given to where 
Scotland, Quebec and Catalunya fit into the history of national development and the growth 
of nationalism as a phenomenon. 
Before delving into theoretical debates on the theories of nationalism, it is essential 
to clarify two terms that will be the focus of the discussion: state and nation. In general 
terms the state is a political unit whereas the nation, very broadly speaking, is a human 
community. This distinction has to be made for the purposes of clarification rather than 
definition. Seton-Watson put this differentiation succinctly: "A state is a legal and political 
organisation, with the power to require obedience and loyalty from its citizens. A nation is a 
community of people, whose members are bound together by a sense of solidarity, a 
common culture, a national consciousness."1 This will form the backdrop for the subsequent 
discussion. 
Anderson's Imagined Communities 
To a great extent, the theoretical discussion of nations and nationalism rests on the 
whole question of the origin of the nation and whether nationalism is a uniquely political or a 
cultural development. Did the concept of the nation originate in the age of the Industrial 
Revolution and in the aftermath of the Enlightenment, or does it have roots that stretch back 
to pre-modem times? One of the seminal works in the field of nationalism studies is 
Benedict Anderson's Imagined Communities. Anderson's persuasive and enlightening 
argument falls largely in the modernist camp. It is modernist in that it views the growth of 
nations and nationalism as a modem event with its origin in the late seventeenth and early 
eighteenth century. From the outset Anderson accepts the assumption that the nation is 
central to the human political experience in the modem era and that it is indeed universal.2 
However, he further argues that the nation and nationality are products of the era of the 
1 Hugh Seton-Watson, Nations and States (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1977), p. I. 
2 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, rev. ed. (London: Verso, 1991), p. 3. 
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French Revolution and emerged in an environment in which various elements came together 
to promote their development.3 The various elements, or "discrete historical forces" as 
Anderson puts it, that came together to allow the emergence of nationalism and nations were 
Protestantism; the demise of Latin and the rise of vernacular languages; the emergence of 
print capitalism; and changing perceptions of time and space. Working together in the 
modern revolutionary age, these cultural developments encouraged the eighteenth-century 
age of nationalism, an age, according to Anderson, that accompanied the decline of religion 
in Europe and the rise of rationalist secularism.4 Nationalism, therefore, is truly a product of 
the Enlightenment during which previously held beliefs were held up to scrutiny and for 
criticism. 
In Anderson's argument, the decline of Latin in Europe encouraged the growth of 
local vernacular languages, which subsequently caused the fragmenting of communities into 
smaller collectivities.5 Latin's decline in the pre-Enlightenment period and the resulting rise 
of vernacular languages as a means of communication had the greatest impact on the 
intelligentsia and local elites. As soon as administrators and rulers began using the 
vernacular to communicate with the populace, the breakdown of the larger Christian 
community within Europe was initiated and increasingly the community became more 
specific.6 While in many cases rulers and elites no longer used Latin they continued to use 
an elite language that was not the language of many of their people, contributing to the rise 
of linguistic-based nationalism. An example of this was the use of Swedish by elites in 
Finland in the centuries prior to independence in the early twentieth century, indeed Finnish 
nationalists such as composer Jean Sibelius and philologist Elias Lonnrot were educated in 
Swedish. The impact of vernacular languages on the creation of the imagined community of 
3 Ibid., p. 4. 
4 Ibid., p. 11. 
5 Ibid., pp. 18-19. 
6 Ibid., p. 42. 
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the nation was further accelerated by the growth of Protestantism and print-capitalism that 
encouraged the mass dissemination of ideas throughout Europe, enabling people to place 
themselves within a series of unique communities. 
Anderson places a great emphasis on the role played by print-capitalism in the 
promotion of nation-ness, as he aptly terms the phenomenon. The argument is made that 
print-capital ism, the distribution of printed materials, across Europe enabled people to 
communicate with one another through the medium of print whereas before dialects hindered 
verbal communication.7 Furthermore, people existing within a particular language 
community came to realise that there were others who shared with them a common linguistic 
heritage: 
In the process, they gradually became aware of the hundreds of thousands, even 
millions, of people in their particular language-field, and at the same time that only 
those hundreds of thousands, or millions, so belonged. These fellow-readers, to 
whom they were connected through print, formed, in their secular, particular, visible 
invisibility, the embryo of the nationally imagined community.8 
Anderson extends this argument of vernacular language and time and place further by 
linking the growth of nationalist movements in the nineteenth century, in particular those of 
Finland and Ukraine, to bourgeois identification with the imagined community. It has been 
argued that it was largely bourgeois elites who were responsible for the promotion of 
nationalist goals and the engendering of nationalist movements. How was this achieved? 
Anderson argues that it was through vernacular print-capitalism that the members of the 
bourgeoisie were able to communicate, gaining an awareness of their place in a larger 
linguistic community, and thereby forming political and cultural links based on that 
community.9 The imagined community of the nation, as termed by Anderson, evolves out of 
this form of recognition within the newly self-aware elite community. According to his 
analysis, if the community is imagined at a certain point in history, it cannot have existed 




before in the form imagined; this is a particular point of debate between modernist theorists 
and those who question modernism as a basis for nationalism. 
Finally, Anderson views the Protestant Reformation as that singular event in history 
that enabled vernacular language and print-capitalism to coalesce and thereby encourage the 
emergence of imagined national communities. The essential argument is that it was only 
through the expansion of Protestantism and its use of print-capitalism for spreading its 
message of reform that vernacular languages began to take hold in Europe. In sixteenth-
century Catholic Europe both the Tridentine Church, through the Index Liborum 
Prohibitorum, and rulers proceeded to ban books as a means to halt the expansion of the 
reform message; Protestantism, however, encouraged vernacular publishing. 10 With the 
expansion of Protestantism through central and northern Europe, peoples speaking the same 
language were further identified as national communities. Yet, it was not until the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth century that this trend produced nationalist movements 
among the vernacular-speaking elites. Ultimately, these vernacular languages came to have 
political meaning, differentiating communities from one another. According to Anderson, 
these imagined communities now viewed themselves with respect to the 'other', those 
communities that did not share their linguistic, cultural heritage: 
Until late in the eighteenth century no one thought of these languages as belonging 
to any territorially defined group. But soon thereafter ... 'uncivilized' vernaculars 
began to function politically in the same way as the Atlantic Ocean had earlier done: 
i.e. to 'separate' subjected national communities off from ancient dynastic realms. 11 
In Anderson' s final analysis, then, the nation and national identity are modern 
constructs engineered through the process of modernisation that began some time in the 
sixteenth century and continued unabated until the evolution of nationalist movements in the 
nineteenth century. Furthermore, the nationalist movements that emerged in nineteenth-
9 Ibid., p. 77. 
10 Ibid., p. 40. 
11 Ibid., p. 196. 
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century Europe were culturally-based rather than having politics as a focus; they sought to 
differentiate one linguistic community from a dominant 'other'. Ern est Gellner further 
illustrates this last point through his Ruritanian allegory of the emergence of elite 
nationalism.
12 
The role of Protestantism, print-capitalism, and the spread of vernacular 
languages enabled local elites to mobilise the people into an imagined community, the 
nation. 
Kedourie's Modernist Theory 
While Anderson embraces a modernist view of the development of nations it is one 
that does take account of events prior to the French Revolution and gives them pride of place 
in terms of influencing nationalist growth. Kedourie adopts the more extreme modernist 
position in his critical work Nationalism. Kedourie is a sceptic; he does not accept 
nationalism as anything other than an invented creed: 
Nationalism is a doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century. It pretends to supply a criterion for the determination of the unit of 
population proper to enjoy a government exclusively its own, for the legitimate 
exercise of power in the state, and for the right organization of a society of states. 13 
Kedourie's position on the evolution of nationalism is as narrow and restrictive as it is 
reductionist. This theory rests on the premise that for a nation to exist it must constitute 
itself into a sovereign state where one language is dominant. 14 For it is only through sharing 
a common language, as Kedourie argues, that a nation can exist and be defined as such. In 
arguing this, Kedourie takes his cue from Fichte's arguments for the unity of German 
peoples in the early nineteenth century where unity was defined solely on the basis of a 
common language. 15 For Fichte, the territorial distinction between Prussians and other 
Gennan-speakers in the west was an unnatural one; presumably this would apply to the 
Swiss, Austrians, and German-speaking Bohemians as well. Kedourie adapts this argument 
12 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), p. 55. 
13 Elie Kedourie, Nationalism, 3rd ed. (London: Hutchinson & Co. Ltd., 1966), p. 9. 
14 Ibid., p. 68. 
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to modern twentieth century nations and nation-states and thereby reduces nationalism to a 
linguistic and ethnic phenomenon without addressing the presence of an inclusive 
nationalism rooted in ideas of citizenship as exists in North America, for example. With 
language as his sole criterion of national definition, Kedourie rejects the concept of 
differentiated British and American nations. 16 Indeed, Kedourie extends this argument and 
dismisses such non-linguistically defined nation-states as aberrations: 
On nationalist logic, the separate existence of Britain and America, and the union of 
English and French Canadians within the Canadian state, are both monstrosities of 
nature; and a consistent nationalist interpretation of history would reduce large parts 
of it to inexplicable and irritating anomalies. 17 
In his rejection of nation-states as viable and legitimate political entities, Kedourie signifies 
his rejection of civic nationalism as a form of national identity or nationalist expression. For 
him, the bonds engendered by civic nationalism are tenuous and are insufficient for national 
definition. The "irritating anomalies" that do emerge within the study of nationalism are 
what make it unique and are what prompt the creation of models for explaining the presence 
of nations. However, many of these existing models attempt to explain away, usually 
ineffectively, the differences between varieties of nationalism and thereby fail to take 
account of the uniqueness of each nationalism. 
Gel/ner's Nations and Nationalism 
Ernest Gellner was arguably one of the foremost writers and theorists on the subject 
of nations, nationalisms and identity. Gellner, like Kedourie and Anderson, was a modernist 
and argued that nations can only be viewed as such in the era of nationalism. 18 In essence the 
argument states that nationalism is what establishes the existence of nations and not the other 
way around. This growth, the growth of nationality is based not only on the development of 
a national high culture but also on a collective will of a people to view themselves as distinct 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid., p. 74. 
17 Ibid., p. 79. 
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and to group themselves into the nation, or the 'imagined community' in the words of 
Anderson.
19 
Central to Gellner's argument is the Ruritanian allegory that explains in a 
unique and highly effective way the evolution of a nationalist movement and the transition of 
the nation into the nation-state in post-imperial central Europe. The allegory presents the 
classical argument for late nineteenth-century nationalist development, modeled largely on 
the Czechoslovak experience or any of the other small states that emerged from the Austro-
Hungarian Empire at the end of the First World War. It discusses how a minority 
community within a larger state or empire to which it is closely tied economically, 
linguistically, and socially is motivated by elites to nationalist agitation. Ultimately, through 
a folk and linguistic revival prompted by the elite group a nationalist movement emerges that 
encourages the establishment of a new Ruritanian nation-state out of the older association 
with the larger entity: Megalomania.20 Through his analysis, Gellner advances an argument 
that has at its core the central feature of nationalist development and national identity: 
identification against the 'other'. 
As national communities attempt to define themselves within the larger human 
community of which they are apart they are exclusive in relation to other nation-states, 
whether this exclusivity is defined ethnically through myths of common descent or language, 
or by civic means such as shared institutions, citizenship, or societal attitudes. Many 
nationalities, both civic and ethnic, define themselves against other nationalities, usually 
those that are closest to them politically, socially, or economically. For instance to be a 
Serb, apart from all the linguistic, religious, and regional labels, is not to be a Croat or a 
Bosnian Muslim. Canadians very often define themselves in opposition to the United States, 
as not American, which is a label that conjures up for many in Canada something that is 
antithetical to Canadian values and traditions. Linda Colley, in her pioneering work, makes 
18 Emest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, rpt. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Publisher, 1984), p. 55. 
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a similar argument with respect to the evolution of British nationalism as something that was 
not continental, not French, and not Catholic. There was a constant and concerted effort to 
define the nation against the other, the rival: 
Imagining the French as their vile opposites, as Hyde to their Jekyll, became a way 
for Britons -particularly the poorer and less privileged- to contrive for themselves a 
converse and flattering identity. The French wallowed in superstition: therefore, the 
British, by contrast, must enjoy true religion. The French were oppressed by a 
bloated army and by absolute monarchy: consequently, the British were manifestly 
free. The French tramped through life in wooden shoes, whereas the British -as 
Adam Smith pointed out- were shod in supple leather and, therefore, clearly more 
21 prosperous. 
Hobsbawm's Interpretation 
The shift between ethnic and civic nations is one aspect of nationalist development 
that has been examined in the work of Eric Hobsbawm, most notably in his Nations and 
Nationalism since 1780. Hobsbawm is largely in agreement with Gellner and Anderson as 
viewing nations as the product of myth and largely invented and modem entities.22 
Hobsbawm structures his argument around the various phases of nationalist development as 
illustrated by the emergent nationalist movements of the late nineteenth century, thereby 
concluding like Gellner, Anderson, et al. that nations and nationalism find their roots in that 
century. Like Anderson, he charts the growth of the administrative state and argues its role 
in the promotion of nationalism. 23 For Hobsbawm too, the existence of a common language 
is central to the development of nationalism, yet it is not the sole determining criterion for 
the development of national consciousness.24 Hobsbawm 's conclusion from his study of 
nations and nationalism is that the nation is doomed as a focus for collective loyalties and 
ultimately the nation-state will be superseded by a supranational world in which 
19 1bid. 
20 Ibid., pp. 58-62. 
21 Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837 (London: Pimlico, 1992), p. 368. 
22 E.J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780, rev. ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995), p. I 0. 
23 Ibid., p. 81. 
24 Ibid., p. 62. 
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internationalism triumphs: "A world of nations cannot exist, only a world where some 
potentially national groups, in claiming this status, exclude others from making similar 
I . I · I · h 25 c atms, w 11c 1, as tt appens, not many of them do." Ultimately, Hobsbawm concludes that 
nationalism is a modern sickness and that the politics of identity and the urge demonstrated 
by humans to belong to some sort of collectivity is symptomatic of this sickness?6 He 
further concludes that the world of the late twentieth century wi 11 be supranational and that 
the concept of the nation-state is too limiting to contain the expanding world.27 Hobsbawm's 
argument exists within a particular internationalist tradition that views the nation-state as a 
somewhat parochial and limiting unit with which to organise the world politically. Yet 
despite this philosophical position, the nation-state continues to exert pressures and influence 
within the globalised world of the 1990s. Indeed, supra-state organisations such as the EU 
serve as forums for smaller nations, which are not nation-states to gain greater representation 
and acceptance, as in the cases with national regions such as Catalunya and Scotland. 
Seton-Watson's Critique of Modernism 
The persistence of nationalism as a phenomenon and the dominance of the nation-
state as a political and cultural unit in the late twentieth century is an issue explored in the 
works of both Anthony Smith and Hugh Seton-Watson. Seton-Watson, writing in the mid-
1970s, challenged the modernist theory of nationalism by looking beyond the nineteenth 
century as the crucible for national formation, making a distinction between what he termed 
the old and new nations of Europe. His argument is based on the premise of nationalism 
being an eighteenth century doctrine, but that this does not preclude the existence of nations 
prior to the Enlightenment. According to Seton-Watson, the nation was formed over a long 
period of time, yet it was only in the late eighteenth century that its usefulness as a basis for 
25 Ibid., p. 78. 
26 Ibid., p. 177. 
27 Ibid., p. 191. 
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collective identity and means of exercising popular sovereignty became realised?8 The old 
and new nations to which Seton-Watson refers to are defined by the stage of national 
development they were at when the doctrine of nationalism first emerged. Thus, the old 
nations had "acquired a national identity or national consciousness before the formulation of 
the doctrine ofnationalism."29 The new nations are those in which the development of 
national identity and the emergence of nationalism happened at the same time. Seton-
Watson categorises the old nations as: the English, Scots, French, Dutch, Castilians, 
Portuguese, Danes, Swedes, Hungarians, Poles, and Russians and argues that the Germans, 
Norwegians, Irish, Italians and Catalans were at an early stage of national development 
where the formation of national consciousness was incomplete.30 Illustrative of this 
distinction is Seton-Watson's example of English and French national consciousness which 
he argues was not present in 1200 when the two nation-states were not as centralised and 
were largely similar in their social stratification and general outlook. However, by 1600 
there was a centralising trend and people in these two nation-states had increasingly come to 
identify with a larger community represented in the person of the monarch and were 
considerably further apart in outlook and comparatively different on an individual basis, 
most obviously in terms ofreligion.31 Therefore, some national communities existed for 
many years prior to the late eighteenth or early nineteenth century where modernists place 
their birth, due in large part to the slow development of these communities over many 
centuries. Yet, it is not until the age of enlightenment and revolution that we are able to label 
such a community as a nation. 
Here is the crux of much of the debate over the origin of nations and nationalism: it 
is very much a chicken-and-egg argument. Seton-Watson, however, takes the position that 
28 Hugh Seton-Watson, Nations and States (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1977), p. 13. 
29 Ibid., p. 7. 
30 Ibid. 
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nations and the states which they constitute themselves into are real and powerful forces 
within the modern world which command considerable loyalty and should not be discounted 
lightly or debased, even though nationalism has caused tremendous hardship and suffering. 
He argues that there is no point in arguing for a world without nations as they have become 
an entrenched part of the modern world.32 Seton-Watson's rejection of the purely modernist 
arguments of Gellner, Anderson, and Kedourie is echoed in the work of Anthony Smith, who 
goes on to contest the argument that nations cannot exist prior to nationalism. 
Smith's Critique of Modernism 
Smith largely rejects the modernist argument out of hand and saves much of his 
attack for the Marxist, internationalist view of nations and nation-states as put forward by 
Hobsbawm and other theoreticians: 
Basically, all these critiques accept the persisting reality and historic role of the 
large-scale national state, but seek to depoliticize it, to render it harmless, by turning 
the nation into a purely cultural or folkloristic phenomenon stripped of all political 
significance, in the interests of wider segments of humanity or of humanity as a 
whole.33 
Like Seton-Watson, Smith argues for the existence of nations prior to the eighteenth or 
nineteenth centuries, yet he is not a primordialist arguing for the existence of nations 
throughout history. For instance, his examination of early Greek city states found 'national' 
characteristics, but their national characteristics cannot be termed national in the modern 
sense.
34 
Pre-industrial states such as England, the Netherlands, Sweden and Spain emerged 
in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries where the state was based upon a national concept. 
The perceived success of these nation-states served as a model for the evolution of nations in 
the nineteenth century, argues Smith. For Smith, like Seton-Watson, there is a paradox in 
the formation of nations: "Ifthe nation seems in many ways modem, it is also deep-rooted. 
31 Ibid., p. 8. 
32 1bid.,p. 13. 




The nationalists were guilty of telescoping history, but they were not altogether mistaken."35 
Smith argues that in Western Europe, nations were already in existence in large part prior to 
the emergence of a coherent doctrine of nationalism in the eighteenth century. This is 
essentially due to an accident of history and to the fact that these nations were "largely 
unplanned."36 
A Critical Approach 
The approach of Smith and Seton-Watson in their attempts to plot historically the 
emergence of nations is constructive, since it does not limit the evolution of nations and 
nationalism to the last two hundred years or so. The modernists' approach fails largely to 
take account of those characteristics, which can be termed national, that existed within 
defined territories prior to the Enlightenment. A shared language, religion, system of laws 
and government, a common history, and most importantly a sense of shared territorial 
community with others did exist in Seton-Watson's old nations. Even though such a 
community with these common characteristics cannot really be defined as a nation until the 
eighteenth century due to the limits of intellectual or philosophical development, this does 
not negate its existence or its importance. In a discipline such as the study of nationalism 
where so many exceptions and qualifiers exist, it is short-sighted to limit the field of view to 
national evolution since the late eighteenth century. Furthermore, the pervasiveness of 
nationalist movements at the beginning of the twenty-first century demonstrates the 
legitimate place of the nation within human culture. Nationalism exists in developed as well 
as underdeveloped states and secessionist forms of nationalism can no longer be labeJJed 
solely as colonial or anti-imperial agitation based upon economic disadvantage or 
oppression. As Smith argues, nationalism, particularly its ethnic variety, has largely been on 
34 Anthony D. Smith National Identity (London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1991), p. 48. 
35 Ibid., p. 69. 
36 Ibid., p. I 00. 
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the upswing since the end of the Second World War.37 Nationalism continues to be a real 
and present force in the world today, even when one considers the growing strength of such 
institutions and alliances such as the EU and NAFTA. If we are to understand the 
nationalisms of Quebec, Scotland, and Catalunya, which are post-industrial and post-modern 
in character, then we must take Smith's argument as a point of reference: 
In short, this myth of the modern nation has to be recognized for what it is: a semi-
ideological account of nations and nationalism, one that chimes with modern 
preconceptions and needs, especially with those of a mobile, universalist 
intelligentsia, for whom the nation-state is only a staging-post in humanity's ascent 
to a global society and culture.38 
Many theories of nationalism, modernist and others, fail to account adequately for 
more recent minority nationalisms such as those being studied here that are liberal, 
democratic, and inclusive, and curious mixtures, in varying amounts, of civic and ethnic 
ingredients. Indeed, the use of terms such as civic and ethnic to describe these nationalisms 
is limiting. Many of the theories debated at present have an historical basis: they attempt to 
explain what has come before and then, having developed a sound argument, attempt to 
apply it to contemporary nationalist movements. The problem with this approach is that 
many western nationalisms that exist at the beginning of the twenty-first century are post-
industrial, post-modern, and inclusive movements that are beyond the scope of earlier 
definitions of the nation and nationalism. In attempting to explain minority nationalisms in 
twenty-first century multinational states such as Canada, Spain, and the UK the focus should 
not be based solely on the pattern of nationalist development in the mid-to late-nineteenth 
century. Indeed, many of the same characteristics are present in both eras, but nationalist 
development is largely affected by broader global economic and political trends that vary 
considerably from generation to generation. The presence of a global economy and supra-
state structures such as the EU in 2001 is something quite unlike the age of empires and their 
37 Smith, Nations and Nationalisms in a Global Era, p. 14. 
24 
Theoretical Foundations 
subsequent dissolution in the twentieth century. What is required is an entirely new 
assessment of nations as units of communal identity and self-definition, one that takes 
account of the existence of multiple identities based on membership in a nation and on 
citizenship within a state. Such an analysis is particularly germane to the present discussion 
of minority nationalism in multinational states. 
It will be argued in this thesis that there exists a conflict in certain multinational 
states between two rival concepts of the nation: one held by the minority national group, in 
this case the Catalans, the Scots, and the Quebecois, and one held by those outside the 
minority nation who identify the nation with the state. As has been shown, many theorists 
have focussed on the nation as being co-terminous with the state. This thesis will instead 
focus on how a plurality of nations can exist within a single state and how nationalism 
flourishes in this context. Michael Keating has argued for the need to "separate nationalism 
conceptually from the idea of the state".39 Indeed, nationalism need not be linked to the goal 
of state formation. Although there are many nationalists in Scotland, Quebec, and Catalunya 
who seek some form of independent state there are also many nationalists whose goals are 
centred on greater recognition for the minority nation within the state as will be discused 
below. 
In this discussion on multinational states and minority nationalisms a suitable point 
of departure is Kymlicka's work on multinational states and concepts of citizenship. Even 
though much of Kymlicka's theories are rooted in liberal conceptions of rights which are 
beyond this thesis' frame of reference, his work does provide a conceptual framework for 
examining minority nationalism. 
38 Ibid., p. 41. 
39 Michael Keating, Nations Against the State: the New Politics ofNationalism in Quebec. Catalunya 
and Scotland (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1996), pp. 15 & 18. 
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The United Kingdom, Spain, and Canada are multinational states; that is, states in 
which there exist minority national groups who embrace "internal minority nationalisms".40 
They are collectivities that recognise themselves as nations through a common historical 
experience, occupying a particular territory, and in the cases of the Quebecois and the 
Catalans sharing a language different from that of the majority. Recognition of this 
multinational character is explicit in the case of the United Kingdom where Scotland, Wales, 
and England are acknowledged to be nations. Prior to gaining its independence from the rest 
of the United Kingdom in 1921 Ireland too was identified as a nation within the UK 
multinational state. However, since 1921 Northern Ireland has not viewed itself as 
constituting a distinct nation within the British state. The situations in Canada and Spain are 
somewhat different where there is no explicit recognition of Quebec and Catalunya as 
nations and where nationalists are seeking the explicit constitutional recognition of this. As 
mentioned above, these minority nationalisms frequently come into conflict with a majority 
conception of the state as nation. As Kymlicka argues, one of the greatest challenges facing 
multinational states is how to reconcile these competing nationalisms within a single state.41 
Kymlicka's arguments are based upon his understanding of liberalism and how liberal values 
should be fostered in multinational states. Liberal values of justice and equality can only be 
promoted in multinational states where the distinctiveness of minority national groups is 
recognised and they are given the opportunity to maintain their culture and that adequate 
protection is afforded them: 
... we should aim at ensuring that all national groups have the opportunity to 
maintain themselves as a distinct culture, if they so choose. This ensures that the 
good of cultural membership is equally protected for the members of all national 
groups. In a democratic society, the majority nation will always have its language 
and societal structure supported, and will have the legislative power to protect its 
interests in culture-affecting decisions. The question is whether fairness requires 
40 Will Kymlicka, Finding Our Way: Rethinking Ethnocultural Relations in Canada (Toronto: Oxford 




that the same benefits and opportunities should be given to national minorities. The 
answer, I think, is clearly yes.42 
When such recognition is not afforded to minority national groups or the degree of 
recognition offered is seen as insufficient, particularly in the case of the Scottish National 
Party's response to devolution, the conflict between two conceptions of nation comes to the 
surface. Indeed, without recognition for minority national groups the integrity of the 
multinational state can be threatened: 
The politics of nationalism has been powered for well over a century in part by the 
sense that people have had of being despised or respected by others around them. 
Multinational societies can break up, in large part because of a lack of (perceived) 
recognition of the equal worth of one group by another.43 
The nature of the conflict depends very much on the political options favoured by 
nationalist parties. While some of the parties that will be investigated in this thesis favour an 
accommodation of the nation within the larger state through greater devolution of powers 
and constitutional reforms, others opt for the secession of the minority national group from 
the state. Secession allows the minority national group to constitute itself into an 
independent state, possibly with close political and economic links with the old state or as a 
member of a supra-state organisation such as the EU. Devolution and moves towards a more 
federal arrangement are options by which these groups can seek greater recognition.44 
Scotland, Quebec, and Catalunya have chosen all these alternatives in varying degrees. 
In the Scottish case, the growth in the power of the Scottish Office in the post-war 
era is an example of decentralisation on an administrative level. As the welfare state 
expanded in the 1950s and 1960s the Scottish administration gained greater control in areas 
such as healthcare, education, and social services provision; this gave Scotland a certain 
degree of administrative autonomy from Whitehall. The Scotland Act, 1998 moves beyond 
42 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (1995; rpt. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), p. 113. 
43 Charles Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," in Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of 
Recognition, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 64. 
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simple administrative decentralisation and devolves power from Westminster to a new 
Scottish Parliament, thus responding to popular calls for greater accountability and local 
control. As will be discussed in subsequent chapters, the belief that devolution is sufficient 
to promote greater recognition of Scotland's distinctiveness as a nation is dependent very 
much on whether you are a nationalist who supports a reformed Union or one who favours 
independence. 
As a constituent part of the Canadian federal state, Quebec enjoys a great deal of 
autonomy through its exercising of sovereignty in a number of areas. However, as separatist 
demands for greater autonomy increased in the late 1970s and 1980s, the Federal 
Government moved to devolve jurisdiction in a number of areas such as immigration, and 
more recently in the field of manpower training. Again, for many Quebecois nationalists the 
devolution of sovereignty from Ottawa to Quebec is insufficient as the federal system does 
not provide enough recognition for Quebec as a nation and so the only option left is 
secession. Yet for many nationalists in Quebec there is enough flexibility in the system to 
allow for significant constitutional and administrative reforms which would grant greater 
recognition. 
In Spain there exists a high level of decentralisation to the autonomous communities, 
a move made by Madrid in the drafting of the 1978 constitution that attempted to meet 
nationalist demands in Catalunya and Euskadi among others. As in the other cases there are 
those Catalan nationalists who favour greater recognition of the Catalan nation within the 
Spanish State and, additionally, an affirming of the multinational character of the state and 
those who favour independence from Spain. 
We can conclude that Kymlicka's arguments regarding minority nationalism and 
multinational states are useful when trying to put the nationalisms of Scotland, Quebec, and 
44 Michael Walzer," Pluralism: a Political Perspective," in The Rights of Minority Cultures, Will 
Kymlicka, ed. (1995; rpt. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 141. 
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Catalunya in context. Modernist theorists such as Kedourie, Gellner, and Hobsbawm do not 
adequately address these minority nationalisms; they do not fit their patterns of nationalist 
development where the nation is bound together with the idea of the state. The minority 
nationalisms that are the subject of this thesis exist in the unique context of the multinational 
state. The subsequent chapters in this thesis will go on to examine more closely the 
historical roots of these three nationalist movements and how their development in a 
multinational context has affected how nationalists see the nation and what positions they 
adopt regarding its place within the state. Kymlicka's theories around the need for 
recognition of minority national groups will serve as a point of departure for the thesis, 
which will help to underline how nationalists' arguments for greater recognition for the 
minority nation and constitutional change are inextricably linked. 
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Nationalism and Quebec 1760-1992: Strands of Political Thought 
Our statement on the basic prerequisites for fashioning a nationality and on 
the territory that moulded it leads us to say without hesitation that French 
Canadians in this country are a real nation, and that the vast expanse of 
territory irrigated by the St. Lawrence is their own legitimate homeland. 1 
This chapter seeks to place in historical context the emergence and growth of 
nationalism in Quebec since the conquest ofNew France in 1759-60. It is essential to 
understand both the foundations ofQuebecois nationalism and its various manifestations 
over the last two centuries to nationalism's role in seeking to bring about significant 
constitutional change. As this thesis employs a comparative approach in discussing these 
issues in Scotland, Catalunya, as well as Quebec, the following chapters will explore the 
corresponding growth of contemporary nationalism in these other two nations. In general, 
this chapter will highlight the key political events and constitutional developments since the 
proclamation of the Quebec Act, 1774. It will also examine what the views and arguments of 
Quebec's leaders and polemicists have been on the subject of the nation and Quebec's role as 
the homeland for the French in North America. Attention will be given to a discussion of the 
writings of Quebec's philosophers, liberal reformers, clerics, and nationalist leaders who 
have shaped the landscape of the nation since the late eighteenth century. This chapter seeks 
only to give a fairly broad summation of events and the philosophies that shaped them, thus 
laying the foundation for a more in depth discussion on nationalism and constitutional 
politics in chapter seven. 
1 Louis-Fran~ois Lafleche, "The Providential Mission of the French Canadians," trans., in French-
Canadian Nationalism: An Anthology, ed. Ramsay Cook (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1969), pp. 
95-96. 
Nationalism and Quebec 1760-1992 
Strands of Nationalism 
Broadly defined, there are four distinctive strands of nationalist thought in Quebec, 
two which dominated in the period before the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s and two which 
have emerged since then. It would be wrong to see these various paths of nationalist 
development as mutually exclusive since there has been a good deal of interweaving between 
them, with many pre-1960 nationalist ideas finding resonance in the nationalism of the later 
period. Thus, there is no sui generis Quebecois nationalism. 
The two pre-Quiet Revolution strands of nationalist thought I wish to identify are the 
conservative-clerical and the liberal strands. As will be discussed, the conservative-clerical 
strand can be subdivided into two varieties of nationalist thought: Tory and Ultramontane, 
both of which frequently manifested themselves in the so-called pure laine, literally 'pure 
wool, form of nationalism. Pure laine nationalism is essentialist and has an exclusive 
conception of who comprises the nation. The liberal strand can also be divided into two 
varieties: the liberal or rouge variety and the pan-Canadian variety. There is also a sub-set of 
this second strand which can be labeled the Patriote/Republican variety of nationalist 
thought. 
Tory Nationalism 
Firstly, Tory nationalist thought in Quebec is best expressed in the ideas of post-
conquest leaders such as Bishop Joseph-Octave Plessis who viewed the resulting 
accommodation of the French-Canadian fact in North America by the British in 1774 as a 
deliverance from American republicanism and a fact to be celebrated. Ultramontane thought 
emerged later in the mid- to late-nineteenth century and had its promoters among senior 
clerics such as Bishop Louis-Fran9ois Lafleche ofTrois-Rivieres, Bishop Ignace Bourget of 
Montreal, and the writer Jules-Paul Tardive!. Ultramontanism had its roots in France and 
was an ultra-conservative, Catholic nationalism that argued for the indivisibility of Church 
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and State and the providential mission of French Catholics in North America. The equally 
ultra-conservative, although more explicitly xenophobic and anti-semitic pure laine 
manifestation of this nationalism is evident in the writings of Lafleche and somewhat more 
subtly in some of the works of Abbe Lionel Groulx. 
Liberal Nationalism 
The liberal strand of nationalist thought became more explicitly linked with the 
Liberal party in Quebec, also known as the rouges. This rouge nationalism was the antithesis 
of the nationalism of the Ultramontanes who were the Liberals' political adversaries in the 
late-nineteenth century. Leading Liberals were Louis-Hippolyte LaFontaine, who played a 
key role in Canadian colonial administrations from 1842-43 and 1848-51, and Antoine-Aime 
Dorion, the Quebec Liberal leader in the 1860s and critic of Confederation. The pan-
Canadian variety of nationalist thought is best typified by Henri Bourassa and the 
publication, Le Devoir, which he founded, and by his protege, Andre Laurendeau. Pan-
Canadian nationalism argued for Quebec's place within Canada, but a Canada shorn of the 
prevailing imperial nationalism, a nationalism dominant in English-speaking Canada during 
the Boer and First World wars. The sub-set ofPatriote/Republican nationalist thought is 
largely confined to the era of the 1837-38 rebellions in Lower Canada and its champions, 
Robert Nelson and Louis-Joseph Papineau. 
During the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s and the decades following, two other 
strands of nationalist thought emerged in Quebec: the socialist/social 
democratic/independantiste and the moderate nationalist/etatiste. The first strand can again 
be divided into three varieties: Marxist, socialist, and moderate social democrat or Pequiste. 
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Marxist!Socialist Nationalism 
The Marxist and socialist varieties of nationalism post-1960 have common 
ideological roots although they used different methods to try and attain their goals. Marxist 
revolutionaries such as Pierre Vallieres and members of the Front de Liberation du Quebec 
(FLQ) extensively employed post-colonial Marxist rhetoric in arguing for Quebec's 
independence from the rest of Canada with the FLQ using terrorist tactics to achieve this 
goal. Socialists such as Pierre Bourgault and his party the Rassemblement pour 
l'lndependance Nationale (RIN) also argued for Quebec's independence, but through protest 
and occasionally riots, notably on 24 June 1968, in seeking to bring about this result. 
Moderate Nationalism 
The moderate social democratic thought of Rene Levesque and his Parti Quebecois 
became dominant in the 1970s and would eventually subsume other pro-independence 
parties such as Bourgault's, thereby emerging as the voice for Quebec independence. What 
can be considered to be the moderate nationalist or etatiste variety of nationalism is 
represented in the Quebec Liberal Party of Jean Lesage and his successor Robert Bourassa 
that helped to shape Quiet Revolution Quebec. This variety of nationalist thought argued 
that Quebecois should be in charge of their own affairs to a greater degree. A policy brought 
about to a large extent through increased government intervention in the economy. The level 
of government intervention in Quebec's economy is something that even today distinguishes 
the province from the rest of Canada. This moderate nationalist approach is federalist, in 
that it argues for Quebec's continued place in Confederation, however it is one that has led to 
a greater degree of asymmetry within the federal State. The moderate nationalism of the 
Quebec Liberal Party has been influenced by the earlier pan-Canadian strand; it is in 
opposition to the separatist nationalism of its main rival since the mid-1970s, the Parti 
Quebecois. Having identified the four main historical strands of nationalism in Quebec the 
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rest of this chapter will go on to examine how these have developed since the conquest and, 
in turn, how they have influenced an understanding of Quebec as a nation. 
The French-Canadian Nation and Quebec 
Nationalism in Quebec has manifested itself in a variety of different ways since the 
British conquest; thus it would be disingenuous to categorise it as merely ethnic or civic, 
revolutionary or moderate, linguistic or Catholic. As the political, social, cultural, and 
economic realities of Quebec and the Quebecois have changed and evolved, so has the 
nationalism in the territorial home of the French in North America. However, it would be 
wrong to imply that the French in North America are not at home in Manitoba, Eastern 
Ontario, or New Brunswick, as Franco-Manitobans, Franco-Ontarians, and Acadians are all 
established communities, territorially, culturally, and politically. It is, however, the French-
Canadians in Quebec who have come to define themselves as a nation in a way in which the 
other dispersed groups of French-speakers in Canada have not. As Silver has pointed out, it 
was not until the late nineteenth century that the French-Canadians living in Quebec 
discovered or acknowledged the existence of the Acadians as a distinct community.2 As the 
vast majority of French-Canadians lived in Quebec they recognised it as their homeland, la 
patrie. Prior to the advent of the Quiet Revolution in the 1960s, it is more appropriate to talk 
of a French-Canadian and not a specifically Quebecois nation and nationalism. While 
Quebec was the historical homeland of the French in North America, it is not until the 1960s 
that there emerged an explicit identification of Quebec as a nation and increased Quebec 
demands for greater sovereignty within Canada. As a result this chapter will refer to French-
Canadian nationalism up to the period of the Quiet Revolution. 
The focus of the French-Canadian homeland, as the Ultramontane Bishop Lafleche 
pointed out in I 866, was "that vast expanse of territory irrigated by the St.Lawrence", thus, 
2 A. I. Silver, The French-Canadian Idea of Confederation, 2nd ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1997), p. 151. 
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the ancestral, seigneurial lands of New France. For the French-Canadians their focus was 
Quebec first and foremost, a view that Silver argues failed to change much with 
Confederation in 1867: 
'The Quebec legislature had hardly begun its session when all eyes were turned 
toward the provincial capital and firmly fixed upon it." ... Given this attitude, it was 
not su~prising that those who considered Quebec the proper homeland of the French 
Canadrans should often look forward to its eventual separation from the rest of 
Canada and emergence as an independent French-Catholic state.3 
The concept of Quebec as the national homeland for the French-Canadians is one that would 
evolve over time under numerous influences: conservative and liberal; the arguments of 
armed revolutionaries; and through the link between nationalism and Catholicism in Quebec 
through to the 1960s. The growth of nationalism in Quebec, however, can by traced back to 
that one defining, watershed event in Canadian history: the British conquest of New France. 
The Conquest of New France 1759-60 
The events of 1759-60 are the backdrop to the nationalist discourse in Quebec. 
Quebecois nationalism cannot be understood without reference to the conquest; it became 
entrenched in the collective mind of the French-Canadians that they existed as a conquered 
people. For the inhabitants of New France and what was to become the new British colony 
of Quebec, the conquest was a most traumatic event accompanied by a considerable amount 
of upheaval. Under the French regime most of the colonial administrators and senior clerics 
were imported from France, such as Bishop Franl(ois de Laval who helped to shape the early 
political and religious life of the colony in the 1660s. Following the conquest, connections 
with France were severed, thus affecting institutions such as the Church.4 The British 
3 Ibid., p. I I 7. 
4 In his somewhat outdated French Canadians, 1760-1967, Mason Wade addresses this issue of 
clerical appointments and the upset caused by the conquest by examining ~he debate that too~ place 
between the former governor, Vaudreuil, and Lord Amherst over the appomtment of a. new bishop 
following the events of 1759-60. Vaudreuil argued that the French ~onarch sh?uld still be ab!e to 
name the Bishop of Quebec. Amherst refused this request, thus leavmg the Quebec Church without a 
head for six years and thereby eliminating the possibility of any further ordinations taking place until a 
new bishop was chosen. The loss of financial support from France for the Church and the lack of 
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political response to the conquest and its resulting impact on Quebec society was unique 
given the importance of the common law to the British and that Catholics in the United 
Kingdom remained subject to penal laws until the mid-nineteenth century. It demonstrated 
that the British had some appreciation for the situation they found themselves, in which there 
was a pre-existing political, clerical, social, and economic order in the colony. 
The Proclamation of 1763 and the Treaty of Paris in the same year finalised the 
conquest and established the British administration in the colony. The Quebec Act, 1774 was 
a landmark piece of legislation in the British empire since it acknowledged the presence in 
the colony of distinct institutions, namely the Catholic Church, the seigneurial system of land 
holding, and the civil law, and guaranteed their continued existence. The legal protection 
given to the Catholic Church is one of the most significant elements of the Quebec Act: 
And, for the more perfect Security and Ease of the Minds of the Inhabitants of the 
said Province, it is hereby declared, That his Majesty's Subjects, professing the 
Religion of the Church of Rome of and in the said Province of Quebec, may have, 
hold, and enjoy, the free Exercise of the Religion of the Church of Rome, subject to 
the King's Supremacy ... and that the Clergy of the said Church may hold, receive, 
and enjoy, their accustomed Dues and Rights, with respect to such Persons only as 
shall profess the said Religion.5 
The maintenance of the Catholic Church and its hierarchy in Quebec would have a profound 
impact on the development of nationalism in the province over the following one hundred 
and seventy-five years. It would be under the influence of clerics such as Joseph-Octave 
Plessis, Lafleche, Ignace Bourget, Antonine Labelle, Lionel Groulx, and Georges-Henri 
Levesque that the national identity of the French-Canadian would be defined and 
subsequently transposed on to the populace at large. This link between Catholicism and 
national ism in Quebec remained strong right up until the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s 
legal sanction for the tithe meant that the Church in Quebec was severely hampered by the effects of 
the conquest. 
5 Quebec Act, 1774, 14 George Ill, c.83 (U.K.), s. V. 
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when the anti-clerical nationalism of the Cite libristes and groups such as the RIN dissolved 
Early 19th Century Nationalism 
In the decades following the Quebec Act, 177 4, French-Canadian leaders were 
generally glowing in their praise for the political accommodation of 1774 that allowed them 
to maintain their position as the leaders of civil and religious Quebec. Ironically, Voltaire 
had equally praised the victory of the British at the Plains of Abraham, declaring it to be "the 
triumph of liberty over despotism, heralding the liberation of all America."7 At the turn of 
the century there is little evidence of nationalist sentiment, let alone agitation. Joseph 
Octave Plessis was Bishop of Quebec from 1806 until his death in 1825, during which time 
he preached deference to the colonial government and argued that the conquest was "a 
blessing in disguise"; indeed, Britain was best able to protect Quebec from the anti-clerical 
excesses of the French republicans and from the revolution in America.8 In a sermon 
preached after Nelson's victory against Napoleon's navy at Aboukir, Plessis established his, 
and therefore the Church's position: 
Ou est le bon patriote, ou est le loyal sujet, je dis plus, ou est le vrai chretien dont le 
creur n'ait ete rejoui a cette heureuse nouvelle? L'empire des eaux assure a la 
Grande Bretagne; son pavilion deploye majestueusement sur toutes les mers; ses 
ennemis confondus et humilies; un paix apres laquelle toute la terre soupire, devenue 
plus facile. Ces seules considerations ne suffisent-elles pas pour porter l'allegresse 
dans toutes les ames? Ajoutons ici, que cette victoire a pour nous un merite 
particulier, parce qu'en affermisant la puissance de la Grande Bretagne, elle assure la 
continuation du repos et du bonheur de cette Province.9 
6 The term Cite Iibristes refers to that group of Quebecois intellectuals, including Pierre Trudeau, 
Gerard Pelletier, and Pierre Vadeboncoeur, who wrote for the journal Cite fibre. They challenged the 
~revailing nationalist orthodoxies of the 1950s and 1960s and the government ofMaurice Duplessis. 
Mason Wade, The French-Canadians, 1760-1967, 2"d ed., vol. I (Toronto: Macmillan, 1968), p. 44. 
8 "Mgr. Joseph-Octave Plessis," in Canadian Political Thought, ed. E.D. Forbes (Toronto: Oxford 
University Press, 1987), p. 2. 
9 Joseph-Octave Plessis, Discours a I' occasion de la victiore remportee par les f~rces navales de sa 
majeste britannique dans la Mediterranee le I et 2 aofit 1798. sur la flotte franc01se, (1799; rpt. 
Quebec: Dussault & ~roulx, 1905), pp. 19-20. 
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Thus, it can be argued that it was under the authority of Great Britain that the peace and 
happiness of the province was gained. Plessis continued on to point out that the government 
best suited for the good of the province was that of Britain, since it had respected the faith 
and given the people a reasonable role in the administration of the province. 10 
This abundant respect for the colonial administration and its way of governing the 
colony did not extend very far into the nineteenth century. By the 1 81 Os, there was 
considerable agitation on the part of some of the seigneurial and professional classes who 
argued that the entrenched colonial oligarchy, the Chateau Clique, was misusing its powers 
of patronage. Those who called for greater reform of colonial institutions became more 
militant and radical in their demands; this prompted open rebellion in the colony from 1837 
to 1838. Patronage and power in Quebec was controlled by a small coterie of colonial 
officials, merchants, and other prominent Anglophones who worked with senior members of 
the clergy to maintain the Anglophone ascendancy within the colony. They were challenged 
within the Legislative Assembly by a group of bourgeois liberal reformers in the Parti 
Canadien who sought to work within the existing system and argue for such reforms as 
responsible government, control over the civil list, and an elected Legislative Council. 11 By 
1826 the Parti Canadien had come to be referred to as the Parti Patriote and its leader, ' 
Louis-Joseph Papineau, was becoming increasingly more radical and overtly nationalist, 
despite his bourgeois origins. Papineau was a lawyer and seigneur of Petite-Nation who, 
according to Ouellet, disliked politics and saw his actions more as patriotic responsibility. 
Indeed, Papineau did not become radical until he left the more moderate reform faction of 
the Parti Canadien in 1830 and began advocating an independent French-Canadian 
10 
Ibid., p. 20. . nd • k 
11 John A. Dickinson and Brian Young, A Short History of Quebec, 2 ed. (Toronto. Copp Clar 
Pitman Ltd., 1993), p. 160. 
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republic.'
2 
To that effect in 1832 the Patriotes adopted a tricolour flag reminiscent of 
another European revolution and found that support for their cause was increasing among the 
disaffected bourgeoisie of Quebec. During the 1830s riots became common occurrences as 
supporters of the Patriotes defied the established order, such as in the West Ward of 
Montreal in 1832 when troops opened fire killing three during an election where a Patriote 
candidate, Daniel Tracey, had been nominated. 13 
The 1837-38 Rebellions 
By 1837, the Patriotes under Papineau had become a popular revolutionary force 
made up of Francophones, Irish, and like-minded Anglophones. However, in the battles that 
took place between the Patriotes and the colonial militia, the Patriotes failed to register any 
great victories, due largely to the fact that they were poorly led, poorly equipped, and had 
failed to muster enough grassroots support as a result of the clergy preaching against the 
evils of rebellion.
14 
The rebellion was largely inspired by the revolutionary ideals of the 
French and American revolutions, such as the rights of men and the principles of liberty and 
independence.
15 
In his "Address to the Confederation of the Six Counties" in 1837, 
Papineau condemned the ineptitude and corruption of the colonial administration: 
Loin que des reparations aient ete concedees a nos humbles prieres, l'agression a 
suivi l'agression,jusqu'a ce qu'enfin nous ne paraissons plus tenir l'empire 
britannique pour notre bonheur et notre properite, nos libertes et l'honneur du peuple 
et de la couronne d' Angleterre, mais en vue seulement d'engraisser un de horde 
d' inutile officiels, qui non content de jouir de salaires enormement disproportionnes 
12 Femand Ouellet, "The Insurrections," Canada: Unity in Diversity, ed. P.G. Cornell et al. (Toronto: 
Holt, Rinehart and Winston of Canada, 1967); rpt. in Readings in Canadian History: ?re-
Confederation, eds. R. Douglas Francis and Donald B. Smith, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston ofCanada Limited, 1990), p. 329. 
13 Ibid., p. 162. 
14 As Ouellet points out, the Church realised in October 1837, after the Patriotes' publishing of their 
manifesto at the Assembly of St.Charles, that the rebellion was a threat to the established order and 
needed to be put down. The Bishop of Montreal, Jean-Jacques Lartigue, issued a pastoral letter 
condemning the actions of the Patriotes and the liberal, republican, and anti-establishment ideas that 
motivated their actions. Once again the conservative elements within the clerical leadership 
emphasised the need for order over the evils of rebellion and that active participation in rebellion 
could but only lead to excommunication. 
15 Louis-Joseph Papineau, "Adresse de la confederation des six comtes au peuple du Canada," in 
Papineau, ed. Femand Ouellet, 2"d ed. (Quebec: Les Presses de I'Universite Laval, 1970), p. 80. 
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aux devoirs de leurs charges et aux ressources du pays, se sont combines en une 
faction uniquement mue par l'inten~t prive a s'opposer a toutes les reformes, a 
defendre toutes les iniquites d'un gouvernement ennemi des droits et des libertes de 
cette colonie ... 16 
After the 1837 rebellions Papineau was driven into exile and the movement became 
increasingly radicalised under the leadership of Robert Nelson, who led a rebellion from a 
base in Vermont in 1838. The 1838 rebellion was an abortive one, but it was considerably 
more radical in its aims, many of which were inspired by the Chartists in Britain. These 
included: the separation of Church and State; the establishment of a republic; abolition of 
confessional schools; expropriation of clergy estates; universal suffrage; a secret ballot; and 
freedom of the press. Nelson's Proclamation of the Independence of Lower Canada of 1838 
was republican in its entirety. Among its various declarations it proclaimed "Que le Bas-
Canada doit prendre la forme d'un Gouvemement republicain et se declare maintenant, de 
fait, republique." 17 
The rebellions of 1837 and 1838 had two important effects: they signaled the 
emergence of a new nationalism and they brought about limited institutional reform. In 
1839, at the behest of the British Government, Lord Durham issued a report which criticised 
the rule of the entrenched oligarchies in both Upper and Lower Canada and led to the 
establishment of a united parliament for the two Canadas with responsible government. In 
his observations of the situation in the British North American colonies Durham himself 
employed the language of nations to illustrate what he saw as irreconcilable differences 
between the French and the British: 
I expected to find a contest between a government and a people: I ~ou~d two nations 
warring in the bosom of a single state: I found a struggle, not o~ pn~ctples, but of 
races; and I perceived that it would be idle to attempt any amehoratt.on o~ laws or 
institutions until we could first succeed in terminating the deadly ammostty that now 
16 
Ibid., p. 81. · · d F d 
17 Robert Nelson, "La proclamation de l'independance du Bas-Canada," m Papmeau, e · ernan 
Ouellet, p. 83. 
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separates the inhabitants of Lower Canada into the hostile divisions of French and 
English. 18 
The Union of the Canadas, 1840 
The accommodation of 1840 had the assimilation of the French-Canadians as its 
objective; it was seen by the British as the most "expeditious way to prevent further such 
occurrences."
19 
The Union Act, 1840 united the two colonies of Upper Canada (Ontario) and 
Lower Canada (Quebec) and gave them each forty-two seats in the new legislative assembly. 
From 1845 a double majority principle was established in the assembly through an alliance 
between the Lower Canadian Reform majority and the Upper Canadian Tory majority so that 
neither part of the united province could be dominated by a majority administration from the 
other.
20 
However, it was not until 1847-48 that responsible government was established 
where the government had to have a majority in the assembly; the first administration was 
that of the reformers Robert Bald win and Louis-Hippolyte LaFontaine. Baldwin and 
LaFontaine had different ideas on the 'double majority' principle, the need for a party to 
maintain majority support in its respective section of the Assembly as well as the Assembly 
as a whole. Bald win denied it in theory but accepted it as it came to function in the 
Assembly whereas LaFontaine liked it in theory but feared its practical implications and ~he 
sectional ism it could foster. 21 This style of joint administration would last until that of John 
A. Macdonald and George-Etienne Cartier when the Province of Canada came together in 
Confederation with the colonies ofNova Scotia and New Brunswick in 1867 to form the 
Dominion of Canada. 
The Era of Confederation 
18 Gerald M. Craig, ed., Lord Durham's Report (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1 963), pp. 
22-23. . 1945 19 Kenneth McRoberts, "The Sources ofNeo-Nationalism in Qu~bec," in Quebec Smce : 
Selected Readings, ed. Michael Behiels (Toronto: Copp Clark Prtman Ltd., 1 987), p. 81 · 
"0 
- Wade, p. 248. . . . . u · · 
21 S.J.R. Noel, Patrons, Clients, Brokers: Ontario Socretv and Pohtrcs 1791-1896 (Toronto. mversrty 
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The British North America Act, 1867, now the Constitution Act, 1867, which 
established the Canadian federal State was championed by the Conservative or bleu party of 
Cartier. Cartier characterised the Confederation agreement as a defining moment in the 
history of British North America:" 'British and French Canadian alike could appreciate and 
understand their position relative to each other. They were placed like great families beside 
each other and their contact produced a healthy spirit of emulation' ."22 The Liberal or rouge 
party of Antoine-Aime Dorion was less enthusiastic. The rouges saw Confederation as 
unacceptable and merely an extension of the assimilationist goals of the 1840 act; it would 
centralise power and lead to legislative union, which was the greatest fear of Dorion's 
party.23 This fear of Dorion's was confirmed by Macdonald'~ approach to dealing with the 
province in the years following 1867 by which he changed or disallowed provincial bills 
which were contrary to the federal interest or, as Young argues, the interest of the 
Anglophone ruling class ofMontreal.24 Ultimately, the opposition of Dorion and other 
Liberals had little effect on the passage of the BNA Act as Cartier, Hector Langevin and 
other bleus played dominant roles in helping to bring the Province of Canada into 
Confederation. 
Emergence of Ultramontanism 
Nationalism in Quebec continued to develop in the period immediately following 
Confederation, taking on an ethnic and ultra-conservative guise under the influence of 
Ultramontane Catholicism. Increasingly, nationalist leaders and polemicists in Quebec 
identified French-Canadians as being a people set apart, and in some cases a people with a 
messianic mission in North America. The explicit identification of French-Canadian 
nationalism with Catholicism by late nineteenth century writers and critics accompanied the 
22 George-Etienne Cartier as quoted in Dickinson and Young, A Short History ofOuebec, P· 187. 
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emergence of Ultramontanism, an ultra-conservative Catholicism with its roots in France, as 
the dominant nationalist creed. Again, the Bishop ofTrois-Rivieres, Louis-Fran9ois 
Lafleche, provided a clear indication of this link between the nation and the Church: 
It is ?ur firm belief that we should be doing our countrymen a great service by 
helpmg to strengthen their faith in our nationality and their trust in its future. We 
might further contribute toward encouraging us all to realize, as needs we must, that 
the SAVING OF OUR NATION depends, no less than that of our souls, on our 
constant, unyielding adherence to CATHOLICISM. This is doubtless our most 
powerful bond as a national entity, and one that will always be strongly effective in 
protecting us from the many dangers around us, the most fearful of which is 
unquestionably the threat of division.25 
For Lafleche and other conservatives, the terms French Canadian and Catholic were 
synonymous. They had been inspired in this view by Ultramontane writers in France such as 
Joseph de Maistre and Louis Veuillot who argued that France had a special providential 
mission to fight for Catholicism in the world; Ultramontanism in Quebec was an extension 
of this philosophy.
26 
In the 1880s and 1890s, certain French-Canadian polemicists pointed to 
how this mission of France's was under threat by all those forces that sought to secularise 
French society; these forces were liberal intellectuals, Freemasons, and the Jews.27 As Silver 
has demonstrated, the popular press in Quebec led the outcry against these enemies of 
French, and thus French-Canadian, Catholicism: " ... but French Canadians could only lament 
at the 'mob of atheists, freethinkers, Jews, and other foreigners, who are now dancing upon 
the disfigured body of our unfortunate mother-country, insulting everything which is most 
dear to us. "'28 This is strong imagery indeed, imagery that evokes the frequently xenophobic 
and anti-Semitic face of French-Canadian nationalism, the so-called pure laine, or "pure 
wool" national ism. 
24 Brian Young, "Federalism in Quebec: The First Years After Confederation," in Fe.der:alism i? 
Canada and Australia: The Early Years, eds. Bruce W. Hodgins et al. (Waterloo: WIIfhd Launer 
University Press, 1978), p. 102. 
25 Latleche, p. I 03. 
26 Silver, p. 230. 
27 Ibid., p. 232. 
28 L'Etendard, 3 Feb. 1883, as quoted in Silver, p. 232. 
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As Ultramontane France had Louis Veuillot as its polemicist, Quebec had Jules-Paul 
Tardive) whose works such as the 1895 Pour la Patrie vindicated the position of the Catholic 
Church as the guardian of the French-Canadian nation and vilified liberalism and other 
forces which sought to subvert its position. Some ofTardivel's most strident attacks of 
liberalism came in 1882 in articles he published in his Ultramontane paper La Verite. More 
often than not these attacks were directed at the rouge party and its successor the Quebec 
Liberal Party of Wilfrid Laurier rather than liberalism as a philosophical or ideological 
construct, although Tardive) rarely made any distinction between the two : 
And take careful note that by nature this liberalism we have just defined resembles 
godless liberalism and atheism, to which it inevitably leads. In effect, one begins by 
excluding God from politics; one contends that He has nothing to do with elections, 
laws, and public policy; that electors, deputies, and ministers owe Him no account of 
their public acts. Then one goes a step further: one says that the good Lord has no 
place in school; then that he has no place in the family; and finally, that He is 
superfluous everywhere, even in the Church and in the conscience of individuals. 
Such is the slippery slope taken by those who begin by denyin~ the rights of God in 
the civil order, and it is a slope that leads to the abyss, to hell.2 
The conflict between the Ultramontanes and the rouges emerged as a dominant one in 
Quebec political discourse until the Quiet Revolution. The approach of the Ultramontanes 
coalesced politically through the publication of the Programme catholique in 1871 by 
followers of Bishops Lafleche and Bourget. The goal of the Programmistes was to educate 
electors how to vote, in essence telling them to vote for the Conservative Party as it was the 
only party which had their spiritual and national interests at heart, which were one in the 
same.30 Ultramontane thought inspired the direction taken by the Church in Quebec in all 
political and national matters. Evidence of this can best be found in two ofthe important 
episodes of the late nineteenth century: the colonisation movement and the Riel Affair. 
The Colonisation Movement 
29 Jules-Paul Taridivel, "On Liberalism," in Forbes, p. 153. . , , . 
Jo As quoted in Marcel Hamelin, Les Premieres annees du parlementansme guebecms 0867-1878), 




Nationalism and Quebec I 760-1992 
As part of the providential mission of French Canadians to spread the work of the 
Church in North America, clerical and other leaders in Quebec encouraged the development 
of a colonisation movement. The purpose of this movement was to colonise those parts of 
rural Quebec that were far from the traditional seigneurial lands in the St.Lawrence Valley. 
These areas included the Saguenay-Lac St. Jean region, the Eastern Townships, and the 
Outaouais region. These colonisation projects were encouraged and led by figures such as 
the Bishop of Montreal, lgnace Bourget, and by L' Abbe Fran9ois-Xavier-Antoine Labelle. 
In 1869, the Colonization Societies Act was passed in Quebec which financed the cost of 
buying Crown land so that colonisation societies such as the Societe Generale de Montreal 
could encourage Francophone and Catholic migration to these new areas of settlement.31 The 
colonisation of these areas was generally successful, yet in the case of the Eastern Townships 
there was often friction between the established Anglophone settlers and the new 
Francophone Catholic colonisers. Colonisation demonstrated the desire of nationalist leaders 
in Quebec to carry forward the mission of the Church in the remote parts of the province. 
French-Canadian Nationalism and Louis Riel 
In November 1885, the Metis rebel leader, Louis Riel, was executed after a 
questionable trial in which he was convicted of treason. The Metis are the people who were 
the outcome of unions between Cree women and French and Scottish fur traders who came 
to live in the Canadian Northwest. After having played a key role in the creation of the 
province of Manitoba out of the Northwest Territories in 1870, Riel had led a rebellion by 
the Metis over the issues of land claims and non-aboriginal settlement in the Northwest. The 
Metis were aggrieved at Ottawa's poor handling of their land claims, particularly in the face 
of increasing European settlement which was accompanying the construction of the 
Canadian Pacific Railway. There has been much debate over whether Riel was insane. He 
viewed himself as a messianic figure among the Metis people. His execution for his part in 
31 Dickinson and Young, p. 115. 
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the rebellion inflamed public opinion in Quebec where Francophones saw this event as an 
attack against Francophones and Catholicism; this was despite French-Canadian 
condemnation of the insurrection and their vigorous support of the French-Canadian militia 
units that went to fight.
32 
Many Quebec newspapers turned the Northwest rebellion and 
Riel's execution into a racial issue, in which the Federal Government sided with the 
influential Orange Order to oppress the Metis: 
'Orange fanaticism which would like to exterminate the French Metis of the North-
West, and which must have fomented these troubles on purpose, in order to have a 
reason to deal severely with the hated race.' Surely this was, after all, the real if 
secret reason for the abuse and mistreatment to which the Metis had been subjected 
by English-Canadian employees of the federal government.33 
The ethnic aspect of this nationalism was something that would remain until well into the 
twentieth century. 
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries there appeared two new 
advocates of nationalism in Quebec: Henri Bourassa and Abbe Lionel Groulx. Both Groulx 
and Bourassa's nationalism were characterised by a broader view of Quebec's place within 
both Canada and the world, yet each was still firmly rooted in French Canadian Catholicism. 
Increasingly this nationalism was focussing more and more on Quebec itself and not French 
Canada as a whole, although this transition would not be complete until the dawn of the 
Quiet Revolution in the 1960s. 
Henri Bourassa and Pan-Canadian Nationalism 
Henri Bourassa was one of the most significant Quebec politicians and nationalists 
of the twentieth century. He was both a federal and provincial Member of Parliament during 
his career and sat as a Liberal, a Conservative and as an independent at various times. He 
stood out as a nationalist in Quebec due to his opposition to Canadian involvement in the 
Boer War and to conscription in World War I, both issues which provoked furious debate in 
32 Silver, pp. 154-55 . 
.n La Verite, 4 Apr. 1885 and L'Etendard, I Apr. 1885 as quoted in Silver, p. 156. 
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Quebec and served to divide English and French Canada. Bourassa's founding of the 
Montreal newspaper Le Devoir in 1910 contributed to the growing influence of nationalism 
within Quebec politics.
34 
The nationalism of Henri Bourassa was typified by its promotion 
of a pan-Canadian nationality that had at its core a belief in biculturalism and greater 
Canadian autonomy: 
We are neighbours and partners of the English majority. We do not wish our fellow 
citizens to tighten the ties which attach us to England nor to upset for their advantage 
the equilibrium between the two races in Canada. In return we should not hurt their 
nationalist feelings and their justified susceptibilities by desiring a political 
rapprochement with France or a rupture of Canadian Confederation. Let us remain 
solidly on the ground where the circumstances of history have placed us. Let us 
resist firmly the political absorption of Canada into the Empire and the extinction of 
our nationality in Canada. Let us respect the vow we have sworn to England and the 
Anglo-Canadian majority: this is the way to make them respect their own word. It is 
important for our security to convince Anglo-Canadians of one undeniable fact: it is 
not as Frenchmen but as Canadians that we do not wish to draw closer to England 
and assume new obligation in the Empire ... 35 
Bourassa also sought a truer, reformed federalism by which the provincial autonomy 
of Quebec would be respected. 
The Concept of Duality in Canada 
In the years following Confederation various commentators, such as the jurist 
Thomas J.J. Loranger, began to advance a dualist theory of the Canadian federation that 
came to be known as the compact theory. Advocates of the compact theory argued that 
Confederation was a partnership, or compact, between two founding nations, the British and 
the French. The compact theory became an accepted view of the events of 1864-67, a view 
that remained dominant in Canadian political discourse until the late 1960s with the arrival 
of Pierre Trudeau and his conception of Canada rooted in liberal ideas of equality. The 
dualist understanding of Canadian federalism remains dominant in Quebec and runs counter 
to the predominant, Trudeau-influenced view in English Canada that the federation is one of 
34 Dickinson and Young, p. 246. 
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equal provinces where Quebec is no different than Ontario, British Columbia, or Nova 
Scotia. The long-running debate between the dualist argument of the compact theory and the 
equality of provinces argument has its roots at the turn of the century. The federalism of 
Bourassa echoes this concept of duality and the need for mutual respect between English 
Canada and French Canada: 
Let us avoid living or falling into an over-narrow provincialism; let us resist the 
encroachments of an absorbing federalism. Let us keep in the provincial domain all 
that is essential to the maintenance of our national character: education civil laws 
municipal organization. Equally let us work for the proper functioning' of the fed~ral 
system; in this area let us take the place which belongs to us and let us inspire the 
confidence of our neighbours by showing ourselves to be worthy of participating 
with them in common government.36 
L 'Abbe Groulx and Modern Nationalism 
While Bourassa argued for a greater understanding among the two nations of 
Canada, Abbe Groulx argued for a reaffirmation of the Catholicity of French Canadian 
nationalism and for a greater appreciation for the sovereignty of the Quebec nation. 
Abbe Lionel Groulx has been credited by many as the father of contemporary Quebecois 
nationalism. Indeed, he influenced a vast proportion of the Quebec educated middle-class 
who would help to bring about the Quiet Revolution of the I 960s. Groulx achieved much of 
this through his prodigious writing and through his occupation of the chair in Canadian 
History at the Universite de Montreal from 1915. His founding in 1903 ofthe Association 
Catholique de la Jeunesse Canadienne-Fran~aise, subsequently the Action Nationale, had a 
profound influence on young Quebecois with its indoctrination of conservative, Catholic 
ideals.37 Groulx's nationalism exhorted the past history of the French Canadians and placed 
Catholicism firmly at the centre of their national identity: 
35 Henri Bourassa "French Canadians and Canadian Nationalism," in Henri Bourassa on Imperialism 
and Bi-culturalis~, 1900-1918, ed. Joseph Levitt (Toronto: Copp Clark Publishing Company, 1970), 
~· 106. 
· 
6 Ibid., p. I 04. 
37 E.D. Forbes, p. 251. 
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The essence of our being can be expressed in two words, French and Catholic. 
French and Catholic we have been, not merely since our arrival in America, but for 
the past thousand years since and even before Tolbiac and the birth of the Frankish 
nation. Our rights go back far enough to inspire respect, and surely we are of quite 
respectable lineage as well.38 
Groulx's use of the terms 'nation' and 'rights' is explicit. The ethnic nationalism expressed 
here is one which seeks recognition of its place within the world and in hearkening back to 
medieval history Groulx seeks to give it a foundation. Groulx's nationalism had a strong 
ethnic element to it, an extension one might say of the earlier 'providential mission' 
national ism of Lafleche and others: 
... who would dare maintain that French culture no longer ranks first among 
European cultures? And in what respect could others claim to be superior? The 
culture and civilization of the Anglo-Saxon nations, which are at the forefront of 
today's world scene, are praised to the skies. In this case I would ask the question I 
have already asked elsewhere. Are these cultures presently at the beginning of a 
climb to further heights, or are they at the beginning of a decline? ... Gentlemen, if 
we really must choose, is it worth abandoning the ship which may be ancient and 
outmoded, but in which we willingly took refuge in times of war, simply to throw 
ourselves upon other doomed vessels, their shattered hulls hidden below the water 
line?39 
The nationalism of Lionel Groulx is important because of what it said about the cultural 
identity of the nation and that it challenged Confederation and the impact it was having in 
transforming the French-Canadian into a minority within Canada. The image of Quebec 
presented by Lionel Groulx was of a conservative, French-Catholic, rural nation, an image 
that was championed politically from 1936 to 1960 by the Union Nationale party under the 
autocratic leadership of its leader, le Chef, Maurice Duplessis. 
The Rise of the Union Nationale 
Js Lionel Groulx "French Canadian Nationalism," in Abbe Groulx: Variations on a Nationalist 
Theme, ed. Susa~ Mann Trofimenkoff(Toronto: Copp Clark Publishing Company, 1973), P· 87. 
39 Ibid., p. 92. 
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The Union Nationale was founded by the leader of the Quebec Conservative Party, 
Maurice Duplessis, and members of the reformist Action Liberale Nationale (ALN) of Paul 
Gouin on 7 November 1935.
40 
The ALN had sought considerable social and political reform 
in Quebec: labour reforms; control of the various trusts in Quebec; agricultural reform and 
the creation of cooperatives; electoral reforms and an end to the political corruption in the 
Liberal government of Louis-Alexandre Taschereau. In an attempt to bring down 
Taschereau the two parties formed an alliance with Duplessis as leader and with an ALN 
platform. The Union Nationale came into office in August 1936, at which time Duplessis 
abandoned the principles of the ALN, turned his back on its leaders, and transformed the 
party into a conservative, populist, Catholic party that would govern Quebec until 1960 with 
a five year break from 1939-44. The nationalism ofDuplessis and the Union Nationale 
embraced the Church, rural ism, the principles of provincial autonomy, and autocracy. 
Duplessis' period in office was characterised by the persecution of what his government 
perceived to be the opponents of Quebec: the unions, communists, Jehovah 's Witnesses, 
socialists, and other so-called "heretics".41 Duplessis' governments enjoyed a great deal of 
cooperation from the clergy and support from rural and working-class voters, allowing him 
to stay in power for almost twenty years. Much of this support was gained through 
patronage and corrupt electioneering, as evidenced by what he said to voters at Vercheres in 
1952: "I warned you in 1948 not to vote for the Liberal candidate. You didn't listen to me. 
Unfortunately your county did not receive the grants, the subsidies that would have made it 
happier. 1 hope that the lesson will suffice."42 However, the excessive use of patronage and 
the violent repression of the unions at Thetford Mines and Asbestos in 1949 provoked 
greater opposition from an emerging generation of liberal critics in the province. Most 
prominent among these opponents were Andre Laurendeau and his Bloc Populaire, and the 
40 Richard Jones. "Duplessis and the Union Nationale Administration," in Behiels, p. 9. 
41 Ibid., p. 15. 
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Cite libristes Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Gerard Pelletier, and Pierre Vadeboncoeur. They 
challenged the nationalism of Duplessis and in the case ofTrudeau rejected nationalism out 
of hand. 
Laurendeau and the Bloc Populaire 
In the 1930s, Andre Laurendeau challenged Bourassa's interpretation of French-
Canadian nationalism and promoted a nationalism that emphasised the importance of the 
collectivity and the importance of personalism within that collectivity. Laurendeau was 
inspired by the French personalists Jacques Maritain, Nicholas Berdiaeff, and Emmanuel 
Mounier who existed on the left of the Catholic Church and advocated a Christian 
transformation of society along the lines of democratic socialism.43 In 1942, Laurendeau 
along with other like-minded nationalists associated with Le Devoir and under the influence 
of both Groulx and Bourassa founded the Bloc Populaire Canadien which took as its slogan 
"Canada for Canadians, Quebec for Quebeckers!"44 The Bloc Populaire led the fight against 
conscription in the Second World War and called for an end to the increasing centralisation 
of Canada. Economically, the Bloc advocated an interventionist State which would 
encourage the growth of small and medium-sized, Franco phone-owned corporations, 
nationalisation of industries, and the creation of agricultural cooperatives.45 It was, however, 
unable to have much of an effect politically due to its lack of electoral success. As Behiels 
argues, it did represent a transition between two styles of nationalism in Quebec: "The 
Bloc's provincial programme was both a reaffirmation of the essentially conservative nature 
of traditional French-Canadian nationalism and a harbinger of the liberal-oriented neo-
nationalism that would emerge in the postwar years."46 
42 
Ibid., p. I8. . . . · r 
43 Michael D. Behiels, Prelude to Quebec's Quiet Revolution: Liberalism versus Neo-Nat10na Ism. 
I945-1960 (Montreal: McGiii-Queen's University Press, 1985), p. 27. 
44 Ibid., p. 29. 
45 Ibid., p. 3 I . 
46 Ibid. 
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The Quiet Revolution 
Following the death of Duplessis, the Union Nationale was defeated in the 1960 
provincial election by Jean Lesage's Liberal Party. Under the Liberal slogan "Maitres chez 
nous!" a new period of nationalist development was ushered in through the Quiet 
Revolution. The Quiet Revolution was a cultural, political, social, and economic renaissance 
that profoundly transformed Quebec into a liberal, secular society with an increasingly 
activist government that sought to promote with greater vigour the interests of Quebec within 
Canada. Through the full nationalisation of Quebec's power utilities into the State-owned 
and run Hydro Quebec and the establishment of the Caisse de depot et placements du 
Quebec, a key source of investment capital for the province, the etatiste nationalism of 
"Maitres chez nous" developed within the Quebec Liberal Party. In contrast to this was the 
emerging separatist movement and its various manifestations in the 1 960s as well as its 
antagonist the anti-nationalism of the intellectual journal Cite Libre and Pierre Trudeau. 
Trudeau as Nationalist Critic 
Trudeau and the other writers in the Montreal journal had been criticising the 
autocratic brand of nationalism of Duplessis throughout the late 1 950s. When the 1 960s 
ushered in the Quiet Revolution and the new separatist nationalism, Trudeau did not 
differentiate between the two nationalisms. He saw both to be divisive, parochial, and 
reactionary. As a leading anti-clerical intellectual who argued passionately for a bilingual 
Canada free from what he viewed as petty nationalism, Trudeau adopted a position 
diametrically opposed to the emergent separatism of Bourgault and later Levesque and 
frequently berated the separatists for turning nationalism into the new religion: 
The separatist devout and all the other zealots in the Temple of the ~ation alre~dy 
point their fingers at the non-worshiper. And a good many non-believers find 1~ to 
their advantage to receive their nationalist sacrament, for they h~pe thus to attam 
sacerdotal and episcopal, if not pontifical, office, and to be pennttted thereby to 
recite prayers, to circulate directives and encyclicals? to d~~~e dogma, and to 
pronounce excommunication, with the assurance of mfalhbthty. Those who do not 
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attain the priesthood can hope to become churchwardens in return for services 
rendered; at the very least they will not be bothered when nationalism becomes the 
state religion.47 
For Trudeau, the independence of Quebec from Canada that was emerging as the new 
nationalist credo was never an option. In his view it would be a regressive step that would 
lead to Quebec's further isolation from the rest of the world. Separatism was against the 
internationalism that Trudeau fervently believed in, an apposition that effectively meant that 
the two sides would never be reconciled: 
The truth is that the separatist counter-revolution is the work of a powerless petit-
bourgeois minority afraid of being left behind by the twentieth-century revolution. 
Rather than carving themselves out a place in it by ability, they want to make the 
whole tribe return to the wigwams by declaring its independence.48 
Trudeau' s ideas would fundamentally re-shape Canada in the late 1960s and through the 
1970s and early 1980s during his terms as prime minister when the battle with the separatists 
would be joined on numerous occasions. Trudeau 's promotion of a bilingual and 
multicultural Canada angered Quebecois nationalists since both concepts were anathema to 
them in that they rejected duality. By the time he left office in 1984, the anti-nationalist 
Trudeau had succeeded in promoting a new nationalism in the rest of Canada outside Quebec 
where the nation was the State, a bilingual, multicultural, nation in opposition to the 
Quebecois conceptions of the nation and the State. There will be further elaboration on this 
issue below in chapter seven. 
Separatist Nationalism 
The nationalism emerging in the atmosphere of the Quiet Revolution was separatist 
and more on the left of the ideological spectrum than the earlier conservative, clerical 
47 Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Federalism and the French Canadians (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 
1968), pp. 206-207. 
48 Ibid., p. 211. 
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nationalism or even the pan-Canadian nationalism of Bourassa. The publication of Pierre 
Vallieres' Marxist manifesto Les negres blanc.\· de l'Amerique (White Niggers of America) 
in 1971 compared the Quebecois to other subject nations in the world.49 Vallieres had been 
influential earlier in the formation in 1963 of the Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ), the 
terrorist organisation responsible for a campaign of bombing, kidnapping and murder which 
culminated in the October Crisis of 1970. Trudeau invoked martial law under the War 
Measures Act and effectively put an end to the FLQ's activities, although there would be 
lasting recriminations and accusations that civil liberties were violated. The FLQ made 
effective use of Marxist rhetoric in its attempts to destroy "all colonial symbols and 
institutions, in particular the RCMP and the armed forces; all the information media in the 
colonial language ... ; all commercial establishments and enterprises that practise 
discrimination against Quebecois and that do not use French"50 The attempt by the FLQ to 
bring about an independent Quebec through violent revolution was thwarted and the 
organisation was a spent force following October 1970. From this point on separatist 
nationalism would be democratic. 
The more influential left-wing nationalist movement to emerge out of the 1960's 
was Pierre Bourgault's RIN, which contested seats in the 1966 provincial election but failed 
to get more than eight per cent of the vote. Bourgault made effective use of anti-colonial 
language in his characterisation of Quebec's position in Canada and in advancing the 
argument that the only goal for the Quebecois could be independence: 
Quebec n 'echappera pas au processus historique. Si, un jour, no us voulons que les 
Canadiens francrais se fassent connaitre dans le reste du monde; si nous voulons que 
les Canadiens francrais profitent des autres cultures, des autres civilisations, il faudra 
que no us sort ions du colonialisme dans lequel nous maintient Ottawa et que nous 
prenions enfin nos responsabilites. Il faudra que le Quebec suive !'example de ce.s 
huit pays courageux et qu'il conquiere enfin sa liberte. C'est alors seulement qu'tl 
49 Dickinson and Young, p. 312. 
50 Ibid. 
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nous se~a perm is de traiter egal a egal avec les Algeriens, les Jama'icains, les 
Ruanda1s ... et avec tous les autres peuples de la terre. 51 
The ideas of Bourgault and other separatists became dominant in nationalist discourse by the 
end of the decade when a former member of Jean Lesage's cabinet, Rene Levesque, declared 
his support for separatism and founded the PQ. The creation of the Rene Levesque's Parti 
Quebecois in 1968 brought about the demise of the RJN leaving Bourgault and the rest of his 
party to join the PQ. 
The Parti Quebecois and the Sovereignty Movement 
In 1968, Rene Levesque published An Option for Quebec after his departure from 
the Quebec Liberal Party. In it, he championed the collective aspirations of Quebecois and 
argued that full sovereignty for Quebec was how these aspirations might be met: 
For our own good, we must dare to seize for ourselves complete liberty in Quebec, 
the right to all the essential components of independence, i.e., the complete mastery 
of every last area of basic collective decision-making. This means that Quebec must 
become sovereign as soon as possible. Thus we finally would have within our grasp 
the security of our collective 'being' which is so vital to us, a security which 
otherwise must remain uncertain and incomplete.52 
The Parti Quebecois had consolidated its position in the early 1970s as the nationalist party 
in Quebec; separatism had now become a viable argument in Quebec. Levesque and the 
PQ's ad vocation of independence for Quebec, what would come to be termed sovereignty-
association, led them to contest the 1970 general election in Quebec in which they garnered 
23.1% of the popular vote. By 1976 the PQ's message of sovereignty-association for 
Quebec had made an impact and they were elected to government in the general election of 
that year when they defeated Robert Bourassa's Liberals. The PQ's election was a rejection 
of the soft nationalism of the Quebec Liberal Party and the perceived ineptitude ofRobert 
Bourassa. It was also seen as a reaction to the inability of Quebec to reach an agreement 
51 Pierre Bourgault, "Dependance, independance, inte~dependance," in La Politique, vol. I of Ecrits 
P:olemiques, ed. Pierre Bourgault (Montreal: Lanctot Editeur, ~ 996), P·. 47. 
2 Rene Levesque, "A Country that Must be Made," in Canadian Political Thought, ed. H.D. Forbes 
(Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 398-99. 
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with the rest of Canada over the contentious issue of the Canadian constitution after the 
failure of the Victoria Charter of 1971. The PQ promised that once elected they would hold 
a referendum on sovereignty-association. This was done in 1980 with the PQ and those in 
favour, the "OUI", receiving 40o/o of the vote and those federalists opposed to any form of 
separation, the "NON", receiving 60% of the vote. The Anglophone and Allophone vote 
was almost entirely in favour of the NON, while the Francophone vote was evenly split 
between the two sides. 5
3 
The result at the time was seen as a defeat ofQuebecois separatism 
and a victory for a renewed federalism that had been promised by Prime Minister Trudeau 
and the federal government. Despite the referendum defeat, the PQ remained a powerful 
force in Quebec politics, holding on to power with a second majority government in 1981. 
The Patriation Debate and its Aftermath 
In 1982, after lengthy constitutional negotiations between the Federal and provincial 
governments, the Canadian constitution was patriated from the United Kingdom with a new 
amending formula and the new Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. This fulfilled the 
promise of constitutional renewal made by the Federal Government during the referendum 
campaign. Patriation, however, was achieved without the support of Premier Levesque or 
the National Assembly in Quebec, thus alienating the government of Quebec and a majority 
of Quebecois. The Meech Lake constitutional accord of 1987 and the Charlottetown Accord 
of 1992 went some way to the recognition of Quebec as a nation through the so-called 
"Distinct Society clause": 
1 . ( 1) The Constitution of Canada shall be interpreted in a manner 
consistent with 
(a) the recognition that the existence of French-speaking Canadians, 
centered in Quebec but also present elsewhere in Canada, and 
English-speaking Canadians, concentrated outside Quebec but 
also present within Quebec, constitutes a fundamental 
characteristic of Canada; and 
53 The term • Allophone' is unique to the language politics of Quebec ~d refers ~o ~ Quebecois ~~ose 
first language is neither French nor English. Allophones make up a sizeable maJOrity of Montreal s 
immigrant community. 
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(b) the recognition that Quebec constitutes within Canada a distinct 
society.54 
However, the failure of these two accords in 1990 and 1992 respectively was seen by 
nationalists within Quebec as a further rejection of Quebec and its argument that it is unique 
from the other provinces in that it is a nation, a province unlike the others, a distinct society, 
or possessing a special character. 
The proclamation of the Constitution Act, 1982 containing the Charter and a new 
amending formula without the approval of the Quebec National Assembly has been the 
catalyst for all subsequent constitutional debates in Canada and a focus for nationalist 
criticism in Quebec. A more in-depth analysis of the constitutional situation since 1982 will 
follow in chapter seven with a view to understanding the position of nationalists in Quebec 
vis a vis the Canadian federal State. The focus of both federalist and nationalist discourse 
since 1982 has been on the place of Quebec within Canada and its relationship to the other 
constituent parts of the federation. The debate focusses on how the explicit recognition of 
Quebec as a nation by nationalists in Quebec can be reconciled with the broad rejection of 
this concept in the rest of Canada where the Canadian federal State has come to be viewed as 
the nation. This will be the focus of the discussion below. 
54 Constitutional Accord. 1987 (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1987). 
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Nationalism and Catalunya 1840-1980: La Renaixenc;a to Pujol 
Lo programma del catalanisme en totas sas manifestacions no pot esser mes 
que un: rompre las lligaduras que tenen alas nostra Regi6 agarrotada y 
subjecta, substituhintlas per Ios suaus y dolsos llassos del afecte que la 
germanor fa neixer. 
- Valenti Almirall 1 
The evolution of the nationalist discourse in Catalunya from the mid-nineteenth 
century to the immediate post-Franco period of the late 1970s can be traced through the 
writings of not only political thinkers, but through those of the literary and clerical classes as 
well. The emergence ofCatalanisme in the mid to late 1800s had a profound effect on the 
construction of this discourse; it was a movement which promoted, and in many ways 
rediscovered, a political, cultural and religious Catalan identity. As the writing of Valenti 
Almirall suggested in 1885, Catalanism sought change and a departure from the status quo in 
Catalunya's relationship with the Spanish state. The principles ofCatalanisme were not 
linked to one specific political ideology or fonn of cultural expression, rather they were 
absorbed by groups as diverse as Socialists, conservative Catholics, and Anarchists. This 
chapter traces the development of Catalan nationalist, or Catalanist, thought in all of its 
various guises, by examining the works of various thinkers and puts the development of 
Catalan nationalism in historical context. The history of Catalunya and that of Spain as a 
whole has been a turbulent one punctuated by civil war, repression and dictatorship, and 
tremendous economic and social changes. It is a complex and intricate history that can be 
very difficult to unravel, particularly in such a short space as this chapter allows. As a result, 
1 "The Catalanist programme in all of its manifestations seeks nothing more than this: to break the 
bonds which keep our region subjected and unable to move, substitute them with ~oft and sweet bonds 
that the affection of brotherhood will give birth to." Valenti Almirall, Lo Catalamsme (Barcelona: 
n.p., 1885), p. I I. 
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the description of various events will be limited with the emphasis being placed on key 
events that, when linked, form a relatively coherent chronology of the development of 
Catalanist thought since the beginning of la Renaixenva in the middle of the nineteenth 
century. 
The political history of the Spanish State and Catalunya's place within it over the 
last 150 years is characterised by periods of centralisation and decentralisation. Periods of 
centralisation include the First Republic in the 1870s and the dictatorships ofPrimo de 
Rivera and Franco during which centralisation was compounded by the repression ofCatalan 
culture and politics. The three main periods of decentralisation are the era of the 
Mancomunitat from 1923-30, the Second Republic, and the post-Franco era beginning in 
1977 with the re-establishment of the Generalitat and the promulgating of the 1978 
Constitution. Political events in Catalunya and the growth of Catalan nationalism had a 
tremendous impact on these shifts between a centralised and decentralised State. As will be 
discussed, the response made by political leaders in the rest of Spain to Catalan nationalist 
pressures for a federalist, autonomist, or independentist solution depended very much upon 
which political party or faction was ascendent in Madrid. 
Catalunya's Geography and its Early History 
Before moving on to an examination ofCatalan nationalism's historical evolution it 
is first worthwhile to examine Catalunya and its political geography. Present-day Catalunya 
is one of seventeen autonomous communities that make up Spain. Situated in the northeast 
corner of the country it is organised into thirty-eight provinces and has a population of 
approximately seven million inhabitants. The major cities and towns are Barcelona, the 
capital, Tarragona, Girona, and Lleida. The geographical autonomous community of 
Catalunya is more or less coterminous with the principality ofCatalunya of the Middle Ages, 
a state that emerged in the eleventh century under the rule of the Counts of Barcelona. It has 
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been argued that the campaign against the Moors at Cordoba in 1 01 0 which united the 
Counts of Barcelona, Urgell, and Besalu with the Bishops of Barcelona, Elna, Girona, and 
Vie in a collective act affirmed the existence of a Catalan people for the first time.2 Under 
the Counts of Barcelona, Catalunya emerged as a dominant Mediterranean power in the 
thirteenth centuries with the conquest of Valencia and Mallorca. In addition, Count Ramon 
Berenguer IV had secured a dynastic union with Aragon in the twelfth century which gave 
Catalunya a considerable role in the construction of medieval Spain prior to the 
. 3 ReconqUJsta. 
Catalunya is distinguished from much of Spain by its linguistic heritage. The Catalan 
language is part of a small branch of Romance languages that includes Proven9al and 
Occitan spoken in southern France and it is more closely related to them than to Castilian. 
Through the expansion of medieval Catalunya came the expansion of Catalan, as a result 
Catalan is spoken today in Catalunya proper, and in Valencia, the Balearic Islands, the 
eastern part of Aragon, in southeastern 'France around Perpignan (Perpinya), and around the 
town of Alguer on Sardinia. However, Catalan is being employed less and less in these last 
two regions. To nationalists, particularly those in Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya who 
favour independence for Catalunya, these Pa"isos Catalans constitute greater Catalunya. The 
promotion of the Catalan language has been a central goal of Catalan nationalism from the 
mid-nineteenth century. Political nationalism in Catalunya arose in the late 1800s out of a 
literary nationalism that resurrected Catalan as a literary language. 
La Renaixen~a 
A greater awareness of Catalan culture emerged in the 1840s with a movement that 
sought to reclaim Catalan as a literary language. The foundations for this reawakening or 
2 Michel Zimmerman, "Origens i Formaci6 d'una Societat Feudal (785-113?)," in Historia d~. 
Catalunya, eds. Joaquim Nadal i Farreras and Philippe Wolff (Barcelona: Otkos-Tau, s.a.-edtciones, 
1983), p. 261. 
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renaixenya had been laid in the eighteenth century by Catalan historicists who revived 
interest in Catalan mediaeval civilisation, the most notable of whom was the historian and 
philologist Antoni de Capmany. Although his writings were in Castilian, they were a base 
upon which future political and literary thinkers could build, as argued by Grau and L6pez: 
"The most important of the eighteenth century Catalan contributions towards the 
construction of modern political thought is, without doubt, that of Antoni de Cap many i de 
Montpalau."
4 
Following Capmany in the 1820s and 30s was the romantic movement in 
Catalan literature which centred around the journals El Europeo and El Vapor and their 
guiding force, Bonaventura Caries Aribau.5 Again, much of the worked published in these 
reviews was written in Castilian although many of the contributors wrote in Catalan as well. 
As time passed more and more authors began to break with the use of Castilian as a means of 
literary expression in favour ofCatalan. This development was to have political implications 
in the mid-nineteenth century and help to further the development ofCatalan nationalism. 
Historians such as Risques, have argued that la Renaixenya began as an elite-led 
movement in which conservative intellectuals moulded a bourgeois Catalan culture shaped 
by a provincial culture that emphasised, among other things, the defence of historicism, 
Catholicism, and Catalan as a cultivated language.6 This fits in well with the mid-nineteenth 
century European pattern of nationalist evolution where the importance of history and a 
desire to reclaim a language are central to an evolving literary nationalism. A parallel can be 
drawn with the emergence of Finnish nationalism and the desire among elites such as Jean 
Sibelius to encourage Finnish as a nationallanguage, transposing its use among the peasant 
-'Thomas N. Bisson, "L'Epoca dels Grans Comtes-Reis (1137-1276)," in Historia de Catalunya, p. 
279. 
4 Ramon Grau and Marina L6pez, "Antoni de Capmany: el primer model del pensament politic catala 
modem," in El Pensament politic catala del segle XVII a mitjan segle XX, ed. Albert Balcells 
(Barcelona: Edicions 62, 1985), p. 13. . . 
5 Jesus Mestre i Godes Breu historia de Catalunya, 3rd edition (Barcelona: Edicions 62, 1998), p. 196. 
6 Manuel Risques, "Liberalisme, Industrialitzaci6 i Practiques Subalteme~, 1833-1874," in Historia de 
la Catalunya Contemporania, eds. Manuel Risques et al. (Barcelona: Port1c, 1999), p. 143. 
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and working classes to the Swedish-speaking middle and upper classes. A further 
comparison can be made with Scotland when considering the importance of historicism and 
reclaiming the national past. The historical novels of Waiter Scott fostered a romantic view 
of Scotland's history, its national history, while the Macphersons' Ossian sought to reclaim 
Scotland's Celtic past. In many ways nineteenth-century Catalunya was no different, except 
that Catalan elites were reclaiming a language with a long literary tradition from the 
dominance of Castilian as the principal means of literary expression. 
Lo Gaiter del Llobregat and Literary Nationalism 
A key event during la Renaixen9a that reflected this emphasis on historicism and the 
importance of reclaiming the Catalan language was the publication of Catalan poems by 
Joaquim Rubi6 i Ors. Known by his pseudonym Lo Gaiter del Llobregat, Rubi6 i Ors 
published his poetry in the conservative journal Diari 1e Barcelona during the years 1839 
and 1840.
7 
Puig i Oliver argues that the resulting volume ofRubi6 i Ors poems were seen as 
a manifesto of la Renaixen9a and that he had created in the language a symbol, a patriotic 
one that called upon Catalans to reclaim their literary and cultural identity.8 Rubi6 i Ors' 
works and those of other Catalan authors in the mid-nineteenth century were part of a long 
Catalan I iterary tradition, both oral and written, which goes back to the epic histories and 
ballads of the Catalan-speaking troubadours of the Middle Ages. Poets and troubadours such 
as the king Alfons el Cast, Cerveri de Girona, and Ramon Vidal de Besalu were composing 
lyrics and ballads in identifiable Catalan and Proven9al from the middle of the twelfth 
century to the end of the thirteenth.9 According to Mo1as i Batllori, these ballads and 
histories that often related experiences of everyday life were popular among all classes and. 
could be heard sung and recited in both palaces and streets. The legacy of the troubadours 
7 Lluis M. de Puig i Oliver, "La Renaixen9a," in Historia Contemporfmia de Catalunya. Volum I, ed. 
Jaume Sobreques i Callic6 (Barcelona: Columna Assaig, 1997), p. 337. 
8 Ibid., p. 338. 
9 Joaquim Molas i Batllori, "La Literatura," in Historia de Catalunya, p. 127. 
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was significant to the romantics in ninteenth century Catalunya who sought to forge a 
modern Catalan literary identity. Indeed, Rubi6 i Ors believed that by following the way of 
the troubadours it would be possible to fully reclaim the Catalan language. 10 
Accompanying the development of Catalan literature in this period various 
organisations and groups that promoted the literary revival emerged. The restoration of the 
Jocs Floral, or Floral Games, in 1859 helped to bring Catalan literature to a wider audience 
through poetry contests. Risques argues that the institution of the Jocs Florals by the local 
government of Barcelona was an attempt by elites once again to remove Catalan from the 
streets, where it was poorly spoken, and re-establish it as a literary language rooted in 
antiquity.
11 
While largely an apolitical, cultural movement in the 1840s and 1850s, la 
Renaixen9a began to evolve into a coherent expression of a distinct Catalan political identity 
by the late 1860s and early 1870s. Some progressives such as Victor Balaguer took the 
middle-class Catalanism that was emerging out of la Renaixen9a and from it constructed a 
political argument which called for a quasi-federal decentralisation of the monarchic state. 12 
This emergent political nationalism would take shape in the the 1870s following the 1868 
Revolution that brought about an end to the old Borbon regime. 
The Sexenni Democratic 
The 1868 Revolution, "La Gloriosa", that brought about the dethronement oflsabel 
11 encouraged the expansion of the Catalanist movement into the political sphere as calls 
came from Catalan political leaders for constitutional reform. It inaugurated the Sexenni 
Democratic or Six Years of Democracy during which time Catalanists organised themselves 
politically into groups that were strongly anti-centralist and began to call for the 
establishment of a federal republic in Spain. Similar calls were being made prior to the 
revolution by intellectuals in Barcelona who saw the regionalisation of Spain as its salvation. 
10 Puig i Oliver, "La Renaixen9a," p. 338. 
11 Risques, p. 144. 
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Those advocating regionalism existed on both the right of the political spectrum such as Joan 
Mane i Flaquer and Manuel Duran i Bas, and on the left among those who advocated 
federalism and defended the rights of workers such as Francesc Pi i Marga11. 13 By 1869 
under Pi i Margall, federal republicanism had emerged as a major force in Catalunya. Those 
who were sympathetic to the republican cause won a majority of the vote in the elections of 
that year, while in the rest of Spain the party was in a minority. 
Pi i Margall's Federalism 
As the dominant figure among the federal Republicans, Pi i Margall became 
incredibly influential at the time in developing a political ideology that called for radical 
democratic change within Spain. Pi i Margall's nationalism advocated a federal model for 
Spain in which Catalunya would have a greater voice and the centralist legacy of the Borbon 
monarchic state could be overcome. His influence had a long-lasting effect on Catalan 
nationalist thought. This continued right through the period of the Civil War of 1936-39 and 
contributed to the present-day federalist nationalism of the Partit dels Socialistes de 
Catalunya, demonstrating that nationalism need not mean separatism .14 
Pi i Margall was born in Barcelona in 1824. His writings are firmly rooted in the 
ideas of the late nineteenth century as they are characterised by a championing of democracy 
and the need for a division of powers within the State that would bring about increased 
representation and thus greater liberty. As Molas argues, Pi i Margall was in favour of 
greater power being given to lower levels of government, whether they be municipalities 
within a region or a nation within a state.15 Pi i Margall sought to bring about a political 
revolution within Catalunya and Spain by moving from a monarchy to a liberal and 
democratic republic. He desired a shift away from the concentration of power at the centre 
12 Ibid. 
13 
Mestre i Godes, p. 198. . · , 
14 lsidre Molas, "Francesc Pi i Margall: democnlcia i federalisme," in El Pensament Politic Catala, p. 
75. 
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to a federal division of powers and away from an outdated economic system to one that was 
. d . 16 
more progressive an cooperative. He argued that greater decentralisation was the key to 
democratic growth in Spain and ultimately political and economic progress: 
"Decentralisation is unity in variety, and unity in variety is the way of the 
world. Decentralisation is freedom and we are human because we are free. 
De~entralisa.tion is ~ailing to life all those social groups, and in this calling 
to life t.here IS a rap1d move towards progress. That is to say, we support the 
federatiOn of classes and peoples, and we are enemies of the republic as as 
much as we are enemies of the monarchy, unless it is committed to 
decentral isation." 17 
Pi i Margall's ideology was taken up by many leading intellectuals at the time, not the least 
of whom was Valenti Almirall. 
Expansion of Catalanism 
In 1869, Almiralllaunched the strongly anti-centralist and federalist paper, El 
Estado Catalan, in Barcelona. From these early beginnings Almirall went on to publish his 
seminal work Lo Catalanisme in 1885, a political text that laid out the Catalanist programme 
through a crude comparison of the national character of Catalans and the national character 
of Castilians. In employing this approach he argued what was necessary for Catalunya's 
'rebirth' as a nation. In this political environment, Catalanist ideas began to take root among 
the urban middle-classes in Catalunya. In Barcelona in 1870 there appeared the first 
Catalanist association, Jove Catalunya (Young Catalunya), led by the literary figures Angel 
Guimera, Pere Aldavert, and Josep Roca i Roca. This was followed by the publication in 
1871 of the magazine La Renaixensa the purpose of which was to encourage the restoration 
of the Catalan language. It was an influential journal at the time and it was from its title that 
la Renaixen9a derived its name. 
There has been some debate over the extent to which la Renaixen9a was a cultural 
movement and the extent to which it was a means of political mobilisation. The Catalan 
15 Ibid., p. 83. 
16 Ibid., p. 82. 
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historian, Lloren9 Prats, has argued that la Renaixen9a was an ideological movement, literary 
in its inspiration, that lead to a promotion of Catalunya and Catalan identity which became 
the dominant conception of identity in Catalunya during the nineteenth century: " 'the 
Renaixen9a, as an ideological movement mainly expressed in literature, promoted a 
particular definition and symbolic representation of the notion ofCatalunya and Catalan-
ness ... that became hegemonic in Catalunya in the nineteenth century. "'18 Ultimately, 
political Catalanism or Catalan nationalism found fertile ground in this literary and cultural 
renaissance for its development later in the century. While maintaining its cultural roots and 
continuing to champion the promotion of the Catalan language, Catalanism was able to 
develop into a diverse and hegemonic political movement by the twentieth century. It was 
hegemonic in the sense that it dominated political discourse in Catalunya from the end of the 
nineteenth century onwards, giving Catalunya a political culture distinct from the rest of 
Spain. It was diverse in the way it could be appropriated for both cultural and political 
means by groups on all sides of the political and cultural spectra. Republicans, socialists, 
Carlists, anarchists, communists, federalists, separatists, and conservative Catholics at 
various times incorporated Catalanism into their programmes or developed positions in 
response to the overwhelming presence of Catalanist thought in the late nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, as will be discussed. 
The First Republic 
The politics of Spain were thrown into further chaos in the 1870s when the Third 
Carlist War erupted in 1872, reviving the ongoing dynastic disputes that had dominated the 
political landscape for most of the previous sixty years. Upon the abdication of Amadeus of 
Savoy as King of Spain in 1873, the monarchist Parliament proclaimed the establishment of 
the First Republic. Although a new republic had been proclaimed it did not come with a new 
17 Francesc Pi i Margall as quoted in Molas, p. 83. 
18 Lloren~ Prats as quoted in Mestre i Godes, p. 195. 
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constitution, instead the pre-existing 1869 constitution remained the fundamental law of the 
State albeit shorn of all references to the monarchy and the power of the king. 19 In response, 
a small minority of radical Catalan federalists and anarchists tried to coerce the Diputaci6 de 
Barcelona, the provincial government, to proclaim a Catalan state. The radicals' plans were 
undermined by Pi i Margall and Almirall. Despite the efforts of Pi i Margall to lobby in the 
Corts for a federal constitution the First Republic remained strongly centralist in its 
orientation and as a result the efforts ofCatalan federalists were thwarted. 
The First Republic was short-lived and ended with the restoration of the Bourbon 
monarchy in 1874. In Catalunya, Catalanism continued to flourish with the establishment in 
1879 by Almirall of the first Catalan-language newspaper El Diari Catala. This was 
accompanied by the convening, in the same year, of the first Catalanist Congress by Almirall 
that gathered together monarchists, republicans, and Catholics for the purpose of 
coordinating Catalanist organisations. The Congress also agreed to establish a commission 
to defend the position of Catalan civil law within an increasingly centralised and 
standardised Spanish legal system, and to create an academy that would standardise and 
regulate the Catalan language.20 
The Lliga de Catalunya 
The first instance of a coalition of Catalanist groups taking action against the 
centralised state came in 1885. In that year the apolitical group, Centre Catala (Catalan 
Centre), founded in 1882 among the followers of Almirall and Pi i Margall, led a protest 
against the threat posed to the Catalan textile industry by free trade agreements with France 
and Britain.21 The group also protested against the new Castilian law-based Spanish C6digo 
Civil that did not take into account the Catalan civil law tradition. The concerns of the group 
19 
Risques, p. I 34. 1 r 
20 Albert Balcells, Catalan Nationalism: Past and Present, ed. Geoffrey J. Walker, trans. acque me 
Hall (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., I 996), p. 35. 
21 Ibid., p. 36. 
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were laid out in a document titled the Memorial de Greuges (Memorandum of Grievances) 
and presented to Alfonso XII. It was not until 1889 that the demands relating to the anomaly 
of Catalan civil law within the Spanish legal system were met when, as a result of pressure 
exerted by mass rallies organised by the newly founded Lliga de Catalunya, the Catalan civil 
code was entrenched in the C6digo Civil. The Lliga de Catalunya succeeded the Centre 
Catala in 1885 and was a group centred around those who had been involved with the paper 
La Renaixensa and supported by Catalanist university leaders Enric Prat de la Riba, Narcis 
Verdaguer i Califs, Lluis Dom~nech i Mutaner, Francesc Camb6, and Josep Puig i Cadafalch 
who were to become the dominant Catalanist leaders of the first decades of the twentieth 
century.
22 
Increasingly, the Catalanist movement was becoming more conservative and less 
Republican in its orientation, due in part to the emergence and growing influence in the 
1880s of the Catholic Vigantist movement or Vigantisme. 
Torras i Bages and Vigantisme 
Vigantisme was a conservative, Catholic movement based at Vie that established 
itself in opposition to the progressive, liberal Republicanism of Almirall. Its leaders were 
Jaume Collell and the future Catalanist Bishop of Vie, Josep Torras i Bages, and it embraced 
a Catalanist ideology that viewed Catalan identity as intrinsically and necessarily Catholic. 
The emergence of this political ideology in Catalunya during the mid-1880s coincides with 
the development of ultramontanist thought in France and its championing by clerics in 
Quebec such as Ignace Bourget (see above). Vigantisme did not distinguish between 
Catholicism and Catalanism and as such emerged as the dominant branch of conservative 
Catalanist thought in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The ideas of 
Vigantisme were disseminated in the paper La Veu de Montserrat (The Voice of 
Montserrat). The name of the paper derived from the Benedictine monastery at Montserrat 
that was viewed as being the spiritual heart of Catalunya and would later be a focus of anti-
22 Ibid., p. 37. 
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Franco, pro-Catalanist protests during the years of the dictatorship. In 1890, the new 
Barcelona voice of Vigantisme, La Veu de Cata/unya was adopted as the organ of the first 
Catalanist political party, the Lliga Regionalista de Catalunya (Regionalist League of 
Catalunya). The programme of La Veu de Montserrat, and by extension La Veu de 
Cata/unya was conservative, pacifist, and Catholic.23 The paper had as its primary goal the 
renewal of the Catalan 'race', "renovaci6 de la rac;a catalana", and the reclaiming of 
Catalunya's ancient rights. It was strongly historicist in its approach and focussed on 
Catalunya's "antigues glories" (former glories).24 
Vigantisme found its greatest expression in the writings ofTorras i Bages, 
particularly his work La Tradici6 Catalana published in 1892. Born in 1846, Torras i 
Bages' ideology was centred around opposition to the liberalism and secularism that had 
emerged out of Enlightenment thought. He argued that out of this environment had emerged 
a political and social revolution that promoted republicanism and what he viewed as the 
dangerous trend of Jacobin centralisation, the ultimate goal of which was a secularised 
state.
25 
Torras i Bages argued that the proper model for Catalunya's regional development 
was based upon a conception of the Church as it had existed in the Middle Ages in 
Catalunya: as being the focus of society. Again, the influence of historicism is in evidence 
in his thought. Regionalism existed as a way forward against liberal and secular revolution 
and the centralisation of the Spanish state. What was needed was a renewed Catalan society 
that adopted the ideas of the Middle Ages and applied them to the contemporary era.26 In La 
Tradici6 Catalana, Torras i Bages defends the position that the Church and Catalunya are 
23 Maties Ramisa, Els orfgens del catalanisme conservador i «La Veu del Montserrat» 1878-1900 
(Vie: Eumo Editorial, 1985), p. 87. 
24 Ibid. . h' , . d I 
25 Casimir Marti, "Torras i Sages: el regionalisme tradicionalista, un antitipus et1co- Istonc e 
sistema de la Restauraci6," in El Pensament Politic Catala, p. 164-65. 
26 Ibid., p. 173. 
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bound together in such a way by history that to diminish the role of the former would 
threaten the survival of the latter: 
Catalunya and the Church are two things in our land's past that are 
impossible to distinguish between. They are two ingredients that bonded 
well and created the fatherland [patria]. And if somebody would want to 
repudiate the Church, he should have no doubts that he would also be 
repudiating the fatherland. 27 
There are very strong echoes in the political philosophy of Torras i Sages of ultramontanism 
and its condemnation of liberalism and the secularisation of traditional society. Torras i 
Sages' contemporaries in Quebec, including lgnace Bourget and Jules-Paul Tardive!, were 
adopting very similar positions vis a vis the position of the French-Canadian nation within 
Canada. The writings of French ultramontanes Veuillot and Le Maistre were having a clear 
impact on conceptions of Church and State in Catholic Europe and Quebec and how prelates 
and other Catholic polemicists conceived ofnationalism.The impact ofTorras i Sages' 
philosophy and ofVigantisme in general shaped the future of conservative Catalanist 
political thought, particularly as represented by the Lliga Regionalista de Catalunya. The 
1890s was a decade of political developments in Catalunya based upon an evolving sense of 
political identity. With this evolution came greater organisation of the Catalanist movement 
and an expanding list of Regionalist demands directed at the Spanish government. 
The Uni6 Catalanista and the Bases de Manresa 
In 1891 the umbrella Catalanist organisation, Uni6 Catalanista (Catalanist Union) 
was established and it was through its actions that demands for Catalan regional autonomy 
were first organised into a specific political programme. The drafting of the Bases de 
Manresa (The Manresa Bases) at Manresa in 1892 by Uni6 Catalanista encapsulated the 
constitutional programme of the Catalanists. The document called for Catalan self-
government; established the bases for a regional constitution; and called for the 
27 Josep Torras i Bages, La Tradici6 Catalana, as quoted in Marti, P· 168. 
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establishment of Catalan as the only official language of Catalunya.28 The specific 
constitutional proposals focused on decentralisation and new roles for Catalan institutions . 
They included the demand that a Catalan government have jurisdiction over justice and 
public order; that obligatory military service be replaced by a volunteer force; that only 
Catalans be eligible to hold office in Catalunya; and that there be no appeals beyond the 
Catalan high court.
29 
The bases were framed by liberal constitutional thought, emphasising 
the rights and liberties of the Catalan people, as Base 2 establishes: 
The expansive character of our ancient legislation will be maintained in the 
formal part of the Catalan Regional Constitution, amending, where in 
keeping with new needs, its wise clauses which are respectful of the rights 
and freedoms of Catalans.30 
Indeed, this document was promoted as being the expressed wishes of the Catalan people 
since a broad cross-section of Catalan civil society was represented in the 243 delegates 
present at Manresa including writers, artists, architects, historians, academics, clergy, 
lawyers, doctors, and businessmen.31 Among those Catalanist leaders present were Guimera, 
Puig i Cadafalch, and Domenech i Mutaner. This was a watershed in the history of 
Catalanist development in that it was the first time a broad consensus was reached by 
Catalan civil society on the way forward towards the goal ofCatalan self-government within 
Spain. It could be argued that the Bases de Manresa and the movement behind them were 
not unlike the Claim of Right in Scotland one hundred years later which put Scotland firmly 
on the road to devolution.32 Yet, the Bases de Manresa did not lead to any real degree of 
devolution or self-government for Catalunya at the end of the nineteenth century and the 
Mancomunitat of the 191 Os was to prove to be insufficient. One could argue that the failure 
28 Balcells, p. 38. 
29 1bid. 
30 Uni6 Catalanista, "Bases pera la constituci6 regional catalana" (Barcelona: Estampa de «La 
Renaixensa», 1900), p. 7. 
31 Mestre i Godes, p.202. · 
32 The impact of the Claim of Right on Scottish devolution will be explored further m chapter seven. 
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to achieve a more devolved Catalunya during this period was due to the inherent instability 
of the Spanish state, of which the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera was symptomatic. 
The L/iga Reginonalista de Catalunya: Autonomism and Conservativism 
By 190 I a group of right-wing nationalists organised themselves into the Lliga 
Regionalista de Catalunya (Regionalist League ofCatalunya), a new party which emerged 
out of the Centre Nacional Catala and the Uni6 Regionalista. The moderate and Catalanist 
Lliga reflected the middle-class perspective shared by both its precursor parties. It was 
dominated by the urban bourgeoisie of Barcelona who were disaffected by Madrid and its 
antagonism towards the Catalan middle-classes' modernism and support of industry.33 The 
key founding members of the party were Domenech i Mutaner, Puig i Cadafalch, Verdaguer 
i Callis, Francesc Camb6, and the emergent Catalanist leader Enric Prat de la Riba. Two 
years earlier Prat de la Riba and Pere Muntanyola had founded La Veu de Catalunya, a paper 
that embraced much of the rhetoric ofVigantisme.34 Prat de la Riba expressed the view in a 
1902 edition of La Veu that "the conquest of Spain is a fatal consequence of our 
nationalism."35 The conquest, in Prat de la Riba's view, would be a peaceful one by which 
the establishment of autonomy and federalism as well as the Catalan 'race's' conception of 
~ h . good government would be entrenched. Views such as these would shape t e conservative 
Catalanism of the Lliga and its understanding of the Spanish State as it emerged at the 
beginning of the twentieth century as the dominant Catalan party. 
In 1901, the Lliga fought their first elections in Barcelona in which it did well 
against the republicans ofUni6 Republicana garnering 6.3% of the vote compared to the 
33 Josep M. Roig Rosich, "Catalanisme, Anticatalanisme i Obrerisme, 1900-1930," in Historia de la 
Catalunya Contemporania, p. 218. . . 
34 Angel Duarte, "La Restauraci6 Canovista, 1875-1900," in Historia de la Catalunya Contemporama, 
o. 168. . d 1 R · · 
~5 Enric Prat de la Riba as quoted in Francesc Bonamusa, "Les Dtficultats e a econstruccto 
Nacional ( 1898-1980)," in Historia de Catalunya, p. 466. 
36 Ibid. 
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latter's 4.4o/o; the monarchists remained the dominant party.37 In 1905, the republicans were 
victorious in Catalunya in the general election, however the Lliga's percentage of the 
popular vote was on the rise. In the local elections for Barcelona in the same year they took 
twelve seats compared to Uni6's fourteen, demonstrating that the Lliga had emerged as the 
principal Catalanist rival to the republicans.38 This was due in large part to the divisions that 
existed within the republican movement during this period. Uni6 was a very broad coalition, 
or 'union', of disparate republican groups including moderate Catalanist republicans such as 
Pi i Margall, groups of radical workers, and the new activist republicanism championed by 
Alejandro Lerroux. In 1908 Lerroux and his followers established the Partit Republica 
Radical which Roig Rosich argues created a clearly radical and republican alternative to the 
monarchists and the emerging bourgeois Catalanism of the Lliga.39 
As support for the Lliga increased it met greater opposition from various other 
quarters, particularly those opposed to Catalanism such as the army. In 1905 soldiers from 
the Barcelona garrison attacked two of the Lliga's papers, Cu-cut! and La Veu de Catalunya 
for their brutal satirising of the army's defeat in the Spanish-American War of 1898. The 
Catalanist response to the army's attack was a mass mobilisation of the main Catalanist 
forces, the Lliga, Uni6 Catalanista, republican Catalanists, Carlists, and a few other 
republicans. These groups came together in yet another broad coalition, Solidaritat Catalana 
(Catalan Solidarity) that was founded in Girona in 1906. In that same year Solidaritat gained 
71% of the votes in local elections in Barcelona, compared to the anti-Solidaritat 
Republicans headed by Lerroux.40 The coalition had given Catalanism one of its most 
significant electoral successes to date. This success was tempered by the events of 1909 and 
la Setmana Tragic~ events that placed all the Catalanist gains in jeopardy. 
37 Balcells, p. 44. 
38 Ibid., p.53. 
39 Roig Rosich, "Catalanisme, Anticatalanisme i Obrerisme, 1900-1930," p. 221. 
40 Ibid., p. 58. 
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La Setmana Tragica 
La Setmana Tragica (The Tragic Week) began in Barcelona with a mass protest 
against the incidents that eventually began the Moroccan War. By the end it had turned into 
a frenzied attack on conservative institutions, in particular the Church. The results of the 
violence were that 40 religious schools, monasteries and convents were burned and 
destroyed as were 12 parish churches in and around Barcelona. No one admitted 
responsibility for the atrocities, but it became evident that much of the damage had been 
caused by a radical group within the Partit Republica Radical known as the j6venes barbaros 
(Young Barbarians).
41 
The right-wing, populist Partit Republica Radical and Lerroux had 
emerged as the staunchest opponents of Catalanism; they were also rampantly anti-clerical 
and extreme Spanish nationalists whose political approach was typified by the street violence 
of the Young Barbarians.
42 
The political fallout from la Setmana Tragica was the closure of 
all non-denominational schools and republican clubs by the Maura government in Madrid 
following a brutal repression of the violence and execution of 5 people. These actions were 
supported by the Lliga in La Veu de Catalunya.43 
The Mancomunitat 
In the 1914 Barcelona elections the Lliga was victorious. For the next seven years 
the Lliga's hegemony in Barcelona was confirmed again and again. Their dominance was 
due in large part to there being no party that was more liberal than the Lliga and the absence 
of any viable leftist party.44 The strength of the Lliga in 1914 prompted the monarchist 
government in Madrid to establish the Mancomunitat, a commonwealth of the four Catalan 
provinces which would regionalise services in Barcelona. Enric Prat de la Riba was chosen 
as the first President of the Mancomunitat and following his death suceeded by the Catalanist 
41 
Mestre i Godes, p. 205. . · · 1898 1998 
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architect, Puig i Cadafalch, in 1917. The nationalism of Prat de la Riba made a significant 
impression on Catalanist thought, arguing as he did strongly for Catalunya's existence as a 
distinct nation and the need for regionalism to develop further towards a mature and self-
assured nationalism.
45 
Prat de la Riba saw the development of a Catalan nationalism as being 
essential to the development of civil society in Catalunya and in constructing a world view 
that was internationalist: 
.. .the Nation, that is, a society of people who speak a distinct language and 
share the same spirit which is clearly one and unique through the variety of 
all collective life ... thus we arrived at a clear and concise notion of 
nationality, to the conception of this social, primary, fundamental unity, 
destined to exist in world society, in Humanity ... 46 
Prat de la Riba's writings in works such as La Nacionalitat Catalana and La Naci6 i I 'Est at 
made a valuable contribution to the thought of the moderate right in Catalanism, later 
inspiring many in the revived Catalanist movement of the 1950s such as Jordi Pujol.47 
With Prat de la Riba's death the development of the Mancomunitat's role in 
Catalunya was left to Puig i Cadafalch who would ultimately contribute to its demise. By 
1920 all of the Catalan diputaci6ns had completed the transfer of services to the 
Mancomunitat, giving it control over such areas as roads and agriculture.48 There was no 
devolution of services from the state to the new regional body. In the same year the council 
of the Mancomunitat presented to the Spanish Congress a proposal for Catalan self-
government. The proposal was soundly rejected, causing the Catalan minority to withdraw 
from the Cortes, demonstrating the limits of the Mancomunitat and thus the limits of this 
attempt at decentralisation. 
44 Roig Rosich, "Catalanisme, Anticatalanisme i Obrerisme, 1900-1930," P· ~?~· , . 
45 Jordi Casassas i Ymbert, "Enric Prat de la Riba: le tenacitat d'un estratega, m El Pensament pohttc 
catal~ p. 189. . 
46 Enric Prat de la Riba as quoted in Casassas 1 Ymbert, p. 189. 
47 Balcells, p. 139. 
48 Ibid., p. 69. 
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In 1922 a serious split resulted in the Lliga led by Jaume Bofill i Mates and Nicolau 
d'Olwer, who went on to found Acci6 Catalana (Catalan Action) at the Conferencia 
Nacional Catalana (Catalan National Conference) along with the nationalist Republicans of 
Antoni Rovira i Yirgili. Their goal was to unite all nationalist opinion in Catalunya and 
challenge the hegemony of the Lliga.49 Acci6 Catalana had tremendous support within the 
Mancomunitat and among former members. This led to its defeating the Lliga in provincial 
elections in the 2"d district of Barcelona in 1923, which initiated the decline of the Lliga as 
the dominant political force in Catalunya. Although there were significant political tensions 
within Catalanism at the time it can be argued that nothing could have prepared the 
Mancomunitat for the events of September 1923 when General Primo de Rivera seized 
power in a coup d'etat. 
Catalanism and the Dictatorship of Prima De Rivera 
In his role as President of the Mancomunitat Puig i Cadafalch tacitly, and 
mistakenly, supported Primo de Rivera whom he saw as being pro-regionalist. 5° This proved 
to be a grievous error since very soon after seizing power Primo de Rivera halted the 
progress of Catalanism by banning the Catalan language and flag and outlawing numerous 
organisations such as the apolitical youth movement Pomells de Joventut (Garlands of 
Youth). Puig i Cadafalch was forced to resign as President of the Mancomunitat in 1924 and 
was succeeded by the dictator's puppet, Alfons Sala Argemi, who initiated a purge of 
Catalanism within the institution. Ultimately, the Mancomunitat was abolished by Primo de 
Rivera in 1925. The politics of the Mancomunitat and attempts to decentralise the Spanish 
State were replaced by an authoritarian unitarism that emphasised the sovereignty of the 
State and promoted a "hegemonic and homog~nising Spanish-ness."51 Centralisation was 
accompanied by significant repression on the part of the regime. The dictatorship through its 
49 Roig Rosich, "Catalanisme, Anticatalanisme i Obrerisme, 1900-1930," p. 262. 
50 Balcells, p. 83. 
76 
Nationalism and Cata/unya 1840-1980 
party the Union Patri6tica imposed a Spanish nationalism that was based upon religion and 
upon a deterministic conception of history.52 Under Prime de Rivera political life changed 
fundamentally as all political parties were banned as were the trades unions while military 
officials occupied administrative positions throughout Spain. In Catalunya all specifically 
Catalan organisations and bodies were surpressed, all Catalanist and regionalist politicians 
were replaced by those who embraced Spanish-ness, and all higher officials were replaced 
by military personnel.53 
During the dictatorship, Catalanist action was not entirely repressed. For instance, 
there was moderate growth in the number of Catalan newspapers from seven in 1923 to ten 
by 1927.
54 
In 1926, in an attempt to engineer an insurrection in Catalunya, the militant left-
wing separatist Francesc Macia tried to enter Catalunya from France with a group of 
guerillas from his party Estat Catala their goal being to overthrow Prime de Rivera. Macia's 
insurrection failed and he was subsequently tried and exiled to Belgium. 
Republican Catalanism 
In 1930, Prime de Rivera suddenly resigned and constitutional rights were restored 
under the new government, in which the Lliga refused to participate because of the 
repression unleashed against Catlunya during the dictatorship. The position of the Lliga as a 
dominant party was further challenged in the same year when the Spanish republican parties 
signed a pact with the left-wing Catalan parties Estat Catala, Acci6 Catalana and its offshoot 
Acci6 Republicana de Catalunya (Republican Action of Catalunya). The Pacte de Sant 
Sebastia united the republican forces and pledged that a future Republican government 
would grant Catalunya a statute of autonomy, at the same time preparing a coup d'etat to 
51 Roig Rosich, "Catalanisme, Anticatalanisme i Obrerisme, 1900-1930," P· 265. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid., p. 267. 
54 Ibid., p. 85. 
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implement their plans.
55 
This represented a fundamental reorganising of left Catalanist forces 
along unified Republican lines, bringing about also a reunited Acci6 Catalana under the 
name Partit Catalanista Republica (Catalanist Republican Party) or PCR. To the centre of 
these far-left parties existed a large number of organisations, parties and workers' groups 
which represented varying degrees of orthodox separatism, nationalism, republicanism and 
federalism. These groups lacked both focus and a common sense of strategy unlike the far-
left republicans. As a result they were increasingly on the margins of what was happening 
politically in Catalunya immediately prior to the start of the Civil War. 56 
The 1930s were a decade of profound upheaval for both Catalunya and Spain, a 
decade of tremendous advances in terms of Catalunya gaining greater autonomy within the 
Spain of the Second Republic while also one of great tragedy and repression. The left in 
Catalunya was ascendant in 1931, winning 68% of council seats compared to 21% for the 
Lliga.
57 
The parties of the moderate left Partit Republica Catala and Estat Catala were united 
under one banner in the elections. The new party Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, ERC 
(Republican Left of Catalunya), was to dominate Catalan politics up to the Civil War and re-
emerge during the transition to democracy in the 1970s. In the 1931 general election ERC's 
victory was repeated in electing twenty-five members compared to the federalists five, the 
Lliga's three, and the PCR's three. 58 Following ERC's victory in Catalunya and 
corresponding republican successes across Spain on 14 April 1931 Lluis Companys of ERC 
proclaimed the new Catalan republic from Barcelona's City Hall followed by Francesc 
Macia's proclamation on the balcony of the old Mancomunitat of"the Catalan Republic as a 
55 Mestre i Godes, p. 208. . . 
56 Lluis M. de Puig i Oliver, "El catalanisme politic durant la Restaurac16. Dels ongens a la 
Mancomunitat," in Historia Contemporania de Catalunya. Volum I, p. 433. 
57 
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58 Josep M. Roig Rosich, "Segona Republica i Guerra Civil, m H1stona de la ata unya 
Contemporania, p. 286. 
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State within the Iberian Federation."59 The Catalan Republic lasted only three days before 
Macia reached an agreement with the Spanish republicans to fulfil the Pacte de Sant 
Sebastia and bring into existence regional government for Catalunya under the name of the 
Generalitat. After a referendum in which 99% of Catalans supported the statute bringing the 
General itat and new regional regime into force the Statute of Self-Government was 
proclaimed in 1932 bringing a much greater degree of decentralisation through the creation 
of such a regional government. 
The Second Republic and Catalunya 
The Generalitat under the presidency of Macia gained considerable devolved powers 
in the Statute. The Catalan language was granted official status in Catalunya for the first 
time alongside Castilian. This was a major boost to the Catalanist cause. In terms of 
powers, the Generalitat exercised exclusive jurisdiction over Catalan civil law and territorial 
administration. It had executive powers in the areas of social insurance, labour relations, and 
it had devolved powers relating to law and order, administration of justice and public works. 
It was, thus, a major development in relations between Catalunya and the Spanish state, 
bringing about for the first time a great degree of the powers of self-government that 
Catalanists had been arguing for since the publication of Les Bases de Manresa. 
In 1933, there was yet another change in the political landscape of Catalunya with 
the dissolution of the last isolated fragments of Acci6 Catalana and the move by Antoni 
Rovira i Virgili and Caries Pi i Sunyer to ERC, other members established the Christian 
democratic party Uni6 Democratica de Catalunya (Democratic Union of Catalunya), or 
UDC. While ERC dominated the Generalitat and Parliament, the republican right and the 
Partit Republica Radical were weak. However, at the same time the larger Spanish right-
wing coalition, the Confederaci6n Espafiola de Derechas Autonomas, CEDA (Spanish 
Confederation of Right-wing Autonomous Groups) emerged as a powerful anti-republican 
59 Mestre i Godes, p. 209. 
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force. The left-wing programme of ERC provoked considerable unease amongst the 
landowning and petit bourgeois classes of Catalunya. In ·1934, the Generalitat's Llei de 
Contractes de Conreu (Catalan Law of Agricultural Contracts) was introduced as a social 
reform bill that allowed a majority ofCatalunya's tenant fanners to buy their land. This 
reform was bitterly opposed by the landowners and ultimately was disallowed by the 
government in Madrid, provoking the ERC as well as the Basque Nationalists to withdraw 
from the Corts Generals. The growing right-wing sentiment was made manifest in the fall of 
the Samper government that same year and the establishment of a right-wing government led 
by Lerroux and CEDA. 
The change in government brought a quick response from Barcelona. The new 
President of the Generalitat, Lluis Companys, declared his opposition to the Madrid 
government on 6 October 1934 and proclaimed the existence of a Catalan state within a new 
Spanish federal republic. Companys' state lasted only ten hours before he was forced to 
surrender to the army. Lerroux and Madrid viewed Companys' act as a separatist rebellion, 
resulting in he and his ministers being sentenced to thirty years hard labour as a result. At 
the same time all municipal councils were suspended by Madrid, the press was censored, and 
earlier social reforms such as the Llei de Contractes de Conreu were repealed. The fallout 
from the events of 1934 continued into the following year when Lerroux repealed the 
Catalan Statute of Self-Government, dismissed the civil servants, and closed the Parliament. 
Leftist agitation in Barcelona increased and in 1935 the Trotskyist Andreu Nin helped to 
establish the Partit Obrer d'Unificaci6 Marxista, POUM (Workers' Party of Marxist 
Unification). It sets itself in opposition to the Stalinist Partido Socialista Obrero Espafiol, 
PSOE (Spanish Socialist Workers' Party) anq the Partido Communista Espafiol, PCE 
(Spanish Communist Party).The ground was then set for civil war in Spain as the parties on 
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the right and left established their hard-line positions, and ERC had an effective hegemony in 
the General itat. 
The Civil War 
A seemingly infinite number of sources exist on the events leading to the Spanish 
Civil War and the war itself, offering a variety of historical, political, and economic 
interpretations. It is not appropriate here to enter into a prolonged discussion of the Civil 
War and its effects on Catalunya as they are well documented. However, something should 
be said of the events of 1936 and their impact on Catalunya.60 With the electoral victory of 
the leftist Front d' Esquerres, the Catalan Frente Popular, and Spanish left in the rest of Spain 
the Generalitat was re-established and amnesties granted. At that time there was a further 
consolidation of Socialist parties in Catalunya when the Catalan parties Uni6 Socialista de 
Catalunya (USC), the Partit Comunista de Catalunya (PCC), the Partit Catala Proletari, and 
the Catalan branch of the PSOE formed the Partit Socialist Unificat de Catalunya, PSUC 
(Unified Socialist Party of Catalunya). The new party was a national party of Communists 
and Socialists whose focus was Catalunya and their goal the establishment of a 
Socialist/Communist hegemony in Catalunya, according to Caminal.61 The leader of the new 
coalition was Joan Comorera, leader of the USC. He was a formidable political thinker who 
contributed greatly to the evolution of Socialism in Catalunya during the Second Republic. 
The Marxist Political Thought of Joan Comorera 
Comorera was a Communist intellectual who subscribed to Leninist doctrines 
pertaining to nations and nationalities, and who saw the exercise of the right to self-
60 For a more detailed account of the events leading up to the Civil War see Paul Preston The Coming 
of the Spanish Civil War: Reform. Reaction and Revolution in the Second Republic. For t~e ~ivil . 
War itself see Preston's A Concise History ofthe Spanish Civil War, Raymond Carr The Civil War m 
Spain, or Preston and Mackenzie The Republic Besieged: The Civil War in Spain .. ~or the Civil War 
in Catalunya see Various Authors Catalunya i la guerra civil, P. Page~ ~a.guerra civ~l espanyola a 
Catalunya and A. Manent De 1936 a 1975: Estudis sobre la Guerra Civil I el Frangmsme for a broader 
examination of Franco's victory on Catalunya. 
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determination as a means to achieve an international family of nations united in the common 
cause of Socialism. Comorera was anti-clerical and republican in his outlook and he viewed 
the Second Republic of the embodiment of liberty and democracy, two principles that were 
incompatible with the old clerical, conservative, authoritarian, monarchic Spain: 
The Republic was coming to symbolise the fight against economic 
bac~wardness, against cruel social injustice, against alienating clerical ism, 
agamst conservative authoritarianism ... against the Monarchy, as 
incompatible with freedom and democracy.62 
Comorera's concept of revolution thus involved the shedding of the undemocratic and 
illiberal political culture of pre-Republican Spain. It was his view that only the working 
class of Catalunya had the power or the capacity to change Catalunya since neither the 
landowners or the petit bourgeoisie of Barcelona were motivated by either history or 
experience to bring about revolutionary change.63 Joan Comorera was to play a central role 
in guiding the PSUC in the last years of the Second Republic as well as during the Civil War 
and the early years of the Franco regime. 
Collapse of the Generalitat 
The re-establishment of the Generalitat was followed in July by the revolt of 
Franco's troops in Morocco and the start of the Civil War. Barcelona was the main 
republican centre and where the Generalitat under Companys sought to maintain control over 
Catalunya in an atmosphere of street violence between Socialists, members of the POUM, 
and the anarchists of the Confederaci6n Nacional del Trabajo, CNT (National Confederation 
of Labour). In an effort to bring about some unity of purpose in fighting the Nationalist 
forces of General Franco, Companys formed an alliance with the CNT: the Comite Central 
de Milicies Antifeixistes, CCMA (Central Committee of Anti-Fascist Militias). The 
increasing influence and power of the anarch.ists and Marxists of the PSUC and POUM 
61 Miquel Caminal, "Joan Comorera: vers un comunisme catala," in El Pensament politic catal~ pp. 
395-96. 
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forced the hand of Companys who in September 1936 welcomed the CNT, PSUC, and 
POUM into a coalition government with the ERC under Josep Taradellas.64 The new 
coalition did not last long as infighting broke out between the POUM and PSUC. It was 
further undermined by a POUM backed anarchist mutiny in May of 1937 which left a 
government made up of the ERC and PSUC surviving until the end of the war. The events 
of the Civil War and the power struggles in Catalunya among left-wing forces that resulted 
from it brought about the end of the Generalitat and undermined the successes of the Second 
Republic and moderate left-wing Catalanism. With the fall of Barcelona to Franco's forces 
in January 1939 and the forced exile of almost 60,000 Catalan political and other leaders the 
"oasis of the republic" that had been Catalunya was shattered.65 What followed was a 
prolonged period of Fascist repression and reprisals that had a negative impact on Catalan 
nationalism. 
Franco and Catalunya 
The Nationalists of Franco were profoundly anti-regionalist and anti-Catalanist. This 
led to a rapid shift in power from the abolished Generalitat to the dictator in whom all state 
power was vested. During the 1940s the use of Catalan was banned under Franco as it had 
been under Primo de Rivera, 25,000 civil servants were dismissed, and pro-Catalanist school 
teachers were removed to other parts of Spain and replaced with teachers from Castilla and 
Extremadura whose role was the de-Catalanisation of the school system.66 The most brutal 
repression came at the hands of the military tribunals. Between 1939 and 1945 
approximately 40,000 Catalans were forced to appear before the tribunals in Catalunya. The 
same tribunals executed approximately 4,000 Catalans for political purposes between 193 8 
and 1953. In some provinces, such as Baix Penedes, along the coast south of Barcelona over 
63 Ibid., p.395. 
64 Balcells, p. I 17. 
65 Ibid., p. 125. 
66 Ibid., p. 127. 
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3o/o of the population was executed. In Barcelona itself 573 people were executed during 
that period
67 
Exiled Catalan intellectuals established themselves abroad at this time with the 
first organisation being the Consell Nacional de Catalunya set up in 1939 under Lluis 
Companys, with Pompeu Fabra, Rovira i Virgili, Josep Pous i Pages, and Santiago Pi i 
Sunyer involved.
68 
This was a short-lived group, eventually broken up by the capture of 
Companys by the Gestapo and his subsequent execution by Franco in October of that year in 
Barcelona. Ultimately, a government in exile was set up in London under the aegis of the 
Consell Nacional Catala with Caries Pi i Sunyer as representative of the Generalitat and 
Josep Batitsta i Roca as secretary. In Barcelona, Josep Pous i Pages established the Consell 
Nacional de la Democracia Catalan, CNDC (National Council ofCatalan Democracy) in 
1945 which was sponsored by a wide range of left-wing student and labour groups as well as 
by former members of the POUM, CNT, the Uni6 Democratica de Catalunya and the Front 
Nacional de Catalunya.69 Relationships between the remaining militants in Catalunya and 
the exiles were frequently strained as they both tried to rebuild after the Civil War. 
Catalanism, however, did not die out as a movement or ideology during the years of Franco's 
dictatorship. As will be discussed, Catalanism was maintained by small groups of 
individuals and by one major player in Catalan civil society, the Catholic Church. 
The Catalan Church and Resistance to Franco 
The Church hierarchy was split on the issue of Catalunya, but there were many 
activist priests and religious who through various activities and Church-sponsored 
organisations promoted Catalanism relatively openly. One seminal event took place in 1947 
when the Virgin of Montserrat was enthroned at the Benedictine monastery at Monserrat. It 
was an event attended by 70,000 people with a ceremony conducted in Catalan below a hill 
67 Borja de Riquer, "Franquisme, Transici6 i Democnkia," in Historia de la Catalunya 
Contempon\nia, p. 361. 
68 Balcells., p. 126. 
69 Ibid., p. 129. 
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top on which a Catalan flag flew. Due to the autonomous position of the monastery within 
the Church, it was little affected by Franco's National Catholicism and its abbot, Abbot 
Escarre, acted with impunity against the regime on a number of occasions in the 1950s. 
Among the various Church organisations that were Catalanist in their orientation, including 
the Catholic Scout Movement of Fr. Antoni Batlle and the student sections of the Jesuit 
Marian congregations, the most activist was Crist i Catalunya or Cristians Catalans (CC) 
founded in 1954.70 
Cristians Catalans was a non-political, Catholic organisation that promoted 
Catalanism and trained militants to fight the regime's Spanish nationalism and anti-
Catalanism. CC was established during the era of the Second Vatican Council at which John 
XXIII had repudiated Franco's doctrine of National Catholicism and condemned his 
repression. The most militant section of CC was led by Jordi Pujol, a group which 
engineered one of the most significant mass protest actions during the period of the regime. 
The leader of the Francoist Barcelona paper La Vanguardia, Luis Martinez Galinsoga, had 
attended mass at which the priest preached in Catalan and he reacted afterwards by uttering 
the fateful words: "Todos Ios catalanes son una mierda," (All Catalans are shit.). Pujol and 
his followers protested against Galinsoga which resulted in the mass cancellation of 
subscriptions to the paper and a fall in its revenue. Franco was forced ultimately to get rid of 
a disgraced Galinsoga. Towards the later years of the regime, in the 1960s, a growing 
number of clerics in Catalunya were willing to take a stand against the government. Another 
clear example of this was the clerical protest after the events of la Caputxinada. 
La Caputxinada and Student Resistance 
In 1966, a group of students from the University of Barcelona who were members of 
the newly established left-wing, pro-Catalanist and independent students' organisation, the 
Sindicat Democratic d'Estudiants de la Universitat de Barcelona (SDEUB), were meeting in 
70 Ibid., p. 140. 
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the Capuchin monastery of Sarra in Barcelona.71 The purpose of the meeting was to listen to 
a group of Catalanist literary figures, Jordi Rubi6, Salvador Espriu, and Joan Oliver. The 
meeting was broken up when the police raided the monastery, arresting the speakers and 
numerous student leaders. University staff connected with SDEUB were dismissed and one 
Communist student leader was dealt with harshly by the police. The regime's reaction 
prompted a protest of 130 priests and religious in front of police headquarters which was 
dispersed by uniformed police with truncheons. This event is seen as seminal in the history 
of opposition to Franco in Catalunya. It demonstrated that a much broader group of 
organisations, many Catalanist in orientation, were emerging in the late 1960s and willing to 
go farther than before in their open opposition to the regime. 
Revival of Catalanist Organisations in the 1960s 
Towards the end of the dictatorship during which there was a greater degree of 
openness than there had been before, Catalanist forces began to organise in preparation for a 
return to democracy. In 1969 the Coordinadora de Forces Politiques de Catalunya, CFPC 
(Coordination of the Political Forces ofCatalunya) was established by the PSUC, UDC, and 
ERC and was one of the first attempts to coordinate all the forces opposed to the Franco 
regime. At the insistence of the CFPC, the Assemblea de Catalunya was convoked at the 
church of Sant Agusti in Barcelona in 1971 at which meeting a programme was developed 
calling for a general amnesty, a statute of self-government for Catalunya, and a coordination 
of forces opposed to the dictatorship. The Assemblea de Catalunya, like the meeting at 
Manresa almost one hundred years earlier, was a coming together of Catalan civil society in 
an attempt to bring about change in the Spanish government and recognise the goals of 
Catalanism. Among those organisations involved in the Assemblea were the political parties 
of the CFPC, the Grup Cristia de Defensa dels Drets Humans (Christian Group for the 
71 Joan Casanas, El Progressisme Catolic a Catalunya (1940-1980) (Barcelona: La Liar del Llibre, 
1988), p. 287. 
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Defence of Human Rights), the Assemblea Permanent d'Intel·lectuals (Permanent Assembly 
of Intellectuals), the Comunitats Cristianes de Base (Basic Christian Communities), the 
Assemblea Permanent de Capellans (Permanent Assembly of Priests), and various other 
professional and neighbourhood associations.72 The prominent role played by the Church in 
the defence of Catalanism during the last decades was clearly reflected by their involvement 
in the Assemblea. 
Post-Franco Catalan Nationalism 
With the death of Franco in November of 1975, the Assemblea's role diminished as 
the then legalised political parties began to fill the vacuum that had been created. The 
demands voiced in Catalunya for a return to self-government and the Generalitat were 
difficult for the new government of Arias Navarro in Madrid to ignore. However the 
government did choose to move more slowly than Catalans had wanted and only proposed 
the bare minimum, a form of Mancomunitat.73 Massive demonstrations of over 100,000 
filled the streets around Barcelona demanding that the government act quickly to bring about 
self-government. In the period following Franco's death the liberalisation of the media gave 
a boost to Catalanists when the first Catalan daily paper, Avui, began publication in 1976, 
the same year in which Radio 4 began broadcasting in Catalan and the Institut d'Estudis 
Catalans was recognised. 
With the victory of the left in Catalunya in the first democratic elections of 15 June 
1977 and a victory for the autonomous parties in local elections, the newly formed Union 
Central Democratico (UCD) government of Adolfo Suarez chose to act to address the 
Catalan question. 74 Josep Taradellas, President of the Generalitat-in-exile in France returned 
to Spain in 1977 for meetings with Suarez over the Catalan question. Suarez took a risky 
political decision in choosing not to negotiate with the newly elected Catalan representatives 
72 Balcells., p. 165. 
73 Ibid., p. 169. 
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and with Taradellas instead because Taradellas was seen by many as the symbol of 
Catalanism, a Catalanism that had been defiant throughout the dictatorship.75 Under 
Taradellas, a provisional Catalan government was set up in October 1977 made up of 
socialists, communists, the UCD, and the Pacte Democratic. Following the adoption of the 
new Spanish constitution in I 978 in which the right of the "historic nationalities" to 
autonomous community status was recognised, the Assembly ofCatalan Parliamentarians 
met at Sau to draw up a new statute of self-government. On 25 October the Statute of Self-
Government was ratified by Catalans in a referendum and the Generalitat with devolved 
powers was once again established in Barcelona. Elections were called for the new 
Parliament in which the socialists and communists performed well and took a majority of 
seats in Barcelona. But in the process a new force emerged in Catalan politics, namely CiU. 
CiU was a coalition formed between the Christian Democratic Uni6 Democratica de 
Catalunya and the left-of-centre Convergimcia Democratica de Catalunya, and was led by 
Jordi Pujol. Ultimately, the nationalist coalition came to dominate the Parliament and the 
Generalitat and under Pujol CiU became a dominant player in the power politics of the new 
Spain. A new Catalanism rooted in the Catalanism of the early twentieth century became the 
dominant force in post-Franco Catalan politics as Catalunya participated in a newly 
decentralising, regional Spanish State. 
The constitutional developments that came following the death of Franco will be 
explored in greater detail in chapter six when the balance of powers between the State and 
the autonomous communities in the 1978 constitution is examined more closely. Greater 
attention will also be given to the Catalan Statute of Autonomy and how it helps to define the 
structure of the modern Spanish State and what has emerged as an expanding asymmetrical 
relationship. The perceptions ofCatalan political and academic participant-observers of 
74 Ibid., p. 170. 
75 Romero Salvad6, pp. 168-69. 
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Catalunya's place within Spain's constitutional framework will be analysed in chapter six in 
an effort to examine the various approaches of Catalan nationalism,federalist, autonomist, 
and independentist towards the reform of the State. These three strands have evolved over 
the course of 150 years and continue to provide three very different routes towards greater 
recognition of Catalunya in Spain. After continual fluctuation between periods of 
decentralisation and centralisation beginning in the 1900s Catalan nationalism has come to 




Nationalism and Scotland 1707-1999: From Union to Parliament 
As with the two previous chapters that gave some brief background of the 
development of nationalism in Quebec and Catalunya, this chapter examines the major 
influences on the development of political nationalism in Scotland. In tracing the evolution 
of Scottish nationalism this chapter will focus on the constitutional developments that have 
shaped Scotland since the Union and the impact of the debate between Unionism and 
Scottish nationalism as expressed in the activities of nationalist groups and other political 
parties. Whereas the evolution of political nationalism in Quebec and Catalunya has often 
been characterised by linguistic or ethnic tensions, these features have been relatively absent 
from the history of Scottish nationalism's development. The recognition ofScotland's 
position as a nation within the United Kingdom has been explicit, unlike the Spanish State's 
rejection of Catalan nationhood and Canada's seeming inability to come to terms with 
Quebec's dualistic view of the Canadian State. It has been argued by some commentators 
that the all-encompassing British identity that emerged out of the Treaty of Union in 1707 
largely negated any need for a distinct Scottish nationalism prior to the mid-twentieth 
century. 1 Smout argues that 1707 was a watershed event that "erased the formal 
Parliamentary independence of Scotland [and] reduced her to the status of a 'region' in the 
new hybrid kingdom of Great Britain."2 With the collapse of the Empire, a nascent Scottish 
national ism that had been taking shape since the turn of the century found a voice as a 
distinctly Scottish identity. Fry argues that this nationalism emerged as the economic 
prosperity by the Empire began to disappear and a historic "indifference" to Scottish 
1 Michael Fry, Patronage and Principle: A Political History of Modem Scotland (Aberdeen: Aberdeen 
University Press, 1987), p. 20 I. 
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institutions "was aggravated by centralisation and failure compounded by immobility."3 The 
history of nationalism's development is very much about a gradual shift in the understanding 
of Scotland's place within the U.K. State. From nineteenth century fin de siecle agitation for 
home rule for Scotland within the Union, to the creation of the Scottish Parliament in 1999, 
Scottish nationalism has emerged as a significant political force in the constitutional politics 
ofthe United Kingdom. 
Diffuse Nature of Scottish Nationalism 
As in the cases of Quebec and Catalunya, nationalism in Scotland should not always 
be equated with separatism, or the desire for independence from the existing nation-state. 
Although the Scottish National Party (SNP) is the only explicitly nationalist party among the 
four main Scottish parties, nationalists who have favoured a greater devolution of power to 
Scotland have found a home at various times in the Liberal/Liberal Democrat, Labour, and 
Conservative and Unionist parties. Lindsay Paterson has argued that Scottish nationalism is 
very diffuse, allowing all parties to use the mantle of nationhood to their benefit. The 
Conservatives, who in the 1930s could equate Scottish nationalism with imperial loyalty and 
a defence of Presbyterianism, made effective appeals to a sense of Scottish nationhood.4 A 
sense of Scottishness, or loyalty to an idea of Scottish nationhood, evolved over the course of 
the centuries following the Treaty of Union that united the parliaments of Scotland and 
England. An explicit desire for home rule, devolution, or some form of self-government did 
not manifest itself in Scotland until the late 1880s with the creation of the Scottish Home 
Rule Association. The home rule movement was a movement that developed in the existing 
political structure that dated from the era of reform in the mid-nineteenth century. Its 
evolution and its impact on the Union will be discussed below. 
2 T.C. Smout, A History ofthe Scottish People 1560-1830 (London: Harper Collins, 1969), p. 199. 
3 
Fry, p. 20 I. . . . 
4 Lindsay Paterson, The Autonomy of Modern Scotland (Edinburgh: Edmburgh Umverstty Press Ltd, 
1994), p. 114. 
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The experience of the Union has shaped ideas of nationalism in Scotland in a 
fundamental way. This nationalism differs from its counterparts in Quebec and Catalunya as 
a result of the political framework of Unionism. Prior to the 1960s and 1970s during which 
time the Scottish National Party emerged as the nationalist party with a platform of 
independence for Scotland, nationalism in Scotland was expressed largely through an 
imperial British nationalism. A minority of Scots who termed themselves Scottish 
nationalists existed on the cultural and political fringes of the late nineteenth century and the 
first sixty years of the twentieth century. For the majority of Scots the Union negotiated in 
1707 allowed them to participate in the building of an empire that brought prosperity and an 
equally fervent loyalty. Smout argues that the Union did not, in fact, eliminate a Scottish 
identity but rather created a duality of national consciousness, of being both Scottish and 
British at the same time.
5 
Indeed, as Paterson argues, the Union was a framework which 
allowed Scotland considerable autonomy within the United Kingdom State, something which 
the Catalans rarely experienced within the Spanish State. For the Quebecois there was not a 
similar sense of partnership with the rest of British North America until the era of 
Confederation. Their position as a linguistic and religious minority motivated nationalist 
development in Quebec; similar factors did not exist in Scotland nor was Scotland seen as 
having been conquered except by perhaps the most reactionary of anglophobes. 
The Treaty of Union, 1707 
The Treaty of Union of 1707 brought about not only a political union between 
Scotland and England, but also an economic one. Commentators hold various views as to 
whether the political or economic aspect of the Union was more important. The political 
union did have a significant impact by incorporating the Scottish political tradition and the 
English parliamentary tradition with its doctrine of the legislative supremacy of Parliament. 
Many Scottish lawyers have argued since the Union that this doctrine was foreign to Scots 
5 T.C. Smout, A Century ofthe Scottish People 1830-1950 (London: Harper Collins, 1986), p. 238. 
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Law, an argument that was frequently employed when various sections of the Treaty of 
Union were repealed.
6 
Smout argues that Scotland did not surrender its sovereignty to 
England in 1707, but rather surrendered its sovereignty along with that of England to the 
new state created as a result of the Union. However, as argued by Smout "the letter of the 
law ... was not altogether the same as the spirit, for the partnership was a grossly unequal 
one."
7 
Fry has argued that the political union in fact did not have a tremendous impact as the 
loss of the Scottish Parliament and its particular tradition was relatively insignificant. This 
was due to the Scottish Parliament not being historically the focus of political life in 
Scotland as Parliament was in England. Scottish political life was centred instead on a 
number of institutions, in particular the Kirk, the law, the burghs, and the education system, 
all of which were maintained under the terms of the Treaty of Union.8 As Smout argues, the 
Union transformed Scottish political life as political elites moved south to advance their 
political careers and take advantage of the system of patronage that operated at Westminster. 
As will be discussed below, under the political system that emerged after the Union Scotland 
was in essence ruled by Westminster through Scottish notables such as the Duke of Argyll, 
Lord Bute, and Henry Dundas.9 They became the agents of the new British state, the 
dispensers of local patronage, and political overlords of Scotland. 
While the debate over the nature of the political union achieved in 1707 was 
significant it was overshadowed by the arguments for an economic union. It was this 
economic union that Scots sought gaining them entry to the imperial market that was 
beginning to expand as England exploited its overseas colonies. The failure of the Darien 
scheme at the end of the seventeenth century and the lack of available capital in Scotland 
necessitated some fonn of relationship with England, since competing against its growing 
6 James G. Kellas, The Scottish Political System, 4th ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1989), pp. 21-22. 
7 Smout, A History ofthe Scottish People 1560-1830, p. 200. 
8 Fry, p. 202. 
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economic power was seen as being futile. Scotland was not to be an imperial power in its 
own right. Andrew Fletcher, in his opposition to the Union, pointed out that it was 
impossible to compete against England since, following the Union of the Crowns in 1603, 
the expansion of English trade had adversely affected Scottish commerce. Despite the 
demise of Scottish trade, the Scottish political class in London was seemingly unable to 
exercise any influence on the government: 
Upon the Union of the crowns not only all this went into decay; but our money was 
spent in England, and not among ourselves; the furniture of our houses, and the best 
of our clothes and equipage was bought at London: and though particular persons of 
the Scots nation had many great and profitable places at court, to the high 
displeasure of the English, yet that was no advantage to our country, which was 
totally neglected, like a farm managed by servants, and not under the eye of the 
master. 10 
For Fletcher the Union was a great debacle; for other members of the ruling political and 
economic class in Scotland it was to present innumerable opportunities for advancement in 
England and abroad as imperial merchants, administrators, and soldiers. 
Jacobitism 
The guarantees provided for in the Treaty of Union that protected the Scottish legal 
system, system of local government, the Scottish universities, and in a subsequent act the 
Presbyterian form of government in the Kirk facilitated Scotland's political assimilation into 
the British State. However, this assimilation was far from complete as the Jacobite 
rebellions of 1715 and 1745-46 demonstrated. The rebellions openly challenged the 
Hanoverian succession and threatened the stability of the Union as a loose coalition of 
Episcopalians, certain Highland clans, Roman Catholics, and northern English Tories sought 
the restoration of the Stuarts to the British throne. Jacobitism can hardly be declared to be a 
nationalist movement or some form of nascent Scottish nationalism since it was confined to 
9 
Smout, A History ofthe Scottish People 1560-1830, pp. 20~-03. . . 
10 Andrew Fletcher, "An Account of a Conversation Concemmg a Rtght Regulation ofGove~ments 
for the Common Good of Mankind," in Oavid Daiches, ed. Fletcher ofSaltoun: Selected Wntmgs 
(Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1979), p. 114. 
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particular constituencies within Scotland who were opposed to the constitutional and 
religious settlement brought about by the Glorious Revolution. Jacobitism was one dominant 
factor in shaping the future of Scotland in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. 
With the defeat of Charles Stuart's forces at Culloden Moor in 1746 came a period of brutal 
repression by the Crown which sought to impose its will on the Highlands and those 
elements in Scottish society that had supported the uprisings. The repression included the 
Disarming Act, which banned the carrying of weapons; the proscribing of Highland dress; 
the suppression of Episcopalian meeting houses; the abolition of heritable jurisdiction; and 
the scorched earth policy practised by the forces of the Crown in the western Highlands. 11 
Accompanying this repression was the experience of the Clearances, which led to the 
collapse of the clan system, and the depopulation of the western Highlands and Islands as 
Gaels migrated to North America. The confiscation of Jacobite estates was a further attempt 
at establishing the Crown's hegemony in disparate parts of the kingdom. As Linda Colley 
has argued, the dispossession of Highland estates was an effective way of redistributing 
wealth and buying off Lowland Scots through the subsidising of industry: 
The intention [of the Crown's actions post-1745] being, as one MP succinctly put it, 
to 'carry off the King into every part of the United Kingdom'. These were the sticks 
designed to beat down Highland autonomy. But an attempt was made to create some 
meagre carrots as well. As far as the Highlands were concerned, this meant 
ploughing money from confiscated Jacobite estates back into the economy. Basic 
industries like tanning, whaling and paper-making were subsidised. Schools were 
established to instruct adults in the mechanics of linen production and to teach 
Gaelic-speaking children English. Yet again, the rulers of the British state betrayed 
their absolute conviction that trade and patriotism were inseparably linked. 12 
Without a doubt the Crown was able to carry out its aims of uprooting Highland society and 
extending its influence. However, the view of the Jacobite and the Highlander as counter-
revolutionary did not last and soon became appropriated as the symbol of Scottish identity, 
an identity that sought to distinguish itself from the other. 
11 T.M. Devine, The Scottish Nation 1700-2000 (London: Alien Lane The Penguin Press, 1999), p. 46. 
12 Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837 (London: Pim1ico, 1994), PP· 119-20. 
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High/andism as an Identity 
lt has been argued that with the incorporation of Highland regiments into the British 
military in the eighteenth century a positive impression of the Highlander as noble, loyal, 
and brave emerged in popular culture. Jacobitism and the Highland way came to be further 
romanticised through the poetry of Burns and the publication of numerous songs that sought 
to capture the daring exploits of Bonnie Prince Charlie and his loyal band of Highland 
followers.
13 
Devine has argued convincingly that through this popularisation of Jacobite 
myth and legend Jacobitism and Highlandism was appropriated as a new national identity. 
As the Scots became more and more integrated with England economically and gained by 
this integration there arose a fear that their own sense of nationhood would be assimilated. 14 
Increasingly, Highlandism became Scottishness as the tartan and the pipes were adopted in 
the Lowlands and became intrinsic to Scottish identity. This was an identity that was 
fostered in Waiter Scott's Waverley novels and other works such as Jvanhoe as well as in the 
writings of James Hogg and James Macpherson. The promotion of this identity reached its 
apogee when George IV on his visit to Edinburgh in 1822 appeared at state functions in full 
Highland dress; Highlandism was triumphant. Fry has argued that the creation of this 
identity by Scott and other nineteenth century Conservative romantics reflected a "deep 
historical consciousness of their country" that was similar to what was happening in other 
European national movements. However, Fry goes on to argue that this romanticism was in 
effect an effort to maintain the privileges of the Conservative aristocratic class in Scotland in 
the early 1800s. 15 Although there was an emerging popular consciousness of Scottish history 
based upon invented tradition, as Hobsbawm would argue, this did not evolve into a new 
Scottish nationalism. 16 
13 Devine, p. 237. 
14 Ibid., p. 244. 
15 
Fry, p. 203. . .. 
16 See Eric Hobsbawm and Terrence Ranger, eds., The Invention ofTrad1t10n. 
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While the adoption of this mythical identity as national does not point directly 
towards the evolution of nationalism in Scotland, it does serve to illustrate the attitude 
among certain Scots towards their relationship with the English. This relationship was one 
not of equal partners in fact, but one of a dominant power and a small nation that feared the 
cultural and political influence of England and felt the need to construct a distinct, yet 
wholly invented, cultural identity. As Devine contends, the" 'archaic world' of the 
contemporary Highlands ... was an alluring myth for a society searching for an identity amid 
unprecedented economic and social change and under threat of cultural conquest by a much 
more powerful neighbour."
17 
If the nineteenth century opened with Scots seeking a distinct 
national identity to embrace in their cultural life, it also ushered in a period that was both 
politically conservative and radical. 
19th Century Patronage and Reform 
Political life in Scotland in the nineteenth century was characterised by various 
movements, many of which had a uniquely Scottish dimension to them. The radical 
societies of the early decades, Chartism in the 1840s, liberalism in the middle of the century, 
temperance, and the push for home rule at the century's close all helped to shape the nature 
of Scottish political debate. While these movements in their own ways represented 
challenges to the status quo, they existed within the larger framework of imperial Britain and 
Scotland's role within the Empire, a role that the majority of Scots can be said to have 
embraced since in the Empire lay prosperity. Scottish politics in the second half of the 
eighteenth century and early nineteenth century were dominated by political managers such 
as the Duke of Argyll and Henry Dundas who were the fount of patronage in Scotland and 
the de facto representatives of the imperial government. These managers acted as a 
"subordinate monarch" and effectively governed Scotland; they were also the advocates of 
17 Devine, p. 245. 
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Scottish interest at Westminster.
18 
While this was a relatively efficient, if not representative, 
system it was not able to withstand the challenges that were launched against it in the 1 820s 
and 1 830s by the diversity of radical societies that were arguing for reform of the political 
system. There was considerable cooperation between Scottish and English radical societies 
including the Anti-Corn Law League and those who followed English radicals such as 
Richard Cobden.
19 
What was unique about Scottish involvement was the use of particular 
Scottish symbols in radical protests such as banners displaying the names of Wallace, Bruce, 
and St. Andrew and the singing of"Scots wha hae". While these symbols were employed so 
also were the Union flag, images of Britannia, and as in Edinburgh in 1832 placards with 
imperial slogans in the manner of Nelson's famous entreaty at Trafalgar that 'England 
expects that every man will do his duty!' .20 The use of national symbols alongside imperial 
ones does hint at the growing importance of a unique identity and its effective use. It must 
be emphasised, however, that radical demands did not take the form of demands for the 
dissolution of the Union or any condemnation of the Empire. Scots had a strong attachment 
to the Union that had brought them material prosperity. When Scottish radicals joined with 
their English neighbours to press for reform in the 1830s it was done in the context of British 
institutions and the need to give Scotland greater equality within them.21 
With the passage of the Reform Act of 183 2 there were further demands for an 
expansion of the franchise and the reform of constituencies. In the late 1830s and 1840s 
Chartism emerged as the mov~ment which would articulate a radical programme of reform 
including: universal manhood suffrage, abolition of property qualifications, paid members of 
Parliament, equal constituencies, the secret ballot, and annual parliaments. In Scotland 
Chartism was a mass movement with over eighty associations in existence by 183 8 that 
18 Paterson, p. 33. 
19 Fry, p. 39. 
2° Colley, pp. 338-39. 
21 Fry, p. 206. 
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called for reform of the system through peaceful agitation.22 For the Scottish Chartists the 
movement was embraced with particular evangelical zeal and it became strongly linked to 
Calvinist virtues such as struggle, temperance, cooperation, education, and hard work. The 
principles outlined in the Charter were seen to have been inspired by the New Testament, 
and the Chartist struggle was akin to that faced by the Covenanters in the seventeenth 
century as they fought for the survival of Presbyterianism in Scotland.23 As Fry argues, 
Scottish Chartism reflected the dominance of religion in Scottish society, thus giving it a 
distinctly "moralistic [and] rather apolitical character."24 In fact, within Scottish Chartism 
there could be found a clear expression of a distinct national culture and perspective on 
reform that was firmly rooted in Calvinism and the ethos that it inspired. 
Liberalism in Scotland 
As the reforming zeal of Chartism had dominated Scottish political life in the middle 
part of the century, liberalism and the position of the Liberal Party dominated the latter half 
of the 1800s. With the expansion of the franchise following the Reform Act of 1868 the new 
working-class electorate in Scotland put its weight behind the Liberal Party of Gladstone and 
the values that they saw liberalism supporting: education, self-improvement, temperance, 
and general respectability. Devine has argued that in the late nineteenth century liberal 
values were Scottish values due to the extent to which the Scottish electorate sympathised 
with them.25 These were the same values articulated through the prevailing Calvinist ethos in 
Scotland, values that had been championed by the Chartists. The inclusion of the working 
class in the political system in Britain in the nineteenth century has been argued to have 
acted as a disincentive towards the type of popular revolutions that were common on the 
continent. In this context the dominance of liberalism and the new inclusiveness brought 
.,., b"d ~~ I I ., p. 42. 
23 Devine, p. 279. 
24 Fry, p. 44. 
25 Devine, p. 285. 
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about in 1868 acted as moderating factors in Scottish politics along with the inherent 
conservatism of Calvinism. Scotland at the time was also benefiting substantially from 
imperial expansion and so there was even less of a need to argue for revolutionary change. 
Such revolutionary change could have included a challenge to the constitutional 
status quo of the Union, yet the majority of Scots throughout the nineteenth century and into 
the twentieth century continued to be supportive of the Union and its benefits. If Britishness 
enjoyed hegemony as the common national identity in Britain during this period, it is 
because of the strength ofthe Empire and the population's wholehearted acceptance of it. 
As stated above, Britishness only began to decline in Scotland as a unifying identity in the 
years following the Second World War as the Empire and the economic prosperity is brought 
began to collapse. The era of Liberal dominance in Scotland during the mid- Victorian 
period was an era in which there was very little nationalist agitation. Indeed, the only 
notable organisation to appear was the National Association for the Vindication of Scottish 
Rights, and it only existed for three years from 1853-56. The National Association was 
founded by James and John Grant and called for better Scottish representation at 
Westminster. Their approach centred on the distribution of pamphlets and the writing of 
letters that focussed on the various wrongs done to Scotland since the Union that needed to 
be redressed. The association pleaded for more government attention to Scottish matters. 
However, it always sought to work within the system and reform the Union.26 It is evident 
that there was concern for the Union and that there should be a recognition of particular 
Scottish grievances, but it was not until the latter part of the century that a more fully 
developed movement emerged to argue in favour of greater self-government or home rule for 
Scotland. 
The Irish question was a dominant political issue in the United Kingdom during the 
last three decades of the nineteenth century and the first three of the twentieth. The impact of 
100 
Scotland and Nationalism 1707-1999 
Irish home rule on Scotland was that it motivated a group with allegiances to the Scottish 
Liberal Party to advocate the principle of Home Rule all around. This concept argued that a 
measure of self-government be offered to Scotland within the Union along the same lines as 
that being championed by Irish home rulers such as the Protestant landowner Charles 
Stewart Parnell and the more radical Fenian Michael Davitt. Along with his championing of 
home rule for Ireland Davitt went on to found the Irish National Land League in 1879 in 
which he and Parnell argued for land reform. 27 The Land League served as an inspiration to 
Highland crofters in Scotland who went on to found the Highland Land Law Reform 
Association in 1883, a prelude to later demands for home rule for Scotland.28 Gladstone's 
ultimate conversion to the home rule cause encouraged the re-establishment of the Scottish 
Office in 1885 as a means to give greater prominence to Scottish affairs at Westminster.29 
The Liberal Response 
The establishment of the Scottish Office by Gladstone's government was in many 
ways a response to demands for greater Scottish autonomy that would allow Scots to have a 
certain measure of control over the administration of the nation. Paterson argues that the 
Scottish Office came about as a result of nationalist demands.30 In many ways it can be 
argued that the creation of the Scottish Office in 1885 was a recognition by central 
government of the distinct nature of Scotland within the British State and that this merited a 
unique form of administration. In essence, the Scottish Office fulfilled many of the roles 
performed by political managers such as Argyll and Dundas in the eighteenth century before 
the era of reform; its function was to administer Scotland leaving Westminster to perform 
26 Fry, p. 206. 
27 
T.W. Moody, "Fenianism, Home Rule, and the Land War (1850-91)," in The Course of Irish 
History, eds. T.W. Moody and F.X. Martin, 3rd ed. (Niwot, Colorado: Roberts Rinehart Publishers, 
1995), p. 285. 
28 Michael Lynch, Scotland: A New History (London: Pimlico, 1992), p. 375. 
29 Richard J. Finlay, A Partnership for Good? Scottish Politics and the Union Since 1880 (Edinburgh: 
John Donald Publisher Ltd., 1997), p. 44. 
30 
Paterson, p. I 07. 
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similar functions for England and Wales. Paterson also contends that the creation of an 
official nationalism was embodied in the technocracy of the Scottish administration a 
' 
nationalism that was reinforced when the Scottish Office was moved to Edinburgh in 1939. 
The move of the Scottish Office allowed Scottish politicians to govern in a Scottish context 
with a Scottish civil service assisting them, thus giving Scottish politics more of a national 
focus: " ... yet again, we are reminded that Scottish nationalism was partly official, providing 
a taken-for-granted context in which Scottish politicians operated."31 As the State expanded 
so did the Scottish Office, which enabled the welfare state of the post-war years to develop a 
particularly Scottish character as the Scottish administration came to have more and more 
power over administration in areas of a purely local concern.32 However, as will be discussed 
below, the lack of the Scottish Office's direct accountability to the Scottish people through a 
legislative body became one of the key arguments in favour of legislative devolution in the 
late twentieth century. Even in the late 1880s there were demands for legislative devolution 
to Scotland -home rule that would allow for greater debate on Scottish issues and greater 
representation. These demands came from a new political group that emerged out of the 
Liberal Party: the Scottish Home Rule Association. 
The Scottish Home Rule Association 
The establishment of the Scottish Home Rule Association (SHRA) in 1886 by the 
Liberals Charles Waddie, G.B. Clark, William Mitchell and John Romans planted the roots 
of Scottish political nationalism.33 The SHRA was outside the formal party structure of 
Scottish politics and as such sought to influence the policy of the Liberal Party, and 
subsequently that of the Labour Party in the early twentieth century, towards the adoption of 
home rule for Scotland. The SHRA was joined by the Young Scots in 1900 who were allied 
with the Liberal Party to advocate home rule, although they were more of a Liberal Party 
31 Ibid., p. I 08. 
32 Ibid., p. I 09. 
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r. . t . 34 1actJon t 1an an extenor pressure group. The Young Scots proved to be a potent 
campaigning force advocating the preservation of free trade at the turn of the century and 
working to unite the Liberals in Scotland following their defeat in 1900.35 
The SHRA's objectives were similar to those of the Irish home rulers and its leaders 
believed that the "national aspirations of the Irish people were identical with their own."36 
The SHRA was strong in its support for the Empire, yet called upon the government to grant 
Scotland self-government through a legislature and executive with full control over affairs of 
a purely Scottish nature, and to devolve control over the Scottish civil service and judiciary. 
These requests were made in the spirit of promoting "the national sentiment of Scotland and 
maintain[ing] her national rights and honour." 37 Through the canvassing of candidates at 
elections and the subsequent advocating of Scottish home rule at Westminster the SHRA was 
able to promote its cause. As the majority of the SHRA members were also members of the 
Liberal party this encouraged the Liberals to endorse the principle of home rule for Scotland 
at the party conference of 1888.38 There was, however, a considerable amount of opposition 
to home rule for Scotland among some of the Liberal membership. The Conservative Party 
was consistent in its opposition to home rule during this period.39 In the period between 
1886 and 1914 there were no less than eight Scottish home rule bills proposed in the 
Commons by Liberal members who supported the SHRA.40 The last of them was proposed 
in 1914, but died on the order paper when war was declared. The SHRA was the first 
organisation to emerge that argued for a measure of legislative devolution for Scotland; it 
was also the first to have any measure of real support. 
33 Ibid., p. 45. 
34 James Mitchell, Strategies for Self-Government (Edinburgh: Polygon, 1996), p. 72. 
35 . I 52 . Fm ay, p. . 
36 Mitchell, Strategies for Self-Government, p. 70. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Finlay, p. 48. 
39 Ibid. p. 50. 
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Following the war the SHRA was re-established by Roland Muirhead, a member of 
the Independent Labour Party (ILP). In its new incarnation the SHRA had a largely Labour 
membership including the radicals James Maxton and Tom Johnston and it was affiliated to 
the Scottish Trades Union Congress (STUC).41 In the 1918 general election fifty-eight 
candidates from the Liberal, Labour, and Unionist parties declared their support for home 
rule and the aims of the association.42 By 1928 there were over three hundred groups 
affiliated with the SHRA, many of which had a left-wing focus, thus drawing it all the more 
closer to the Labour Party. The SHRA under the leadership of Roland Muirhead remained 
the main voice for Scottish self-government up until the 1930s advocating the cause of 
legislative devolution for Scotland. What is notable about the SHRA is that it did not seek to 
dissolve the Union or undermine the political system; rather, it sought to enhance Scotland's 
position within the Union and Empire through the achieving of home rule and limited 
legislative devolution. 
Labour and Home Rule 
With the SHRA emerging after the First World War as an essentially Labour-led 
body there was increasing pressure placed on the Labour Party to embrace home rule for 
Scotland. The ILP passed a resolution at its 1919 party conference endorsing the idea of a 
Parliament for Scotland, a resolution that was surpassed by one in 1922 which demanded 
that Scots themselves be allowed to chose what sort of government would best be suited to 
them.43 By I 923 the Scottish Labour Party and its National Executive Committee were fully 
in support of home rule for Scotland. Their support of home rule translated into a home rule 
bill being introduced in the House of Commons in 1924 by the Labour government. 
40 Gordon Donaldson, "Scottish Devolution: The Historical Background," in Government and 
Nationalism in Scotland, ed. J.N. Wolfe (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1969), P: 10. 
41 Michael Keating and David Bleiman, Labour and Scottish Nationalism (London: Macmtllan Press 
Ltd., ] 979), pp.6] -62. 
42 Mitchell, Strategies for Self-Government, p. 75. 
43 Keating and Bleiman, p. 61. 
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Supported by all the Scottish Labour MPs, the bill was piloted through the Commons by 
George Buchanan and Tom Johnston until a Labour motion for closure of debate was ruled 
out of order by the Speaker.
44 
With the defeat of Labour in that year the Conservatives paid 
little attention to the home rule issue. 
During its second period of office under Ramsay MacDonald, Labour quietly 
abandoned home rule in the face of the need for social and economic reform. The evolution 
of the labour movement in Scotland and the rest of the U.K. also encouraged the decline of 
home rule as a viable policy. Although the Scottish Council of the Labour Party and the 
Scottish Trades Union Congress favoured home rule they became marginalised by the 
growth of the larger U.K.-wide trade unions. In addition, as Harvie argues, the debates 
emerging around the time of the General Strike of 1926 shifted the focus away from the 
constitutional issues of the 191 Os to social and economic issues, reinforced class 
consciousness, and emphasised the "political archaism" of the Liberal home rule agenda.45 
The Labour-dominated SHRA ultimately fell into decline when MacDonald, a former leader 
in the SHRA, refused to receive any deputations from them.46 
Nationalism's Fringe in the 1930s 
The failure of the SHRA's strategy of working within the political system to bring 
about constitutional change encouraged the growth of other, more radical groups to emerge 
in Scotland in the 1930s. These groups were marginal players at best whose approaches can 
be placed on a spectrum running from moderate and inclusive to extremist and ethnically 
exclusive. As Fry argues, these groups of"militant socialists, Gaelic revivalists, the leaders 
of the Scottish literary renaissance ... were not bothered about administrative efficiency or 
constitutional tinkering -their concern was with_ the soul of the nation and with independence 
44 
Ibid., p. 82. . . . . nd 
45 Christopher Harvie, Scotland & Nationalism: Scottish Society and Politics 1707-1994,2 ed. 
(London: Routledge, 1994), p. 23-24. 
46 Mitchell, Strategies for Self-Government, p. 79. 
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as the one way of restoring it."
47 
The earliest of these groups were the Scottish National 
League (SNL) and the Scottish National Movement (SNM) both of which worked outside 
the party structure to try and promote the cause of Scottish self-government; they were both 
precursors to the National Party of Scotland and its successor, the Scottish National Party. 
The SNL was led by Celtic romanticists such as Ruairidh Erskine of Mar and William Gillies 
and beginning in 1920 began to call for Scots to rise up and assert their national 
independence. The league's message was peppered with Celtic myth, Catholic collectivism, 
clan superiority, and an unhealthy dose of ethnic superiority and anglophobia.48 The SNM, 
itself an off-shoot of the SNL, argued for a Scottish Parliament and for the greater promotion 
of Scottish culture, yet its overall strategy was ill-defined. The movement's leader, Lewis 
Spence, also had anglophobic tendencies and so it was largely hampered in achieving any 
sort of mass support.
49 
With considerable division in the nationalist movement in the 1920s 
between the SNL, the SNM, and the SHRA there was a lack of focus and a lack of a coherent 
strategy on how to achieve what was their aim: self-government for Scotland. With the birth 
of the Scottish National Party (SNP) in 1934, the attentions of nationalists in Scotland could 
be focussed in one political party. 
Founding of the SNP 
The Scottish National Party came about in 1934 as the result of a merger between 
moderates in the National Party of Scotland (NPS) under the leadership of John MacCormick 
and the Conservative and aristocratic Scottish Party led by Sir Alexander MacEwen 
Younger. 5° The appearance of the SNP in Scottish politics in the 1930s shows that there was 
a considerable degree of unity among nationalists in Scotland regarding the strategy they 
would adopt: the contesting of elections and se~king to bring about their stated aim of 
47 Fry, p. 211. 
48 Mitchell, Strategies for Self-Government, p. 82. 
49 Ibid., p. 84. 
5° Finlay, p. 82. 
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constitutional change through the democratic process. The SNP remained a minor political 
player until after the Second World War and it was dogged by internecine struggles between 
pragmatists and fundamentalists over the course of the following decades. 51 Yet, the 
presence of the SNP demonstrated greater organisation and coherence in the nationalist 
movement than can be found in either Quebec or Catalunya. 
As has been shown in the previous chapter Catalan nationalism was widely diffused 
and, while appealing to the vast majority ofCatalan elites in the early twentieth century, it 
was typified by the continual breaking apart and reforming of coalitions, parties, and 
pressure groups. It was really not until the last years of Franco's dictatorship in the 1970s 
that Catalan nationalist groups began to focus their attention and rallied around Pujol's 
coalition of Convergencia i Uni6 and the democratic socialist PSC as the dominant 
nationalist parties. In the same way, Quebecois nationalism did not fully emerge as a 
democratic movement until the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s when nationalists abandoned 
the older nationalist ideals of the conservative, Catholic Union Nationale and embraced the 
progressive and secular doctrines of the Liberal Party of Jean Lesage and subsequently the 
Parti Quebecois ofRene Levesque. The strategy and philosophy of the SNP developed as 
the party expanded in the 1960s and 1970s and the nature ofthe relationship between 
Scotland and Westminster evolved. However, there appears to have been a much greater 
coherence among Scottish nationalists in the 1930s than among their counterparts in 
Catalunya and Quebec, possibly because they were a small force within Scottish politics at 
that time. 
The approach adopted by the SNP was significantly different in that it established 
itself outside existing political parties. In its statement of goals there was a rejection of this 
earlier strategy employed by the SHRA and the Young Scots of working within the 
traditional party structure to try and bring about a firm commitment to self-government from 
51 Mitchell, Strategies for Self-Government, p. 173. 
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the Liberals or Labour. This had clearly failed as an approach. The goals of the new SNP in 





The establishment of a Parliament in Scotland which shall be the final 
authority on Scottish affairs, including taxation and finance; 
Scotland shall share with England the rights and responsibilities they, as 
mother nations, have jointly created and incurred within the British Empire; 
Scotland and England shall set up machinery to deal jointly with these 
responsibilities, and in particular to deal with such matters as defence, 
foreign policy, and customs; 
It is believed that these principles can be realised only by a Scottish National 
Party independent of all other political parties. 52 
The commitment made by the founders of the SNP in 1934 was essentially to a federal 
Britain. A Scottish Parliament was to be created exercising sovereignty as "the final 
authority" in areas of local concern with Westminster being left control over areas that 
would normally be within the ambit of the central government in a federal system. The 
federalism evident in these goals hearkens back to the federal concept of Home Rule All 
Around that had been embraced by the SHRA some decades earlier. This was not a proposal 
for constitutional reform which would dissolve the Union or take Scotland out of the Empire; 
the commitment to the Empire and therefore to the United Kingdom is explicit in the above 
statement. The SNP was to become the sole voice advocating self-government for Scotland 
since it was contended that none of the traditional Scottish parties could be counted upon to 
advance this goal. 
The SNP and its precursor, the National Party of Scotland, had very little impact on 
Scottish electoral politics in the 1930s and early 1940s. It was not until the Motherwell by-
election of 1945 when the SNP candidate Robert Mclntyre took the seat from.Labour that the 
SNP gained its first measure of success. 53 This was a Pyrrhic victory in that it was the result 
of the wartime electoral truce between Labour ~nd the Conservatives, that thus allowed the 
SNP to adopt the mantle of opposition to the wartime coalition. Mclntyre subsequently lost 
52 Glasgow Herald, 31 January 1934, as quoted in Mitchell, p. 183. 
53 Mitchell, Strategies for Self-Government, p. 191. 
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the constituency in the Labour sweep of the 1945 General Election and the SNP continued to 
perform poorly in by-elections during the 1940s, rarely gaining more than 8% of the popular 
vote. 5
4 
What did not help the SNP was the division brought about in the party in 1942 when 
one of its leaders, the influential John MacCormick opposed the selection of Douglas Young 
as Party Chairman in the conference of that year. MacCormick went on to form the rival 
Scottish Convention, which embraced a populist rhetoric in arguing for Scottish self-
government. 
The Scottish Convention and National Covenant 
MacCormick's Convention was moderate and non-partisan, seeking to bring about 
self-government within the United Kingdom rather than outright independence for Scotland. 
Its gradualist approach made it popular and helped the Convention to mobilise Scottish civil 
society into action. At its March 1947 Scottish National Assembly in Glasgow 600 delegates 
from the trade unions, the Kirk, and chambers of commerce who supported the aims of the 
Convention came together to launch the National Covenant. 55 The two million signatures 
that accompanied the covenant when it was presented to the third National Assembly in 1949 
demonstrated to great effect how Scottish civil society could be mobilised around the issue 
of self-government. 
The use of covenants in Scottish history as a means to express Scottish grievances to 
central authority illustrates the unique position of Scottish civil society, a civil society that 
was autonomous from the State, in the political culture of the nation.56 This political culture, 
it has been argued by Paterson and others such as Tom Nairn, is centred around a concept of 
popular sovereignty in which certain claims are made by the people as to how they should be 
goven1ed. There are echoes of this in the National Covenant and Solemn League and 
54 F.W.S. Craig, Minor Parties at British Parliamentary Elections 1885-1974 (London: Macmillan 
Press Ltd., 1975), p. 90. 
55 Devine, p. 566. 
56 Paterson, p. 45. 
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Covenant of the seventeenth century, MacCormick's National Covenant, and the Claim of 
Right of 1988 which declared that Scots had the right to determine how they were to be 
governed. The increased role of Scottish civil society in the campaign for self-government is 
a dominant theme in Scottish politics after 1945. The relative success of MacCormick's 
strategy in the 1940s can be seen as a watershed in this sense. 
Nationalism and the Post-War Consensus 
MacCormick's failure to achieve devolution through the National Covenant 
focussed attention back on the SNP. In the late 1940s and 1950s the SNP remained on the 
margins of Scottish politics. This period was the "high point of modem British Unionism", 
as termed by Devine.57 Labour's landslide victory in 1945 ushered in the post-war consensus 
that brought Keynesian economic reforms and the adoption of the principles of William 
Beveridge's report which championed social insurance and state provision of services. After 
the experience of war and the defeat of fascism and nationalism it was very difficult to 
compete with Labour. As Morgan has argued: 
Labour concentrated on the 'people's war' theme of emphasising housing, social 
insurance, and full employment. Allied to this was the need for modernization and 
central planning instead of the acknowledged waste of the industrial stagnation of 
the thirties. In addition, for once in its history, Labour could uninhibitedly play the 
. . d 58 patnottc car . 
What Labour could offer Scotland in terms of economic restructuring was palatable and 
Scots saw Westminster as having the ability to deliver the programmes and assistance that 
Scotland needed to improve its society.59 In light of its adoption ofKeynesian economic 
planning and the post-war consensus the Labour leadership had by 1945 abandoned its 
57 Devine, p. 566. d 
58 Kenneth 0. Morgan, The People's Peace: British History Since 1945, 2" ed. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), p. 27. 
59 Finlay, p. 135. 
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support of home rule for Scotland believing that a Scottish Parliament could be a barrier to 
solving Scotland's social and economic problems.60 
While Westminster embarked on a programme of nationalisation of industry and 
centralisation of power there was some measure of administrative devolution to the Scottish 
Office during the post-war years. Some further areas of central government jurisdiction, in 
particular justices of the peace and road planning, had been devolved to the Scottish Office 
in 1954 following recommendations made by the Balfour Royal Commission on Scottish 
Affairs. The role of the Scottish Office as the Scottish administration thus continued to 
expand in keeping with the expanding role of the State; it had expanded to become the focal 
point for Scottish politicians and administrators. 
SNP Growth in the 1960s 
With the demise of the Covenant movement by the 1960s the SNP began to gain 
strength. This was also helped by the in-fighting that was taking place within the Labour 
Party.61 The SNP performed well in by-elections in Glasgow Bridgeton in 1961 and West 
Lothian in 1962 with 18.7% and 23.3% of the popular vote respectively.62 The party also 
found its membership increasing. The party, through the efforts of its new organiser, I an 
Macdonald, had established a strong branch organisation by the middle of the decade and 
had 42,000 members in 1966 compared to only 2,000 in 1962.63 It was largely due to 
effective organisation that the SNP was able to win a major by-election victory in Labour's 
Glasgow fiefdom when Winifred Ewing took Hamilton in 1967. 
The victory at Hamilton shocked the Labour Government into action as they came to 
perceive nationalism as a threat, particularly to the party's increased hegemony in Scotland. 
In April 1969, Prime Minister Harold Wilson appointed the Royal Commission on the 
60 Ibid., p. 136. 
61 Mitchell, Strategies for Self-Government, p. 198. 
62 Craig, p. 90. 
63 Harvie, p. 176. 
Ill 
Nations ofDistinction 
Constitution under the chairmanship of Lord Crowther. The commission's remit was to give 
consideration to the constitutional arrangements existing between the constituent nations or 
regions of the United Kingdom and what, if anything needed to be done. The report ofthe 
Crowther, later the Kilbrandon Commission, in 1973 proved to be one in a series of events 
that would focus greater attention on Scotland and nationalism in the United Kingdom and 
lead to the first attempt at recognition of Scottish demands for self-government. 
The Conservatives and Nationalism 
The Conservative Party was equally shocked at the SNP's win at Hamilton causing it 
to re-examine its long-held opposition to any form of home rule. Immediately following 
Hamilton in November 1967 a group of young, reform-minded, Scottish Conservative and 
Unionist MPs formed the Thistle Group to advance the cause of devolution within the party. 
The group of roughly twelve members including Malcolm Rifkind, Michael An cram, and 
Alex Pollock published a paper entitled Devolution: A New Appraisal which was highly 
critical of the Scottish Office and the role of Secretary of State, arguing that they were not 
subject to enough Parliamentary scrutiny.64 The paper went even further and argued for a 
federal solution in which a Scottish Parliament would have complete fiscal independence 
and possibly some control over monetary policy. The Thistle Group also favoured the 
guaranteeing of a percentage of places at Scottish Universities for Scottish students.65 The 
Thistle Group had a considerable impact on the party, but it did not expose the divisions in 
the party over the issue of devolution to the extent that Edward Heath's speech to the 
Scottish party conference at Perth in 1968 did. 
In his so-called declaration of Perth, Heath argued that the party was now in favour 
of limited devolution along the lines proposed in a report prepared by Sir William MacEwen 
Younger: a separate Scottish chamber that would play a role in the legislative process of 
64 James Mitchell, Conservatives and the Union: A Study of Conservative Party Attitudes to Scotland 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, I 990), p. 53. 
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Parliament. M> As Mitchell states, this was a major reversal of party policy and came as a 
shock to many in the party resulting in considerable opposition among the more right-wing 
members of the party who opposed any change in the constitutional status quo. Despite this, 
Heath established a committee under the chairmanship of Sir Alec Douglas Home to 
examine devolution and constitutional change. The report of Home's committee favoured a 
directly elected 'convention' which would perform the same functions as the Scottish Grand 
Committee and Scottish standing committees at Westminster in the consideration of 
legislation. Amendments, Third Reading and Royal Assent would take place at Westminster 
as a way of preserving the sovereignty of Parliament which the committee and party viewed 
as sacrosanct.
67 
The shift in Conservative policy could be seen as responding in part to the 
rise in fortunes of the SNP following Hamilton. However, when the SNP perfonned poorly 
in the 1970 General Election, taking only one seat in the Western Isles on 11.4% of the 
popular vote, the Conservatives abandoned any devolutionary pretensions.68 
Kilbrandon, Oil, and the SNP 
Following the 1970 election came the discovery and exploitation of oil reserves in 
the North Sea off the coast of Scotland. With this development the SNP quickly latched onto 
the slogan "It's Scotland's Oil" which became a rallying cry for the party. North Sea Oil 
could not have come at a better time for the SNP. It gave the party an issue that it could 
champion and one around which it could develop an economic policy that defended the 
economic feasibility of an independent Scotland. The second key event that proved a fillip 
for the party in the early 1970s was the publication of the Kilbrandon Commission report 
that recommended wide-ranging devolution for both Scotland and Wales. 
65 Ibid., p. 54. 
66 Ibid. p. 56. 
67 Ibid., pp. 58-59. 
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In his report, Lord Kilbrandon and his commissioners identified a wide range of 
fields to be devolved to a new Scottish Assembly including: housing, local government, 
planning, tourism, the administration of justice, and health. Most of the areas of jurisdiction 
that the commission argued should be devolved can be found in the areas devolved to the 
Scottish Parliament in the Scotland Act, 1998. The Kilbrandon Commission had been 
supported by a large cross-section of Scottish civil society with many groups including the 
Kirk and trade unions arguing for devolution but with groups such as those in industry 
arguing against. The SNP greeted the commission's findings with a sense of vindication. 
The findings and recommendations of Kilbrandon and the oil issue gave the SNP a 
significant boost in the 1974 general elections as they promoted them as key issues to the 
electorate.
69 
With the constitutional status quo of the United Kingdom being effectively 
challenged by Kilbrandon the Scottish parties entered the February 1974 General Election 
with a certain amount of uncertainty. 
The 197 4 Elections 
The February 1974 election resulted in a Labour minority government and the 
election of seven SNP MPs, many of whom had been elected in areas of previous Tory 
strength, such as the northeast. The SNP, under the chairmanship of Billy Wolfe, 
campaigned on a platform of advocating independence from a social-democratic perspective. 
As Mitchell argues, it was due to the influence of members of the SNP leadership such as 
Wolfe and Isobel Lindsay, who had been active in left-wing causes like the Campaign for 
Nuclear Disarmament, that there was a shift to the left in SNP ideology and strategy. Social-
democracy was to be the base for the establishment of an independent Scotland: "The 
February 1974 manifesto made explicit referenc_e to the 'programme of social democracy 
which the Scottish National Party proposes for the foundations of a self-governing 
69 Mitchell, Conservatives and the Union, p. 66. 
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Scotland' ."
70 
The presence of more nationalists, both Scottish and Welsh, in the Commons 
forced Labour's hand on devolution and they published in September of 1974 a white paper 
on devolution that proposed to implement much of what was contained in the Kilbrandon 
report. The results of the election were not to stand for long as the government of Harold 
Wilson was forced to call a second election that year for October in which the SNP picked 
up an additional four seats bringing its total to eleven and received its largest percentage of 
the vote ever. Labour had to rely on Liberal and nationalist support, therefore much of the 
government's term was to be preoccupied with the issue of devolution and how the 
constitution might be reformed to halt the spread of nationalism in Scotland and Wales. If 
support for the nationalists was to have continued to increase it would have directly 
threatened Labour's position in both Wales and Scotland. 
The Scotland Act, 1978 
The first attempt by the government at devolution legislation, the Scotland and 
Wales Bill, 1976, did not make it to third reading after Labour backbenchers revolted in 
February 1977 against the government's guillotine motion to end debate. The subsequent 
Scotland Bill, 1978 was given royal assent in July 1978 subject to a referendum with the 
requirement that at least 40% of those Scots entitled to vote must vote 'Yes' in support of 
devolution in order for the legislation to take effect -the 'Cunningham amendment' .71 The 
Scotland Act, 1978 provided for the establishment of a devolved assembly in Edinburgh 
which would exercise legislative power in a wide range of local fields, most of which had 
already been devolved to the Scottish Office. While there was significant popular support 
70 Mitchell. Strategies for Self-Government, p. 207. 
71 George Cunningham was a Scottish-bom Labour MP sitting for a London seat. During the final 
debate on the Scotland Bill rebel Labour MPs and the· Conservatives passed an amendment sponsored 
by him which required that 40% of the total electorate had to support the devolution bill in the 
referendum, rather than just 40% of those who actually voted. This effectively ~ean.t that an~one who 
abstained was voting against devolution. It did not help also that the ~lecto~al hst bemg used m the 
referendum was outdated and likely included many people who had smce d1ed and thus were 
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for the act in Scotland, the Labour Party itself was divided. A number of Labour 
backbenchers, such as Tarn Dalyell from West Lothian, were opposed to any measure which 
would re-shape the Union in any way and therefore proposed numerous amendments to the 
Scotland Bill, 1978 in an effort to water it down.72 The Labour Party thus approached the 
referendum campaign of 1979 with a less than united front. 
Heath had committed the Conservatives to supporting Labour's devolution plan in 
1974, naming Rifkind as the party's spokesman on devolution. Rifkind was ultimately 
responsible for drafting the Conservative's policy paper on devolution. It proposed an 
assembly with no independent executive, rather there would be one appointed by the Scottish 
Secretary and accountable to both the assembly and Westminster. In addition, the assembly 
would have no control over the block grant from Westminster.73 As Mitchell argues: "The 
Rifkind proposals succeeded in making Labour's devolution white paper appear almost 
radical...A charitable interpretation of the Rifkind proposals is that they were an attempt to 
find a compromise."
74 
Following Margaret Thatcher's assuming the leadership of the party 
in 1979 it gradually came to abandon devolution and ultimately was the only party who 
campaigned for the 'No' side in the referendum. 
The 1979 Referendum 
The referendum on 1 March 1979 gave a lukewarm sense that Scots were supportive 
of devolution with 51.6% voting 'Yes' compared to 48.4% voting 'No'. However, only 
32.9o/o of the total electorate voted 'Yes' thus failing to meet the condition imposed on it by 
the Cunningham amendment. After the debacle of the devolution vote the Lib-Lab pact in 
Parliament that was helping to keep Labour in power was broken. The Liberals, who 
favoured a federal U.K. state, withdrew their support of the Callaghan government over 
incapable of voting. The amendment to the bill was passed at the last minute leaving Labour 
unprepared to face the revolt. 
72 Harvie, p. 193. 
73 Mitchell, Conservatives and the Union, p. 72. 
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Labour's handling of the devolution issue. In an effort to halt the repeal of The Scotland Act, 
1978 the SNP voted with the Conservatives and Liberals against the Callaghan government 
which precipitated the government's fall and the subsequent election of the Conservatives 
under Margaret Thatcher. This was a strategic decision which many in the SNP, in 
hindsight, saw the madness of. As Mitchell argues, the 1974-79 Parliament had given the 
SNP its greatest chance of achieving its goals.75 
The fall of the Callaghan government was followed by the Conservatives' victory 
under Margaret Thatcher in the 1979 General Election that brought about repeal of the 
Scotland Act, 1978 and the death of this first attempt at devolution 
In the lead-up to the 1979 vote the Labour Party was badly divided over devolution 
and facing the ever-present threat of a vote of no-confidence in the Commons. Within the 
SNP there were those who had favoured a gradualist approach to independence and saw in 
the party's support for devolution in 1979 an opportunity to bring about the first stage: 
limited self-government for Scotland. The SNP at the time had had its own debate over the 
merits of devolution, only coming to accept the principle in 1978. There was a half-hearted 
commitment to devolution made in a resolution passed at the 1975 SNP party conference 
which called on the party to adopt the gradualist approach and see the assembly as the first-
step towards independence; an amendment to eliminate this provision only just passed by 
594 votes to 425.76 A case can be made that none of the parties involved were truly 
converted to the idea of devolution and the Conservatives under Thatcher were resolutely 
opposed to any form of devolution to Scotland or Wales. 
The devolution project in the late 1970s was founded upon a negative premise: a 
weakened Labour government acting defensive!~ in response to the nationalist threat. 
Devolution in Scotland did not get a great endorsement by the electorate either with the 
74 Ibid., p. 73. 
75 Mitchell, Strategies for Self-Government, p. 218. 
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'Yes' side gaining only a slim majority on a low turnout of less than 65%. One conclusion 
might be that while political nationalism had made inroads into Scottish political culture in 
this period, it failed in its attempt to impress upon a sufficient number of the Scottish 
population the potential benefits of devolution or how devolution could improve Scotland's 
position within the Union. The demise of the Scotland Act, 1978 and the election of 
Margaret Thatcher's Conservative Party represented the nadir of the nationalist movement in 
Scotland and plans for legislative devolution at that time. 
Thatcherism and Scotland 
In the 1980s nationalism in Scotland reorganised as civil society met the challenges 
posed by the policies of the three successive Conservative governments ofMargaret 
Thatcher. The approach towards governing that was taken by the Conservatives challenged 
Scottish institutions such as the legal system and public bodies, which did not fit in with 
Thatcher's policy of centralising power. Lindsay Paterson argues that by ignoring Scottish 
institutions the Conservative government alienated the Scottish middle class that perceived 
itself as the protector of them: 
The middle class saw themselves as the guardians of the welfare state; any threat to 
their hegemony was interpreted as a threat to Scotland itself. Thus Thatcher did not 
have to be deliberately anti-Scottish for her policies to be received as such. Her 
reforms impinged on specifically Scottish institutions because she wanted to end 
what she saw as the suffocatingly consensual way in which Britain had been 
governed since 1945.77 
Whether it was Thatcherite privatisation and monetary policy, or the imposition of the poll 
tax on Scotland first in 1988, or Thatcher's so-called 'Sermon on the Mound' address to the 
Kirk that equated Conservative and Christian values, much of Scottish civil society became 
increasingly united in its opposition to the Westminster government and its centralisation of 
power. As Tom Devine argues persuasively, there was a fundamental clash of values 
between Conservative individualism, competition, and the values upheld by Scottish society: 
76 
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Scottish opposition to Thatcherism went much deeper than simple hostility to an 
unpopular government. While the Scots remained loyal to the idea of state and 
community, the Conservatives made a virtue out of promoting nationalism, 
competition and privatization. The government's values had been rejected in the 
humiliating defeat of several Conservative candidates in 1987 but were nevertheless 
still to be imposed because of its electoral ascendancy elsewhere in the UK.78 
By the mid-1980s Scotland was indeed voting en masse against the Thatcher government 
thus giving rise to what came to be termed the 'democratic deficit' where Scots were being 
governed by a party they did not support. In the 1979 general election the Conservatives 
won in England by 1 0.5% over Labour, whereas in Scotland they lost by the same amount. 
By the 1987 election the Conservatives had been reduced to ten seats in Scotland on only 
24% of the vote. 
79 
This disparity in voting patterns and the perception that the government 
at Westminster was a "little Englander administration" were representative of the democratic 
deficit and helped to motivate Scottish civil society into action.80 
The Role of Scottish Civil Society in the 1980s 
Following the repeal of the Scotland Act, 1978 the non-partisan Campaign for a 
Scottish Assembly was established in 1980 with its aim being to fight for the creation of a 
Scottish Assembly; it had support from a wide cross-section of society including the media, 
the trade unions, and local government. The Campaign later changed its call for a Scottish 
Assembly to arguing for a Scottish Parliament with taxation powers. As an organisation it 
was at the forefront of leading opposition against the Conservative government's 
constitutional policy, or what was perceived as its general lack of one. The most notable 
event in the campaign against Thatcherism and nationalist demands for self-government 
came in 1988 with the movement behind the Claim of Right for Scotland. 
The Claim of Right followed in the tradition of popular sovereignty of other national 
covenants. The Claim of Right declared the right of Scots to govern themselves as they 
77 Paterson, p. 169. 
78 Devine, p. 606. 
79 Lynch, p. 448. 
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chose and called for the establishment of a constitutional convention with membership from 
civil society to debate constitutional issues with the ultimate aim being the establishment of a 
Scottish Parliament. The outcome was the establishment of the Scottish Constitutional 
Convention (SCC) in 1989 whose members came from the churches, trade unions, the 
Convention of Scottish Local Authorities (COS LA), minority groups, and the Liberal, 
Labour, and Green parties. The Conservatives chose to not take part and the SNP attended 
only the first meeting before abstaining from the Convention's deliberations.81 
The Labour Party in the 1980s had come to embrace devolution largely through the 
efforts of pro-devolutionists such as John Smith and Donald Dewar. Under the leadership of 
Smith the party began to discuss the idea of devolution for Scotland and Wales as part of a 
package of extensive constitutional reform. The participation of Scottish Labour in the SCC 
was another significant factor in the shift taken by the Labour Party following the debacle of 
the 1992 general election. As leader, John Smith commited Labour to devolution should it 
be elected in the proceeding election. This position was maintained by Tony Blair upon his 
assuming the leadership of the party after Smith's death in 1994. The aim of creating a 
devolved Scottish Parliament following a referendum on devolution became a manifesto 
commitment for Labour in the 1997 General Election. 
The SNP's opposition reflected the ongoing debate within the party between 
gradualists who favoured devolution and fundamentalists in favour of outright independence 
for Scotland. The SNP entered a prolonged period of internal struggle following the 1979 
referendum with fundamentalists and gradualists attempting to take over the party and assert 
their respective programmes. There had also been a renewal of the radicalism in the party 
that had characterised the SNP in its early days as the leftists of the '79 Group and the 
80 Ibid. 
81 David McCrone and Bethan Lewis, "The Scottish and Welsh Referendum Campaigns," in Scotland 
and Wales: Nations Again?, eds. Bridget Taylor and Katarina Thomson (Cardiff: University of Wales 
Press, 1999), p. 20. 
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crypto-fascists of Siol nan Gaidheal sought to take the movement in a more radical direction 
characterised by futile, comic attempts at civil disobedience.82 It was largely due to the 
divisions within the SNP that, once again, the party was unable to devise a clear strategy 
towards devolution. Ultimately, the SNP embraced the more fundamentalist position of 
choosing not to participate in the sec and instead to continue the fight for independence and 
not to work with Labour and the Liberal Democrats as they had in 1979. The party remained 
opposed to participating in the SCC after the Conservatives' victory in the 1992 general 
election. 
In 1990, the SCC reported consensus on the proposal to establish a Scottish 
Pari iament elected through a system of proportional representation and funded through the 
Westminster block grant, which was made up largely of Scottish tax revenues. This 
consensus represented the willingness of Scottish civil society to come together and bring 
about constitutional change through popular will and action. The work of the SCC was 
stifled by the re-election of the Conservatives in 1992, however the campaign was taken up 
by other non-partisan groups such as Common Cause and Democracy for Scotland sought to 
keep up the momentum for constitutional change. The goals of these groups was to exert 
some political influence in an effort to keep the devolution issue on the political agenda 
during what would be five more years of Conservative government.83 The re-elected 
Conservative government of John Major essentially ignored the SCC, demonstrating that 
there had been little change in Conservative policy; the party continued in its opposition to 
devolution. 
The Scotland Act, 1998 and the Referendum 
In the five year period following John Major and the Conservatives' victory in 1992 
ongoing work on the model of Scottish devolution was undertaken by the members of the 
82 Mitchell, Strategies for Self-Government, pp. 230-3 I. 
83 McCrone and Lewis, p. 2 I . 
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SCC. With the landslide victory of the Labour Party in 1997 came the declaration by Tony 
Blair that one of the new government's first priorities would be to enact legislation to 
provide a devolved Parliament for Scotland and a devolved assembly for Wales. The white 
paper Scotland's Parliament was published by the Labour Government under the Secretary 
of State for Scotland, Donald Dewar. It embraced the vast majority of the recommendations 
made by the sec including the legislative model, the tax-varying power, and the mixed first-
past-the-post/proportional representation electoral system envisaged by it. Considerable 
divisions arose when the Labour government decided to hold a two-question referendum to 
ratify the resulting Scotland Act, 1998. Many in the Labour party and the Liberal Democrats 
argued that the general election result was enough of a mandate for the government to 
proceed with its programme of constitutional reform. 84 Against this opposition the 
referendum was held on 11 September 1997 and asked Scots whether they were in favour of 
the establishment of a Scottish Parliament and secondly whether it should have tax-varying 
powers. Scotland FORward, a coalition of Labour, the Liberal Democrats and the SNP, had 
been formed in June 1997 to work for a 'Yes'-'Yes' vote in the referendum. This was the 
first time these three parties had worked together in the cause of devolution and represented 
a significant move on the part of the SNP, who under its gradualist leader Alex Salmond had, 
for the large part, chosen to support devolution. The Scottish Conservative and Unionist 
Party was alone in its opposition to devolution and constituted the campaign Think Twice, to 
push for a double 'No' vote. The referendum resulted in 74% voting 'Yes' on the first 
question and 63% on the second question on a turnout of 60%. The specific provisions of 
the Scotland Act, 1998 and its impact on Scottish politics and the constitutional framework 
of the United Kingdom will be elaborated upon in chapter seven. 
The development of Scottish political nationalism from the late nineteenth century 
has been characterised by the involvement of civil society, including the churches, the trade 
84 Ibid., pp. 22-23. 
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unions, business groups, citizens' groups, all of which worked alongside the political parties 
who favoured devolution. While the SNP emerged as the 'nationalist' party in the mid-
twentieth century it did not have an exclusive claim to the use of nationalism as a tool for 
mobilising the Scottish populace. As was mentioned in the early part of this chapter, 
Scottish national ism is diffuse and it is this characteristic that is evident when one examines 
the development of the movement to achieve self-government. It has been argued that 
nationalists have influenced the policy of all three unionist parties leading them to embrace 
home rule or devolution for Scotland in varying degrees as Scottish nationalism increasingly 
challenged U?ionism as a constitutional doctrine and a political identity 
In subsequent chapters on the constitutional structure of the State and nationalist 
arguments for change the similarity in approach and arguments by the nationalist movements 
in Scotland, Catalunya, and Quebec will be drawn out. To make a comparison between 
these nationalisms and how they are affecting change within the broader multinational states 
of which they are a part, it is essential to examine the constitutional structures of these states. 
Following this there will be an analysis of nationalist arguments favouring constitutional 
change and their approach towards constitutional politics. The second half of this thesis will 
be dedicated to analysing how the State has responded to these demands and how 
participant-observers understand the relationship that exists between what are arguably two 
rival conceptions of the nation. 
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Quebec's Constitutional Position within Canada and the 
Nationalist Response 
From the very beginning there have been these two construals of the nation, purely 
political like the American or French revolutionary one, and the other relies on some 
idea of a certain cultural entity prior to political action. A nation of nations means 
literally a nation there before what can be called a political one. So, in Canada we 
have one political nation, which is the whole country, which is just a political 
nation. But then we have among other things this very important French Canadian 
or Quebec nation in the other sense ... 1 
What we use to call the Quebec nation is not a big family, it's full of dissonance, it's 
full of conflicts, it's full of distinctions and differences. Quebec's people are not 
actively different from any other people in the world; they are trying to find a good 
balance between interests and passion. Passion in the sense that in order to survive 
you have to have this sentiment of belonging to a community, you can hardly exist 
solely as an individual.2 
This chapter examines the constitutional position of the province of Quebec within 
the Canadian federal system, the nationalist response, and how certain participant-observers 
understand this position. It also examines how the current constitutional politics of the 
Canadian State are shaping a conception of nationhood. In the above quotations Taylor and 
Letourneau echo the tension over national identity that is at the root of Canadian 
constitutional discourse. Both understand Quebec to be a nation, but a nation within a 
nation where the conception of nation has been fundamentally reoriented as a result of 
constitutional reform since 1982. With the patriation of the Constitution Act, 1982 and the 
entrenching of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms by the Liberal government of 
Pierre Elliott Trudeau a fundamentally new understanding of the Canadian federal system 
and Quebec's position within it was brought about. This conceptualisation of the Canadian 
1 Interview with Prof. Charles Taylor, Department of Philosophy, McGill University, Edinburgh, 
I 0.05.1999. 
2 Interview with Prof. Jocelyn Letourneau, Faculte des Lettres, Universite Laval, Quebec, 12.01.1999. 
Quebec's Constitutional Position 
State was reflective ofTrudeau's own understanding of Canadian federalism. In the almost 
two decades following the patriation of the Canadian constitution from the United Kingdom 
Parliament, the vast majority of English-speaking Canadians outside Quebec have come to 
accept the Canadian State as the Canadian nation, inclusive of Quebec. For these Canadians 
the state as the nation is represented in symbols such as the flag, in concepts such as 
multicuturalism and bilingualism, and in the liberal, rights-based understanding of Canadian 
society contained in the Charter. During the same period this understanding of the Canadian 
nation has been rejected by nationalists in Quebec who view Quebec as the nation within the 
framework of a federal Canadian state. 
As in the case of Scotland and Catalunya there is a rival conception of nation. One 
is held by the majority outside the territory of the minority national group which views the 
state as the nation and one held by the minority national group who understand Quebec, 
Scotland, or Catalunya as the nation. This nation is their primary, though not exclusive 
source of identity. An understanding of Quebec as one of the two founding peoples of 
Canada was embraced within Canadian federalism prior to the late 1960s through the 
concept of duality. Duality was premised on the understanding that there were two founding 
peoples, the British and the French, who came together to establish Canada as a federal state 
in 1867 at the time of Confederation. As discussed in chapter two, the French-Canadians 
viewed themselves as a nation from very early on, having their own history, language, 
religion, culture, and legal system distinct within North America. While this compact theory 
of Confederation did not gain general credence until some decades after Confederation, it 
did influence an understanding of Canada and Canadian federalism that became dominant 
among political classes. It was based on the recognition of the French-Canadians as a 
distinct community, a people, and from their perspective a nation. This ultimately became 
restricted to the Quebecois through the identification of Quebec as the territorial basis of 
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French Canada and the political vessel of French Canadian nationalism.3 As Prime Minister 
Lester Pearson stated in 1963: "While Quebec is a province in this national confederation, it 
is more than a province because it is the heartland of a people: in a very real sense it is a 
nation within a nation."
4 
This understanding of the Canadian State as a multinational nation 
rooted in the principles of federalism has little resonance today in what can be called the 
Charter era of Canadian constitutional politics. The position adopted by Quebecois 
nationalists that argues for greater sovereignty for the Quebec nation has been shaped over 
the last thirty years, a period during which there has emerged two rival conceptions of the 
nation. 
This chapter will examine the current character ofQuebecois nationalism and 
examine to what degree it is a diffuse nationalism. As in the fo11owing two chapters, this 
chapter wi 11 go on to analyse the current constitutional framework in Canada and Quebec's 
place within that framework. The aspects of the Canadian constitution that will be 
discussed are the principles of federalism and sovereignty within the federal system, the 
nature of the Charter itself, language rights and rights to minority language education that 
are entrenched in the constitution. Particular attention will be paid to areas of the 
constitution which nationalists in Quebec view as being problematic and argue, in many 
cases, to be against the principles of federalism. As in the two previous chapters, this 
chapter will draw upon particpant-observer interviews and on an analysis of constitutional 
documents to highlight the argument that nationalists have a different conception of what 
the nation is from the majority in the rest of the state. 
The subsequent section will focus briefly on the failed attempts at constitutional 
reconciliation following the Quebec government's rejection of the patriation package of 
3 For how this transfonnation from an idea of a French Canadian nation to a Quebecois nation took 
place see Jeremy Webber, Reimagining Canada: Language, Culture, Community, and the Canadian 
Constitution, particularly chapter 3. . . 
4 As quoted in Kenneth McRoberts, Misconceiving Canada: The Struggle for National Umty (Toronto: 
Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 40. 
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1982 and its subsequent endorsement by the other nine provinces and the federal 
government. Both the Meech Lake Accord of 1987 and the Charlottetown Accord of 1992 
attempted to reconcile the concept of duality with the constitutional framework that had 
been adopted in 1982. They emerged as responses to the five specific demands made by the 
Quebec government for its acceptance of the 1982 package of reforms. For many Quebecois 
nationalists the acceptance of these five demands remains the foundation upon which to 
build a new partnership with ROC. 
The following section will examine how this constitutional framework is viewed as 
being problematic by nationalists in Quebec and how political developments since the late 
1960s have given rise to nationalist demands for change. The question of duality versus the 
theory of provincial equality will be analysed as it impacts on nationalists' views of Quebec 
within Canada and how this debate has affected approaches to constitutional reform. 
Finally, the Trudeauite vision of Canada and its embracing of bilingualism, individual rights 
within the Charter, and multiculturalism will be discussed in order to ascertain its impact on 
nationalist discourse. 
The nationalist response to the current constitutional framework of Canada will be 
analysed largely through an examination of party documents coming from the Parti 
Quebecois (PQ), Bloc Quebecois (BQ), and the Action Democratique du Quebec (ADQ). 
Consideration will also be given to recent proposals for constitutional reform made by the 
Parti Liberal du Quebec (PLQ) which can be said to represent the so-called soft nationalist 
position of that party. An analysis of the federal responses to the threat of Quebec secession 
since the 1995 referendum will form the basis of a broader concluding discussion on the 
merits of asymmetry within the Canadian federal system. A qualitative analysis of interview 
data from political and academic participant-observers will serve to shed greater light on 
how they understand the debate over Quebec's place in Canada. 
The Federalist-Sovereigntist Divide 
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As was previously mentioned, the nationalist movement in Quebec at the beginning 
of the twenty-first century is in many ways as diffuse as it was in the nineteenth or twentieth 
centuries. While the PQ, and since 1990 its federal partner the BQ, have been the dominant 
voices arguing for greater sovereignty for Quebec, they are not alone in representing 
nationalist opinion. Like Catalan nationalism there is a plurality of groups and parties in 
Quebec that explicitly identify themselves as nationalist, although this nationalism takes 
many forms. As is the case in both Scotland and Catalunya, it is common to find 
nationalists represented in those parties which do not openly advocate secession or division 
of the state to meet their aspirations. As with the PSC in Catalunya or the Labour Party in 
Scotland, the PLQ represents a sizeable segment of nationalist opinion. As in the other two 
cases nationalism in Quebec is not synonymous with separatism. In Quebec the key 
political divide is between federalists and sovereigntists. Federalists are a broad-based 
group who are supportive of the PLQ and advocate a reform ofthe status quo and greater 
recognition of Quebec's distinct position within Canada as a nation, but all within the 
context of a strong, united and federal Canada. For them, a strong and united Canada is one 
that recognises the need to promote Quebec's distinct language and culture. This link 
between federalists and sovereigntists is expressed well by the current leader of the PLQ, 
Jean Charest, who as a former federal cabinet minister was an active constitutional 
negotiator in the early 1990s: 
All separatists are nationalists but not all nationalists are separatists. So that sort of 
sums it up. There is an important tranche of the Francophone population who are 
nationalist and federalist and in their case it's a more defensive fonn of federalism 
in which they say their nationalism is a shield against the tyranny of the majority 
who side with Canada in a way that to them does not recognise their distinct culture 
and language. 5 
Charest's perspective is an interesting one in that his comments are shaped by his 
experience as a Quebec politician, as a former federal cabinet minister who played a role in 
5 Interview with Hon. Jean Charest, Leader of the Opposition, Quebec National Assembly, Montreal, 
07.08.2000. 
128 
Quebec's Constitutional Position 
the Meech Lake constitutional round of 1987-1990, and as one of the chief negotiators of 
the Charlottetown Accord of 1992. In his current role as Leader of the PLQ, Charest is 
forced to balance the two dominant voices within his party. On the one hand there are those 
he identifies as federalist and nationalist and who adopt this defensive nationalism as a 
bulwark against a more strident federalism; they are seen as 'soft nationalists'. The other 
dominant group is the one with which Charest, from his choice of language, appears to 
identify. These are federalists who choose to adopt a less antagonistic posture towards 
Ottawa. Under Charest's leadership the PLQ has adopted a proactive approach that calls for 
a more progressive federalism. It is an approach that seeks to meet the concerns of 'soft 
nationalists' for a reform of federalism and a move away from the status quo while at the 
same time not alienating federalists, in particular Anglophones in Quebec, who fear a more 
antagonistic, openly nationalist strategy. The exact nature of the PLQ's current 
constitutional position will be discussed below. For Charest, being able to balance these 
two often divergent views within the PLQ is key if both he and the party are to be a viable 
opposition to the sovereigntists of the PQ. 
On the opposite end of the spectrum from federalists are the sovereigntists who are 
generally supportive of the PQ and BQ and who seek in varying degrees and in various 
forms independence for Quebec. Some sovereigntists argue for outright separation from 
Canada while the majority is supportive of a new partnership with ROC, a partnership that 
would establish political and economic links between it and a sovereign Quebec. Indeed, 
there are varying shades of opinion in all parties, including the ADQ that tries to occupy the 
nationalist middle ground. More will be said of the approaches of the different parties. 
Language and Culture 
As in Catalunya, language is the pre-eminent issue in Quebecois nationalist 
discourse; it shapes Quebec society and dominates its politics. The central goal of 
nationalists in Quebec is the preservation of the French fact in North America through the 
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promotion of the language in all aspects of society: government, education, commerce and 
day-to-day living. As Catalunya has implemented linguistic normalisation legislation to 
promote the use of Catalan and enhance its status, so too has Quebec. This has been the 
goal of the National Assembly, the provincial legislature, in enacting such laws as La Charte 
de la languefranr;aise, or Bill 101, and Bill22 that ended language equality in Quebec in 
1972.
6 
While language is central to Quebec nationalism, many nationalists would argue that 
this focus on the linguistic question does not imply that it is an ethnic nationalism: 
We are talking about a nation of Francophones. That has nothing to do with 
ethnicity, it has to do with the fact that the language is the cement or cohesion that 
strengthens the link that people establish together. That means also that the French 
are participating in the same media society, they are listening to the same 
programmes, they are watching the same T.V., they are reading the newspapers and 
over a certain period of time it strengthens very much the existence of the 
• 7 commumty. 
A nationalist academic, Letoumeau emphasises the role of the French language as a means 
of communication, a way of communicating culture in a society and thereby contributing to 
the ongoing construction of that society. The society of which he speaks is defined by its 
language, and the link between language and national identity is explicit. The broader 
recogntion of this national community within <;:anada depends upon the ROC understanding 
and accepting the existence of this historically and linguistcally-defined national 
community: 
What we have to think about is the existence of an historical and political 
community made up by French Quebeckers, that is a history that cannot be erased 
and in order to reveal any functional or any positive or any possible agenda for 
Canada, this is my perspective, one has to take account of that reality: the existence 
of an historical and political community formed by French Quebeckers.8 
At the same time as this community is being fashioned and strengthened nationalist 
parties in Quebec are attempting to construct an inclusive nationalism that does not exclude 
any individual or group from this community. It was argued in chapter two that Quebecois 
6 McRoberts, Misconceiving Canada, p. 99. 
7 Interview with Prof. Jocelyn Letourneau, Faculte des Lettres, Universite Lava), Quebec, 12.01.1999. 
8 1bid. 
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nationalism had a more ethnic conception of the nation in the period prior to the Quiet 
Revolution. Yet, nationalist parties have worked to encourage the emergence of a 
nationalism that is inclusive and that uses language as a unifying characteristic. The PQ's 
conception of an inclusive nationalism will be looked at below in a closer examination of 
the party's policy. 
It is difficult to gauge the extent to which Francophones embrace such an inclusive 
nationalism -one that attempts to accept the diversity of Quebec society, including 
aboriginal peoples and the sizeable English minority, while also promoting French language 
and culture. Letourneau emphasises that a new form of partnership between a sovereign 
Quebec and the ROC must meet the needs of Francophones as a community: 
... traditionally I think we had a concept of nation which was a littie bit exclusive. 
For some years now the concept of nation in Quebec has been re-defined as a very 
inclusive one. But there is a sort of association in this re-definition in the concept of 
the nation as an inclusive one in that if a project of sovereignty partnership is not 
first and foremost for the Francophones there is no sense, because the concept of an 
inclusive nation which makes very few difference between all those who are 
participants or members of the nation is already the project pushed to the fore by 
Canada.9 
This would appear to be a less inclusive and possibly more ethnic conception of the nation 
than the one that the PQ attempts to promote. Former Quebec premier Jacques Parizeau 
echoed a similar view when he, in a speech on the night of the sovereigntists' defeat in the 
1995 referendum, blamed the results on "money and the ethnic vote". Yet at the same time it 
would be na'ive to think that the PQ is not fighting first and foremost for a sovereign, 
unilingual French political entity within North America that is also tolerant of diversity. 
Whether such an entity is an independent state or involved in some sort of partnership with 
the ROC is dependent upon circumstances at the time of negotiation should that time come. 
However, this goal of sovereigntists is pursued largely in spite of the massive and persistent 
opposition towards it on the part of Anglophones and aboriginal groups. Those nationalists 
9 1bid. 
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who support the sovereigntist project do so out of a belief in the existence of "an historical 
and political community formed by French Quebeckers", a Quebec nation that has 
repeatedly been rejected by English-speaking Canada since 1982. 
Constitutional Structure 
The complex nature of Quebecois nationalism is reflected in the politics 
surrounding Canada's constitution and the question of its reform. The constitutional 
settlement of 1982 did not have the support of Quebec since the National Assembly did not 
ratify it. Constitutional law as interpreted by the Supreme Court of Canada dictated that this 
was not necessary for the Constitution Act, 1982 to come into effect and apply equally to 
Quebec and the other nine provinces and two territories. 10 This was viewed by nationalists 
in Quebec as a rejection ofthe principle of duality and thus a repudiation of Quebec's status 
as a nation within Canada. To gain a greater understanding of the position of Quebec 
following 1982 it is imperative to look at the framework of the Canadian constitution and to 
what extent Quebec is recognised within it. 
Federalism and Sovereignty 
Unlike the United Kingdom and Spain, Canada is a federal country in which its 
component parts, the provinces as British North American colonies, came together in a 
federal union in 1867. As stated in the preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867: "Whereas 
the Provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick have expressed their Desire to be 
federally united into One Dominion under the Crown of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Ireland, with a Constitution similar in Principle to that of the United 
Kingdom: ... " 11 Even though Canada has a written constitution as necessitated by virtue of 
its federal nature, it is similar to the United Kingdom's unwritten constitution in that it is not 
based solely on one document. The principal documents of the Canadian Constitution are: 
10 Peter H. Russell, Constitutional Odyssey: Can Canadians Become a Sovereign People?, 2nd ed. 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), p. 119. 
11 Constitution Act, 1867, preamble. 
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the Constitution Act, 1867 and its amendments, the Canada Act, 1982 including the 
Constitution Act, 1982, orders-in-council and statutes creating new provinces and regulating 
their boundaries, the Statute of Westminster of 1931, and any further amendments. These 
are outlined in s.52(2) of the Constitution Act, 1982. 12 The Canadian constitution also 
includes numerous conventions, rules of the constitution that are not expressly stated or 
legally enforceable, such as the convention that royal assent is never withheld from a bill 
that is duly passed by both houses of Parliament. 13 
As Canada is a federal state, the constitution divides sovereignty between the 
Federal Parliament and the legislatures of the ten provinces. Given that sovereignty operates 
within this federal context in Canada, the doctrine of the legislative supremacy of 
Parliament therefore cannot function precisely as it does in the United Kingdom. At the 
same time the doctrine is not entirely absent from the Canadian constitution. It does appear 
for example in s.33 of the Constitution Act, 1982, the so-called 'notwithstanding clause', 
which enables Parliament or a provincial legislature to enact a law that operates 
"notwithstanding" provisions contained in certain sections of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms. The areas of legislative jurisdiction, or sovereignty, for the Federal 
Parliament and the provincial legislatures are outlined in sections 91 and 92. Section 91 
enumerates areas such as defence, monetary policy, and the criminal law given to the 
Federal Parliament and s.92 gives control of such areas as municipal institutions, property 
and civil rights and "Generally all Matters of a merely local or private Nature" to the 
provinces. 14 In Canada, the residuary power lies with the Federal Parliament in s.91, that is, 
the Federal Parliament is given jurisdiction over all those areas not specifically enumerated. 
In contrast, the Spanish Constitution of 1978 establishes that residuary power lies with the 
autonomous communities. 
12 Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 1999 Student Edition (Toronto: Thomson Canada 
Limited, 1999), p. 6. 
13 Ibid., p. 18. 
14 Ibid., ss. 91-92. 
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Residuary Power 
The federal residuary power in the Canadian constitution gives the Federal 
Pari iament considerable legislative power. Together with the federal declaratory power and 
the powers of reservation and disallowance the Canadian constitution has a somewhat 
unitary flavour as many commentators have argued. The beginning of s.91 of the 
Constitution Act, 1867 gives the Federal Parliament the power to "make Laws for the Peace, 
Order, and good Government of Canada, in relation to all Matters not coming within the 
Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the 
Provinces; ... [ emphasis added]" 15 The Fathers of Confederation, in particular Sir John A. 
Macdonald, believed in a much more centralised federation and had been influenced by the 
events of the American Civil War. In their view the war between the states resulted from a 
weakness in the American federal model where residuary power had been left with the 
states. 16 In the decades following Confederation a series of rulings by the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC) in London, particularly those of Lord Watson and 
Viscount Haldane, established precedents which were founded upon a belief in greater 
provincial rights and thus somewhat redressed the imbalance between the provinces and the 
Federal Parliament that had existed since 1867. There has, however, been a centralising 
trend in constitutional jurisprudence since 1949 and the abolition of appeals to the JCPC. 17 
Declaratory Power 
The federal declaratory power under s.92( 1 0)( c) allows the Federal Parliament to declare an 
area of local jurisdiction in the national interest and bring it under federal control: "Such 
Works as, although wholly situate within the Province, are before or after their Execution 
declared by the Parliament of Canada to be for the General Advantage of Canada or for the 
Advantage of Two or more of the Provinces."18 While it is invoked infrequently the 
15 Ibid., s. 91. 
16 Hogg, p. 1 14. 
17 1bid., p. 117. 
18 Constitution Act, 1867, s. 92(10)(c). 
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declaratory power does give Ottawa the further scope to interfere in areas of provincial 
jurisdiction. Indeed , there has been increasing interference by the Federal Government in 
areas of provincial jurisdiction since the I 960s, particularly in health care and education. 
As will be discussed, many Quebecois nationalists decry this ongoing interference on the 
part of Ottawa and see it as underlying what they argue are the inherent problems in the 
constitutional framework of the federal state. 
Reservation and Disallowance 
The federal powers of reservation and disallowance in sections 55 and 56 
concurrently with s.90 allow the Federal Parliament, through the provincial lieutenant-
governors as the sovereign's representative in the province, to reserve or disallow any piece 
of provincial legislation. Reservation places a hold on a piece of provincial legislation prior 
to royal assent whereas disallowance annuls legislation after it has received assent. While 
disallowance has not been used since 1943 and no bill has been reserved since I 96 I, these 
powers do remain a part of the constitution and along with the federal declaratory power are 
viewed with disdain by nationalists in Quebec. 19 
For political scientist Guy Laforest and other Quebec nationalists, the continued 
presence in the constitution of powers such as reservation and disallowance demonstrate an 
incomplete form of federalism in which the Federal Parliament is able to encroach into areas 
of provincial jurisdiction. Laforest is frustrated by the lack of constitutional action and 
believes that as long as these dormant provisions in the constitution remain unreformed then 
it is impossible to afford greater recognition: 
They are not conventions, they are in the constitutional text and if they don't exist 
then tell the minister that he just has to have them abrogated and I'll believe it. 
There is a sentence in French that says: "Un droit qui dort n'est pas un droit mort." 
Kill it and I' 11 believe that it's killed. It's dormant and in our legal tradition a 
dormant right or a dormant law is a law in effect, and after I 995 it was said by a 
19 Russell, Constitutional Odyssey, p. 47. 
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federal representative that in the crunch they would use reservation and 
disallowance.20 
Although the powers of reservation and disallowance were to be repealed as part of the 
Charlottetown Accord in 1992 this failed to come about when the agreement died as a result 
of its defeat in a Canada-wide referendum. Nationalists in Quebec have argued that these 
sections in the Constitution Act, 1867 must be repealed or amended to allow for some 
greater degree of asymmetry if the ROC is to achieve a constitutional reconciliation with 
Quebec. Quebecois nationalists have continually emphasised in the years since the death in 
1990 of the Meech Lake constitutional accord through documents such as the PLQ's Allaire 
Report and the report of the provincial Belanger-Campeau Commission that there must be 
an end to federal interference in areas of Quebec's jurisdiction.21 More will be said on this 
point below when the five traditional demands of Quebec for constitutional renewal are 
discussed. 
Laforest has argued that Canada and particularly Quebec, labours under an imperial 
federalism in which the constitution permits the Federal Government to exercise power of 
an "imperial nature"; the powers discussed above are symptomatic of the "central 
government's imperial temptation."22 These constitutional relics of an imperial conception 
of federalism are, in Laforest's view, the most significant impediments towards a 
reconciliation between Quebec and the ROC, a reconciliation based upon the explicit 
recognition of Quebec as a nation. However, this recognition is proving increasingly 
difficult to achieve due to the re-assertion of what Laforest argues to be the essentially 
unitary character of the Canadian federal State: 
Canada is treated as an undifferentiated, unitary society in article 1 of the Charter. 
So, in a land where a lot of people call themselves federalists we have had a 
20 Interview with Prof. Guy Laforest, Chair, Department of Political Science, Universite Laval, 
Quebec, 13.01.1999. 
21 For an exhaustive and scholarly analysis of the Allaire Report, the Belanger-Campeau Report and 
their impact on the development of Quebec's constitutional position since 1990 look at A lain-G. 
Gagnon and Daniel Latouche, eds. Allaire. Belanger. Campeau et Ies autres. 
22 Guy La forest, "Standing in the Shoes of the Other Partners in the Canadian Union," in Beyond the 
Impasse: Toward Reconciliation, eds. Roger Gibbins and Guy Laforest (Montreal: IRPP, 1998), p. 61. 
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constitutional reform that weakened the federal principle and maintained the non-
federal elements of the 1867 constitution. The fact that Ottawa controls judicial 
appointments, the fact that we do not have, like Germany has, sufficient counter-
balance in the second chamber ... We have again a second chamber where members 
are nominated single-handedly by Ottawa. And we have, still, in the symbolism of 
the Canadian State the imperial civil servants that are the lieutenant-governors 
nominated by Ottawa and again the chief of state that used to be the Queen of the 
Empire, but now she is only of Canada for us. We have maintained it in a way ... the 
fantastic thing is that we have had this gradual, typically pragmatic in the British 
sense, evolution and moving away from the colonial link with Britain from 1867 to 
1982, but, we have internalised it in our institutions and cultures, we have still kept 
it.23 
Laforest's approach is that of a theorist who is seeking to understand the Canadian 
constitutional framework in the context of federalist theory to Canada. To this end he 
examines other federal models to see how Canada's federalism fits in with other existing 
federal states. Laforest finds Canada to be deficient and lacking in what he views to be 
certain key federalist credentials, namely proper regional representation in the Senate as 
exists in the German Biindesrat, a role for the constituent parts of the State in judicial 
appointments, and an independent head of state. The 1982 settlement failed to rectify what 
Laforest argues to be the flawed, imperial and unitary character of the Canadian 
constitution. For him the broader question deals less with the issue of Quebec nationalism 
and more with the issue ofthe ill-formed federal state. From the perspective ofLaforest, if 
the Canadian state could be reformed towards a federalism in which there is greater 
decentralisation of power, where there is recognition of Canada as a differentiated or 
multinational state, and where there is greater representation for the provinces in federal 
bodies then Quebec would achieve greater recognition. His interest lies more in federal 
structures, their impact on political culture, and how they could be reformed, and less in 
23 Interview with Prof. Guy Laforest, Chair, Department of Political Science, Universite Laval, 
Quebec, 13.01.1999. 
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matters of nation and identity. As Laforest argued: "We are all in a way prisoners of the 
structures in question."24 
Other interviewees, including Stephane Dion and Bob Rae, rejected a contention 
such as Laforest's that Canadian federalism is unitary in character. An ardent federalist and 
supporter of both the Meech Lake and Charlottetown constitutional accords, Bob Rae rejects 
the language employed by Laforest as nationalist rhetoric: "The fact remains that they don't 
know what imperial federalism means, I mean that's the use of language for an ideological 
purpose."
25 
Many federalists seek the greater accommodation of Quebec and Rae, when 
Premier of Ontario in the early 1990s, tried to achieve this during the Canada round of 
constitutional negotiations that produced the Charlottetown Accord in 1992. Rae adopts an 
historical approach and traces how Quebec has been accommodated in Canada and argues 
that since 1867 Canada has evolved into a highly decentralised federation: 
Well, I mean I think it's fair to say that the model of federalism that was chosen 
back in 1867 was a model that depending on who interprets it, if it's the JCPC 
who's interpreting it, it became a very decentralised form of federalism. We have a 
very decentralised federation. Sovereigntist academics notwithstanding, Mr. 
[Bemard] Landry notwithstanding, and others notwithstanding it's pretty hard to 
argue that the model we have today is highly centralised. It's not.26 
By arguing in favour of Canadian federalism as a decentralised federalism federalists are 
responding to the rhetoric of more hard-line nationalists who argue that Quebec can no 
longer function within Canada, largely as a result of how Canadian federalism has 
developed since 1982. Federalists who have supported reconciliation with Quebec and 
moderate nationalists who argue for fundamental structural reform in the constitution can 
agree that the 1982 constitutional settlement and the view of the Canadian State it promotes 
is problematic. As argued by Rae: " ... ifyou take Mr. Trudeau's or the Charter ideology as 
24 Ibid. 
25 Interview with Hon. Bob Rae, Chairman ofthe Board, The Forum of Federations, Toronto, 
14.01.1999. 
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being one which rejects the significance of a federation or federalism then that model is 
unsustainable; it's unsustainable because it does not deal with the pluralism of collectivities 
that is Canada." This sentiment points back to the fundamental debate over the nature of the 
Canadian federal state and whether it is multinational in character or whether there is one 
undifferentiated Canadian idea of nation enshrined in its constitution. 
The Constitution Act, 1982 and Its Impact 
Following Confederation, Canada gradually gained its independence from the 
United Kingdom. However, up until 1982 it was still necessary for the Federal Parliament 
to petition the United Kingdom Parliament to amend the Canadian constitution, then called 
the British North America Act, 1867. From time to time during the post-war period the 
Federal Government and the provinces attempted to reach agreement on an amending 
formula so that the constitution could be patriated to Canada, thus severing the most 
significant remaining colonial attachment. It is not the function of this chapter to give an 
account of the process that led to patriation in 1982. It suffices to say that the patriation of 
the constitution in 1982 with an amending formula and the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms was a watershed event in Canada's constitutional evolution. More will be said of 
the legacy of 1982 and how it embodied Pierre Trudeau 's conception of Canada, one that 
was fundamentally at odds with the that of majority of Quebecois in its rejection of duality. 
The goal here is to give a broad sketch of what is contained in the act and in particular the 
Charter. 
Amending Formula 
The patriation of the constitution in 1982 was "the culmination of a search for a 
domestic amending procedure". It allowed the Federal Parliament to amend significantly 
26 Ibid. 
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the constitution within Canada for the first time since 1867.27 The amending formula makes 
up one part of the act, encompassing sections 38 to 49; the other significant part consists of 
the Charter. Under the amending formula there are two procedures for amending the 
constitution. Certain areas of the constitution such as the office of the Queen, the Governor 
General, and of lieutenant governor, and the composition of the Supreme Court can only be 
amended with the unanimous consent of the Federal Parliament and the legislatures of all 
ten provinces as outlined in s.41. Most other amendments can be made by following the 
general procedure in s.3 8(1) that requires the consent of the Federal Pari iament and the 
legislatures of at least two-thirds, or seven provinces, comprising at least 50% of Canada's 
population. The amending formula as it exists was not supported by Quebec in 1982 and 
therefore its reform constitutes one of Quebec's five demands that would have to be met 
before it could endorse the provisions of the act. At present Quebec is subject to the 1982 
amending formula, indeed it is subject to the entirety of the Constitution Act, 1982 despite 
its lack of consent. 
The Charter 
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is the recognition of a set of rights 
and freedoms comprising fundamental freedoms, democratic rights, mobility rights, legal 
rights, equality rights, linguistic rights, and minority language educational rights. The 
Charter is framed in liberal principles emphasising individual equality while at the same 
time affording certain collective rights to linguistic communities. The Charter does impose 
certain limits to the enumerated rights including those in s.I, s.6( 4), s.l5(2), and in 
particular the limit established by s.33. As discussed above, the 'notwithstanding clause' 
allows legislation to operate notwithstanding a constitutional provision, specifically s.2 
fundamental freedoms, and sections 7-15 which include all those rights enumerated with the 
'7 - Hogg, p. 62. 
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exception of linguistic rights and democratic and mobility rights. Section 33 has been used 
on only a few occasions since 1982. The most significant case was in 1988 when the 
Quebec government made use of the clause to pass Bill 178 that restored restrictions on the 
use of languages other than French on exterior signs in the province; this followed the 
Supreme Court's striking down of the same restrictions in Bill I 0 I. The provincial 
government under Robert Bourassa's Liberals defended the move because it prevented a 
Charter review by the Supreme Court in future, and thus would help to protect the position 
of French in the province.28 Section 33 remains a controversial section of the constitution as 
a result of this episode. 
Minority Language Rights 
Language rights are enshrined in the Charter through the entrenchment of 
bilingualism and minority language educational rights. Prior to the Constitution Act, 1982 
the only mention of language was in s.133 which permits the use of either English or French 
in the Federal Parliament and in the Legislature of Quebec and allows any person to use 
either language in any Canadian or Quebec court.29 Sections 16 to 22 establish French and 
English as Canada's official languages, as well as those ofNew Brunswick, and their 
equality of status in all federal institutions. The entrenchment of language rights was the 
culmination of a process of establishing official bilingualism in Canada that had begun with 
the Trudeau government's passage of the Official Languages Act, 1969. Along with 
\ 
democratic rights and mobility rights in sections 3 to 6, the language rights provisions are 
the only rights to which the 'notwithstanding clause' is not applicable. Section 23 of the 
Charter enumerates a collective right. This section guarantees that citizens who are 
members of a minority language group within a province, for example Francophones in 
28 Jeremy Webber, Reimagining Canada: Language, Culture, Community, and the Canadian 
Constitution (Montreal: McGiii-Queen's University Press, 1994), p. 139. 
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Nova Scotia, have the right to have their children receive primary and secondary education 
in their first language where numbers warrant.30 This is a significant section of the Charter 
in that it affords a collective right to a minority group and protects their particular culture. 
Although the Charter does contain these provisions which protect language rights it perhaps 
more importantly contains section 27 that entrenches bilingualism and multiculturalism as 
defining elements of Canadian society. This view of Canada was rejected by Quebecois 
nationalists in the PQ in 1981-82 at the time of patriation and all subsequent attempts at 
reconciling nationalists to the 1982 constitutional settlement have failed. 
Attempts at Reconciliation 
As has been discussed, both Meech Lake and the Charlottetown Accord of 1992 
attempted to reconcile Quebec to the Canadian constitutional settlement of 1982. The 
Quebec government of Robert Bourassa issued five demands that would have to be met if 
Quebec was to accept the Constitution Act, 1982. These demands were: 1) Recognition of 
Quebec as a 'distinct society' within Canada; 2) The strengthening of Quebec's role in the 
area of immigration; 3) Giving Quebec a role in the selection of justices to the Supreme 
Court of Canada; 4) Giving Quebec the right to opt out of federal spending programmes in 
areas of provincial jurisdiction without suffering a penalty; and 5) Affirming a constitutional 
veto for Quebec on matters affecting the province's interests.31 These demands were met in 
the Meech Lake Accord and agreed to by all the provincial premiers and the Federal 
Government in 1987. However, the Accord failed as a result of its not being ratified by two 
of the ten provincial legislatures before the end of the three-year ratification period. This 
led to a deep sense of betrayal felt by Quebec's leaders who believed that Quebec had once 
again been rejected by English-speaking Canada as in 1982. The Charlottetown Accord 
29 Constitution Act, 1867, s. I 33. 
3° Constitution Act, 1982, s.23. 
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attempted, through a process of public consultation, to resurrect Meech Lake while at the 
same time trying to meet the concerns of western Canada in the area of Senate reform and of 
aboriginal groups over self-government. In the Canada clause that was to be added after s.1 
of the Constitution Act, 1982 the following declaration was made: "(c) Quebec constitutes 
within Canada a distinct society, which includes a French-speaking majority, a unique 
culture and a civil law tradition."32 The failure of the Charlottetown Accord in the 1992 
referendum marked the end of large-scale attempts at constitutional reform by the Federal 
Government and provinces. With the rejection of both Meech Lake and Charlottetown 
many nationalist commentators have argued that a particular Trudeauite conception of 
Canada which rejected duality had triumphed. As Laforest has succinctly put the impact of 
the death of the Meech Lake agreement: "The April 1987 compromise had been torn up. In 
my opinion the Canadian and dualist dream the Quebecois had also was shredded."33 The 
acceptance of the 1982 constitutional settlement by the ROC and the failure of the two 
constitutional accords led to a constitutional impasse in Canada. This continuing impasse 
continues to exist due to the presence of two rival conceptions of federalism and of nation. 
Trudeau's National Vision and Quebec · 
The constitutional entrenchment of bilingualism and of multiculturalism in s.27 was 
representative of a new national character which Pierre Trudeau was seeking to promote 
within the whole of Canada. As a liberal who embraced the principle of the equality of 
individuals and repudiated nationalism as irrational, Trudeau himself fashioned a new 
Canadian nationalism. This nationalism centred upon concepts that found expression in the 
Charter such as bilingualism and multiculturalism, and a finn belief in the equality of 
31 Russell, Constitutional Odyssey, pp.133-34. 
32 "Consensus Report on the Constitution, Charlottetown, August 28, 1992," as given in the appendix 
to Russell, Constitutional Odyssey, p. 239. 
33 Guy Laforest, Trudeau and the End of a Canadian Dream (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University 
Press, 1995), p. 108. 
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provinces as a cornerstone of Canadian federalism. For nationalists in Quebec the 
Trudeauite conception of Canada that has found expression in the Constitution Act, 1982 is 
problematic. That it is problematic was reinforced by the rejection of Meech Lake and 
Charlottetown that would have moderated its impact and embraced a more dualistic concept 
of the state through the distinct society clause. 
It is argued both within Quebec and outside it that Trudeau's constitutional project 
and his promotion of a bilingual and multicultural Canada has fashioned a new source of 
identity for English-speaking Canadians, an identity focussed on the state: 
Thanks to the spirit of 1982, the values associated with a certain view of liberalism 
have become the foundations of the Canadian national identity. Canadian citizens 
have come to feel an affinity with a central state whose institutions, such as the 
Charter and the Supreme Court, promote the kind of liberalism that guarantees their 
rights and protects them from discrimination. This helps explain the rhetoric of 
those who fought for absolute ascendancy of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
over the distinct society clause during the Meech Lake debate.34 
Academic commentators such as Kenneth McRoberts have argued since the death of the 
Meech Lake Accord that within Canada these are two fundamentally different concepts of 
nationality. These concepts are founded upon two understandings of Confederation that are 
irreconcilable.35 Other academics such as Berc~son and Cooper do not accept the view that 
Quebec is a distinct society.36 With the failure of the process of constitutional reconciliation 
with Quebec in 1990, in 1992, and following the result of the 1995 referendum a view has 
emerged among many commentators that the Trudeau vision of a bilingual and multicultural 
Canada is flawed. While most laud the protection of individual rights in the Charter they 
also call for a recognition of the dualistic nature of the Canadian federation, that Canada is a 
multinational state, and that greater recognition of Quebec's distinct society is absolutely 
necessary. 
34 Ibid., p. 190. 
35 McRoberts, Misconceiving Canada, p. 2. 
36 See O.J. Bercuson and B. Cooper, Oeconfederation: Canada without Quebec. 
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For many Canadians in the ROC the vision of Pierre Trudeau to create a bilingual 
and multicultural Canada based on justice and equality for all Canadians has become a 
potent force and increasingly the dominant conceptualisation of the Canadian nation. It is a 
vision that is creating an ever-increasing gap between Canadians in the rest of Canada and 
many Quebecois. What exists in Canada today are two diametrically opposed conceptions 
of federalism. The first extends the principle of the equality of individuals to the equality of 
provinces. In other words, all provinces are equal. Robert Vi pond has argued that 
embracing such principles as fairness and equality are important in organising a liberal 
society, but it seems unrealistic to expect a federal system as diverse as Canada's to 
establish these as the state's main guiding principles.37 Despite Vipond's view, Laforest has 
argued that the power of this conception of the Canadian state is considerable and that with 
the failure of the sovereigntist forces in the 1995 referendum it is beginning to take hold in 
Quebec: "what we can see in the sovereigntist movement in Quebec following the 
referendum is that there is something about a kind of primary belonging, unconditional 
allegiance to the Canadian nation-state that is making some ground."38 For Laforest this is a 
further argument for the need to address the question of structural reform rather than being 
an entirely insular nationalist and dwelling on the Quebec nation alone.39 
The second conception of the State is the one largely embraced in Quebec that 
Canada is a multinational state with Quebec existing as a distinct society within the 
federation; it is a province unlike the others. As Alain Gagnon ~as argued, the reality of the 
federal state is not Trudeau' s view: "Provinces cannot be viewed as the fundamental 
ingredients that constitute the country. Neither can individuals be viewed as 
37 Robert Vipond, "From Provincial Autonomy to Provincial Equality (Or, Clyde Wells and the 
Distinct Society)," in Is Quebec Nationalism Just?: Perspectives from Anglophone Canada, ed. Jospeh 
H. Carens (Montreal: McGiii-Queen's University Press, 1995), pp.115-16. 
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undifferentiated elements that compose the country."40 Since 1992 there has been an 
unwillingness on the part of the Federal Government to press the issue of the distinct society 
with in a constitutional context; but it did pass a resolution in the House of Commons in 
November 1995 recognising the distinct society for the purposes of government actions. 
This action by the Federal Government will be discussed in greater depth below. Generally 
speaking, many of the dominant political elites in Ottawa continue to embrace a federalism 
based upon the equality of the provinces position. 
The current federal Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs and former academic, 
Stephane Dion, is chiefly responsible for articulating the Federal Government's 
constitutional strategy. As minister, Dion has adopted a combative stance towards Quebec 
sovereigntists, arguing that Quebec's distinctiveness is best promoted within Canada. In 
promoting the Federal Government's view of the federal constitutional framework he has 
embraced the principle of provincial equality and argues that since 1982 Quebec has gained 
greater protection and that despite what nationalists say there is no threat to Quebec culture 
or identity: 
.. .1 don't know one country that would be able to define itself in one sense. Canada 
is not only one definition, obviously it-is the equality of the provinces because you 
have only one status quo. You are either a province or you're not. There are no 
provinces plus and provinces minus. We are all provinces, we are all equal 
according to the statutes.41 
Dion addresses here the view articulated by many nationalists that Quebec is a province 
unlike the others. From a cultural and linguistic perspective this is certainly the case and 
Dion articluates this when he argues that "there is an obvious reality that Quebec society is 
unique in English-speaking North America."42 However, Dion adopts the view of the 
equality of provinces within the Canadian federal system as a means of refuting 
40 Alain-G. Gagnon, "Discussant's Comments," in Seeking a New Canadian Partnership: 
Asymmetrical and Confederal Options, ed. F. Leslie Seidle (Montreal: IRPP, 1994), p. 97. 
41 Interview with Hon. Stephane Dion, Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs and President of the 
Queen's Privy Council for Canada, Privy Council Office, Ottawa, 05.0 I. I 999 
42 Ibid. 
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sovereigntist arguments that they could negotiate some other form of arrangement and still 
remain politically and economically linked with the ROC. Notwithstanding the various 
asymmetrical arrangements which are discussed below, Quebec cannot be more or less a 
province than any other constituent part of the State. While this might be legally the case, as 
a basis for Canadian national identity in provincial equality it does not carry a great deal of 
weight among nationalist Quebecois who argue, like Gagnon, that a country cannot be based 
on a strictly political division into provinces without taking into account the existence of 
distinct national communities. Dion rejects the Quebecois nationalist argument in favour of 
national recognition within Canada and argues that entrenching a distinct society clause is 
just, but not if it is used as a bargaining tool on the road to secession: 
The Prime Minister of France came and spoke about community. What does he 
mean by community? Mr. Bouchard wanted to speak about peoples. My colleagues 
want to speak about nations. I really don't care, what I want is a capacity to have a 
foundation built upon good universal values, and certainly the capacity to express 
something collective ... What I don't like is this attempt to .. .I am a people, you are 
only a community. Why do they do that? Because I want to have more rights than 
you and I want to have rights on you. And this I don't welcome.43 
It has been argued that the refusal on the part of English-speaking Canada to 
recognise Quebec's claim to nationhood within Canada through a distinct society provision 
can also be linked to the idea of an undifferentiated concept of citizenship that is rooted in 
the Trudeau vision of Canada. For English-speaking Canada, the Federal Government and 
all its institutions, has come to represent the Canadian nation.44 These institutions include 
the institutional and constitutional promotion of bilingualism and multiculturalism. This 
precludes the acceptance of a distinct culture that is somehow outside the accepted 
principles of bilingualism and multiculturalism that transcend Canada and link it together as 
a national community. The political scientist Kenneth McRoberts argues that the primacy of 
individuals that exists in the Canadian Charter has encouraged Canadians to see the 
43 Ibid. 
44 Will Kymlicka, "Multinational Federalism in Canada: Rethinking the Partnership," in Beyond the 
Impasse, p. 25. 
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Quebecois as a culture among many others that contributes to the diversity of Canada. 
McRoberts' position runs counter to that of Dion in that he rejects the orthodox Trudeauite 
view of the federal state in which provincial equality derives from the liberal view of the 
equality of individuals that is enshrined in the Constitution Act, 1982: 
I think then that he [Trudeau] was successful in establishing a new kind of 
orthodoxy in which indeed all provinces had the same status as Quebec had, it was a 
province like the others. Rights had the same status. There was not only the 
equality of individuals, the provinces, equality of cultures, all cultures had the same 
status, and language rights exist throughout the country in essentially the same way. 
Well, once you have this vision of the country then it is very hard, I think, to 
understand something like distinct society when you think about Quebec as just a 
province like the others. Its language is a language that is spoken throughout the 
country. Its culture, to the extent that there is a distinct culture of the majority of 
Quebeckers, is just one among a multitude of others.45 
McRoberts is sympathetic to Quebecois nationalism and has embraced the principle 
that Canada should be construed as a multinational state in which Quebec as a national 
minority culture constitutes a distinct society. It is his view that that the Trudeauite vision 
of a bilingual and multi cultural Canada is one that has been imposed without taking into 
account the reality of Canada. McRoberts argues that by entrenching multiculturalism and 
bilingualism in the constitutional framework the whole notion of duality is undermined and 
therefore so is the conception that there could be national collectivities within Canada, one 
of which is Quebec. Through his argument McRoberts helps to establish a paradox of 
national identities: on the one hand there is a liberal view of a bilingual, multicutural Canada 
made up of equal individuals and equal provinces which is increasingly the dominant 
identity, yet not dominant in Quebec or accepted there by nationalists. Opposing this in 
Quebec is a dominant identity based on duality and the existence of a distinct Quebec 
nation, yet not accepted in the ROC: 
The notion there is that Trudeau developed this idea of a Canada which rooted in 
official bilingualism and multiculturalism, equality of the provinces, Federal 
Government as the national government, the Charter of Rights to entrench language 
45 Interview with Prof. Kenneth McRoberts, Department of Political Science, York University, 
Toronto, 29.12.1998 
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rights in particular, this idea of Canada was perceived to incorporate Quebeckers 
within Canada so that they would see themselves first and foremost as Canadians. It 
didn't work in Quebec, it was largely rejected in Quebec ... but was widely accepted 
in the rest of the country so then we find the rest of the country much more 
committed to the equality of the provinces and that's Quebec not having any 
particular status, and by the same token to the idea of a bilingual nation. Once that 
conception of the country is adopted it becomes very hard to even comprehend what 
Quebec is talking about let alone respond positively to this.46 
Many nationalists in Quebec share McRoberts' view of how Quebec's place in Canada has 
been understood or conceived of since 1982. In the eyes of nationalist commentators such 
as A lain Gagnon this Trudeauite view of Canada that has been imposed upon Quebec is a 
reconstructed reality.47 
The promotion of the Trudeauite conception of the Canadian nation is rejected by 
Quebecois nationalists as it does not permit the recognition of a Quebec nation in a 
bicultural Canada. It is because of these essentially different conceptions of the nation that 
support has arisen in Quebec for some form of renegotiation of its relationship with the 
ROC, whether this takes the form of secession, sovereignty-partnership, or a more 
asymmetrical Canada. The failure of both the Meech Lake Accord and the Charlottetown 
Accord and the near victory for the sovereigntists in the 1995 referendum are evidence of 
English-speaking Canada's apparent inability to conceive of the country in terms other than 
that of a bilingual, multicultural state. It is this conflict over what may constitute a nation in 
Canada that is at the root of the constitutional conflict. 
Nationalist Arguments 
Nationalists have reacted to the federalist view of a united Canada based on 
individual equality and the equality of provinces. Since 1976 the fundamental strategy of 
the main nationalist party, the PQ, has been that any change to Quebec's status within 
Canada must be assented to by the citizens of Quebec in a referendum. The party favours 
the creation of an independent state with or without association to the ROC. As discussed in 
46 Ibid. 
47 Gagnon, p. 96. 
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chapter two, both the 1980 and 1995 referenda failed to endorse the sovereigntist project. 
Since 1990 the Parti Quebecois has had an ally in the Federal Parliament, the BQ, which 
seeks to represent the views of Quebec in Ottawa and endorse the sovereignty project 
articulated by the PQ. Both parties accept without reservation that Quebec is a nation and 
has a right to self-determination. In party congress documents, programmes, election 
manifestos, and public speeches by party leaders the goal of self-determination for Quebec 
is clearly enunciated. 
The Parti Quebecois 
First elected to government under Rene Levesque in 1976, the PQ has traditionally 
been a left-of-centre party that emphasises the role played by the Quebec state, I 'etat du 
Quebec, in the province's social, economic, and cultural development. Its programme from 
its founding in 1968 has been sovereignty for Quebec and the establishment of a Quebec 
state. During the course of the May 2000 party congress the PQ updated its programme 
outlining its conception of the nation and what sovereignty means for Quebec. The 
programme emphasises the need to ensure the continued presence of a strong Francophone 
culture within North America and that this can best be adopted through the establishment of 
a sovereign Quebec: 
Le peuple quebecois compose de ]'ensemble de ses citoyennes et ses citoyens, est 
libre de decider lui-meme de son statut et de son avenir. Le Parti Quebecois s'est 
forme a partir de la conviction qu'il y a urgence d'etablir un Quebec souverain, avec 
au premier plan, l'urgence d'assurer que le Quebec demeure un territoire de langue 
et de culture franyaises. Ceci est le creur du projet soverainiste. Le Parti Quebecois 
a comme objectif fondamental de realiser la souverainete du Quebec de fayon 
democratique.48 
The main objective of the party is to be achieved through a referendum put before the people 
having as its aim the establishment of a sovereign Quebec while at the same time presenting 
48 Parti Quebecois, Proposition adoptee parIes delegues Iors du XIVe Congres National (5,6 et 7 mai 
2000) (www.pq.org, 2000), p. 1. 
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to Canada an offer of partnership.
49 
In many ways this is a curious approach for a party 
which is perceived by most federalist Quebecois and English-speaking Canadians to be a 
separatist party. 
The PQ and Sovereignty in the Quebec Context 
In the context of Canadian constitutional politics the term 'sovereignty' has a 
seemingly paradoxical meaning. As we have seen, Quebec exercises sovereignty as a 
constituent part of the Canadian federal state through the National Assembly; this is 
demonstrated by the powers enumerated in s.92 of the Constitution Act, 1867. The same 
cannot be said of either the Scottish Parliament or the Generalitat in Catalunya, neither of 
which can be said to exercise sovereignty in areas of jurisdiction devolved to them. For the 
PQ sovereignty means independence, yet a qualified independence since the party argues for 
the maintenance of some political and economic links with Canada including the use of the 
Canadian dollar. 
Thus, although sovereignty is a paradoxical term in the Quebec context, but the 
rhetoric of the PQ might give another impression: "Pour un Etat, la souverainete c'est la 
juridiction to tale et exclusive sur les pouvoirs legislatifs, executifs et judiciaires exerces sur 
son territoire. Les Quebecoises et les Quebecois doivent etre mai'tres chez eux et 
responsables d'eux-memes."50 With this in mind it is difficult to conceive of a state that is 
truly independent when it is part of an economic and social union with another state. If the 
PQ is using the EU as a model it is clear from the organisation of the EU that neither 
Gennany, Belgium, France, or the United Kingdom can be truly independent since they are 
bound to a greater or lesser extent by the decisions of the European Court, the Council of 





for a sovereign Quebec would most certainly be qualified by the amount of influence the 
Canadian Parliament would have in areas such as monetary policy. Peter Leslie has argued 
that sovereigntists naturally desire an economic union since it would allow Quebec to 
defend its economic interest within North America: 
Understandably, then, Quebec independantistes want to preserve the Canadian 
economic union more or less as it is; it offers them effective defence of Quebec's 
interests vis-a-vis the ROC, and it would avoid loss of bargaining power vis-a-vis 
the United States. The latter consideration also explains why the ROC, even if it 
had assured access to Quebec markets, has good reason to fear the disruption of the 
economic union in its present form. 51 
When referring to the Quebecois people, the PQ has adopted an inclusive 
understanding of who the people are. This approach towards understanding the composition 
of the nation is shared by nationalists in both Catalunya and Scotland. Elements of ethnic 
nationalism do surface on occasion in Quebec as in December 2000 when the prominent 
nationalist Yves Michaud made disparaging comments about Jews who chose to not support 
the sovereignty project of the PQ. However, these views are not tolerated and Quebecois 
national ism as espoused by the PQ, BQ, and ADQ has established itself as one that respects 
diversity in Quebec society and will seek to promote it: 
Un Quebec souverain se doit de creer un environnement politique, social et culture! 
qui favorise le rapprochement entre les citoyens et qui se donne pour tache 
d'integrer ces diverses collectivites et les individus qui les composent dans un projet 
collectif base sur la democratie, I 'egalite des droits et le franc;ais comme langue 
commune. Le Quebec d'aujourd'hui est une societe pluraliste dans sa composition 
demographique. De nouveaux arrivants, d'origines diverses, se sont installes au fil 
des ans sur le territoire quebecois et ont enrichi la societe essentiellement 
francophone. 52 
Along with sections on citizenship, the indivisible national territory of Quebec, and a 
reaffirmation of the Charte de la /angue franr;aise, the PQ programme also discusses how 
sovereignty is to be achieved. Any referendum that garners a simple majority of the popular 
51 Peter M. Leslie, "Asymmetry: Rejected, Conceded, Imposed," in Seeking a New Canadian 
Partnership, p. 44. 
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vote, i.e. fifty per cent plus one, will be viewed by the National Assembly as a mandate for 
the negotiation of sovereignty and a new partnership with Canada. 53 The new partnership 
with Canada is to be based on the model of the European Union facilitating a form of 
economic partnership. The bases for this economic partnership would be a customs union 
and the free movement of goods, people, services, and capital. 54 This position of the PQ is 
problematic particularly since there is considerable disagreement on first of all whether a 
clear majority is enough to bring about Canada's division and secondly whether the Federal 
Government and the other nine provinces would agree to some form of partnership as 
envisaged here. These questions have been dealt with by the Supreme Court of Canada and 
the Federal Parliament in the Court's decision on the Quebec secession reference in 1998 
and the subsequent enacting of the Federal Government's Bill C-20 or 'Clarity Act.' The 
impact of these two actions will be dealt with below. 
For nationalist leaders in Quebec the 1982 constitutional settlement remains 
something to be derided as an attack on the principles of federalism. In a speech to an 
international conference on federalism at Mont-Tremblant, Quebec in October 1999, PQ 
Premier Lucien Bouchard raised the legacy of 1982 arguing that it diminished the powers of 
the National Assembly over language and education: 
52 Ibid. 
Ne l'oublions pas, c'est ici et a nous Quebecois qu'on a impose, en 1982, une 
constitution qui a reduit les pouvoirs de I' Assemblee nationale du Quebec dans des 
domaines aussi nevralgiques que la langue et !'education. Faut-il rappeler que, 
depuis, tous les gouvernements quebecois ont repudie cette constitution? Les 
Quebecois ont pen;u ce coup de force pour ce qu'il etait, c'est-a-dire une rupture du 
.C:'d, 'f 55 pacte .e eratt . 
53 Ibid., p. 5. 
54 Ibid., p. 6. 
55 Parti Quebecois, "Notes pour une allocution de monsieur Lucien Bouchard, Premier ministre du 
Quebec. Prononcee a }'occasion du «Forum des federations», Mont-Tremblant, le mercredi 6 octobre 
1999," (www.pq.org, 1999), p. 2. 
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The PQ is highly critical of the Federal Government's use of the declaratory power and its 
residuary power. Again, nationalists view this as a violation of the principle of provincial 
autonomy, which they see as a fundamental premise of Confederation. Former premier 
Lucien Bouchard claimed time and again that federal interference in Quebec's affairs is part 
of the continuing legacy of 1982 and the imposition of a conception of the state that 
"challenged the understanding of Canada as a fundamentally federal community:"56 
Les Quebecois ont toujours vu dans la federation canadienne un pacte entre deux 
nations; un pacte qui devait leur garantir le contr6le de leur developpement et 
l'exercice de competences constitutionnelles exclusives ... Decennie apres decennie, 
mes predecesseurs ont denonce !'intransigence et les envahissements federaux. Le 
regime federal canadien est presentement engage dans une strategie concertee de 
banalisation du Quebec dont les consequences pourraient s'averer plus graves 
encore que celles de I' imposition de la constitution de 1982.57 
Again, the rejection of duality in the 1982 constitutional settlement is central to 
comprehending nationalist grievances in Quebec. The PQ as a sovereigntist party has 
consistently seen its option of sovereignty-partnership with the ROC as the only viable 
option for solving the constitutional impasse. 
The Bloc Quebecois 
In the 1993 federal election the Bloc Quebecois garnered 49% of the popular vote 
and was elected in fifty-four out of seventy-three seats in Quebec, which enabled them to 
become the Official Opposition in the federal House of Commons. The party's central 
argument was that Canadian political institutions had failed Quebec. 58 The BQ said in 1993 
that it would remain in Ottawa until a referendum was held on Quebec sovereignty. This 
happened in 1995 but the BQ has continued to sit in the House of Commons despite their 
total number of seats having declined to a rough parity with the Liberals following the 2000 
56 Russell, Constitutional Odyssey, p. Ill. 
57 Parti Quebecois, "Notes pour une allocution de monsieur Lucien Bouchard, Premier ministre du 
Quebec," p. 4-6. 
58 McRoberts, Misconceiving Canada, p. 219. 
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federal election. The BQ was established by Lucien Bouchard after his 1990 break with the 
Progressive Conservative government of Brian Mulroney in which he was a cabinet 
minister. When Lucien Bouchard became Premier of Quebec after the 1995 referendum, 
Gilles Duceppe, the M.P. for Laurier-Ste-Marie in Montreal, became leader and has worked 
with Bouchard, his successor Bernard Landry and the PQ to promote a united front in the 
cause of Quebec sovereignty. The positions adopted by the BQ on the question of Quebec's 
place within Canada are identical to the PQ. The Bloc explicitly acknowledges that Quebec 
is a nation and as such has a right to self-determination through its accession to sovereignty: 
Quebec is neither a province like the others, nor a region. It is a homeland. It is a 
legacy of settlers from France and elsewhere. It is a rich melting pot of influences 
that have molded and shaped it into a nation and a people. Quebeckers do not claim 
to be better than Canadians. They simply believe that they are different, as they do 
not share the same language , the same culture, nor the same social and economic 
visions ... Quebec has a legitimate desire to possess all the levers necessary to 
develop its economy, promote its culture and take its place as the only majority 
French-speaking people in North America. For this to happen, it must have the 
fundamental tools of any people: the ability to levy all its own taxes, to make all its 
own laws, and to conclude all its own treaties. In short Quebec needs its 
sovereignty.59 
The BQ, like the PQ, embraces an inclusive concept of the Quebecois nation and commits 
itself to "building a national identity that includes all Quebec citizens. [This] must be the 
central concern of all Quebeckers."60 Its commitment to a democratic path to sovereignty is 
central to the BQ's programme, including a similar commitment to holding another 
referendum on Quebec sovereignty where a majority of fifty per cent plus one will be 
enough for the National Assembly to commence negotiations with Ottawa.61 
In parallel with the attitudes of the Catalan nationalist parties, the BQ and the PQ 
see the promotion and protection of French language and culture as central to their goal of 
59 Bloc Quebecois, "Quebec ... on the Road to Nationhood" (www.blocquebecois.org, 2000), p. 4. 
60 Bloc Quebecois, Main Proposal for submission to the party conference in Quebec City, 28-30 
January 2001 (www.blocquebecois.org, 2000), p. 4. 
61 Bloc Quebecois, "Quebec ... on the Road to Nationhood," p. 6. 
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sovereignty. From the sovereigntist perspective language is intrinsic to the evolution of an 
independent Quebec state and all members have a responsibility to preserve this French 
culture: 
There could be no Quebec nation if a national majority of Francophone Quebeckers 
with a specific language, culture and history constituting the basis of their common 
public identity did not live within Quebec's borders. This common public identity 
is also consistent with the express recognition of cultural pluralism within Quebec 
society, since English-speaking Quebeckers, Quebeckers of all other origins and 
Aboriginal peoples, in short all Quebec citizens, have the opportunity and duty to 
take part in the preservation of this language, in the transformation, mixing and 
dissemination of this culture and the pursuit of this common history.62 
Although the sovereigntist parties might hope that all Quebec citizens would choose to 
promote French culture and indeed take up their responsibility and do so, it does seem an 
unlikely prospect. When one considers that Anglophone residents of Quebec have been 
particularly vehement in their criticism of the Charte de la languefram;aise and how it 
limits their individual right of freedom of expression on signs, et cetera they may not choose 
to be the guardians of French culture that the sovereigntists feel they should be. 
The Action Democratique du Quebec 
The other smaller nationalist party within Quebec is the Action democratique du 
Quebec. It came into being following its leader Mario Dumont's break with the PLQ over 
its unwillingness to implement the Allaire Report's recommendations. It has a base among 
those nationalists who do not feel that the PLQ is assertive enough in articulating Quebec's 
demands to the Federal Government and who do not support the PQ/BQ approach of 
sovereignty-partnership. It is a centrist to centre-right party that argues for a reduction in 
provincial taxes, the diminution of government planning in the economy, a trimming of the 
62 Bloc Quebecois, Main Proposal for submission to the party conference in Quebec City, 28-30 
January 2001, p. 6. 
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provincial bureaucracy, and the reduction of the provincial debt.63 In terms of its 
constitutional policy, the ADQ is supportive in the long term of a new Canada-Quebec 
partnership, one between two states and founded upon common political and economic 
institutions.
64 
This is in essence a confederal arrangement. However, the ADQ has chosen 
to emphasise the need to encourage economic growth and investment in the economy as 
well as good government instead of continually dwelling on constitutional and linguistic 
issues. 
L' Action democratique du Quebec croit que le respect d'une treve sur les questions 
linguistiques et constitutionnelles permettrait d'unir les forces vives du Quebec 
derriere des objectifs communs. Un gouvernement de I' ADQ ne tiendra done pas de 
referendum lors du prochain mandat et ne rouvrira pas les chicanes linguistiques. Il 
se consacrera d'abord et avant tout a la remise en marche du Quebec par la revision 
de la fiscalite, la creation d'emploi et une gestion responsable de I'Etat.65 
This is a position that distinguishes the ADQ from the PQ, who have vowed to hold another 
referendum on sovereignty when the right conditions are present. Although it is a 
comparatively marginal player in Quebec politics, the ADQ does have a constituency among 
nationalists who are tired of the endless discussion of constitutional affairs that is often seen 
to distract government from important economic and social concern such as the reform of 
the health care system in the province. 
The PLQ's Constitutional Proposals 
The Quebec Liberal Party in January 200 I presented the report of a committee that 
was established to examine the party's position on Quebec's constitutional and political 
position within Canada. This was done in an effort to update the PLQ's constitutional 
policy. The report establishes at the outset the importance of federalism and that Quebec 
continue to remain part of Canada: "we favoured federalism characterized by partnership, 
63 L' Action democratique du Quebec, L' ADO et le Quebec du prochain millenaire (www.adq.qc.ca, 
2000), p. 2-4. 
64 Ibid., p. 6. 
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that is, federalism based on rich and positive relations and associations between the 
governments concerned ... It is clear to the Committee that Canada offers Quebec excellent 
prospects for the future."
66 
The report's proposals centre around five themes: 1) "A 
Collective Project for Quebeckers" that promotes the francophone heritage while at the 
same time reiterates the rights and privileges of the Anglophone minority and the right of 
immigrants to full participation in Quebec society. 2) "Affirmation and Recognition of 
Quebec's Specificity" that calls for the entrenching in the constitution of an interpretive 
clause similar to the 'distinct society clause' that recognises Quebec's specificity. 3) 
"Federalism that is more flexible and based on co-operation between the partners in the 
federation" that argues for a more asymmetric approach to Canadian federalism which could 
incorporate more administrative agreements between Quebec and Ottawa in areas such as 
international relations and the environment. 4) "Consolidation of the Canadian Social and 
Economic Union" which includes calls for expanding the 1994 Agreement on Internal Trade 
and revisiting the February 1999 Canadian social union agreement to rectify certain 
"deficiencies and inaccuracies".67 The final section calls for Quebec to take a leadership 
role in improving the Canadian federation. In this last section the report re-states many of 
Quebec's traditional demands including a role for the provinces in nominating Supreme 
Court justices, the entrenching of the current composition of the Court, limits on the federal 
spending power, and the entrenchment of a regional veto for Quebec. The regional veto 
would apply not only to Quebec but to Ontario, British Columbia, two of the Western 
provinces and two of the Atlantic provinces. This is an arrangement similar to the one 
adopted by the Federal Government that is outlined below. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Quebec Liberal Party, Quebec's Choice: Affinnation. Autonomy, and Leadership. Summarv of the 
Preliminary Report of the Special Committee ofthe Quebec Liberal Party on the Political and 
Constitutional Future of Quebec Society (www.plq.org), p. 2. 
67 Ibid. 
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This approach adopted by the PLQ clearly represents the Quebec federalist 
approach that has many soft nationalist aspects to it. It is supportive of the federation but 
not as it currently stands, it needs to be reformed to grant Quebec greater recognition, yet 
recognition within Canada and not outside it. The arguments in favour of an entrenched 
interpretive clause that would establish Quebec's unique character in the constitution are 
linked again to an understanding of Canada in which Quebec is a province unlike the others. 
As Charest argues: 
the constitution has two dimensions to it: one of them is legal with very important 
consequences, but the other one is symbolic and ideally the constitution should be a 
mirror of who you are and what you are and it should reflect a good sense of 
yourself when you read it, and that's what an ideal constitution should be able to do. 
Now, the mirror aspect for Quebeckers is not satisfactory ... 68 
For nationalists in Quebec, whether sovereigntist or federalist, some form of recognition for 
Quebec is key. Despite the goals of the PLQ and the views of political leaders such as 
Charest, many non-Quebec political leaders and political commentators in the ROC are 
increasingly unsure as to whether a distinct society clause is viable due to its rejection by the 
ROC in 1990 and 1992. 
The Federalist Response 
Nationalists who seek greater recognition of Quebec as a distinct society within 
Canada have found that their arguments are failing to provoke any great degree of 
constitutional reform that might address some of Quebec's grievances regarding the Charter, 
the amending formula, federal spending and other areas of particular concern. Canadian 
federalists such as Stephane Dion will argue that never before has Quebec had greater 
influence, never before has the French fact in Quebec been as strong as it is today. To such 
68 Interview with Jean Charest, Leader of the Opposition, Quebec National Assembly, Montreal, 
07.08.2000. 
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federalists the rejection of a pan-Canadian identity in favour of a uniquely Quebec one is 
nonsensical: 
There is no way you can say that Quebec culture or Quebec identity is in danger, 
never has the province been more French than today. Quebec's identity is alive and 
well thank you very much! But why give up Canadian identity? Where in the world 
now to have different identities is a great strength, to be Scottish, British and 
European is a strength and why choose. That is my argument: why choose?69 
Nationalists in Quebec would argue that the Canadian identity that is presented to them is 
one in which they do not see themselves; it is one that does not explicitly acknowledge their 
distinctiveness and their presence as a nation within a multinational state. The perception of 
many in Quebec is that they are being forced to choose between Canada and Quebec by 
English-speaking Canada. In rejecting a certain conception of Canada and identifying first 
as Quebecois nationalists in Quebec are sometimes accused of not being good Canadians 
and undermining national unity. As Taylor argues: 
[Newfoundland Premier] Clyde Wells said to us when that compromise was made 
on Meech which he then pulled the rug out of, he said: "Now you've got this, I want 
you to put Canada first and Quebec second the way the rest of us do." Now, apart 
from the fact that coming from a Newfoundlander that is so ... it boggles the mind. It 
is also a misperception of what it is to be a really gung-ho Quebec federalist. The 
idea of putting one first is not the language that makes sense to us. So it's been this 
problem that the things that seems to solve our identity problems seem to many in 
the rest of the country to undennine Canadian unity, whereas in fact it would be 
I h . 70 exact y t e opposite. 
Charles Taylor's view of Quebec's position in Canada is shaped very much by his 
development of communitarian theory as a challenge to liberalism. An opponent of 
Trudeau's vision of Canada, Taylor understands Quebec as a national community within 
Canada. He would argue that it is this community that Quebecois have as their primary 
identity, although not at the expense of an identification they have with the Canadian State. 
69 Interview with Hon. Stephane Dion, Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs and President of the 
Queen's Privy Council for Canada, Privy Council Office, .Ottawa, 05.01.1999. 
70 Interview with Prof. Charles Taylor, Department of Philosophy, McGill University, Edinburgh, 
I 0.05.1999. 
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Such a dual identity is a reality that exists for Quebecois. The referendum of 1995 provided 
a stark illustration of this reality in Quebec. With 50.4o/o of voters supporting the federalist 
'No' option and 49.6o/o supporting the sovereigntist 'Yes', the divide was exposed. The 
referendum had a profound impact on the Federal Government and determined how it would 
respond in the present and in the future to claims made by Quebec. Following the 
referendum, the federal Liberal government of Jean Chretien initiated a two-pronged 
approach to the Quebec question and the threat of Quebec secession: Plan A and Plan B. 
The following section will analyse the responses of the Federal Government to the 
referendum result and to the ongoing claims of Quebecois nationalists. 
In the period immediately after the referendum a number of academics proposed 
how the Federal Government might respond to the surprisingly close result. One of these 
was Peter Russell who favoured a two-track approach. Track One would be essentially non-
constitutional and address many of the suggestions raised throughout Canada on how 
federalism could be reformed: 
It should focus on reforms that do not require formal amendment of the 
Constitution. For more than a generation we Canadians have tortured ourselves 
searching for a mega-constitutional breakthrough -a grand-slam constitutional 
remedy for all that ails us. This is surely not the time for yet another frustrating 
round of constitutional wrangling. 71 
Track Two involved the Federal Government developing a plan that would consider how to 
handle a referendum, the rules on how it should be conducted, and how to negotiate if the 
sovereigntists were to win.72 Plan A and Plan B, which roughly corresponded to Russell's 
tracks one and two, are presently playing themselves out. This has the Federal Government 
71 Peter Russell, "Preserving the Canadian Federation: A Two-Track Approach," in New Perspectives 
on the Canadian Constitutional Debate, ed. lames M. Pitsula (Regina: Canadian Plains Research 
Centre, 1997), p. 3. 
72 Ibid., p. 10. 
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adopting both a non-constitutional, administrative approach to dealing with the threat of 
Quebec secession and an aggressive, legislative approach. 
Plan A - The Administrative Approach 
Plan A is a strategy adopted by the Federal Government in an effort to promote 
Quebec's unique linguistic and cultural character outside the framework of the constitution. 
In December 1995 the Federal Parliament passed the resolution discussed above that called 
upon the legislative and executive branches of the Federal Government to be guided by the 
reality that Quebec constitutes within Canada a distinct society.73 This resolution did 
provide some vague and limited recognition of the distinct society, but it did not entrench it 
constitutionally and so the Supreme Court is not required to take such a reality into 
consideration when ruling on constitutional matters. In addition, the lack of entrenchment 
vastly reduces the symbolic message conveyed by the decalaration of 'distinct society'. As 
Webber has argued, a distinct society provision should lie at the "heart of the constitutional 
order" thereby confirming that the government of Quebec has a right to promote this 
distinctiveness: "It would have acknowledged that Quebec need not be a province like the 
others, and thus would have undone the harm caused by the denial of that claim during the 
. . ,74 
patnatton process. 
Another manifestation of the Plan A approach was a bill that affected the conditions 
by which a constitutional amendment could be introduced in Parliament. The bill which 
received royal assent in February 1996 declared that any constitutional amendment that was 
subject to the general amending formula could not be introduced to Parliament unless it had 
been approved by Ontario, Quebec, British Columbia, and two or more provinces from both 
western and Atlantic Canada whose populations together total at least 50% of the regional 
73 McRoberts, Misconceiving Canada, p. 236. 
74 Webber, p. 288. 
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population.
75 
This essentially served to give Quebec a constitutional veto, one of its original 
demands emanating from the Meech Lake constitutional accord. In addition, the Federal 
Government negotiated an agreement with the provinces that devolved considerable 
jurisdiction in the area of manpower training to the provincial legislatures; this had been a 
long-standing demand of Quebec. Unfortunately, an historic agreement on the social union 
in Canada was not as successful. 
The social union agreement of February 1999 between nine provinces, the three 
territories, and the Federal Government highlighted the need for greater cooperation and 
more effective delivery of social programmes and health care. The Federal Government 
committed itself "not to launch any new Canada-wide initiatives in the social field without 
the consent of the majority of the provinces and to work with the provinces to define 
objectives."76 Quebec refused to sign the agreement as it believed that it would still allow 
Ottawa to interfere in areas of provincial jurisdiction such as housing and health insurance. 
One example of this cited by Quebec was Ottawa's creation of the Millennium Scholarship 
Plan for university students across the country; it was viewed as interfering with the 
province's jurisdiction over education funding: The Quebec government also objected to 
Quebec taxpayers being forced to pay for social programmes throughout Canada when 
identical programmes existed in Quebec funded by the provincial government. The social 
union agreement failed to give a concrete guarantee that Ottawa would not interfere in areas 
of Quebec jurisdiction, one of the long-term goals of the PQ and Quebecois nationalists. 77 
Plan B - The Supreme Court Reference and the Clarity Act 
75 McRoberts, Misconceiving Canada, p. 236. 
76 Privy Council Office, "A Framework to Improve the Social Union for Canadians: An agreement 
between the Government of Canada and the Governments of the Provinces and Territories, February 4, 
1999" (www.pco-bcp.gc.ca, 1999), p. I. 
77 For a broader critical assessment ofthe social union agreement and the impact of Quebec's rejection 
of it see A lain-G. Gagnon and Hugh Segal, eds., The Canadian Social Union without Quebec: 8 
Critical Analyses. 
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The Federal Government's Plan 8 approach to the Quebec question and the 
demands of nationalists picks up on some of the recommendations made by Russell. The 
Plan B strategy is a far more aggressive one that deals head on with what the federal 
response should be to the next referendum and, ultimately, to a 'Yes' vote in favour of 
sovereignty should it come to that. Plan 8 began with the Federal Government's reference 
to the Supreme Court on Quebec secession, followed by its response to the court's decision 
in Bill C-20, the Clarity Act. Both actions were highly controversial and provoked strong 
reactions within Quebec. 
The Federal Government in September 1996 sought the opinion of the Canadian 
Supreme Court on a series of questions related to Quebec secession. Ottawa sought to have 
the Court clarify what the ground rules would be in the event of another referendum and 
whether following such a vote Quebec could declare its independence unilaterally from the 
rest of Canada. The Court was asked to rule on the following: 
I. Under the Constitution of Canada, can the National Assembly, legislature, or 
government of Quebec effect the secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally? 
2. Does international law give the National Assembly, legislature or government of 
Quebec the right to effect the secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally? In 
this regard, is there a right to self-determination under international law that 
would give the National Assembly, legislature or government of Quebec the 
right to effect the secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally? 
3. In the event of a conflict between domestic and international law on the right of 
the National Assembly, legislature or government of Quebec to effect the 
secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally, which would take precedence in 
Canada?78 
On question one the Court ruled that Quebec did not have the right under the Canadian 
constitution to secede unilaterally, declaring that "The Constitution vouchsafes order and 
stability, and accordingly secession of a province 'under the Constitution' could not be 
achieved unilaterally, that is, without principled negotiation with other participants in 
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Confederation within the existing constitutional framework."79 In response to the second 
question the Court ruled that Quebec did not enjoy a right under international law vis-a-vis 
the right to self-determination to secede: 
Some supporting an affirmative answer did so on the basis of the recognized right to 
self-determination that belongs to all "peoples". Although much of the Quebec 
population certainly shares many of the characteristics of a people, it is not 
necessary to decide the "people" issue because, whatever may be the correct 
determination of this issue in the context of Quebec, a right to secession only arises 
under the principle of self-determination of a people at international law where "a 
people" is governed as part of a colonial empire; where "a people" is subject to alien 
subjugation, domination or exploitation; and possibly where "a people" is denied 
any meaningful exercise of its right to self-determination within the state of which it 
forms a part. In other circumstances, peoples are expected to achieve self-
determination within the framework of their existing state.80 
The Court did not believe that the Quebecois had been denied the ability to pursue their 
development within Quebec as a result of being part of the Canadian federal state.81 With 
the first two questions answered the third question became moot. The Court did, however, 
make the following statement regarding a referendum: "A clear majority vote in Quebec on 
a clear question in favour of secession would confer democratic legitimacy on the secession 
initiative which all other participants in confederation would have to recognize."82 No 
definition was given as to what "clear" meant. · 
The Federal Government embraced the ruling by the Court, arguing that it ruled out 
the possibility of Quebec seceding unilaterally. The nationalists in Quebec also embraced 
the ruling, arguing that it mandated negotiation on the part of the Federal Government in the 
event of a 'Yes' vote. The ruling is a landmark in Canadian constitutional and judicial 
history. What is perhaps more significant is what it says about the concept of federalism 
and the nation. The judgement recognised the importance of the federal principle and that 
78 Reference re: Secession of Quebec, [ 1998] 2 S.C.R. (www.lexum.umontreal.ca, 1998), p. 1. 
79 Ibid., p. 2. 
80 Ibid., p. 3. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid., p. 2. 
165 
Nations of Distinction 
the other partners in Confederation, the provinces and the Federal Parliament, would have to 
acknowledge Quebec's decision and negotiate. McRoberts argues that this decision might 
show a swing of the pendulum away from the vision of the country expressed in 1982: 
To be sure the Supreme Court said no, Quebec doesn't have the right under the 
Canadian constitution to declare independence unilaterally, I don't think anybody 
really said it did. But then went on to say well, on the other hand, we have to 
understand that the Canadian constitution is rooted in several different principles 
and if there were in fact to be a democratically arrived at vote in favour of 
sovereignty with a clear majority on a clear question then the rest of the country in 
the name of the principle of federalism in particular is obliged to sit down and 
negotiate. That's a very strong statement. To a certain extent I think it represents 
an attempt to restore this older idea of Canada in which federalism is so important. 
It's a very important decision and to that extent the court may have broken with the 
tradition up to that point which seemed to be one of entrenching the vision of the 
country contained in 1982.83 
Along with Laforest and others sympathetic to the claims of Quebecois nationalism, 
McRoberts sees in the Supreme Court's decision an affirmation of the arguments he has 
advanced that Canada is in reality a differentiated federation, a state in which considerable 
asymmetry exists. With the Court calling upon the Federal Government and the other 
provinces to negotiate with Quebec in the event of a vote in favour of some form of 
secession the essential link between Canadian constitutionalism and federalism is 
established. Thus, McRoberts argues that what the court has said is that it would be 
unconstitutional for the Federal Government to try and use its powers of reservation and 
disallowance to stop Quebec from exiting Confederation.84 By extension it could be argued 
that Canadian federalism is an ongoing process of negotiation and compromise on the part 
of the provinces and the Federal Government and that the Federal Government cannot 
effectively impose its will against a decision democratically arrived at by the people of 
Quebec. 




Quehec 's Constitutional Position 
The political scientist and federalist Peter Russell extends the point made by 
McRoberts even further by arguing that constitutional negotiations following a 'Yes' vote 
could lead Canada back towards some sort of modern compact with Quebec, even if such a 
new deal involved separation for part of Quebec: 
The Reference Case helps to bring back some balance because it says that ifthere~s 
a clear majority in Quebec then Canada has to negotiate and almost make a modern 
compact somehow with Quebec either on the terms of its leaving Canada or on its 
renegotiating its terms of being a part of Canada.85 
Whether Russell believes that a new compact would take the form of a renewal of the 
dualistic conception of Confederation outside of Quebec to keep Quebec in Canada or the 
negotiation of some form of con federal arrangement between Quebec and the ROC is 
unclear from his comments. However, it can be argued, as McRoberts has, that the strength 
of the Trudeauite vision in the ROC more than likely precludes the reassertion of duality. 
Russell's new compact could be understood to refer to a confederal agreement, a post-
referendum solution which finds favour with McRoberts and Gibbins.86 
Nationalist commentators outside of the PQ and BQ have been generally critical of 
the Supreme Court's role in the reference case. Legault has emphasised that the Supreme 
Court's judgement is an assault on Quebec's rights and is symptomatic of Ottawa's 
continuing attack on the Quebecois nation: "Once again, and with the full force of their 
unelected and unanswerable posts, these nine judges, these nine creatures of the federal 
executive power, have proved that they are political mercenaries working to reinforce the 
Canadian state, that they are tools used by Ottawa to combat Quebec's affirmation."87 Such 
85 Interview with Prof. Peter Russell, Professor Emeritus, Department of Political Science, University 
of Toronto, Toronto, 30. 12. 1998. 
86 Roger Gibbins, "The Institutional Parameters of a Canada-Quebec Partnership," in Beyond the 
Impasse: Toward Reconciliation, eds. Roger Gibbins and Guy Laforest (Montreal: IRPP, 1998), p. 
287. 
87 Josee Legault, "How to Deny Quebec's Right to Self-Determination," Globe and Mail, 21 August 
1998 in The Quebec Decision: Perspectives on the Supreme Court Ruling on Secession, ed. David 
Schneiderman (Toronto: James Lorimer & Company Limited, 1999), p. 113. 
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an opinion reflects back to one of Laforest's central criticisms of federalism that Ottawa's 
control of Supreme Court appointments excludes the provinces having a say in the 
constitution of a federal body. From Laforest's perspective the Court exists within the 
context of an imperial federalism.88 
Other nationalist voices have argued that the decision in the Reference Case is so 
unspecific in terms of what part of the amending formula would apply to negotiations and 
that all partners in Confederation must be involved that the Federal Government can 
effectively block secession: " ... the Supreme Court ruling knowingly or inadvertently gives 
the federal authorities the right to erect such substantial and numerous hurdles that this 
obstacle course will require Quebeckers to show enormous will, cohesion, and political 
dexterity."89 Opinions such as these go to demonstrate that there is still a consensus among 
many Quebecois opinion leaders and intellectuals that federalism is not working and that 
Ottawa is not understanding of Quebec's position. 
The Federal Government has chosen to act on the Supreme Court's judgement by 
legislating what the ground rules would be in the event of a 'Yes' vote, arguing that there is 
a need for greater clarity. This has taken place· at the same time as the Federal Government 
continues to pursue the Plan A approach which would, if expanded and perhaps eventually 
constitutionalised, lead to a greater recognition of Quebec's position as a nation within 
Canada. 
The Clarity Act 
As there was no guidance given by the Supreme Court on the meaning of the 
concepts of a clear question and a clear majority, the Federal Government has sought to 
88 Interview with Prof. Guy Laforest, Chair, Department of Political Science, Universite Lava I, 
Quebec, 13.01.1999. 
89 Jacques-Yvan Morin, "The Supreme Court Ruling: A Legitimate and Achievable Secession ... in 
Theory," Le Devoir, 31 August 1998 in The Quebec Decision, p. 116. 
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clarify the situation and has laid out in C-20 how it would respond to another referendum on 
sovereignty. Ottawa also defended its decision to table Bill C-20 by stating that since the 
Premier of Quebec had refused to rule out another sovereignty referendum as requested by 
the Prime Minister then it was incumbent upon the Federal Government to act.90 The 
Federal Government came to the conclusion that a clear majority meant more than a simple 
majority of SOo/o + 1 and that a clear question had to address secession or independence 
alone without any offer of a partnership with the ROC as this would only confuse the 
situation.
91 
During the debate on the Clarity Act, the Federal Government and the 
Government of Quebec went on to develop arguments based how majorities may be 
interpreted.92 
The Clarity Act (see Appendix D) establishes in s.1 that the House of Commons 
shall consider a referendum question as prepared by a provincial legislature and determine 
whether it will result in a clear expression of the will of the electorate. The act also clearly 
states that the Federal Government will not enter into negotiations if the question was not 
clear and thus there could be no absolute determination of the will ofQuebecois .93 Section 
2 of the act refers to the clear expression of the will of the people of the province which is to 
be determined by the House of Commons considering the following criteria: "a) the size of 
90 
Privy Council Office, '"Who's Afraid of Clarity' Brief submitted by the Honourable Stephane 
Dion, President of the Privy Council and Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs to the Legislative 
Committee on Bill C-20, Centre Block, Ottawa, Ontario, February 16, 2000" (www.pco-bcp.gc.ca, 
2000), p. 2. 
91 Ibid., pp. 4-5. 
92 The use and understanding of the tenns clear majority, simple majority, and absolute majority are 
highly politicised in the Canadian context, very often being used to misrepresent concepts of majority. 
A simple majority is understood to mean 50%+ I of votes cast in an election, plebisicite, or 
referendum. An absolute majority would mean a majority of the total eligible electorate. The tenn 
clear majority is ambiguous and the Supreme Court in the Reference Case defined it as requiring a 
qualitative evaluation, such as considering particular regional majorities. The present Government of 
Quebec understands a simple majority in a referendum on sovereignty to be a clear majority, whereas 
the Federal Government rejects this view. 
93 Canada, An Act to give effect to the requirement for clarity as set out in the opinion of the Supreme 
Court of Canada in the Quebec Secession Reference, Statutes of Canada 2000, 2"d Session, 36th 
Parliament, C-20, s.l. 
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the majority of valid votes cast in favour of the secessionist option; b) the percentage of 
eligible voters voting in the referendum; and c) any other matters or circumstances it 
considers to be relevant."
94 
Most importantly, the act establishes that since there is no right 
in the constitution for a province to secede, a constitutional amendment would be required; 
this would necessitate that all provincial governments and the Federal Government be 
involved.
95 
This last section invokes the unanimity procedure of the amending formula in 
the case of negotiations on secession. 
While the act does certainly clarify the position to be adopted by the Federal 
Government, its contents do seem to confirm the criticisms of nationalists who argue that it 
is illegitimate in that it places too many barriers in place. For federalists in the ROC this is 
seen to be beneficial, yet there are those such as Russell who would criticise the abandoning 
of the simple majority principle of 50%+ 1 for deciding the matter.96 Stephane Dion, on the 
other hand opposes this position, arguing that if 50%+ 1 is a clear majority, what would be 
an 'unclear' majority.97 This raises the point that the Supreme Court implied that a simple 
majority was insufficient.98 It is arguable whether a position can be adopted if we are 
talking about this issue in a hypothetical context rather than in the context of an actual vote 
with all those "other matters and circumstances" being in play. The simple majority rule of 
democracy that is intrinsic to most democratic action such as elections is upheld by the PQ 
as the only rule that can possibly apply and that the Federal Government cannot move the 
goal posts when a 50.4% vote in 1995 was enough to defeat the sovereignty option.
99 
The 
94 Ibid., s.2(2). 
95 Ibid., s.3( I). 
% Russell, "Preserving the Canadian Federation: a Two-Track Approach," p. 16. 
97 Interview with Hon. Stephane Dion, Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs and President of the 
Queen's Privy Council for Canada, Privy Council Office, Ottawa, 05.01.1999. 
98 Privy Council Office, "'Who's Afraid of Clarity'," p. 6. 
99 Ministere des Affairs intergouvernementales canadiennes, "Allocution de Monsieur Joseph Facal, 
Ministre delegue aux Affaires intergouvernementales canadiennes: L'avenir du Quebec sera decide par 
le peuple quebecois: principes et portee du projet de loi 99" (www.cex.gouv.qc.ca, 2000), p. 1. 
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Federal Government argues in the Clarity Act that all opinions in Quebec must be taken into 
account when determining whether there is a clear expression of will. This would include 
the views of aboriginal groups, Anglophone groups, and members of the PLQ who would 
most likely be opposed to calling of the referendum and who would vote 'No'. Under the 
circumstances and based on the position adopted by the Supreme Court in its judgement, the 
view on a clear expression of will embraced by the Federal Government is the more 
democratic of the two positions. 
The Quebec Government views the Clarity Act as yet another affront to Quebec's 
right to be recognised as a nation and the right of the Quebecois to self-determination. 
Following the adoption of Bill C-20 by the Canadian Senate in June 2000, Quebec's 
Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs, Joseph Facal, denounced the bill declaring it to be an 
illegitimate bill that violated the right of the Quebec people to decide their own future: 
En bref, pour le gouvernement du Quebec, de meme que pour to us les partis 
politiques representes a I'Assemblee nationale, cette loi est une mesure totalement 
inacceptable et illegitime. Le gouvernement du Quebec ne reconnalt aucune 
legitimite au Parlement federal pour s'ingerer de la sorte dans l'exercice du droit du 
I 'b' . d d "d I d . 100 peup e que ecots e ect er seu e son avemr. 
The Government of Quebec considered C-20 to be a complete misreading of the Supreme 
Court's decision in the Reference Case, declaring that the Federal Government "impos[e] ce 
que la Cour lui a clairement refuse." Quebec has maintained its long-held position that it is 
up to the National Assembly to decide what an appropriate referendum question is and that 
the citizens of Quebec would be the ultimate judges of the clarity of the question and of the 
referendum result. 101 
In direct response to the Clarity Act, the PQ government passed an act in December 
2000 that reasserted Quebec's right to self-determination (see Appendix E). The act asserts 
100 Ministry of Intergovernmental Affairs, "C-20: Une loi illegitime pour le Quebec," 
www.mce.gouv.qc.ca. 
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that no other legislature or Parliament has the right to interfere in an area of Quebec's 
sovereign j urisdiction.
102 
A further affirmation of Quebec's distinctiveness is made in the 
preamble: 
WHEREAS the Quebec people, in the majority French-speaking, possesses specific 
characteristics and a deep rooted historical continuity in a territory over which it 
exercises its rights through a modern national state, having a government, a national 
assembly and impartial and independent courts of justice ... WHEREAS it is 
incumbent upon the National Assembly, as the guardian of the historical and 
inalienable rights and powers of the Quebec people, to defend the Quebec people 
against any attempt to despoil it of those rights or powers or to undermine them. 103 
The act is a further affirmation of Quebec's sovereignty as it exists under the federal system. 
More importantly this act is a further confirmation that there is a considerable divide 
between nationalist Quebecois and Canadians outside Quebec on what federalism means 
and the place of Quebec in Canada either as a nation or as a province equal to the others. It 
reasserts that nationalists in Quebec view themselves as a nation; a view that is based on a 
dualistic conception of Canada. 
Despite Plans A and B there are still significant divisions in how Quebec perceives 
its position within Canada. The increasing asymmetry that has been encouraged by Plan A 
is welcomed and does go some way to trying to meet the demands of nationalists in Quebec 
for broader recognition. However, for many in the ROC asymmetry implies more power to 
Quebec rather than the recognition of the differential nature of the Canadian federal State -a 
fundamental reason behind the demise ofMeech Lake and Charlottetown. For those outside 
Quebec who have increasingly embraced the rival concept of nation identified in the 
nationalism promoted by Trudeau, 'distinct' often is seen to mean 'better'. As Charest 
argues: 
101 Ibid. 
102 Quebec, National Assembly, An Act respecting the exercise of the fundamental rights and 
prerogatives of the Quebec people and the Quebec state, I 51 Session, 36'h Legislature, Bill 99, 2000, 
s.l3. 
103 Ibid., preamble. 
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We are an asymmetrical federation. That's who we are. But I think it's very 
difficult for people to come to terms with that because .. .! mean, I think the core 
political problem has been that distinct has always been interpreted by some as 
meaning better or more ... There is another vision of the constitution, another vision 
of Quebec that we are all one country, we're all one nation, there's one law for 
everybody and there are no special deals for anybody and that's what living in a 
modern democracy is all about and there is a very strong part of English Canada 
which says that's who we are and that goes back to Lord Durham and beyond. It's 
been there and it has always been a theme. It's not a workable theme. It's not a do-
able theme. It's an idea that can't be sustained but it's still there so we have to deal 
with it. 104 ' 
Charest highlights what this chapter has been arguing, that there exists in Canada 
two conflicting conceptions of nation. As has been argued, one of these visions is dominant 
in Quebec and embraced by nationalists; it favours the dualistic view of Canada in which 
Quebec is a distinct society, a nation, one of the founding peoples. The idea of Canada 
being one, undifferentiated federation made up of equal provinces is the conflicting and 
more dominant vision which has evolved with the acceptance ofTrudeau's view of Canada 
based in the Constitution Act, 1982. This latter conception of the nation is one that 
nationalists in Quebec cannot reconcile with their dualistic conception of a federal Canada. 
As McRoberts asserts, Ottawa's claim to be a national government appears to reject the 
conception of a French-speaking community territorially defined in Quebec and the duty of 
the Quebec government to uphold it. 105 One means of reconciling these divergent 
conceptions of nation in Quebec is to promote the idea of a multinational Canada which 
recognises asymmetry within the political and constitutional framework. Such an approach 
is made all the more difficult by the presence of a constitutional document which 
deliberately negates this reality. It is debatable, then, whether the promotion of asymmetry 
and recognition of Quebec's distinctiveness should be first achieved through non-
constitutional means similar to that conceived under Plan A or through the more difficult 
104 Interview with Hon. Jean Charest, Leader of the Opposition, Quebec National Assembly, Montreal, 
07.08.2000. 
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course of fundamental constitutional reform and the symbolic entrenchment of principles 
such as the distinct society. It is not, however, the purpose of this thesis to predict or 
speculate on which of these paths is better or which will be followed by the political actors 
involved. 
As has been argued, Quebec nationalists are divided as to whether greater 
recognition of Quebec can best be achieved through reform of the existing constitutional 
structures or through some form of secession and subsequent negotiating of a new 
partnership with the rest of Canada. Similar questions of how nationalist claims for greater 
recognition are addressed by the state will be analysed in the subsequent two chapters. As 
in the case of Quebec within Canada, there exist in Scotland and Catalunya rival 
conceptions of what the nation is and understandings of how the state is constituted vis-a-vis 
minority national communities. Seeing that the status quo is untenable, nationalists are 
prompted in each case to argue for greater recognition through constitutional reform. The 
nature of the conflict between nationalists and those opposed to their claims varies in each 
instance due to the differences in constitution of each state. Yet, what links the nationalists 
in these three cases is that they all are seeking greater recognition and a greater acceptance 
of their understanding of what the nation is, whether inside the state or outside it. 
105 McRoberts, Misconceiving Canada, p. 249. 
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Catalunya's Constitutional Position in Spain and the Nationalist 
Response 
The Spanish Constitution of 1978 brought about a transformation in Spain's 
governmental system, in the state's approach towards individual rights, and in its territorial 
organisation. A process was initiated which facilitated the move from dictatorship to a 
modern liberal democracy, a key aspect of which was the recognition and entrenchment of 
the right to autonomy for all of Spain's regions and nationalities given in Article 2 of the 
constitution. The death of Franco, the promulgation of the constitution by King Juan Carlos, 
and the provisional reestablishment of the Generalitat signaled the rebirth of Catalan 
nationalism as the dominant political force in Catalunya. This chapter, as is the case with 
those devoted to Quebec and Scotland, will analyse what form of state is established by the 
constitution and what the position of Catalunya is as a nation within the constitutional 
framework. Greater discussion and analysis will be devoted to how this framework is 
problematic in the eyes of nationalists and how ·the various nationalist parties in Catalunya 
are seeking to bring about changes in the constitutional status quo that would give greater 
recognition to Catalunya as a nation. As in the cases of Scotland and Quebec the key 
argument being articulated by Catalan nationalists is for greater recognition for Catalunya 
and that Catalunya should exercise greater autonomy over what it defines as its own affairs. 
As will be demonstrated, there are varying and divergent opinions held by the four Catalan 
nationalist parties as to how this goal can best be accomplished. Finally, an analysis will be 
conducted of the extent to which the Spanish state has been responsive to the demands of 
Catalan nationalists and how this debate between 'nation' and 'state' has set up a conflict 
between two rival conceptions of what the nation is. In the first place, however, it is 
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important to understand the political position of nationalism in Catalunya and how it has 
shaped the political life of Catalunya since Spain's re-embracing of democracy in the late 
1970s. 
In the first elections held under the new constitutional regime in March 1980 the 
victory of the coalition between Convergencia Democratica de Catalunya and Uni6 
Democratica de Catalunya (CiU) ushered in what has been a period of nearly complete 
nationalist dominance of Catalan politics. There are five nationalist parties in Catalunya that 
in their ideology acknowledge, to a greater or lesser degree, Catalunya's position as a nation 
within Spain. These parties have dominated Catalan political life since 1980. 
Aguilera de Prat argues that Catalan politics is divided into three strands: nationalist 
parties, Catalan national parties, and a Spanish party. The nationalist parties are the leftist 
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC), the centrist CDC, and the centre-right UDC. 
Aguilera de Prat defines Catalan national parties as the socialist Partit dels Socialistes de 
Catalunya (PSC) and post-communist Iniciativa per a Catalunya (I C). They are 
distinguished from the nationalist parties by their acceptance of Catalunya's integration into 
Spain and that they place their left-wing or soci~list ideologies ahead of their Catalanism. 
The Spanish party is the governing party in Madrid, the Partido Popular, which is seen to 
identify strongly with a statist, Spanish nationalism. 1 Together the CiU, the PSC, ERC, and 
IC have regularly polled between 77% and 87% of votes cast in elections to the Catalan 
Parliament, with the percentage not going below 86.5% between 1984 and 1995. 
Traditionally, the right-wing PP has rarely managed to receive more than 13% ofthe popular 
vote in Catalan elections.2 Yet despite its opposition to Catalan nationalism, the PP managed 
to secure 22.8% of the vote in Catalunya in the 2000 general election as a result of a 
1 Interview with Prof. Cesareo Aguilera de Prat, Departament de Dret Constitucional i Ciencia 
Polftica, Universitat de Barcelona, Barcelona, 12.04.1999. 
2 Gabriel Colome, "El sistema de partits politics a Catalunya," in La societat catalana, ed. Salvador 
Gin er (Barcelona: lnstitut d'Estadistica de Catalunya, 1998), p. 1102. 
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booming Spanish economy.3 However, the recent history ofCatalan nationalism speaks of 
the dominance of two parties in coalition: CiU. Since 1980, CiU under the leadership of 
Jordi Pujol has been in power either with an absolute majority or as the largest party in the 
Catalan Parliament; Pujol has been President of the Generalitat for as long. 
Unlike either Scotland or Quebec, Catalunya's largest political force without 
exception is the nationalist coalition CiU whose greatest electoral competition is other 
nationalist parties. In Scotland the SNP is the one explicitly 'nationalist' party, although the 
Scottish Socialist Party also advocates independence for Scotland. In Quebec, there are the 
PQ and BQ, which are both explicitly nationalist. Although members of other parties might 
view themselves as nationalists they do not necessarily agree with the avowed aims of the 
PQ, BQ, or the SNP. The PQ, BQ and the SNP compete in elections against parties linked 
to the state who either support the constitutional status quo or who seek to change it to match 
a particular conception of a federal Canada or a devolved Britain. Indeed, this is a 
conception that rejects certain nationalist aspirations that favour some form of independence 
for the minority national group. In Catalunya, the party system is constructed in a very 
different way. This comes as a result of the dominance of nationalism in Catalan political 
discourse. The exact nature of each of the nationalist parties' nationalism and their 
arguments will be discussed below when the issue of constitutional reform is addressed. 
Ho\;Vever, it is impossible to understand the constitutional position adopted by the 
Generalitat, and therefore Catalunya, vis-a-vis its relations with the state without 
acknowledging the central role played by nationalism and CiU in particular. 
Catalan Nationalism Since 1976 
The dominant concern of nationalism in Catalunya since the transition to democracy 
in the late 1970s has been the recognition of the Catalan nation within the Spanish state and 
3 Kenneth McRoberts, Catalonia: Nation Building Without a state (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 
200 I), p. 89. 
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its promotion politically, culturally, and economically in a variety of spheres including the 
European Union. As argued by Puig, the Catalan nationalist model has a variety of foci: 
The Catalan model of nationalism is complex and sophisticated. It has four main 
concerns: 1) to preserve national identity; 2) to guarantee internal cohesion; 3) to 
ensure economic survival in the globalized market and, finally, 4) to promote and 
strengthen the power of the regions within the European Union.4 
The goals of preserving national identity, guaranteeing internal cohesion, and promoting and 
strengthening the powers of the European regions are dominant in the rhetoric and party 
platforms of the nationalist parties being examined here. It is essentially these goals that 
shape the Catalan nationalist approach towards constitutional reform. To gain some 
understanding of the various parties' views on how the state needs to be reformed and the 
national aims of Catalunya promoted, there has to be considerable consideration given to 
how the Spanish state is organised at present and how the constitution determines the 
relationship between Catalunya and Madrid. 
The Spanish Constitution of 1978 
The Spanish constitution of 1978, with its 169 articles, came into effect on 28 
December of that year following an extensive period of consultation in the Committee of 
Constitutional Affairs and Public Liberties and 'its passage through both the Congress and the 
Senate. The people of Spain ratified the document in an historic referendum held in 
December 1978 in which 87.8% of the electorate gave it their endorsement, roughly 60% of 
the total eligible electorate.5 The constitution is modeled after other modern European 
constitutions in terms of its broad scope in enumerating various rights, the powers of the 
state, the role of the monarchy and succession to the throne, the organisation of government, 
the territorial organisation of the state, the role of the Constitutional Court (Tribunal 
Constitucional), and a process for constitutional reforin. These key fields are organised into 
4 Pau Puig i Scotoni, "The Four Dimensions of the Catalan Model." Paper presented at the Conference 
'Regional Identities in Europe', University of Sunderland, Sunderland, 12 October 1998, 3. 
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eleven major sections or titles. The sections that will be discussed here are those in the main 
body of the constitution that apply directly to the position of Catalunya within the Spanish 
state, those being: the Preliminary Title which contains Articles 2 and 3 on national unity 
and the official language, Title VII on Economy and Finance, Title Vlll on Territorial 
Organisation, Title lX on the Constitutional Court, and Title X on Constitutional 
Amendment. 
Article 1 - The Form of the State 
What is unique about the Spanish constitution in the very first instance is that it does 
not define what sort of state Spain is in terms of its territorial organisation. In Article 1 the 
'political form' of the state is established as a constitutional monarchy. However, the state is 
not defined as being a union, unitary, federal, or confederal state as in the preamble to the 
Constitution Act, 1867 that created a federal union in Canada.6 As noted by Fossas and 
Perez Francesch, the 1978 constitution is vague in this area: 
Together with the basic principles that define the type of state (social and democratic 
state) and the type of government (Parliamentary Monarchy), the Constitution 
contains principles related to the territorial organisation of the state. Nevertheless, on 
this point our constitutional text does not establish a similar formula to those applied 
by other fundamental alternatives: the Preliminary Title of the Constitution does not 
contain a definition of state from the point of view of its territorial structure (as, for 
instance, the above mentioned article 20 from the Fundamental Law of Bonn does 
by defining the German Federal Republic as a "Federal state", or as the article 1 of 
the 1931 Spanish Constitution did by framing the Republic as an "integral state").7 
This lack of specificity has led to an ongoing debate as to what extent the state, which is 
established with a central government and 17 autonomous communities, including 
Catalunya, is a federalising state and to what extent it is still strongly unitary in many ways. 
This debate will be discussed below when consideration is given to the problematic nature of 
much of the Spanish constitution as it applies to the goals of nationalists in Catalunya. What 
5 Michael T. Newton, Institutions of Modem Spain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 
p. 16. 
6 Spanish Constitution, 1978, art. 1. 
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the 1978 constitution in effect does is effectively abandon the older 19111 century Jacobin 
conception of the Spanish state, which was largely uniformist and centra list in favour of a 
much more decentralised regional model.8 The first indication of this shift in a conception of 
the state is given in Article 2 in which is contained the collective right to autonomy. 
Article 2 - The Right to Autonomy 
Article 2 of the constitution dedicated to national unity and regional autonomy is one 
of the most significant and most contested articles in the entire document. In its 
understanding of Spain it makes some paradoxical assertions: 
The Constitution is based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation, the 
common and indivisible homeland of all Spaniards, and recognises and guarantees 
the right to autonomy of the nationalities and regions which make it up and the 
solidarity among all ofthem.9 
In this short article are entrenched the key principles ofthe unity ofthe 'nation', the 
indivisibility of the 'nation', solidarity, and the collective right to autonomy. Firstly, there is 
the problematic assertion that the nation is Spain and that this geographically defined space, 
or homeland, is indivisible. The nation is understood to mean that territory in which 
Spaniards live, thus the nation is understood to be co-terminous with the state. While the 
nation is defined as Spain no other mention is given to other nations but rather to regions and 
nationalities that make up the nation and which share a solidarity in the framework, the state. 
For Catalan nationalists the principles of solidarity and indivisibility are anathema since they 
as nationalists make a clear distinction between the nation, Catalunya, and the state, Spain. 
The nationalities referred to in Article 2 have been understood to refer implicitly to the three 
historic nationalities ofCatalunya, Euskadi, and Galicia. The equating of the nationalities 
with regions is a means of equalising the relationship between them and eliminating the 
creation of any asymmetry within the constitution: 
7 Enric Fossas i Espadaler & Joan Lluis Perez Francesch, Llicons de dret constitucional, 2"d ed. 
(Barcelona: Edicions Proa, 1997), p. 173. 
8 Ibid., p. 52. 
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The three historical nationalities, which were not explicitly mentioned in the 
Constitution, are Catalonia, Euzkadi, and Galicia. But the obvious trick was to 
extend decentralisation to most other regions, thereby 'relativising' the potential 
impact of Basque and Catalan autonomy. 10 
The distinction between nation and nationality is a deliberate one and rests upon the 
idea of indissolubility and indivisibility of the Spanish nation. Spanish nationalists 
champion this understanding of the Spanish nation. The unwillingness of Francoists and 
other Spanish politicians in 1977 to countenance the idea of a multinational Spain forced 
Catalan and Basque nationalists to accept the compromise term 'nationality' during 
constitutional negotiations. 11 Puig argues that in this compromise lies the foundation for the 
argument over Catalunya's recognition as a nation: 
The Spanish constitution recognises Catalunya as a nationality and as you know it is 
some sort of compromise so that the word 'nation' is not used. The framework is 
that Catalunya has some type of recognition within the Spanish state as a nationality, 
but not as a nation. And, of course, among nationalist politicians here there is some 
kind of revendication that there should be greater recognition of Catalunya's 
character. 12 
This question of 'nation' versus 'state' is a very important one to Catalan nationalists and it 
has provided the focus for a most important debate in Spanish constitutionalism -a debate 
that centres on this core issue of recognition. As argued further by Puig: 
In Catalunya nationalists want a greater degree of recognition, but from the Spanish 
point of view there is enough. You have also the interpretation where Spain is seen 
as a nation, that is the majority point of view, or Spain as a plurinational state. You 
know in Catalan nationalist discourse there is a distinction between state and nation, 
Catalunya is the nation and Spain is the state. 13 
Pau Puig advances an orthodox nationalist understanding of the relationship between 
Catalunya and Spain. As a constitutional scholar and civil servant in the Generalitat Puig 
has been part of the process through which the CiU government of Pujol has gained greater 
9 Spanish Constitution. 1978, art. 2. 
10 Daniele Conversi, The Basques, the Catalans. and Spain: Alternative Routes to Nationalist 
Mobilisation (London: Hurst & Company Ltd., 1997), p. 144. 
11 McRoberts, p. 52. 
12 Interview with Dr. Pau Puig i Scotoni and Snra. Anna Repull6, Generalitat de Catalunya, Barcelona, 
08.04.1999. 
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autonomy for Catalunya as a mean of promoting Catalunya as a nation in Spain, rather than 
just a nationality. Those commentators in Catalunya who embrace such a position are 
highlighting the problematic wording of Article 2. This article establishes an understanding 
of the state that is diametrically opposed to that held by nationalists in that it recognises only 
one nation rather than a plurality of nations coexisting within the Spanish state. 
Certain commentators, such as Requejo, have argued that this debate over the 
question of nation is the key stumbling block towards substantive reform of Article 2 and its 
defining of the constitution: 
... the recognition of the plurinationality of the Spanish state is unclear in the Spanish 
constitution. I am completely against the position of some constitutional lawyers 
who say that the political recognition of the plurinationality is already in the Spanish 
constitution. I don't agree with that. I think that Article 2, which is very, very 
confusing, speaks about nationalities and regions, but we aren't saying what is a 
nationality and what regions are nationalities or not...And for this reason I think that 
it's false to say that there is explicit, or literal, or constitutional recognition of the 
plurinationality of the state. I think that this is the main unresolved question to be 
overcome in the near future in the Spanish political system. 14 
As a nationalist academic, Requejo has been a staunch proponent of substantial 
constitutional reform. From his perspective there must be the reform of Article 2 to 
explicitly recognise the plurinational, or multinational character of the state; without this 
there can be little further development. With a clear definition of what regions are 
nationalities and, further to that, an explicit recognition of the existence of minority nations 
then progress can be made towards a differentiated, asymmetrical understanding of Spain. 
Requejo below refers to the importance of asymmetry as a concept that is implicitly 
acknowledged when speaking about the multinational character of Spain. 
It has been argued that the right to autonomy entrenched in Article 2 is the only 
collective right entrenched in the constitution. This right is the basis for the recognition of 
the administrative autonomy of smaller territories such as municipalities and provinces and 
13 Ibid. 
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the political autonomy of the regions and nationalities as autonomous communities. 15 The 
exercise of this right by the regions and nationalities has led to the territorial organisation of 
Spain into 17 autonomous communities: Catalunya, Arag6n, Navarra, Euskadi (Basque 
Country), La Rioja, Cantabria, El Principado de Asturias, Galicia, Castilla y Le6n, 
Extremadura, Andalucfa, Valencia, Castilla-La Mancha, Comunidad de Madrid, Canarias, 
and Illes Balears (Balearic Islands). The autonomous communities are established through 
the constitution and by their own statutes of autonomy under which their government and 
administration is established. Six of these autonomous communities have claimed in their 
statutes that they are historic nationalities: Catalunya, Arag6n, Navarra, Euskadi, Andalucfa, 
Galicia, and Yalencia. 16 
To understand Catalunya's relationship to the central state it is important to note that 
Catalan nationalists recognise its collective right to autonomy as a nation and not as a 
nationality or as a region. This is despite the provisions contained in Article 2. However, as 
Requejo argues the distinction between nation and region is vague to many people, thus 
illustrating the problematic nature of this section of the constitution: 
I would say that in the political elites the most important position is to understand 
that Catalunya is a real nation, a people with a common tradition, with a clear will 
for self-government et cetera. Among people, according to recent polls, the question 
is quite different because half the population ofCatalunya have the position that a 
nation and a region is more or less the same; it is not very clear. This is a gray area 
and these kinds of distinctions are not very clear. But within the political parties, 
with the exception of the PP ... practically all of them defend that Catalunya has to be 
defined as an historical 'other', as an historical nation with the right of self-
government, maybe with federal, confederal, or regional agreements, so different 
solutions. 17 
Requejo argues from the perspective of a political scientist sympathetic to the nationalist 
view, in particular that advanced by CiU. Much of Requejo's own arguments and 
14 Interview with Prof. Ferran Requejo i Coli, Oepartament de Cic!mcies Politiques i Socials, 
Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, 09.04.1999. 
15 C. Viver Pi-Sunyer, Constituci6 (Barcelona: Ediciones Vincens Vives, 1996), p.147. 
16 Ibid., p. 149. 
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conclusions that he has reached on the need for constitutional reform is echoed in the 
proposals put forward by CiU. Based on the position he articulates above, Requejo argues 
that there is a division between an elite view and the popular of the constitution and 
Catalunya's position vis-a-vis Article 2. If what Requejo argues is correct, that half the 
population makes little distinction between region and nation, it would illustrate two things. 
Firstly, that fin de siecle Catalans have an appreciation of their distinct character and do not 
dwell so much anymore on labels that describe Catalunya's constitutional position within the 
state. Secondly, it could demonstrate a real division between the Catalan nationalist political 
class and the populace. However, as Requejo argues the situation is not very clear and it 
could be further argued that the ambiguous nature of Article 2 only serves to confuse the 
situation even more. 
Certain constitutional theorists, such as Roig, have adopted a much more liberal 
understanding of the right to autonomy, arguing that it is not a collective right: "A collective 
right in the doctrine of the constitution is always based on an individual right. .. Every right 
that the population in the communities has is always channeled through individual rights. 18 
As will be shown, Catalan nationalists do not equate their claim to autonomy or ultimately 
their right to self-determination with the claim of a region such as Extremadura or Castilla-
La Mancha. Aguilera de Prat illustrates this point well when he reiterates an argument of 
Pujol that Catalunya as a nation cannot be compared with Spanish regions that do not 
perceive themselves as national communities: "Catalunya is not La Rioja, Catalunya is not 
Madrid, Catalunya is an historic nation with specific rights. This is the big difference 
between the nationalist and the [Catalan] national parties. The specificity of Catalunya calls 
17 Interview with Prof. Ferran Requejo i Coli, Departament de Ciencies Politiques i Socials, 
Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, 09.04. I 999. 
18 Interview with Eduard Roig Moles, Departament de Dret Constitutcional i Ciencia Politica, 
Universitat de Barcelona, Barcelona, 08.04. I 999. 
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for recognition by Madrid of specific rights." 19 In contrast to this nationalist view, the 
constitutional right to autonomy is viewed legally as a means of decentralising power into 
regional centres giving some freedom to them in terms of administration.20 Nationalist 
parties in Catalunya, though, understand this collective right as a means to further promote 
and develop Catalunya as a nation in its own right either within or without the Spanish state. 
Enric Fossas argues that the debate over the nature of autonomy and the question of 
'nation' versus 'state' is one between symmetrical and asymmetrical understandings of the 
state created by the 1978 constitution. In an effort to gain greater recognition of their 
distinctivess as nations within Spain and their difference from the regions, the historic 
nations, including Catalunya, seek a reform which would eliminate the symmetry imposed 
by the provisions of the constitution: 
The evolution of the autonomic state has run in the contrary sense, trying to establish 
an equality among the seventeen autonomous communities and it is the fight 
between asymmetrical quasi-federalism defended by the nationalities, Catalunya, the 
Basque Country, against the symmetry defended by Spanish parties, the PP and the 
. 1. 21 SOCJa 1St party. 
It can be argued that Fossas views the state as having embraced symmetry while denying 
what is the reality of Spain -that there are national communities who reject symmetrical 
arrangements in favour of greater asymmetry and the recognition of difference that comes 
with it. As a constitutional lawyer who is also a Catalan nationalist, Fossas is sympathetic to 
the need for greater asymmetry as a means of promoting greater recognition for Catalunya in 
Spain. As other commentators have argued, the wording of Article 2 and the conception of 
the state it promotes makes it practically impossible to move towards asymmetry as 
asymmetry would undermine the core principle of the unity of the Spanish nation. 
Article 3 - Language Provisions 
19 Interview with Prof. Cesareo Aguilera de Prat, Departament de Dret Constitucional i Ciencia 
Politica, Universitat de Barcelona, Barcelona, 12.04.1999. 
20 Newton, p. 123. 
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Article 3 establishes Castilian as the official language of the Spanish state and 
declares that "All Spaniards have the duty to know it and the right to use it." Subsections 2 
and 3 state that other languages in Spain will be considered official in the respective 
autonomous communities and that they represent a "cultural patrimony which will be the 
object of special respect and protection."22 This provision must be seen as a progressive step 
when it is considered against the level of state repression of minority languages that took 
place during the Franco era and earlier under Primo de Rivera's dictatorship. For Catalan 
nationalism as with Quebecois nationalism the issue of language dominates nationalist 
discourse. For Catalan nationalists the Catalan language defines the nation and the 
language's promotion and protection is a central goal for them. The recognition ofCatalan 
as an official language of Catalunya in the 1978 constitution has enabled the Generalitat to 
be aggressive in its promotion of the language as the Ilengua pro pia de la naci6, or the 
nation's own language. Catalan has been promoted in law through the Statute of Catalan 
Autonomy, the 1983 Law of Linguistic Normalisation, and most recently through the 1997 
Law of Linguistic Politics. These statutes will be discussed further below as will their 
impact on encouraging bilingualism. 
The negative aspect of Article 3 is that it establishes Castilian not as an official 
language of the state, but the official language of the state. Thus, in the institutions of the 
state such as the parliament (Corts Generals), the high courts, and the Tribunal 
Constitucional, Castilian is the only language that may be officially used. Unlike Canada, 
there is no constitutional provision or other statutory provision for the use of more than one 
official language in institutions of the central state. This has been one of the key demands of 
all the nationalist parties, that the constitution be reformed to reflect the multilingual 
character of the Spanish state. In all of the various party manifestos, programmes, and other 
21 Interview with Prof. Enric Fossas i Espadaler, Departament de Ciencia Politica i de Dret Public, 
Universitat Aut6noma de Barcelona, 12.04.1999. 
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documents that have been analysed, the promotion of Spain's multinational and multilingual 
reality has been a dominant goal. Indeed, Catalan nationalist parties have looked to other 
multinational states such as Canada, Belgium, and Switzerland as models of linguistic 
recognition. 
Article 133- Taxation Power 
Title V I I of the constitution pertains to economy and finance in the state and 
contains Article 133 that enumerates the taxation power enjoyed by the state. This article 
establishes that the power to establish taxes is an area of exclusive state control; the 
autonomous communities are able to establish taxes "in accordance with the constitution and 
the laws."
23 
Thus, the state exercises sole control over taxation and is therefore able to 
maintain again the constitutional principles of solidarity and equality by spreading the tax 
burden equally across Spain.24 Catalunya's budget is based largely on state funds being 
transferred to it under the provisions of the Organic Law on the Funding of Autonomous 
Communities (LOFCA) of 1980. Catalunya is reliant on the state for its funds. However, 
the Generalitat is permitted to borrow on public credit, impose various fines, charges and 
surcharges, levy taxes on goods and services, and earn money from investments. There are 
federal aspects to this fiscal relationship, particularly its redistributive nature. However, 
Catalunya, unlike Canadian provinces, is not allowed under the constitution to tax income. 
Various agreements on taxation have been reached between the autonomous communities 
and the state, such as those in 1993 that established a regime by which a fixed percentage of 
15% of taxes generated on a regional level were made accessible to the autonomous 
communities. Under pressure from Jordi Pujol this percentage was increased to 30% in 1996 
when the PP government of Jose Maria Aznar was forced to concede to these demands in 
22 Spanish Constitution. 1978, art. 3. 
23 Ibid., art. 133. 
24 Newton, p. 125. 
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order to maintain nationalist support for his minority government.25 The Generalitat 
continues to push for greater access to state tax funds that are generated in Catalunya, which 
would give it greater resources to develop Catalan language and culture, the welfare state, 
and Catalunya's infrastructure. 
Article 137- Organisation of the State 
Catalunya exists as an autonomous community by virtue of the provisions of Title 
VIII of the Spanish constitution, which outlines the territorial organisation of the state, and 
through its own Statute of Autonomy. Title VIII is extensive in that it relates not only to the 
creation of autonomous communities but also to the position of municipalities and provinces 
in the organisation of the state. Since the principal concern here is with Catalunya the 
provisions relating to the creation of autonomous communities will be the focus. 
Article 137 establishes that the state is organised into municipalities, provinces, and 
the autonomous communities, all of which enjoy autonomy in their respective areas of 
interest.26 As has been mentioned, there are essentially two forms of autonomy outlined in 
this section of the constitution: administrative and political, both of which have been 
established by the Tribunal Constitucional. The provinces and municipalities are established 
as administrative units in articles 140 and 141, which outline their territorial relationship to 
each other and establish the composition of municipal councils. The autonomous 
communities enjoy political autonomy and considerable legislative and executive power in 
their areas of jurisdiction, or competences. Fossas and Perez Francesch argue that the 
position of the autonomous communities in the constitution is "qualitatively superior" to that 
of the municipalities and provinces due to the political nature of their autonomy: 
As recognised by the constitutional jurisprudence itself, autonomy is an 
indeterminate juridical concept that offers great scope for interpretation. 
Nevertheless, the Constitutional Tribunal has distinguished the purely administrative 
autonomy of the local entities (town councils and provinces), from the autonomy of 
25 Ibid., p. 127. 
26 Spanish Constitution. 1978, art. 137. 
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the Autonom?us Communities, which is qualitatively superior since it is political 
autonomy, g1ven that they enjoy legislative and governmental powers that define 
them as such ... In this sense, the Autonomous Communities are "public corporations 
with a territorial basis and a political nature" ... , that is, territories with a state-like 
nature which hold juridical-constitutional power.27 
Indeed, in the subsequent articles of this section considerable space is given to outlining how 
regions and nationalities gain the status of an autonomous community, how the autonomous 
community should be organised, and what its competences may be. 
Article 143 - Accession to Autonomous Status 
Article 143 establishes which provinces may accede to self-government, how this 
shall be done, and in what time period. Article 143 grants the right to autonomy outlined in 
Article 2 to "bordering provinces with common historical, cultural, and economic 
characteristics, the island territories, and the provinces with a historical regional unity may 
accede to self-government and constitute themselves into autonomous communities."28 
Initiating the process of autonomy is the responsibility of two-thirds of the municipal 
governments and the majority of the electorate in each province. If this was not successful 
within three months of an agreement on autonomy being adopted, then the process could not 
be attempted again until five years had passed. This was the path followed by most regions 
in gaining their autonomy, except Andalucia, which followed the exceptional route provided 
for in Article 151 (1 ). Catalunya was able with Euskadi and Galicia to accede immediately to 
autonomous status as a result of transitional provision Article 2 of the constitution which 
recognised Catalunya's previous autonomy under the Second Republic and the establishment 
ofthe provisional Generalitat in September 1977: 
The territories which in the past have, by plebiscite, approved draft Statutes of 
Autonomy, and which, at the time of the promulgation of this Constitution, have 
provisional regimes of autonomy, may proceed immediately in the manner provided 
in Article 148(2), when agreement thereon is reached by an absolute majority of 
their pre-autonomous higher collegiate organs, and the Government is duly 
27 Fossas i Espadaler and Perez Francesch, p. 181. 
28 Spanish Constitution. 1978, art. 143. 
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informed. The draft statutes shall be drawn up in accordance with the provisions of 
Article 151 (2) when so requested by the pre-autonomous collegiate organ.29 
Along with Euskadi, Catalunya became fully autonomous under the constitution on 31 
December 1979 when the Catalan Statute of Autonomy was published in the Diari Oficial de 
la Generalitat de Catalunya; Galicia achieved autonomous status in 1981. Under the 
provisions of the articles contained in Title VIII there exist, as has been demonstrated, a slow 
and a fast route towards autonomous status. Yet despite this there is no hierarchy of 
autonomous communities since all can, if they so choose, ultimately reach the maximum 
level of autonomy prescribed in Article 148 (see Appendix A).30 It is worthy of note, 
however, that Catalunya and the other historic nationalities that gained autonomous status 
through the special provision have chosen to attain the maximum level of autonomy. While 
Catalunya, Euskadi, and Galicia have had all the areas of competence not specifically 
reserved to the state by the constitution transferred to their jurisdiction, the other 14 
autonomous communities have chosen not to accede to a level of autonomy beyond the 
minimum prescribed in Article 148.31 By taking maximum advantage of the provisions in the 
constitution regarding those competences over which it might exercise power, the 
Generalitat has been able to expand its influence in Catalan political life. 
Article 145- Indivisibility and Solidarity of the State 
Article 145 is of particular interest in terms of how the state is able to maintain the 
principles of indivisibility and solidarity in that it prohibits any form of federation between 
autonomous communities. Further to this no agreements between autonomous communities 
may be entered into without the authorisation of the Corts Generals, unless these agreements 
relate to the administration and rendering of services or to the nature and purposes of 
29 Ibid., trans. prov. art. 2. 
30 Yiver Pi-Sunyer, p. 150. 
31 Ibid., p.l49. 
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corresponding with the Corts Generals.32 As noted by Conversi, this constitutional provision 
undermines any attempts by nationalist parties such as ERC to unite the Catalan-speaking 
nations, els pa'isos catalans, of Catalunya, Valencia, parts of Arag6n, and the Illes Balears. 
However, it has also contributed to the nationalist tension in Euskadi where irredentist 
nationalists seek a union with autonomous and culturally Basque Navarra.33 Again, although 
there is a great degree of decentralisation and regionalisation, the power of the state to 
maintain solidarity and indivisibility is further enhanced in this article. 
Articles 146 and 147- Statutes of Autonomy 
Articles 146 and 14 7 refer to the Statute of Autonomy and what they must contain 
and establishes that the statute shall be the basis on which the institutions of the community 
are built. Under the constitution statutes of autonomy must contain the following four 
elements: 
a) The name of the Community which best corresponds to its historical identity. 
b) The delimitation of its territory. 
c) The name, organization, and seat of its own autonomous institutions. 
d) The competences assumed within the framework of the Constitution and the 
bases for the transfer of the corresponding services to them.34 
The Catalan Statute of Autonomy, as is the case with all 17 statutes, builds upon this basic 
framework in its establishment of the Generalitat, the Catalan government, as Catalunya's 
chief autonomous institution. The statutes of autonomy, in delineating which competences 
the autonomous communities exercise power, draw from Articles 148 and 149. 
Articles 148 and 149 - Competencies 
These articles entrench in the constitution those competences that may be assumed 
by the autonomous communities and those in which the state holds exclusive jurisdiction. 
Article 148 lists competences that the autonomous communities may assume. These include 
areas that are essentially local in nature such as: organisation of institutions of self-
32 Ibid., art. 145. 
33 Conversi, p. 144. 
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government, housing, public works, agriculture and livestock raising, tourism within the 
autonomous community's territory, economic development of the autonomous community, 
culture and the teaching of language, and health and social assistance. Article 149 lists the 
areas of exclusive state competence including: international relations, defence and armed 
forces, administration of justice, banks and the monetary system, general finance and debt of 
the state, customs and tariffs, and labour legislation. In total, there are thirty-two fields of 
jurisdiction (see Appendix A). Any competences not specifically assigned to the state are 
understood to rest with the autonomous communities and as Article 149(3) states, the law of 
the state is to be viewed as supplementary to that of the autonomous communities: 
The matters not attributed expressly to the state by this Constitution belong to the 
Autonomous Communities by virtue of their respective statutes. Authority over 
matters not assumed by the Statutes of Autonomy shall belong to the state, whose 
norms shall prevail in case of conflict over those of the Autonomous Communities in 
everything which is not attributed to their exclusive competence. The law of the 
state shall in every case be supplementary to the law of the Autonomous 
Communities.35 
These two articles then form the basis for the construction of the decentralised state. In 
many ways some very strong parallels can be drawn with both the Scotland Act, 1998 and 
particularly the federal aspect of the Canadian Constitution Act, 1867. Indeed, one notable 
comparison regards the issue of residuary power: in Canada it lies with the Federal 
Parliament whereas in Spain, as Article 149(3) establishes, it lies essentially with the 
autonomous communities. A question of relevance to this thesis is whether articles 143 to 
149 point to the constitution being federal in nature. As has been discussed, the exact 
political form of the state is not explicitly given in Article 1. 
The phrase 'may assume' in Article 148 has great significance for Catalan 
nationalists who oppose the undifferentiated character of the Spanish state. This provision in 
Article 148 effectively allows all seventeen autonomous communities to gain the maximum 
34 Spanish Constitution, 1978, art. 147. 
35 Ibid., art. 149(3). 
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level of autonomy by exercising competence in all the listed areas of jurisdiction. Although 
only Catalunya and Euskadi have chosen to exercise maximum competence this article 
would still permit a region such as Cantabria to exercise full competence, thus placing it on 
the same level as Catalunya. To Catalan nationalists this possibility is intolerable as it 
denigrates Catalunya's status as a nation and rejects its claim to be different from the various 
Spanish regions who have achieved autonomous status. As argued above, the ability for all 
autonomous communities to reach the maximum level of autonomy has led to Catalan 
nationalists calling for an asymmetrical constitution that would recognise fully the 
differential and multinational character of Spain. The way competences are established in 
Article 148 is unique to the Spanish case and encourages a uniquely Spanish debate. 
Comparisons can be drawn with the division of jurisdictions in Canadian and British 
constitutional documents. 
The areas of competence enumerated in articles 148 and 149 can be compared with 
sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867 which state the provincial and federal heads 
of jurisdiction in Canada. If we see Article 148 corresponding roughly to section 92 in its 
establishment of the autonomous communities' jurisdiction in matters of a local nature we 
can also see similarities in how both Article 149 and section 91 establish jurisdiction in areas 
of a state or federal nature such as foreign relations, monetary policy, et cetera. The same 
can also be said of the Scotland Act, 1998 where powers reserved to Westminster are 
enumerated in Schedule 5 and are matters of a general rather than local nature and thus 
related to the state, such as defence, foreign affairs, and fiscal and monetary policy. In 
another way the Spanish constitution is more similar to the Canadian constitution than to the 
devolution settlement in Scotland. In the United Kingdom the Scottish Parliament is not 
sovereign and exists by virtue of an act of Parliament at Westminster, thus preserving the 
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fundamental basis of the union state: parliamentary sovereignty.36 The Generalitat exists by 
virtue of the Catalan Statute of Autonomy which emanates from the provisions in Title VIII 
of the Spanish Constitution, as we have seen, and is not subservient to the Corts Generals in 
Madrid. As in the Canadian federal state there is no hierarchy between the institutions of the 
state and those of Catalunya or other autonomous communities. Herein lies a federal 
characteristic of the Spanish constitution: power is diffuse and does not reside solely in the 
central state, rather the Generalitat enjoys exclusive power in its competences: 
The central power of the state - as for instance, the Central Government - as 
hierarchical superior cannot impose its criteria on the autonomous entities in those 
areas that concern the Autonomous Community. In these areas the will of the least of 
the autonomous governments prevails over the will of the any of the central 
structures. And this is not because autonomous governments are in these areas 
superior to the central structures, but rather because they are the only structures who 
have the competence to decide over these areas.37 
While the institutions of the autonomous communities do have exclusive power in their 
competences, they are not exclusively sovereign in the context of a federal state since Article 
2 establishes the sovereignty of the Spanish nation. Fossas confirmed the Spanish 
conception of sovereignty in an interview during which he argued about the distinction 
between autonomy and sovereignty: 
The constitutional court has ruled many times that autonomy is not equal to 
sovereignty because just the Spanish nation is sovereign ... autonomy in Article 2 is 
the right to become an autonomous community, it means not just this. So, when 
Article 2 established that nationalities and regions had the right to autonomy, here 
autonomy is just the right to become an autonomous community for nationalities and 
• 38 reg10ns. 
Many commentators who seek to analyse Spain's constitutional framework have debated the 
question of what kind of state it is. 
36 While this might be a strictly legal understanding of the Scottish Parliament's relationship to 
Westminster, based on Diceyan theory, the political reality is rather less clear cut. It must be 
remembered that the Scottish Parliament was endorsed through a popular referendum and had its 
genesis in a broad-based movement within Scottish civil society, all of which gave the Parliament a 
political legitimacy. 
7 Viver Pi-Sunyer, p. 157. 
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A Federal vs. a Regional State 
It has been argued from the perspective of Spanish constitutional politics that Spain 
is somewhere in between a federal state and a regional state.39 Without doubt there are many 
characteristics of the Spanish constitutional system that are federal such as the 
decentralisation of power, the equality of the Corts Generals, and the institutions of the 
autonomous communities such as the Generalitat in their respective areas of competence. 
Furthermore, in Article 69 the autonomous communities are given the power to designate a 
senator for every one million inhabitants. However, senators are elected on a provincial 
basis rather than on the basis of the 17 autonomous communities which would constitute a 
more representative, and federal upper chamber.40 Article 162 on the organisation of the 
Tribunal Constitucional allows the executives, or where appropriate, the assemblies of the 
autonomous communities to initiate a challenge against the constitutionality of state laws 
and regulations.41 The autonomous communities are also allowed to initiate the process for 
the reform of the constitution under articles 166 and 87(2). All of these provisions point 
towards a strong federal current in the Spanish constitution, yet Spain is not a federal state. 
While most commentators would agree that the state is not federal there is not universal 
agreement on this point. 
There are a number of key aspects that illustrate that the Spanish constitution does 
not establish a federal state but a rather a highly regionalised one where Catalunya and the 
oth~r autonomous communities enjoy a high degree of legislative and executive power. 
Requejo has argued that there are eight aspects where the constitution betrays its lack of 
authentic federal credentials. These include constituent units, separation of powers, the 
38 Interview with Prof. Enric Fossas i Espadaler, Departament de Ciencia Politica i de Dret Public, 
Universitat Aut6noma de Barcelona, 12.04.1999. 
39 Viver Pi-Sunyer, p. 159. 
40 Spanish Constitution, art. 69. 
41 Ibid., art. 162. 
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senate, taxation, and the constitutional court.42 As has already been pointed out, the 
autonomous communities exist as secondary to the established indissolubility of the Spanish 
nation and the indivisibility of the national homeland; thus they are not separate constituent 
entities.
43 
The Canadian federation, by contrast, is a federal union originally of Nova Scotia, 
New Brunswick, and the Province of Canada. With the other six provinces joining 
Confederation between 1871 and 1949, the Canadian federal state has arrived at its present 
constitution. There is enshrined in the Constitution Act, 1867 of Canada and in other federal 
constitutions such as the United States and Germany a political will to unite various 
territories into a federation where they exist as constituent parts. 
As Requejo argues, the separation and decentralisation of powers in the Spanish 
state is vague and leads to general confusion with a number of competences overlapping 
jurisdiction, between the state and the autonomous communities. For example, in the field of 
social assistance both the state and the autonomous communities enjoy competence with 
Article 149( 1 )( 17) stating that the state holds exclusive competence in "basic legislation and 
economic system of social security, without prejudice to the execution of its services by the 
Autonomous Communities."44 A further example is in the field of health which is vaguely 
defined as both a state competence and an area of jurisdiction of the autonomous 
communities. Article 148( 1 )(21) permits the autonomous communities jurisdiction in the 
area of health and hygiene, yet Article 149( 1 )( 16) gives the state competence in "external 
health; bases and general coordination of health; legislation concerning pharmaceutical 
products."45 The majority of Catalan nationalist parties have argued for greater transparency 
in the distribution of powers and for an end to overlapping and duplication. 
42 Ferran Requejo, "Political Liberalism in Plurinational states. The Legitimacy of Plural and 
Asymmetrical Federalism: the Case of Spain," in Alain-G Gagnon and James Tully, Multinational 
Democracies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001 ), pp. 118-19. 
43 Ibid., 12. 
44 Spanish Constitution. 1978, art. 149(1 )(17) 
45 Ibid., art. 149( I)( 16) 
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In an interview, Requejo argued further that Spain ha<; a clearly regional model and 
that despite the arguments made by some who favour federalism it cannot be considered a 
federal state.
46 
Indeed, it is his contention that it is not possible to build a federal state based 
upon the current constitutional framework and that considerable reform would be required 
before a federalist model, as proposed by the PSC, could be imposed: 
I think that with this constitutional framework it is very, very difficult to create a 
federal state, you can create a more decentralised state, that is, the process of the 
devolution of powers can be greater. For example the devolution of tax power to the 
regions, okay, but this doesn't mean that we are facing a federal state. I think 
different reforms need to be implemented in order to transform ... even towards a 
classical federal state that is a symmetrical one.47 
For Requejo and many who share his views on constitutional reform within CiU the 
approach that should be adopted towards greater recognition of Catalunya within Spain is 
strongly constitutional in its approach. By this I mean it is an approach towards recognition 
of the. nation that does not seek an overthrow of the current constitutional order as proposed 
by ERC and others who seek an independent Catalunya. For those in ERC the CiU approach 
of favouring greater autonomy for Catalunya within Spain over independence has clearly 
failed.48 Speaking for ERC, Maestro agrees with Requejo when he argues that the nature of 
the constitution is ambiguous. The provisions of the 1978 constitution can be given a federal 
spin, but what they in effect amount to is a ruling out of any possibility of creating a federal 
state. In examining Articles 148 and 149 -the division of competences- Maestro makes the 
following argument: 
It creates God knows what kind of state. You can read the constitution in a federal 
way, but that's silly. I think the constitution says that there is no way even to a 
federal state. Also the federal states go from the lowest level to the highest. That is 
what I understand from federalism, the sense of the constitution is not that. I would 
say the main purpose of those articles in the Spanish constitution according to, or 
relating to autonomy was to give a high degree of political autonomy to the three 
46 Interview with Prof. Ferran Requejo i Coli, Departament de Ciencies Politiques i Socials, 
Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, 09.04.1999. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Interview with Snr. Jesus Maestro, Secretari de Politica lnternacional, Esquerra Republicana de 
Catalunya, Barcelona, 12.04.1999. 
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nations, and in that sense it would be an asymmetrical, decentralised, semi-federal 
state as far as I assume that. But, of course, those articles leave the door open to 
harmonisation and harmonisation of the division of powers means nought.49 
Maestro argues that if there was originally a goal of making Spain a more asymmetrical state 
this has clearly not been met, nor is it possible to move towards a federal state given current 
constitutional arrangements. As with other Catalan nationalists, Maestro is critical of how 
the division of powers has led to an undifferentiated, or what he terms harmonised, state 
where Catalunya's position is effectively harmonised with that of all the other autonomous 
communities. This is an untenable situation, in Maestro's view, that highlights the inherent 
problems with the state -problems that lead ERC to advocate the abandoning of the 
constitutional status quo in favour of independence. While Maestro and Requejo represent 
the majority view that Spain's constitution is not federal, there are constitutional experts who 
take a radically different approach. 
The constitutional lawyer Eduard Roig argues that the Spanish constitution is federal 
in nature and bases his arguments on an examination of many of the same structures cited by 
Requejo in his criticism: 
I think that this is absolutely federalism ... This is a federal state with a very specific 
thing which is what he [Eiiseo Aja] calls the differential fact which has some 
specific consequences for Catalunya, the Basque country, Galicia, the Canarias as 
well, and some other autonomies. But how this works is at the centre of the state, so 
we have different political centres with a normal political orientation, we have a 
distribution of powers warranted by the constitution, we have a constitutional court 
which decides on the differences. So that is a federal system. We have a 
constitutionally warranted financing system, fiscal system and so on. 5° 
Roig argues that the structures established by the constitution are federal in nature. These 
are the structures and arrangements that can be seen in many federal and non-federal states 
as discussed above in relation to the Canadian and U.K. models. What Roig does not 
account for, however, are two key elements of a federal system which are not present in the 
49 Ibid. 
50 Interview with Eduard Roig Moles, Departament de Dret Constitutcional i Ciencia Politica, 
Universitat de Barcelona, Barcelona, 08.04.1999. 
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Spanish system: shared or divided sovereignty, and constituent units. As argued above by 
Fossas and Requejo, Spain cannot be anything but a decentralised form of regional state due 
to the fact that the autonomous communities exist only by virtue of the constitution and not 
of their own accord. In addition, sovereignty resides at the centre, in the Spanish nation, and 
is not shared with the autonomous communities despite their enjoying broad competences. 
A further example that emphasises the non-federal nature of the Spanish 
constitution is the structure of the upper house of the Corts Generals, the Senate. The Senate 
does not exist as a truly representative upper chamber since it is not directly linked to the 
representation of the autonomous communities. The majority of senators are elected from 
the provinces, which are administrative units, rather than the political units into which the 
state is organised: the autonomous communities.51 In 1995, under pressure from CiU in the 
Corts Generals, the Senate set up a committee to look at ways of making the upper house 
more representative of the autonomous communities.52 To date little has come of this attempt 
at rectifying what is viewed by nationalists as an imbalance in representation. Many of those 
commentators interviewed see the Senate as a lost cause. 
Fossas argues that a more representative Senate would not be favourable to 
nationalists as it would re-ignite the debate over symmetry and asymmetry within the Corts 
Generals: 
Regarding the Senate, the Senate is completely useless. It's nothing. The Senate 
exists because senators want to be senators. Again, this is real politics. I think that 
nationalists in Catalunya and the Basque country are not interested in the Senate, this 
is why they are happy with the present situation. They say it's completely useless, 
but that's okay because it doesn't influence our politics ... They think it could be 
worse for them to have a real, authentic Senate representing autonomous 
communities because they say we are not like Murcia, or Cantabria, or like 
Extremadura. We need special representation in a would-be Senate in the future. 
This is important, we are not like the others, the other autonomous communities, if 
one day we have a real Senate we claim for specific representation ... Ciearly, all the 
communities and clearly the central government will never agree on this point with 
nationalists, never, because it is impossible. They will never accept that Catalunya 
51 Requejo, "Political Liberalism in Plurinational states", 12. 
52 McRoberts, p. 75. 
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and the Basque country will have greater representation, more senators or different 
regional divisions like in Canada. Never.53 
Again, the inability of the state to accept a multinational Spain and the differentiation 
between autonomous communities that it implies is linked to the inability to reform the 
Senate. Fossas argues that there exists a perception in Catalunya that the Senate does not 
influence Catalan politics due to its not representing Catalunya as a whole. A further 
argument could be made that the autonomous structures of the Generalitat serve the interests 
of Catalans better than any reformed Senate could and that greater recognition of Catalunya 
as a distinct national community is best achieved by local institutions. However, Puig argues 
that one of the key failures of the Spanish system is that it does not provide a mechanism for 
horizontal consultation between the autonomous communities -a mechanism through which 
they could reach common positions.54 One example of this sort of mechanism developing is 
the coming together of nationalist parties from Euskadi, Catalunya, and Galicia to reach 
common positions on approaches to constitutional reform. These are discussed below. The 
non-federal structure of the Senate is problematic though not seen by Catalan nationalists as 
a key source of grievance, whereas issues surrounding the redistribution of wealth in Spain 
and the structure of the Tribunal Constitucional are. 
Through the provisions of Article 133 the central state enjoys the exclusive power 
of taxation with almost all taxes collected by the state which are then redistributed to the 
autonomous communities to finance the cost of maintaining all of the institutions and 
services which are established through the Statute of Autonomy. Navarra and Euskadi are 
exceptions to the rule in that they are able to levy their own taxes as a result of certain 
historic rights. As argued by Requejo, this is hardly a model of fiscal federalism. 5
5 
53 Interview with Prof. Enric Fossas i Espadaler, Departament de Ciencia Politica i de Dret Public, 
Universitat Aut6noma de Barcelona, 12.04.1999. . 
54 Interview with Dr. Pau Puig i Scotoni and Snra. Anna Repull6, Generalitat de Catalunya, Barcelona, 
08.04.1999. 
55 Requejo, "Political Liberalism in Plurinational states", 12. 
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Finally, there exists the constitutional court that is established in the constitution as a 
state institution. The court is responsible for arbitrating, among other cases, disputes over 
competences between the state and the autonomous communities and similar conflicts 
between autonomous communities. The autonomous communities have no role whatsoever 
in the appointment of judges to the court. This power of judicial appointment is the purview 
of the Corts Generals, the judiciary, and the government in particular as laid down in Article 
159(1 ). Despite the existence of a separate system of civil law in Catalunya there is no 
mechanism, as in the Canadian Supreme Court and the case of Quebec civil law judges, for 
judges to be appointed to the constitutional court with a background in Catalan civil law. In 
the case of the Supreme Court of Canada there is no provision for provinces to r~commend 
nominees for appointment to the Governor-in-Council. In Canada, however, convention 
dictates that the various provincial bar associations are consulted and that positions on the 
Supreme Court bench are allocated by province with three being civil law justices from 
Quebec. So while the federal principle is rather indirectly applied in the case of the Supreme 
Court of Canada, there is no such principle in the case of the Spanish constitutional court 
with the autonomous communities having no role to play in appointments or indirect 
representation on the court. 
It is difficult to determine whether the state will evolve towards a fully federal 
system as the PSC and IC argue for from a Catalan perspective: 
The territorial model included in the 1978 Spanish Constitution has evolved in very 
different conditions compared to those of past periods: 1) the transition from 
authoritarian to liberal-democratic rule; 2) the development of the Spanish welfare 
state; and 3) the ongoing process of European integration. The result has been the 
"estado de las autonomias", a new model of fundamentally regional nature that 
establishes a number of sub-state self-governing regions (autonomous communities 
or "ACs") based on a process of "variable geometry" determining the configuration 
of each.56 
56 Ibid., 11. 
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The constitutional structure based on "variable geometry" is problematic in a number of 
respects and is viewed by Catalan nationalists as restrictive vis-a-vis their goal of self-
determination for the Catalan nation. Whether the existing constitutional framework has 
established a decentralised, regional state or some form of quasi-federal state is not so much 
the issue for Catalan nationalist parties; rather, it is the fact that the status quo fails to 
adequately reflect the reality of the Spanish state -that it is both multilingual and 
multinational. It is multinational in the sense that it is comprised of more than one distinct 
nation, as Catalunya claims to be a nation within Spain along with Euskadi and Galicia. To 
some degree the Generalitat acts as a force for bringing the attention of the state to 
Catalunya's position within the Estat de les autonomies. Through the Catalan Statute of 
Autonomy Catalunya's voice is established as one of the autonomous communities of the 
state. Through other legislation such as the Generalitat's linguistic legislation, the specific 
Catalan goal of promoting the Catalan 'nation' within Spain is being largely achieved. Yet, 
most Catalan nationalists would argue that there is little broader recognition outside of 
Catalunya that it is a nation. Although most nationalists consider the current constitutional 
structure problematic and untenable in the long term it can be argued that it has served to 
augment Catalunya's position politically imd culturally. 
The Catalan Statute of Autonomy 
The Catalan Statute of Autonomy of 1979 is that document which establishes 
political power in Catalunya -political power which emanates from the above sections of the 
constitution. In its overall scope the Catalan Statute of Autonomy is a means to implement 
the requirements for the establishment of an autonomous community as laid down in the 
constitution. The statute is comprised of a preamble and five sections with the sections 
being devoted, in order, to general provisions, the jurisdiction of the Generalitat, the 
organisation of the Generalitat, finance and the economy, and amendment of the statute. In 
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Article 1 it establishes the Generalitat, comprising the Catalan parliament and the executive, 
as "the institution around which the self-government of Catalonia is politically organized. "57 
The position of the Generalitat as an historical institution is established in the preamble to 
the statute emphasising its link with the "collective freedom of Catalonia."58 The importance 
of the General itat as an institution with deep roots in Catalunya's history helps to explain 
why it was chosen as the central institution of autonomy under the statute. 59 As required by 
the constitution, the Statute of Autonomy also enumerates in articles 9 to 28 the jurisdiction 
of the Generalitat and its areas of competence and areas of shared competence with the state. 
Again, these competences are essentially of a local nature such as: Catalan civil law, tourism, 
social welfare, sport and leisure, and language and culture (see Appendix B). 
Along with nationalist calls for reform of the 1978 constitution to reflect Catalunya's 
status as a nation there have also been significant demands by nationalists for an expansion 
of the Statute of Autonomy. The chief argument behind these demands is that the statute as 
it currently stands does not give Catalunya the degree of autonomy it requires to continue to 
develop Catalan society. Puig argues that the statute was a result of a compromise during the 
very difficult period of transition from dictatorship to democracy when there was little 
support for aggressive Catalan nationalism in the rest of Spain: 
What I think is that the Statute of Autonomy was a product of compromise in a very 
difficult situation. And so obviously from the beginning Catalan nationalists didn't 
think that it was sufficient, that it's enough. Now we are twenty years after and of 
course maybe there are people now who think that there is some possibility to 
increase the powers, but you know it is very difficult to change the Spanish 
57 Generalitat de Catalunya, The Catalan Statute of Autonomy. 1979 (Barcelona: Entitat Autonoma 
del Diari Oficial i de Publicacions, 1993) art. 1(2). 
58 Ibid., Preamble. 
59 The role of the Generalitat during the Second Republic was discussed at length in chapter 3. 
However, the pedigree ofthe Generalitat as an institution ofCatalan government is more ancient. The 
original Generalitat, or Diputaci6 del General, was established in the 141h century as a committee of 
state that would negotiate with the king over the sums of money he was to have access to. By the 
fifteenth century the Generalitat had evolved into a political body which acted as a check on the power 
of the sovereign (McRoberts, p. 1 0). 
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constitution and at least our president, he is not calling for a constitutional change 
but a more generous reading of the constitution.60 
Again, there is a question of approach echoed in Puig's argument. Whether it is better to 
demand comprehensive reform of the constitution and statute or to adopt the Pujolist 
approach and gain greater power incrementally is a key debate among nationalists. During 
the years when the CiU and the moderate Basque nationalists held the balance of power in 
the Congres dels Diputats in Madrid Pujol was able to gain more powers for Catalunya in 
return for supporting the government. Since the 2000 general election CiU no longer holds a 
balance of power and Aznar is no longer beholden to Pujol for support. It could be argued 
that this could lead to a shift away from the Pujolist approach towards one that seeks 
constitutional reform instead of incremental devolution. One area of competence that has 
benefited from Pujol's approach and is of particular concern to the Generalitat is its 
jurisdiction over language. 
In the area of language the statute in Article 3 states that "the language proper to 
Catalonia is Catalan" and that "Catalan is the official language of Catalonia, as is Castilian, 
the official language of the whole of the Spanish state."61 As previously stated, the position 
of the Catalan language is of primary importance to the Generalitat and to Catalan 
nationalists in general; the official place of Catalan as the 'national' language is enshrined in 
the 1983 Llei de la normalitzaci6lingiiistica de Catalunya (Law of Linguistic Normalisation 
of Catalonia). This legislation has since been updated and expanded in the 1998 Llei de 
politica lingiiistica. It is the earlier provisions that will be examined as they were the first to 
bring about normalisation of the use ofCatalan in Catalunya. 
60 Interview with Dr. Pau Puig i Scotoni and Snra. Anna Repull6, Generalitat de Catalunya, Barcelona, 
08.04.1999. 
61 Generalitat de Catalunya, The Catalan Statute of Autonomy. 1979, art. 3. 
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Linguistic Legislation 
While the Statute of Autonomy contains no mention of the terms 'nation' or 
'national' in keeping with Catalunya's identity within the Spanish nation as an historic 
'nationality', the 1983 language legislation is explicit in its use of 'nation' to describe 
Catalunya and makes a definite link between Catalan as a language and the nation. While 
Article 3(3) gives Castilian equality of status with Catalan in Catalunya and Article 6( 1) 
alludes to the civic nature of Catalan nationalism through its granting the political status of 
Catalans to all Spanish citizens resident in Catalunya, the historical link between nation and 
language is of paramount importance. Despite the provision granting linguistic equality 
many Castilian-speaking immigrants have felt discriminated against, particularly when it 
comes to the language of instruction in school.62 In many ways the Law of Linguistic 
Normalisation of Catalunya performs the same functions and has the same role as the Charte 
de la langue franr;aise of Quebec which established in 1977 the goal of normalising the use 
of French in all sectors of Quebec society. In both the Quebecois and the Catalan cases the 
need to promote the national language is a focus of the legislation. For Catalan nationalists 
the nation cannot exist without the language: 
In fact, ·our land and our language form an inextricable whole. Our language does 
not make sense without the land. But the land would not make sense either without 
the language that belongs to it ... Yes: one can only completely understand a country 
if one knows its language.63 
These sentiments are expressed equally forcefully in Catalunya's language legislation. The 
preamble to the linguistic normalisation law recalls the loss ofCatalan's official status to 
Castilian in the eighteenth century and all of the subsequent persecutions of the language 
through to the period of Franco's dictatorship. As will be shown, there are provisions in the 
legislation for bilingualism giving Castilian legal equality with Catalan. However, this 
62 For greater background on Castilian speakers opinions of bilingualism in Catalunya see chapter 7 
"The Catalan Language: The Politics of 'Normalisation'" in Kenneth McRoberts, Catalonia: Nation 
Building Without a state (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 200 I). 
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equality is purely legal since it is the clear intention of the legislation to establish Catalan as 
the first language of Catalunya and to further its development. 
In what could arguably be termed a paradoxically ethnic call to link the nation with 
the soil, the preamble declares that Catalan is the mother tongue of the nation and at the 
same time calls upon all Catalans to advance the cause of the national language. It is worth 
quoting at some length: 
The Catalan language, an essential element in the formation of Catalonia, has always 
been the nation's mother tongue and natural vehicle of communication, as well as 
the symbol of a cultural unity with deep historical roots. Besides, it has always been 
a witness to the fidelity of the Catalan people to their land and specific culture. 
Finally, it has served very often as an instrument of integration, enabling every 
citizen of Catalonia, regardless of geographical origin, to participate fully in our 
peaceful coexistence ... The restoration of Catalan to its rightful place as Catalonia's 
own language is the unquestionable right and duty of the Catalan people and must be 
respected and protected. In this regard, knowledge of the language must spread 
throughout the whole of Catalan society, to all citizens regardless of the language 
they normally speak, within a global framework in which everyone will accept the 
use of both languages and recognise and contribute to the recovery of Catalan as one 
of the fundamental aspects of the reconstruction of Catalonia.64 
The wording of the language legislation does appear to imply an ethnic identification of the 
Catalan nation based upon the use of the Catalan language, the "mother tongue". It can be 
argued that this linguistic conception of the nation goes against a civic conception of the 
nation that CiU has worked to promote in which all residents of Catalunya are Catalans.
65 
Aguilera de Prat has argued that understanding Catalan nationalism as either civic and ethnic 
is too simplistic an understanding and that there are many layers to a nationalism that is 
essentially inclusive and civic: "Catalan nationalism is, in general, a civic nationalism but 
with certain ethnic ingredients. Pujol dwells continually on the linguistic question because 
in his view the Catalan language is the great identifying element of the nation."
66 
The 
63 Joan M. Pujals, Les noves fronteres de Catalunya (Barcelona: Columna Edicions, 1998), p. 79. 
64 Generalitat de Catlunya, Law 711983. of 18 April. of Linguistic Normalisation of Catalunya 
(www.troc.es/mercator, 2000), Preamble. 
65 McRoberts, p. 67. 
66 Interview with Prof. Cesareo Aguilera de Prat, Departament de Dret Constitucional i Ciencia 
Politica, Universitat de Barcelona, Barcelona, 12.04.1999. 
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importance of the Catalan language to nationalists cannot be underestimated and as Aguilera 
de Prat argues it should not be viewed strictly as an identifier of ethnicity, rather as tool that 
serves to identify the nation within the Spanish context. The Catalan language, it could be 
argued, enables the high degree of differentiation and recognition that Catalunya seeks as a 
nation but which is not afforded to it by the constitution. Nationalists see the linguistic 
legislation as promoting Catalan as a national language in which all Catalans can share. 
Article 1 of the law declares the intent of the legislation to make use of the Catalan 
Statute of Autonomy to bring about the normalisation of the use ofCatalan "in all spheres, 
and to guarantee the normal and official use ofCatalan and Castilian."67 Further provisions 
are contained in Articles 2 through 4 outlawing discrimination against citizens in Catalunya 
for using either of the official languages. The specific goals of the legislation are 
enumerated in Article 1 (2): "a) To promote and protect the use of Catalan by all citizens. b) 
To make effective the official use ofCatalan. c) To normalise the use ofCatalan in all 
communication media. d) To ensure the spread of knowledge ofCatalan."68 The use of 
Catalan is also standardised in all institutions of the Generalitat. To ensure the development 
of Catalan the language is declared to be the language of education at all levels in Section 11 
of the law, although fluency in both Catalan and Castilian is expected of all children upon 
completion of their education.69 It is worthwhile noting the extent to which the use of 
Catalan has been normalised within Catalunya and whether it can truly claim to be the 
language of the nation in terms of the number of native speakers. If statistics related to 
language are analysed it appears that the linguistic legislation of the Generalitat has had the 
desired effect. 
67 Generalitat de Catlunya, Law 7 I 1983, of 18 April. of Linguistic Normalisation of Catalunya, art. 
1 ( 1 ). 
68 Ibid., art. 1 (2). 
69 Ibid., art. 14(4). 
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If we look at data on Catalan language competence between 1991 and 1996 it is 
possible to see an improvement in the status of the language. 
Table 6.1 -Competence in the Catalan Language 
1991 (0/o) 1996 (0/o) 
Understand Catalan 93.8 94.9 
Sneak Catalan 68.3 75.3 
Read Catalan 67.6 72.3 
Write Catalan 39.9 45.8 
Source: Generalitat de Catalunya, "Coneixement de la llengua catalana" (www.cultura.gencat.es, 2000), p. 3. 
What is most notable is that in the 5 to 24 age group, those who have no real experience of 
Catalunya prior to the democratic transition language competence is even higher: 98o/o of 
those between 5 and 24 understand Catalan; 90o/o of those between the ages of I 0 and 24 
speak it; 90o/o between the ages of 10 and 24 can read it; and 87o/o between 10 and 19 can 
write Catalan.70 Increasingly, the link between language and nation is second nature as the 
use of Catalan becomes normalised throughout Catalunya. 
Promotion of Multi nationalism 
One of the fundamental problems Catalan nationalists have with the conception of 
the Spanish state is its rejection of the multinational and multilingual character of Spain. As 
Article 2 clearly states, the constitution is based upon the existence of a Spanish nation -one 
nation, that is indivisible and indissoluble and co-terminous with the territory of the state. 
The 1978 constitution, in creating a decentralised regional state based upon vague autonomy 
criteria, has maintained a strong unitarism.71 The failure to give constitutional recognition to 
the existence of multiple nations within the state is a typical response by the central power in 
liberal-democratic states rooted in nineteenth-century conceptions of how a state should be 
organised. As Requejo argues, liberal-democratic states aim to build a uniform identity, 
whether national or imperial, that rejects any non-state nationalisms as both emotive and 
70 Ibid., p. 4. 
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particularistic.
72 
Ultimately, the state will fail to recognise the claims made by minority 
national entities and will persevere with building a state-oriented nationalism that rejects any 
form of cultural difference.
73 
It has been argued by other Catalan nationalists that what lies at 
the heart of the constitution is a further attempt to build a homogenous state nationalism: 
The failure of Spain as a nation is the failure of the liberal state to produce a 
homogeneous community that did not correspond naturally with a heterogeneous 
reality, not only of languages and cultures but also of mentalities and rhythms of 
economic development.74 
The failure to recognise the diverse nature of the state has led Catalan nationalists of various 
political stripes to call for a reform of the autonomic state so that at all levels there may be a 
recognition of Spain's multinational character.75 The differing conceptions of the state held 
by Madrid and by Barcelona lie at the centre of the constitutional debate with the former 
embracing a statist model and the latter a pluralistic, multinational model: 
The autonomic state is a model characterized by a 'regionalising' logic rather than 
by a genuinely federalist one. We can say that it is a model that turns out to be more 
'open' by lack of definition than by real will. But, in any case, to decentralise a state 
is not the same as articulating the different national entities that exist together inside 
it. In this case 'self-government' is not equivalent to 'more competences'. The list of 
these could be augmented and, in spite of it [autonomy], the 'unease' of minority 
national identities would persist because the recognition and the broader 
development of their cultural specificity is not being established in an effective and 
concrete manner.76 
The argument then follows that the so-called Catalan problem can only be resolved by 
extending the regional state to one that is not based merely on the decentralisation of power, 
but rather on the acknowledgement of multinational ism through a federal or some other form 
71 Ferran Requejo, Zoom politic: Democracia, federalisme i nacionalisme des d'una Catalunya 
europea (Barcelona: Edicions Proa, 1998), p. 152. 
72 Ferran Requejo, "Difen!ncies nacionals i federalisme asimetric," in Federalisme. ger a que? 
L'acomodaci6 de la diversitat en democracies plurinacionals (Barcelona: Edicions l'Hora del Present, 
1998), p. 52. 
73 Ferran Requejo, "Political Liberalism in Plurinational states," 2. 
74 Pujals, p. 89. 
75 'Autonomic state' is a translation of the Catalan 'Estat de les autonomies', or the Castilian 'Estado 
de las autonomias', which is used to define the current Spanish state system. 
76 Ferran Requejo, "L'Acomodaci6 "federal" de l'estat plurinacional espanyol," in Federalisme. per a 
que? L'acomodaci6 de la diversitat en democracies plurinacionals, p. 164. 
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of relationship. Catalunya's nationalist parties address the problems that lie in the way the 
state is organised and the lack of full recognition given to Catalunya as a constituent nation. 
The parties aim in their programmes drawn up at party conferences and in their election 
manifestos for the Catalan Parliament, the Corts Generals, and the European Parliament to 
articulate visions for reforming the autonomic state. All parties have as their aim the 
recognition and development of Catalunya as a nation. However, their means of achieving 
this are diverse and range from the gradualist approach of CiU to the republicanism and 
independence-centred approach of ERC. The following section will examine the views of 
nationalist parties towards the constitution and the changes that they have proposed. 
Nationalist Parties' Arguments 
Catalan nationalism as a political force is non-violent and unlike the more militant 
Basque nationalists works within the institutions of civil society to bring about a greater 
recognition of Catalunya as a nation.77 While the five parties under investigation, UDC, 
CDC, PSC, ERC, and IC-Verds are all nationalist in orientation, they differ largely in their 
approaches to achieving Catalan self-determination and promoting a multinational Spain. 
They also differ in terms of how strong their links are to state parties with the PSC being 
affiliated to the Spanish socialist party, the Partido Socialista Obrero Espaiiol (PSOE), and 
IC being linked with the Green Party or Verds after having established a formal coalition 
between the two parties in Catalunya in 1987. 
Pujolism 
Convergencia Democn1tica de Catalunya (CDC) has been in coalition with Uni6 
Democratica de Catalunya (UDC) as Convergencia i Uni6 (CiU) since 1979. CDC existed 
prior to this date as a social-democratic party and then moved towards the centre after 
deciding to join with the Christian democratic UDC, which was in danger of being subsumed 
77 Miquel Caminal, Nacionalisme i partits nacionals a Catalunya (Barcelona: Editorial Empuries, 
1998), p. 161. 
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by CDC.78 CiU under the leadership of Jordi Pujol has been in power in Catalunya for the 
last twenty years and as a result its brand of Catalan nationalism and consequently the 
approach taken by the Generalitat towards the central state has come to be labeled as 
Pujolism. Pujolism is centrist in its ideology and gradualist in its approach, and this is 
evident in party manifestos. It emphasises the importance of Catalan civil society and 
national institutions: 
Pujol argued as Prat de la Riba did when he pointed out the great importance of the 
Mancomunitat if only because it represented institutional recognition of Catalunya, 
is not concerned about Catalunya being 'more of a state'; though he would be 
concerned if Catalunya would become 'less of a nation'. And the institutions (not 
only the institution of the state) are those which make the nation. The family, school, 
work, associations, unions, parties, and so on as long as they identify with the 
common goal of constructing a country, they constitute an inter-institutional society 
that recognises itself and takes up a singular identity different from others.79 
To get a clearer understanding of what CDC stands for apart from UDC an analysis will be 
made of the party statutes and programme approved by the tenth party congress held at 
I 'Hospitalet de Llobregat in November of 1996. The speeches of Jordi Pujol and other CDC 
leaders such as the former secretary-general of the party, Pere Esteve, are also useful for 
analysis and enlightening in terms of outlining party strategy and ideology. 
Convergencia Democratica de Catalunya · 
The statutes of CDC outline the structure of the party, its discipline, and also its 
basic goals. In the 1996 party statutes there are five objectives listed to be met if the party is 
to move towards the realisation of a country (the term el pais is employed here rather than la 
naci6). The five objectives are stated as the following: a) the drive towards the exercise of 
fu 11 national sovereignty; b) the drive to achieve a balanced country; c) the drive to protect 
and improve the environment; d) the drive to consolidate the Catalan Countries; e) the drive 
towards mutual help and respect amongst all nations and regions that constitute the Spanish 
78 Albert Balcells, Catalan Nationalism: Past and Present (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1996), p. 
174. 
79 Caminal, p. 164. 
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state; f) the drive to construct the Europe of the peoples.80 The impulse to exercise full 
national sovereignty is a core aim of CDC.81 As with the other nationalist parties CDC 
places emphasis on the importance of building a national community, a community with 
historic roots. The conception of a national community is extended in the fourth party 
objective which calls for greater cooperation with the other Catalan-speaking areas of Spain 
in economic, social, political, cultural, and linguistic fields while at the same time respecting 
the uniqueness of each community, including Valencia, les Illes Balears, and parts of 
Arag6n. Unlike ERC, CDC does not embrace a political pan-Catalanism that urges the 
creation of an independent Catalan republic that would unite all of the Catalan lands, 
including the Catalan-speaking region of southern France. One of the most important 
objectives of CDC is the principle of mutual assistance and respect among all the various 
regions and 'nations', not nationalities, which make up the Spanish state. This objective is 
based upon the party's argument for the recognition of Spain's linguistic and national 
communities: "CDC has contributed to maintaining fully democratic governmental forms 
and must continue to progress in the recognition of our identity in a pluri-national, pluri-
cultural and pluri-linguistic state."82 CDC is a nationalist party that works within the Spanish 
state to promote the Catalan nation's right to self-determination. It is a party that emphasises 
the importance of an institutional framework for advancing its goals. This, of course, is an 
approach that has worked for CDC in its coalition with UDC since it has been able to have a 
tremendous influence on the development of Catalunya's political, social, economic, and 
linguistic culture during its twenty years of unbroken control of the Generalitat. 
The fundamental objectives of the party that have been briefly discussed in the CDC 
statutes are more fully developed in the party's programme adopted at the tenth congress in 
8° Convergencia Democn\tica de Catalunya, Estatuts. Aprovats al X Congres. celebrat a l'Hospitalet 
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1996 and in two speeches by party leaders, one delivered by Jordi Pujol in March 1999 on 
political power in Catalunya and another recent one given by Pere Esteve on what the future 
holds for Catalunya. In the 318-page party programme, Convergencia: Laforr;a decisiva per 
a Catalunya, CDC's position on a myriad of issues, including the position of the nation, 
reorganisation of the state, Catal unya in Europe, fiscal arrangements, and reform of Catalan 
local administration, is presented. The premise for much of the party's programme is that the 
twenty-first century will be a period of change in Catalunya, Spain, and Europe which will 
be characterised by an acceptance of the multinational nature of the Spanish state where 
Catalunya's claim to nationhood will be accepted: 
Convergencia believes that the time for recognition has arrived. The time for 
recognising Catalunya's national character within the supranational European and 
state frameworks in which it participates. Let the concepts of 'nation' when referred 
to Catalunya, and 'pluri-national' when referred to the Spanish state become facts, 
realities.83 
CDC argues that what is hindering this greater recognition is first of all the unwillingness of 
the majority of Spaniards to accept the idea of Spain as a multinational state as a result of 
central government attitudes to the contrary. 84 Requejo argues that the 1978 constitution 
provides a very poor framework for the recognition of a degree of multi nationality within the 
state: 
Nevertheless, in spite of all these and other merits shown in the present 
understanding of the constitution, with the same vigour it can be affirmed that it is 
not a good constitution to articulate a pluri-national state. The fact is that it does not 
recognise the national pluralism of the Spanish state, and, moreover, it dilutes the 
regulation of this pluralism into mere decentralisation, which is generalising and 
uniformising in character.85 
Thus, CDC argues for a fundamentally new conception of the organisation of the state that is 
'bottom-up' rather than 'top-down' and recognises to a much greater degree the role of the 
83 Convergencia Democnitica de Catalunya, Convergencia: La forca decisiva per a Catalunya 
(Barcelona: CDC, 1996), p. 20. 
84 lbid, p. 25. 
85 Requejo, Zoom politic: Democracia, federalisme i nacionalisme des d'una Catalunya europea, pp. 
154-55. 
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state's constituent parts. Furthermore, the party calls for a more active approach towards 
pushing for the recognition of nations within the state and Catalunya's own identity. This 
can be accomplished constitutionally through a variety of different measures. Catalan 
national identity can be better promoted within the state through the following means: senate 
reform, asymmetry and multinationality, a pact with the state, and a role in international 
affairs. Greater political power can be achieved by reforming the system of state finance, 
expanding the Generalitat's areas of competence, and reforming institutions.86 
CDC proposes the negotiating of a pact with the state: the Pacte d'Estat. This pact 
would take the form of a constitutional amendment that would extend the constitution by 
entrenching a clause that gives an explicit meaning to the concept of Catalan national 
identity: "The content of the pact, naturally should be the recognition ofCatalunya's national 
identity and, consequently, of the Spanish state as truly pluri-national state."87 It is 
anticipated that this pact would be the centrepiece of a programme of constitutional reform 
of the state. 
The party's proposals to refonn the Senate illustrate CDC's acceptance of the 
doctrine of asymmetry within the state, that being the differentiation between nationalities 
and regions. This would further the assertion of Catalan nationalists that Catalunya is a 
nation within a multinational state, not merely a nationality within a homogenous state. As 
has been noted previously, the provisions of Title VIII of the constitution on territorial 
organisation actually contribute to symmetry among the autonomous communities since all 
are able to gain the maximum number of competences allowed in Article 148 if they so 
choose. The proposals for Senate refonn would turn the upper chamber of the Corts 
Generals into a territorial chamber that would reflect the asymmetry that exists between 
regions and nationalities. The proposals are for: 
86 Convergencia Democn\tica de Catalunya, Convergencia: La forca decisiva per a Catalunya, p. 28. 
87 Ibid., p. 29. 
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a) a Senate elected on the basis of autonomous communities, not provinces; 
b) a Senate where the composition is based on the national asymmetry of the state 
1 while reflecting demographic criteria; 
c) the Senate to have specialisation in matters pertaining to political autonomy and 
territorial legislation; 
d) the use of all official languages in Senate debates; 
e) the introduction of a veto for the Senate in questions which affect the national 
characteristics of those nationalities represented in the chamber.88 
Again, the primary goal of these reforms is to bring about a recognition of the asymmetrical, 
multinational, and multilingual character of the state. 
In the field of international relations the party calls for the establishment of 
mechanisms which would allow for the greater participation of representatives of the 
Generalitat in supra-state bodies. This would include direct Catalan participation in EU 
bodies and cultural organisations such as UNESCO where at present Catalunya is 
represented indirectly by state nominees. The ultimate goal is to promote the greater 
international recognition of Catalunya.89 
In the connected fields of competences and financial arrangements between the state 
and Catalunya, CDC proposes a substantial reordering and restructuring as a means to bring 
about true and greater self-government. Among other proposals, the party's programme 
calls for an end to the excessive regulation imposed by the state's organic laws and basic 
laws which play a central role in determining competences; they are viewed as centralising 
instruments of state power.9° CDC also perceives the judiciary as a centralising force since it 
maintains a rigidly centralised structure. To help remedy this the party calls for the 
establishment of a Consell del Poder Judicial Catala (Catalan Council of Judicial Power) 
which would be appointed by the Generalitat and would have jurisdiction in judicial matters 
within Catalunya.91 This would expand the executive and legislative power already 
decentralised to Catalunya to include judicial power as well. This is curiously the reverse of 
88 Ibid., p. 31. 
89 Ibid., pp.31-32. 
90 Ibid., p. 33. 
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what existed in Scotland prior to the passage of the Scotland Act, 1998 where only 
administrative and judicial power, and not legislative power, had been devolved through the 
Scottish Office. Further demands are also made on the state in these fields to respect the 
principle of exclusive competence and thereby restrict state interference in matters under the 
jurisdiction of the Generalitat.
92 
There are other areas in which CDC calls for the Generalitat 
to exercise competence, and these are discussed further in the party's election manifestos. 
Much of what was presented in CDC's party programme of 1996 has been 
reinforced in the past four years by speeches of the party leaders. Jordi Pujol, in a speech 
entitled "The Political Power of Catalunya: an Instrument for the Service of Citizens", 
argues in favour of constitutional reform, particularly of Title VIII, which would help to 
meet some of the concerns held by Catalunya and Euskadi.93 Pujol reiterates the centrist, 
gradualist, and moderate approach adopted by CiU in his calling for reform of the 
constitution within the context of the state. There is no call here for revolutionary changes in 
the state or for Catalunya's abandoning of it. On the contrary: 
The Constitution was and must continue being a fundamental pact of co-existence. 
Co-existence of citizens and people who constitute Spain ... The combination of re-
reading the Constitution with a reform or a reinterpretation of the Statute [of 
Autonomy] in agreement with this re.:. reading and to modify a long list of laws that 
have been reducing the autonomous competences in a way not necessarily implied in 
the Constitution, allows for many substantial changes.94 
Pere Esteve, in a speech on the future of Catalunya within the Spanish state and the 
European Union, calls for the adoption of a multinational model in Spain and in the EU that 
allows each nation to exercise its collective right to self-determination. In touching upon 
language and culture, symbols and institutions, competences, fiscal arrangements, and 
91 Ibid., p. 34. 
92 
Ibid., p. 33. . . 
93 Jordi Pujol, "Discurs del president Pujol: 'Poder politic de Catalunya: un mstrument al serve1 dels 
ciutadans'. ESADE, 1 de mar9 de 1999" (www.convergencia.es, 2000), p. 1. 
94 Ibid., pp. 3 &5. 
216 
Catalunya 's Constitutional Position 
international relations, Esteve suggests the adoption of a new cooperative model that would 
further promote Catalan self-determination: 
Precisely concerning the achievement of the aimed goals, we must say that, already 
in the introduction, we distinguish two different strategies. The first is to negotiate 
with the central government certain elements in a series of competences which will 
aim to reinforce Catalunya's self-government. But there is also a second more 
important strategy that comes from the new framework, from the new model, from 
the new horizon. Naturally, this second strategy goes beyond particular negotiations 
and it requires creative work in an appropriate climate in order to make this proposal 
effective; particularly concerning increasing the national conscience of Catalunya's 
citizens and, also, through the complicity of Catalan political parties.95 
The focus is again on reforming the system from the inside and continuing to develop a 
national conscience among Catalans. From Esteve's perspective, it is through the political 
parties that much of this can be achieved. Indeed, CDC has often put forward the argument 
that it has motivated the national conscience and has guaranteed the survival of Catalunya 
over the long run.96 
Uni6 Democratica de Catalunya 
The views of CDC and the doctrines of Pujolism have guided the strategy of CiU as 
a coalition, due in large part to that party's greater popularity among voters and as a result of 
the towering presence of Jordi Pujol in Catalan nationalism. Uni6 Democratica de Catalunya 
has the role of junior partner in the coalition. UDC is a smaller nationalist party which, like 
CDC, embraces a moderate and gradualist position somewhere between Pujolism and the 
federalism of the left; it is ideologically rooted in the principles of Christian democracy.
97 
The party documents of UDC express a stronger ideological focus than one finds with CDC. 
The political ideology of UDC is shaped by a dual emphasis on humanism and nationalism: 
As a humanist association, the person and his dignity is for us the first point of 
reference for our political activity. The person has the right to develop his moral 
capacity and capacity for spiritual growth and he should neither be considered as a 
gear subjected to society nor as an isolated individual without common links to other 
citizens. On the contrary, family and nation are the natural communities in which the 
95 Pere Esteve, "Per un nou horitz6 per a Catalunya" (www.convergencia.es, n.d.), p. 2. 
% Caminal, p. 165. 
97 Ibid., p. 166. 
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person completes his development and within which the person can exercise and 
assume his freedom, his creativity and his responsibilities.98 
The communitarian ideology of UDC fits well together with CDC's emphasis on the 
importance of institutions, such as the family, in the construction of a Catalan identity. The 
ideologies of Pujolism and UDC's personalism and Christian humanism come together in the 
coalition of CiU, literally "Convergence and Union." 
Convergencia i Uni6 
Since 1980 the two parties have fought elections together at all levels of 
government, electing members to the Parliament of Catalunya, the Corts Generals, and the 
European Parliament. In each of the recent elections to these governing bodies CiU has put 
its gradualist and moderate strategies into practice. The coalition's manifesto for the 
elections to the Catalan Pari iament in late 1999 called for the gradual transfer of more 
competences to the Generalitat, thereby facilitating greater autonomy. This would include 
changes in the following fields of jurisdiction: 
1) In administration, particularly in the areas of judicial procedure and function, to 
allow the simplification of administrative procedure; 
2) in the economic field, the augmentation of competence in industry, agriculture, 
tourism, fishing, commerce, and stockbreeding and in the socio-economic field 
greater control over cooperatives; credit, savings banks, and professional 
associations; 
3) in public security; and 
4) in education, where the platform calls for exclusive competence in educational 
matters.99 
In the party programme passed at the tenth CDC party congress in 1996 there are further 
calls made in the coalition manifesto for the decentralisation of the judicial system and the 
establishment of the Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Catalunya as the court of first instance 
so that all cases which originate in Catalunya can be heard in Catalan courts. 100 Vis-a-vis 
Europe, CiU seeks in their electoral programme the representation of Catalunya in European 
98 Uni6 Democn\tica de Catalunya, "Estrategia i Politica" (www.unio.es, 2000), p. 1. 
99 Convergencia i Uni6, Catalunya, primer: Programa electoral. Eleccions al Parlament de Catalunya 
1999 (Barcelona: CiU, 1999), pp. 34-36. 
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institutions for the purpose of advancing the nation's interest in supra-state bodies: "The 
external promotion of Catalunya is indispensable nowadays in order that it be able to defend 
its interests by itself in a social and economic context that is becoming increasingly 
international and global."
101 
In the recently held elections for the Corts Generals, the 
coalition held to the same strategy of demanding the expansion ofCatalunya's competences 
in various economic and administrative areas. However, in CiU's electoral programme the 
status quo within the state is attacked much more vociferously and it is repeatedly pointed 
out to voters that the autonomic state is insufficient and needs to be reformed to better reflect 
the multinational nature of the state and Catalunya's position within it: 
The present model of the autonomic state has several shortcomings: shortcomings 
concerning the development of competences, as well as concerning the obvious 
deficiencies of our financial system in which the result is clearly the fiscal 
discrimination against Catalunya by the Spanish state. There are other shortcomings 
concerning the idea of Spain as a plural state, where it should be possible to 
recognise the diverse realities that are present within it... 102 
The need for greater asymmetry within the state, a greater recognition of Spain's 
multinationality, an expansion of autonomy, and greater Catalan representation in 
international fora are the goals ofCiU. It is important to emphasise that the coalition seeks 
to implement this programme through constitutional means, working with the central 
government and organs of the state to achieve a radical reorientation of the Estat de les 
autonomies. This reorientation would represent a further evolution of the liberal-democratic 
Spanish state into a more pluralistic and diverse one. 
100 Ibid., p. 32. 
ICI Ibid. 
102 Convergencia i Uni6, La forca positiva: Programa electoral per a les eleccions a Corts Generals 
2000. (B~celona: CiU, 2000), p. 22. 
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Partit dels Socialistes de Cata/unya 
The other major contender for government in Catalunya, and CiU's principal 
adversary, is the Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya which is directly affiliated with the 
Spanish socialist party. They are known officially in Catalunya as PSC-PSOE but will be 
referred to here as PSC. PSC is a democratic socialist party of the left that reluctantly 
embraces Catalan nationalism and like CiU seeks to work within the state to promote greater 
autonomy for Catalunya. The ideology of PSC-PSOE is one that embraces a federal solution 
for Spain and Catalunya; it is an ideology where federalism comes before nationalism: 
The Catalanism of PSC emphasises the federalist project rather than nationalism, 
though without putting aside 'Catalunya's national rights'. It is a Catalanism that not 
only links the democratic and socialist project in Spain with the fulfillment of 
Catalunya as a nation but also makes them dependent on each other. 103 
The party's platform for the 2000 elections to the Corts Generals cites the examples of how 
other countries in Europe such as the United Kingdom and Italy are devolving power and 
how Spain is a model of a state which moved from dictatorship that did not recognise 
cultural and linguistic diversity to a federalising one which values the idea of unity and 
liberty.
104 
The PSC believes that Catalunya is stronger when it works with the other peoples 
of Spain towards the same goal: a further evolution of the state towards a more federal Spain. 
The party's federalism emphasises the need to recognise within the state linguistic and 
national diversity and to recognise Catalunya as a nation: 
Twenty years later, it is fair to expect an explicit recognition as a nation reflected in 
the definitive acceptance of historic nationalities, as well as in the writing and 
application of basic laws, in the basic functioning of the democratic state, in the 
great strategic options, and in the positive assumption of linguistic and cultural 
diversity. 105 
The PSC proposes in its manifesto four types of federalism: political, fiscal, cultural, 
and judicial. Political federalism consists oftwo proposals: reform of the Senate and the 
103 Caminal, p. 170. 
104 Partit Socialistes de Catalunya, Per repartir el progres: El programa dels socialistes catalans per a 
Espanya (Barcelona: PSC, 2000), p. I 0. 
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establishment of a Catalan presence in European institutions. In terms of Senate reform the 
party embraces many of the same ideas as CiU, such as calling for the Senate to be 
transformed into a truly representative chamber that allows for territorial representation 
based on Spain's multinational character; thereby becoming an expression of the federal 
nature of the state. A reformed Senate would also be the chamber of first reading for all bills 
related to the autonomous communities and should have as its responsibility the protection of 
the multinational reality of Spain. The PSC does not, however, propose that the Senate 
should have any power of veto in matters relating to the autonomous communities, as does 
CiU. Furthermore, in embracing the principle of subsidiarity provision would be made for 
Catalunya's representation alongside the state in European institutions insofar as matters 
discussed at the European level relate to Catalunya's areas of competence. 106 
The proposals relating to fiscal federalism are founded upon the principles of 
solidarity, autonomy, and equality. The PSC supports the idea of granting the Generalitat a 
greater role in the administration of the taxation system through the Agencia Estatal de la 
Administraci6n Tributaria, which is the state body responsible for tax affairs. Furthermore, 
it entails that an essential portion of the Generalitat' s expenditures be derived directly from 
taxes paid by Catalan citizens. This would mean embracing a model of fiscal federalism 
similar to that of Canada and other federal states. 107 
The cultural federalism proposals deal directly with the need to recognise Spain's 
plurality of languages and cultures. The PSC makes the following proposals: 
• the explicit constitutional recognition of cultural and linguistic plurality in Spain; the use 
of the four languages in the Senate and in other areas, as well as in all personal identity 
documents and collective symbols; 
• the expression of Hispanic plurality in schools' curriculum and in the politics of public 
broadcasting; 
• the teaching of the common history of the Spanish peoples; 
105 Ibid., p. 11. 
106 Ibid., p. 12. 
107 Ibid. 
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• a federal conception of the Ministry of Culture as the ministry of cultures, with special 
attention to the promotion of the four languages and the diverse cultures of the state, in 
close collaboration with the Autonomous Communities; and 
• participation of the representative autonomous governments of the four languages in the 
representation of Spain in European and international organisations of co-operation, 
together with the goal of moving towards the politics of conservation and promotion of 
cultural plurality. 108 
In making reference to the four languages the PSC is referring to Castilian, Catalan, Basque, 
and Galician. Provisions are also made, as is the case in CiU policy, for the protection and 
promotion of Aranese, which is a minority language similar to Occitan spoken in the V all 
d' Aran in Catalunya's northwest. Along with these provisions relating to how the 
multilingual and multinational character of Spain can be institutionally promoted there are 
also a number of proposals which explore the details on how this could be funded. The 
PSC's cultural federalism has both a federal and a nationalist element. The federal element 
exists in the party's desire to federalise cultural institutions so that the various autonomous 
communities can work in collaboration with state bodies. The nationalist element lies in the 
desire to promote national languages, not only in their respective autonomous communities 
but also across a federal Spain through a plan of constitutional reform and educational 
development. 
The PSC 's judicial federalism is similar in many ways to the judicial reforms 
proposed by CiU. To bring about a greater federal element in the judicial system, the PSC 
argues that it would be necessary to integrate into the constitution a different and 
decentralised judicial system since, as argued by the PSC, the process of decentralisation 
begun in 1978 has passed by the judicial branch of government. 109 The two most important 
proposals here are to transfer to the Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Catalunya (the Catalan 
high court) competence in civil and administrative law as the court of second instance and to 
create the Comissi6 de Justicia de Catalunya. This latter body would be responsible for 
108 Ibid., p. 13. 
109 Ibid., p.l4. 
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some of the competences related to the administration of Catalan justice, which is at present 
largely the responsibility of the state body which governs the judiciary: the Consell General 
del Poder Judicial. The Comissi6 would then work together with the Tribunal Superior de 
Justicia de Catalunya and the Catalan Parliament in administering justice in Catalunya. 
As we can see, the PSC and CiU hold many of the same aims in common: the 
promotion of a multinational and multilingual state and the promotion of greater autonomy 
for Catalunya. While CiU aims to achieve these principal goals through the promotion of an 
intrinsically nationalist agenda and through asymmetrical arrangements with the central 
power, the PSC favours the evolution of Spain into a federal state. The third Catalan 
nationalist party, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC), rejects both of these 
approaches. 
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya 
ERC is a socialist party that supports the independence of Catalunya from Spain and 
the creation of a Catalan socialist republic among the Catalan-speaking lands, els pa"isos 
catalans.
110 
It was ERC that emerged as the dominant nationalist party of the left in the years 
leading up to the proclamation of the Second Republic in 1934; the party itself was founded 
in 1931. In its declaration of ideology ERC emphasises territorial solidarity, the need to 
protect cultural and linguistic traditions, and the right to economic and political sovereignty. 
These rights, it argues, can only be achieved without the interference of an external power, 
and thus ERC asserts the following right: 
The right to create in its territory the centre for political, cultural and economic 
decisions, and the right to be independent of any external body that has not been 
accepted in a sovereign manner. The right to manage its rightful space, to explore its 
resources, and to direct the economy and administration of the territory and the 
government of the people. 111 
110 Interview with Snr. Jesus Maestro, Secretari de Politica Intemacional, Esquerra Republicana de 
Catalunya, Barcelona, 12.04.1999. 
111 Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, Declaraci6 ideologica d'Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya 
(Barcelona: ERC, 1993), p. 13. 
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It is the expressed opinion of ERC that in multinational states where one nation effectively 
exercises the power, even if democratically, it is impossible to guarantee the national rights 
of other peoples in the state. In this rejection of the multinational approach towards the 
reforming of the Spanish state, the party further affirms that the right of the Catalan nation to 
independence within a united Europe is irrenounceable. 112 In this respect ERC shares with 
the Scottish National Party a common approach towards independence within Europe for the 
Catalan nation. 
In ERC's manifesto for the last general election to the Corts Generals, the argument 
is made that the 1978 constitution and the state which it created, which the party has never 
supported, has failed. Therefore, from the perspective of ERC the only option for the 
immediate future is to develop bilateral relations between Catalunya and the Spanish state 
and to establish a direct presence for Catalunya in European institutions. Furthermore, the 
party wants to bring about the abolition of Article 145, which prohibits any form of 
federation between autonomous communities and thus frustrates pan-Catalanism. 113 While 
ultimately ERC doubts that there can be any true recognition of national and linguistic 
diversity within the state, it does make some similar proposals for constitutional reform in an 
attempt to bring this about. The party's proposals for Senate reform echo those of CiU 
almost exactly with the additional proposal that a law be passed through a reformed Senate 
within Parliament which would amend Article 145 and allow autonomous communities to 
establish a provincia (mica (a single province). 114 ERC's proposals for the recognition of 
linguistic diversity are also similar to those of CiU, and call for the amending of Article 3, 
which names Castilian as the only obligatory language of the state. 115 The similarities 
between the platform of CiU and ERC regarding constitutional reform and linguistic and 
112 Ibid., p. 14. 
113 Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, Mans lliures: Resum del programa de les Eleccions al Congres 
dels Diputats ni al Senat de l'Estat espanyol marc 2000 (Barcelona: ERC, 2000), p. 6. 
114 Ibid., p. 10. 
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national recognition are striking, yet once again the ultimate goal is different. For ERC it is 
independence in the EU and a union of the Catalan-speaking areas whereas for CiU it is 
greater autonomy and recognition for Catalunya within the state. 
ERC has been harshly critical of what they view as the piecemeal approach adopted 
by CiU and the PSC. Maestro argues that ERC is the only party with a clear sense of 
purpose and a clear programme: 
They [the autonomist parties] don't know where to go, that's what we regret about 
them. If one party is federalist or autonomist, that's okay, but we reject the thing 
that the socialist party usually says and Convergencia always says and that's 
Catalunya first, independence we don't know, federalism we don't know, and we 
don't know where to go. We are a clear party. We fight peacefully for 
independence, but independentism not as an ideology. The ideology is left, 
socialism in democracy. Independence is our political goal. 116 
Being both an active member of ERC's National Executive Council and a political scientist 
shapes Maestro's position. While being interviewed he chose to speak exclusively from the 
perspective of an ERC office-bearer and thus reflected a strongly held political belief that 
autonomy has failed Catalunya and that the constitutional status quo is unreformable. ERC 
argues that it is the only clear alternative to those nationalist parties in favour of greater 
autonomy for Catalunya, yet polls have demonstrated that more people support 
independence for Catalunya than support ERC. In a poll published in the year 2000 32% of 
those polled were in favour of independence for Catalunya, whereas only 10% were 
sympathetic to ERC. In addition over half of CiU supporters, 56%, supported independence 
for Catalunya. 117 ERC's leftist ideology is more significant and that it is not viewed as the 
natural political home for those nationalists who favour independence, particularly those of 
the centre-right who support CiU. 
115 Ibid., p. 18. 
116 Interview with Snr. Jesus Maestro, Secretari de Politica Internacional, Esquerra Republicana de 
Catalunya, Barcelona, 12.04.1999. 
117 Institut de Ciencies Politiques i Socials, 1999 Sondeig d'Opini6 Catalunya (www.icps.es, 2000), 
pp. 76 & 98-99. 
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The goal of national independence is one shared by ERC and the Basque separatist 
party, Eusko Alkartasuna, with which it has entered into an agreement: the Acord d'Irufia. 
This agreement commits both parties to work for the realisation of their respective nations' 
right to self-determination. Both parties allege the failure of Spain's democratic transition to 
bring about the recognition of this right: 
After more than twenty years of unfinished 'democratic transition' which has often 
been regressive concerning the recognition of our national realities, it is time to 
present very concrete commitments to push forward towards a fundamental advance 
in recognition or, if preferred, a second transition that would assume without 
reservations the democratic principle of free self-determination of the nations 
integrated in the Spanish and French states, a principle that is part of the democratic 
transition of our Peoples renewed by the resolutions of the Catalan and Basque 
Parliament on the Right to Self-Government adopted in 1989 and 1990. 118 
As this accord states, ERC has adopted the position that the democratic right to self-
determination which is affirmed in the 1966 United Nations International Agreement on 
Civil and Political Rights is rejected by the Spanish state. ERC seeks to develop the Catalan 
nation based on a socialist model outside of an unworkable Spanish state; the gradualist and 
centrist approach of CiU is seen to be untenable in the long run. 
lniciativa per a Catalunya-Verds 
The final nationalist party to be examined is the coalition between Iniciativa 
Catalunya-Verds which is a neo-Marxist party of the far left that emerged out of the old 
Catalan Communist party; it is loosely tied to the state party Izquierda Unida (United Left). 
I C-V defines itself in its ideological statement as a new political formation that fights for 
socialism and for political, social, and economic democracy that will overcome the capitalist 
system. The IC-V goes on further to embrace green principles as a guiding force in its 
struggle to establish a socialist system. 119 The party embraces Catalan nationalism, Catalan 
popular sovereignty, and federalism as the means to bring about the reform of the Spanish 
118 Esquerra Republicana de Catlunya & Eusko Alkartasuna, "Acord d'lruna" (Barcelona: ERC, 
2000), p. I. 
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state and the promotion of Catalunya's right to national self-determination. The party 
programme was ratified at the coalition's first conference, the Assemblea Nacional de 
Castelldefels: 
IC-V originates and acts in Catalan society and fights for the full recognition of its 
national character and for effective self-government. In this sense, IC-V affirms that 
Catalunya's sovereignty resides in its people, who have the right to fully exercise 
their self-determination, and it understands that this right must be promoted in this 
present period through a change and a transformation of the current Spanish 
autonomic state a state organised according to the principles of federalism, where 
each nation enjoys its own sovereignty within the wider framework of a united 
Europe of citizens and peoples that is federal character ... 120 
IC-Y shares its federalist credentials with the PSC, which has also encouraged the evolution 
of Spain into a federal state, but without the socialist rhetoric of IC-V. The coalition seeks to 
establish itself as the alternative national party of the left and it appears to have 
accomplished this in terms of its percentage of the popular vote. IC-Y is the second party of 
the left after the PSC and regularly garners a greater percentage of the vote in elections to the 
Catalan Parliament and to the Corts Generals than ERC. 121 
Multilateral Efforts at Constitutional Reform 
All the parties examined share a commitment to the promotion of Catalunya's right 
to greater autonomy, albeit in varying degrees, and the goal of greater recognition for 
Catalunya as a nation within Spain. Generally speaking, all the parties, except ERC, seek to 
advance Catalunya's national claims within the framework of the Spanish state through 
constitutional and administrative reform. The reforming of the Spanish state would, it is 
anticipated, bring about a recognition of Spain's diversity and its multinational and 
multilingual identity. Clearly there exists within Spain today a conflict between two rival 
conceptions of the nation: one that is a unitarist and statist concept entrenched in the first 
articles of the 1978 constitution and is rejected by Catalan nationalists, and one embraced by 
119 Iniciativa per Catalunya-Verds, "Principis d'Iniciativa-Verds" (www.iniciativa-cat-verds.org, 
2000), p. 1. 
120 Ibid., p. 2. 
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nationalists that view Catalunya as the nation, not Spain. It is this latter conception which 
leads to Catalan, Basque, and Galician nationalist arguments for a so-called nation of 
nations.
122 
In the last three years an alliance of the principal nationalist parties in the three 
nations has been created. This alliance between CiU, the Galician Bloque Nacionalista 
Galego, and the Basque Partido Nacionalista Vasco has resulted in three agreements being 
reached over the course of 1998: the Declaration of Barcelona, the Gasteiz Accord, and the 
Declaration of Santiago. The purpose of these agreements is to establish a common front 
among these parties to push for the recognition of a multinational Spain, as the Declaration 
of Barcelona states: 
• After twenty years of democracy an articulation of the Spanish state as pluri-
national has not yet been dealt with. 
• During this period we have suffered from the lack of judicial and political 
recognition and, moreover, from the lack of cultural and social acceptance of our 
respective national realities within the state ... 
AND WE RESOL YE 
• To summon Spanish society to share and to dialogue on a new political culture 
in agreement with this new understanding of the state, and to ~remote collective 
awareness reinforcing the idea of their own pluri-nationality. 1 3 
The degree of cooperation between these nationalist parties illustrates what they perceive to 
be an urgent need to reform the state. Their arguments are for working within the Spanish 
state to bring about reform and embracing a new political culture that should be extended 
into the European Union through a multinational model where the three nations can enjoy 
greater representation. 124 Many commentators are supportive of these efforts, in particular 
those such as Requejo who advocate a more concerted effort towards constitutional reform 
121 Colome, p. 1102. 
122 Requejo, Zoom politic: Democnkia, federalisme i nacionalisme des d'una Catalunya europea, p. 
162. 
123 Bloque Nacionalista Galego, Partido Nacionalista Vasco, & Convergencia i Uni6, "Declaraci6 de 
Barcelona de la Trobada entre BNG, PNB, CiU" (www.convergencia.org, 2000), pp. 1-2. 
124 Bloque Nacionalista Galego, Partido Nacionalista Vasco, & Convergencia i Uni6, "Acord de 
Gasteiz" (www.convergencia.org, 2000), p. 4. 
228 
Cata/unya 's Constitutional Position 
of the autonomic state.
125 
ERC repudiates these efforts as ineffectual: "We think that the 
Declaration of Barcelona in principle is nothing. It says nothing, it just wants a re-reading of 
the constitution."
126 
Thus, there remains a division between the autonomist parties who 
favour a reform of the status quo through constitutionalism and those in ERC who reject this 
approach in favour of independence. This situation is not too dissimilar from those in 
Scotland and Quebec. 
Thus far the Spanish state has not initiated any fundamental reform of the 1978 
constitution as envisaged and argued for by most nationalist parties in Catalunya. The 
process towards Senate reform is languishing and very little has been achieved. The 
recognition of Spain as a multinational and multilingual state remains largely a nationalist 
argument and one to which a majority of Spanish political leaders and commentators are not 
responsive. Instead, they choose to view the Spanish nation as the Spanish state. Granted, 
Spain's transition from dictatorship to a decentralised liberal-democratic state has 
highlighted the success of constitutionalism as a process. Further, state competences 
continue to be transferred from Madrid to Barcelona largely through the recent influence that 
CiU has exerted on minority Spanish governments prior to Aznar's winning of a majority of 
the seats in the Corts Generals in 2000. Indeed, Catalunya has had more areas of 
competence transferred to it by the central state than any other autonomous community. 141 
royal decrees have been issued between June 1978 and May 1999 proclaiming the transferal 
of areas of competence, some very minor, from the state to the Generalitat. 127 Yet, while the 
process of decentralisation and democratisation in Spain is ongoing, the demands being 
made by Catalan nationalists for greater national recognition through constitutional refonn 
125 Interview with Prof. Ferran Requejo i Coli, Departament de Ciencies Politiques i Socials, 
Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, 09.04.1999. 
126 Interview with Snr. Jesus Maestro, Secretari de Politica lntemacional, Esquerra Republicana de 
Catalunya, Barcelona, 12.04.1999. 
127 Ministerio de Administraciones Publicas, "Reales Decretos de Traspasos" (www.map.es, 2000), 
pp. 1-14. 
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are going largely unheeded by Madrid. Even for the moderate goals of Catalan nationalists 
to be met there must be a sea change in how the idea of the nation is conceived of in Spain, 
and thus how the organisation of the state as it is entrenched in the 1978 constitution relates 
to Catalunya's place within Spain. 
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Scotland's Constitutional Position within the United Kingdom and 
the Nationalist Response 
In many ways Scotland stands out in this study of constitutional politics and 
nationalism. The nationalism of Scotland is distinguishable from that of Quebec and 
Catalunya by not having a linguistic element at its core. As McCrone has argued, Scottish 
nationalism is unorthodox in some respects in that "it draws very thinly on cultural traditions 
[and] there is virtually no linguistic or religious basis."1 Scotland's constitutional position 
within the United Kingdom is also unique in that Scotland forms part of a state in which 
there is an unwritten constitution. The UK's constitution is said to be 'unwritten' in that 
there is no single document to which one can point to in the United Kingdom that determines 
the territorial organisation of the state, the rights enjoyed by its citizens, or how it is 
governed. In both Canada and Spain there are documents that achieve this, the Canadian 
constitution acts of 1867 and 1982 and the Spanish constitution of 1978, both of which have 
been discussed earlier. The other significant difference lies in the way the state is conceived. 
In the UK there has always been an explicit recognition of four nations: Scotland, England, 
Wales, and Ireland (prior to 1921 ); as will be shown this is a constitutional, political, and 
cultural recognition. Nationalists in Quebec and Catalunya continue to argue that their 
national minority cultures are indeed nations existing within a multinational state -a state 
that in both cases largely fails to acknowledge this claim. The creation of a devolved 
Scottish Parliament, which is commonly known as Holyrood after its eventual home in 
Edinburgh, reflects the distinct national character of Scotland within the UK as it has come 
to be viewed as a national institution. Although the Scottish Parliament has contributed 
Nations of Distinction 
significantly to differentiating Scotland politically within the UK and giving Scotland greater 
legislative control over its affairs, its powers are seen by nationalists in the Scottish National 
Party as insufficient. These developments must be kept foremost in mind when analysing the 
constitutional position of Scotland within the UK and how Scottish nationalists who favour 
independence respond to it. 
This chapter is structured in a similar way to those devoted to Quebec and 
Catalunya. After examining how the tenn 'nation' is understood in the Scottish context and 
how Scotland's nationhood is explicitly acknowledged within the state, some consideration 
will be given to how the British state should be defined. To what extent the United Kingdom 
is a unitary state as Spain was in the period prior to 1978 or a union state that operates under 
different constitutional and political assumptions will be discussed. The following section 
will examine the current constitutional structure of the British state and Scotland's 
constitutional position within it. When the term 'state' is used here it refers to the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in the same way as it refers to Spain and 
Canada in other chapters. The four documents that will be discussed in this section are the 
Treaty of Union of 1707 between Scotland and England and Wales; the report of the Scottish 
Constitutional Convention of 1995; the Labour government's White Paper Scotland's 
Parliament of 1997; and finally the Scotland Act, 1998. These are some of the most 
significant constitutional documents for Scotland in that they have shaped, and are shaping, 
Scotland's relationship to the rest of the UK. In examining these documents it is possible to 
give a picture of how Scotland's place in the UK has evolved and how the creation of the 
Scottish Parliament in 1999 and the devolution of power from Westminster has initiated a 
process of profound constitutional change. The subsequent section will explore the extent to 
which this constitutional structure is viewed as problematic, and in the case of an evolving 
1 David McCrone, Understanding Scotland: the Sociology of a stateless Nation, rpt. (London: 
Routledge, 1998), p. 214. 
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constitutional process, how it might affect Scotland's position in the UK constitution. 
Pertinent issues related to devolution such as the legislative supremacy of the Westminster 
Parliament, the effect of judicial review, and quasi-federalism and asymmetry will be 
analysed. In the fourth section of the chapter, the nationalist response to devolution and 
Scotland's role within the United Kingdom will be analysed through an examination of party 
documents and the arguments of leading members of the Scottish National Party (SNP). To 
what extent devolution is a sufficient enough response to nationalist demands will be 
examined as will the debate it has provoked within the SNP itself on the goal of 
independence for Scotland in Europe. In addition, the ongoing discussion of a conflict 
between rival concepts of the nation in multinational states will address the Scottish case. 
Running throughout the chapter, as in chapters five and six, will be an analysis of the views 
of political, academic, and other participant-observers that will inform the discussion on the 
various issues addressed in the chapter. 
The Evolving UK Constitution 
The constitution of the United Kingdom is at present going through a period of 
radical change, change that has had an impact on Scotland through the creation of the 
Scottish Parliament but also on the rest of the United Kingdom. The Labour government 
elected in May 1997 has initiated a process of constitutional reform that will alter 
fundamentally the character of the state. From devolution to Scotland, Wales, and Northern 
Ireland to House of Lords reform, elected mayors for many of the larger cities, including 
London, and the entrenchment of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in 
UK law, the reforms are far-reaching. While some would argue that this is the greatest 
period of constitutional reform since, for example, the passage of the Treaty of Union in 
1707 or since the Great Reform Act of 1832, it can be as persuasively argued that this is the 
greatest period of constitutional reform since the Glorious Revolution of 1688. Through the 
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1688 settlement the doctrine of the legislative supremacy of Parliament was confirmed as 
was the Protestant succession to the throne, thus resolving the long-running battle between 
Parliament and the monarch that had culminated in the Civil Wars. No single legal principle 
has had greater effect on the constitution of the United Kingdom than that of Westminster's 
legislative supremacy, or parliamentary sovereignty.2 The nature of this principle will be 
discussed below and it will be further argued that the present era of constitutional reform has 
undermined parliamentary sovereignty as a concept governing the constitution. Devolution 
has also thrown into question the entire nature of the Union settlement of 1707, which 
established the United Kingdom as an incorporating union of the two Parliaments of 
Scotland, and England and Wales. The Treaty of Union of 1707 established the United 
Kingdom as a union state, a constitutional settlement that is often mistakenly linked to the 
idea of a unitary state. 
The UK as a union state 
The United Kingdom's constitution has many unitary elements to it, such as the lack 
of constitutional entrenchment and a strong centralised government that, even after the 
implementation of devolution in 1999, enables Westminster to wield considerable financial 
control over Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. However, the UK is not a unitary state 
in the same sense that France is where all power resides in the central state and there are no 
constituent nations that came together to create the modern French state. Rather, the UK is a 
union state forged through first a dynastic union of Scotland, England and Wales in 1603, 
then through a union of the Scottish and Westminster parliaments in 1707, and finally 
through a union with Ireland in 1800. The union state was from the beginning a 
multinational one: "It [UK] is a union state, whose component nations joined the union at 
2 This understanding of the doctrine of the legislative supremacy of Parliament was first developed by 
A. V. Dicey in his Introduction to the Study of the Law ofthe Constitution, lOth ed. (London: 
Macmillan, 1959) and has been further elaborated upon by numerous constitutional scholars including 
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different times and on different terms. Like other union states, it was asymmetrical in origin, 
and still exhibits asymmetrical features today ... "3 Asymmetrical provisions in the Treaty of 
Union such as guarantees for Scots law, the system of Scottish local government, a separate 
system of education, and the presbyterian organisation of the Church of Scotland provide 
evidence of this. 
Although there is a history of asymmetrical arrangements in the British constitution 
and the state is multinational in reality, this multinational character is sometimes 
misunderstood. In establishing the existence of a union state the frequent use of the term 
"English" to describe the UK constitution is incorrect and ignores the multinational reality of 
the state.
4 
Scotland's position in a multinational UK state has been explicitly recognised in 
various ways, particularly through the role of uniquely Scottish institutions, all of which 
have helped to contribute to an understanding of Scotland as a nation. Brown identifies the 
UK as a multinational state and argues that the present evolution of the constitution resulting 
from devolution is essentially about re-organising the institutional arrangements that hold the 
multinational state together.5 Crick argues that the UK "has to be perceived as a 
multinational state" as a means of recognising Scotland's existence as a nation within a state. 
However, it is Crick's argument that post-war England has been very slow in recognising the 
reality of Scotland's place within the Union.6 The recognition of Scotland's nationhood 
within the Union is the focus for much of the current debate surrounding devolution and the 
SNP's arguments in favour of independence within Europe. 
A.W. Bradley and K.D. Ewing in Constitutional and Administrative Law, 12th ed. (London: Longman, 
1997). 
3 Robert Hazell, "The New Constitutional Settlement," in Constitutional Futures: The History of the 
Next Ten Years (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 231. 
4 A.W. Bradley and K.D. Ewing, Constitutional and Administrative Law, 12'h ed. with appendix 
(London: Longman, 1997), p. 38. 
5 Archie Brown, "Asymmetrical Devolution: The Scottish Case," Political Quarterly, vol. 69, no. 3 
(July-September 1998), p. 216. . . . . . 
6 Interview with Prof. Bemard Crick, Professor Emeritus, Department of Pohttcal Sctence, Umverstty 
of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, 09.07.1999. 
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Scottish Nationhood 
The question of nationhood and the theoretical problems behind defining a nation 
have already been discussed in chapter one, but it does serve to mention briefly the basis of 
Scotland's claim. While many commentators on the Scottish nation have looked at its socio-
economic condition, its political culture, and its various cultural, religious, and social 
identities, the concern here is with how this national identity is understood in constitutional 
terms.
7 
In the constitutional context, the existence of Scotland as a nation in the United 
Kingdom rests largely on the recognition given to certain legal, religious, social, and 
political institutions. The presence of uniquely Scottish institutions mentioned above has 
contributed to the creation of a distinctive Scottish civil society. Paterson has traced the 
development of Scottish civil society back to before 1707 when powerful institutions such as 
Scots law, the education system, and especially the Kirk encouraged greater autonomy 
against the backdrop of a weak central state.8 From 1707 onwards, Scottish civil society's 
unique nature was acknowledged within the union state, thus allowing it to maintain a high 
level of autonomy.9 Since 1707, this autonomy has been further enhanced by emerging 
differences in social and cultural attitudes, all of which have contributed to distinguishing 
Scotland from England within the Union. However, as McCrone has argued, Scotland 
shares many similarities with England in these areas. This common heritage has served to 
highlight some of the social and cultural links that have developed since 1707 and further 
contributed to the union state: 
7 
There are a number of worthwhile sources that examine these various perspectives of the Scottish 
nation and its distinctiveness within the United Kingdom including Calum Brown, Religion and 
Society in Scotland since 1707; Christopher Harvie, No Gods and Precious Few Heroes; T.C. Smout, 
A Century of the Scottish People, 1830-1950; William Storrar, Scottish Identity; and David McCrone 
et al., The Making of Scotland: Nation, Culture and Social Change. 
8 Lindsay Paterson and Richard Wyn Jones, "Does Civil Society Drive Constitutional Change?," in 
Scotland and Wales: Nations Again?, eds. Bridget Taylor and Katarina Thomson (Cardiff: University 
of Wales Press, 1999), pp. 176. Paterson develops this argument further in The Autonomy of Modem 
Scotland (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1994). 
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Indeed, in its industrial and occupational structures, and its concomitant patterns of 
social mobility, Scotland has far more similarities with than differences from its 
southern neighbour. Nevertheless, in its cultural behaviour, Scotland has become 
more not less distinctive in the late twentieth century. Indeed, it is possible to talk of 
Scotland's distinctive 'civil society' in which social and political values at virtually 
all levels of that society are different. 10 
Neverthless, it is in focussing on how the United Kingdom's constitutional structure has 
incorporated Scotland's distinctive civil society that we can get a clearer indication of what 
the impact of devolution as a constitutional reform process will be. It can be argued that 
devolution will fundamentally alter the position of Scotland within the United Kingdom 
much in the same way that granting autonomy to Catalunya has transformed its position in 
Spain since 1978. The devolution process is one that further confirms the distinctiveness of 
the Scottish nation within the UK by promoting greater asymmetry within the constitution. 
Parliamentary Sovereignty 
A key principle of British constitutional law and one that has led to a centralisation 
of power at Westminster is the doctrine of the legislative supremacy of Parliament, or as the 
nineteenth-century constitutional scholar A.V. Dicey termed it, "parliamentary sovereignty." 
This doctrine lies at the core of the unwritten constitution and has played a dominant role in 
the construction of the British state, yet it is a ·doctrine that is being gradually undermined by 
devolution and greater incorporation into the European Union (EU) which bring with it the 
application of European Commission (EC) law. Indeed, the impact of multi-level 
governance, the EU, Westminster, and the Scottish Parliament at Holyrood on traditional 
understandings of governance is significant. In order to understand better the uniqueness of 
the British constitution from either the Canadian or the Spanish, it is essential to understand 
how the concept of pari iamentary sovereignty has shaped the state. 
9 Alice Brown et al. Politics and Society in Scotland, 2"d ed. (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1998), p. 
39. 
10 McCrone, Understanding Scotland: the Sociology of a stateless Nation, pp. 197-98. 
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Parliament at Westminster is sovereign in that there are no legal limits, including any 
review of legislation by the courts, which can be applied to Parliament's exercising its 
powers of legislation. When the term Parliament is used it refers to the House of Commons, 
the House of Lords, and the monarch who act together to legislate for the United Kingdom: 
the Queen in Parliament.
11 
Any law or statute passed by Parliament is supreme and thus the 
highest form of law within the British constitution. 12 The principle of the legislative 
supremacy of Parliament was enshrined in English constitutional practice by the settlement 
brought about by the Glorious Revolution of 1688 at which time the Bill of Rights and the 
Act of Settlement established the legislative authority of Parliament over the person of the 
sovereign. These two documents are central in the establishment of Britain's constitutional 
framework, legal system and in the gradual evolution of its system of democracy. 
The 'unwritten' British constitution based upon the common law comprises statutes 
and convention with the rule of law being of paramount importance. Statute law being the 
highest form of law has, in effect, meant that there is no way in which an Act of Parliament 
can be challenged except by Parliament itself when it seeks to repeal or amend statute law. 
British courts have adopted this orthodox view of parliamentary sovereignty and have never 
taken a position that an Act of Parliament or a provision of an act was illegal; such a position 
would be a violation of this doctrine. Dicey helped to establish what has become known as 
the continuing theory of parliamentary sovereignty, which holds that no Parliament can bind 
its successors. In other words, no Parliament can legislate in a way so as to prohibit a 
successive Parliament from amending or repealing existing legislation. 13 This Diceyan 
principle is an important one, particularly in the way it relates to the position of Acts of 
Parliament such as the Treaty of Union of 1707 and the Scotland Act, 1998. Since 
Parliament is sovereign and sovereignty does not rest with the people, in the orthodox 
11 Bradley and Ewing, p. 58. 
12 Ian Loveland, Constitutional Law: A Critical Introduction (London: Butterworths, 1996), p. 29. 
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Diceyan view, nor is it shared between legislatures in a federal state such as Canada 
' 
Parliament can repeal or amend any act or provision of an act. Thus, Westminster could in 
theory repeal entirely or in part, or amend in part the Scotland Act, 1998 without the consent 
of the Scottish Parliament, although this could have political consequences as will be 
discussed below. Indeed, Westminster has amended and repealed sections of the Treaty of 
Union that many Scots have argued over the last three centuries constitutes fundamental law. 
Fundamental law refers to law that is so essential to the constitution that it could not be 
altered in any way; it is immutable. 14 The Diceyan interpretation of the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty holds that there is no fundamental law vis-a-vis the British 
constitution. This doctrine has had a profound effect on Scotland's position within the 
Union, a position first established in the Treaty of Union and now reconfigured through the 
process of devolution since 1999. The impact of devolution on parliamentary sovereignty 
and vice versa will be examined below. 
The Diceyan doctrine on parliamentary sovereignty has remained the dominant 
interpretation of Westminster's power to legislate and on the primacy of statute law within 
the UK constitution. However, some contemporary commentators have argued that Dicey's 
understanding of Parliament's central place within the constitution should be viewed with a 
certain degree of historical perspective. The Scottish constitutional scholar, J .D.B. Mitchell, 
argues that there exists a "difficulty of proof' with the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty 
in that there are not many cases in which the question of Parliament's sovereignty could be 
raised. Mitchell goes on to caution that such cases as do exist should be interpreted with a 
full understanding that they may be "inappropriate today, since, inevitably, they reflect the 
then current political facts. 15 In a similar vein, Munro argues that the role of politics and its 
impact on the Diceyan conception of parliamentary sovereignty must be considered. While 
13 Ibid., p. 46. 
14 Ibid., p. 28. 
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not directly refuting the Diceyan argument, Munro argues that it was possibly influenced by 
Dicey's politics and furthermore by the politics of the late-nineteenth century. Furthermore, 
Munro emphasises in his argument that the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty "denotes 
only the absence of legal limitations, not the absence of all limitations or, a more appropriate 
word, inhibitions on Parliament's actions." 16 This discussion raises the question of whether 
political considerations do in fact limit, or inhibit, Westminster from legislating purely as it 
sees fit. As will be discussed further on, this question is of considerable importance when 
considering the impact of the Scotland Act, 1998 on Westminster's sovereignty. 
Before examining the nature and impact of devolution on Scotland and the UK 
constitution it is essential to look at the Union settlement of 1707 and how it shaped the 
United Kingdom. The Treaty of Union of 1707 created a customs union and established a 
common Parliament at Westminster. More importantly for this analysis, the Treaty of Union 
guaranteed the continuing existence of Scottish civil society. From a comparative 
perspective many similarities can be found between the guarantees provided for Scottish 
institutions in the Treaty of Union, with the protection given by the British, to the distinctive 
institutions of New France in the Quebec Act, 1774, the settlement which followed the 
conquest of Quebec by the British in 1759-60. 
The Treaty of Union as a Constitutional Document 
In 1707, the Treaty of Union established the Protestant succession to the throne 
(Article 11) and established a single Parliament for the United Kingdom (Articles Ill and 
XXII) at Westminster and, as most commentators have accepted, was the incorporation of 
Scottish MP's and peers into the pre-existing English parliament. The bulk of the treaty 
deals with trade liberalisation, customs duties, and tax harmonisation throughout the UK 
(Articles IV- XVIII) thus fully incorporating the Scots into the English network of imperial 
15 J.D.B. Mitchell, Constitutional Law (Edinburgh: W. Green & Son Ltd., 1964), p. 49. 
16 Colin R. Munro, Studies in Constitutional Law, 2"d ed. (Edinburgh: Butterworths, 1999), p. 135. 
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trade. As discussed in chapter four, all of this was a welcome development since it enabled 
the Scots to take advantage of imperial markets; something Scottish merchants were thankful 
for after the collapse of the ill-fated Darien scheme. As has been mentioned before, in the 
treaty recognition and protection was given to the system of Scots law, the Church of 
Scotland, local government, and the Scottish universities as established. It is a valid 
argument to state that these provisions recognised the distinctiveness of Scottish legal, 
religious, educational, and governmental institutions and confirmed Scotland's existence as a 
nation within the UK. By way of example, articles XIX and XXI of the Treaty of Union 
gave protection to the Court of Session and other law courts and to the Convention of Royal 
Burghs. 17 Whether these provisions were indeed to remain in effect for all time coming is 
another issue, one that relates directly to the constitutional doctrine of legislative supremacy. 
The subsequent Act for Securing the Protestant Religion and Presbyterian Church 
Government confirmed the presbyterian Church of Scotland as the established church in 
Scotland, a church that was distinct in both its government and its doctrine from the 
episcopalian Church of England. 18 In each one of these cases recognition is given to the 
distinctive nature of Scottish civil society. Yet, these were guarantees and not entrenched 
rights since it remained within the power of the newly constituted Westminster Parliament to 
repeal or amend any of these articles. It is debatable as to whether what was in fact created 
was an entirely new Parliament based upon new theoretical and practical approaches to 
legislating for the newly formed United Kingdom or an institution firmly anchored in the 
theoretical approaches of the old English Parliament. 
Without question the new Union Parliament at Westminster maintained the English 
tradition of parliamentary sovereignty. It rejected what was seen to be the Scottish tradition 
of popular sovereignty that had its basis in the principle of limited monarchy and in 
17 George S. Pry de, ed., The Treaty of Union of Scotland and England 1707 (Edinburgh: Thomas 
Nelson and Sons Ltd, 1950), pp. 96-98. 
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declarations of popular sovereignty such as the Declaration of Arbroath of 1320 and Claim 
of Right of 1690.
19 
Indeed, the pre-Union Scottish Parliament never saw itself as a sovereign 
body.
20 
Dicey and Rait argued that the Scottish Parliament prior to 1707 had never been able 
to establish its sovereignty due to the diversity of forces and institutions that exercised 
various forms of sovereignty: 
It is certain that neither the judicial nor the legislative power of the King could 
before, say, 1745 be always effectively exercised among the Highland clansmen. 
This weakness of the Crown obtained a certain kind of recognition from the 
existence of hereditary jurisdictions held by landowners, nobles, and chiefs, which to 
a considerable extent competed with the jurisdiction of the King's Court. Hence, 
from historical circumstances, the Parliament of Scotland never had, or felt that it 
had, the omnipotence of the English Parliament. Indeed, the Scottish Parliament 
almost at all times acknowledged some power which restrained or competed with 
parliamentary authority. Up to 1690, except in revolutionary periods, the competitor 
was the King acting through the Lords of Articles. After 1560, during the 
revolutionary period from 1638 to 1651, and even between 1690 and 1707, the 
competitor was the established Church of Scotland?1 
So the concept of the legislative supremacy of Parliament in Scotland did not develop due to 
the inherent weakness of the Parliament vis-a-vis the King, magnates, and in particular the 
Kirk whose General Assembly was widely regarded as a surrogate parliamentary body for 
Scotland. This lack of the tradition of legislative supremacy led to English statesmen 
making an assumption that the new Westminster Parliament would maintain "the same 
theoretical and practical authority that the English Parliament already possessed."
22 
What 
emerged out of the Union in 1707, which was in theory a union of equals, was a Parliament 
that was essentially a continuation of the English Parliament. In this context the Union was 
in MacCormick's view a consolidation of Parliament's position established in 1688 by the 
Glorious Revolution: "it extended the authority of parliament geographically and enhanced 
18 Ibid., pp. 105-06. 
19 Neil MacCormick, "The English Constitution, the British state, and the Scottish Anomaly," The 
British Academy Lecture, 1997, pp. 11-12. 
20 Albert V. Dicey and Robert S. Rait, Thoughts on the Union between England & Scotland (London: 
Macmillan and Co., Limited, 1920), p. 20. 
21 Ibid., pp. 21-22. 
22 Ibid., p. 243. 
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its membership in a matching way. But there was no disturbance of the prevalent balance of 
parliamentary forces, and no new constitutional doctrine, no development of popular or other 
powers attributable to it."
23 
While the Treaty of Union did bring Scotland into a 
parliamentary union with England it ultimately meant that Scotland would have to acquiesce 
to the English parliamentary tradition inasmuch as it had existed prior to 1707. This 
acceptance by Scotland of parliamentary sovereignty as the core principle of the constitution 
was only held up to judicial scrutiny .once in 1953 in the obiter dicta of Lord Cooper in 
MacCormick-v. Lord Advocate. Lord Cooper questioned why it should have been expected 
that the new Union Parliament should embrace all the constitutional principles of the English 
Parliament but none of the Scottish.24 Others, in particular Himsworth and Munro, have 
played down the inclination to contrast Scotland's historical tie to the notion of popular 
sovereignty with the English principle of parliamentary sovereignty and the implication that 
these are mutually exclusive concepts. They argue that here exists a specific interpretation 
of political history that ignores the need for English kings to maintain political support. 
Further, Magna Carta is cited as the point at which the English monarch was subordinated to 
the law.25 The embracing of the Union Parliament of the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty has had a significant impact on the Union and continues to be an important 
consideration today, particularly as it is applied to devolution. As will be shown, devolution 
and parliamentary sovereignty are two concepts that will ultimately be difficult to reconcile 
in the present constitutional era: 
Through the application of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty the idea that the 
Treaty of Union constitutes fundamental law has been rejected.26 The Union legislation is 
23 MacCormick, "The English Constitution, the British State, and the Scottish Anomaly", p. 15. 
24 Bradley and Ewing, p. 81. 
25 C.M.G. Himsworth and C.R. Munro, Devolution and the Scotland Bill (Edinburgh: W. Green and 
Son Limited, 1998), p. 25. 
26 Colin R. Munro, "The Union of 1707 and the British Constitution," in Scotland and the Union, 
Hume Papers on Public Policy, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Edinburgh: David Hume Institute, 1994), p. 90. 
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actually two acts of Parliament, first passed by the Scottish Parliament and subsequently by 
the English. Although there is language in the treaty, as seen above, that sought to bind 
future Parliaments regarding certain provisions such as those referring to heritable 
jurisdictions and local government, Dicey's continuing theory of parliamentary sovereignty 
has held that the treaty is an Act of Parliament like any other and can be amended or 
repealed. A precedent for this was the Union with Ireland Act, 1800 which maintained that 
the provisions contained within it which united Ireland with the rest of the UK were to "be in 
force and have effect for ever", yet this union was largely dissolved in 1922.27 Numerous 
articles in the Treaty of Union have been repealed or amended by Parliament, including 
Articles XX and XXI, which granted protection to heritable jurisdictions and the system of 
local government under the Convention of Royal Burghs. Heritable jurisdictions were 
abolished following the 1745 Jacobite rebellion and the Royal Burghs lost their position in 
the 1970s?8 Munro goes on to point out that there has never been a case in which an Act of 
Parliament was deemed illegal or made invalid due to its being contrary to the Treaty of 
Union.29 In terms of the Treaty of Union, then, Scotland's distinct position within the UK has 
been subject to the legislative actions, arbitrary or otherwise, of Westminster. The doctrine 
of parliamentary sovereignty upon which the British constitution has rested for over three 
hundred years has shaped the nature of the union state. However, the current process of 
devolution is proving a significant challenge. 
The Background to the Scotland Act, 1998 
As was discussed in chapter four, devolution of power to Scotland from Westminster 
was frustrated in 1979 with the failure of the then Labour Government's referendum on the 
Scotland Act, 1978. The subsequent period of Conservative government from 1979 to 1997 
was one of profound centralisation motivated by the statist, nee-liberal ideology of 
27 Ibid., p. 92. 
28 Ibid. 
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Thatcherism. It was during this period, as has been shown, that there was a mobilisation in 
Scottish civil society that brought about even greater demand for some form of constitutional 
change. Scottish civil society sought a change that would recognise Scotland's position as a 
distinct nation within the UK and eliminate the perceived 'democratic deficit' brought about 
by the nature of Scottish electoral politics. It was argued that the 'democratic deficit' 
resulted from a situation in which legislation and polices were imposed on Scots by a 
Conservative government which enjoyed only minority electoral support in Scotland.30 The 
work of the Scottish Constitutional Convention from 1989 to 1995 established a framework 
for devolution to Scotland which was adopted almost in its entirety by the Labour 
Government in its 1997 White Paper on Scottish devolution, Scotland's Parliament. The 
starting point for the convention was an explicit declaration of Scottish popular sovereignty 
in the 1989 Claim of Right, and thus an implicit rejection of the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty as applied to Scotland: 
We, gathered as the Scottish Constitutional Convention, do hereby acknowledge the 
sovereign right of the Scottish people to determine the form of Government best 
suited to their needs, and do hereby pledge that in all our actions and deliberations 
their interests shall be paramount. 31 
The convention's final report Scotland's Parliament. Scotland's Right. called for the 
establishment of a Scottish Parliament with the power to legislate on a wide range of 
devolved issues and with the power to vary the basic rate of income tax by a maximum of 3p 
on the pound. The report also called for the implementation of a system of proportional 
representation for elections to the Parliament: the additional member system. It was planned 
that this system would also incorporate a gender balance improving upon what was viewed 
as the gender imbalance at Westminster. This gender balance was achieved by the Labour 
29 Ibid., p. 95. 
30 A lice Brown, "Deepening Democracy: Women and the Scottish Parliament," in Remaking the 
Union: Devolution and British Politics in the 1990s, eds. Howard Elcock and Michael Keating 
(London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1998), p. I 06. 
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Party in the 1999 elections to the Scottish Parliament in which exactly half of their MSPs 
(Members of Scottish Parliament) elected were women. The SNP came close to approaching 
parity of representation between men and women with 43%, whereas the Liberal Democrats 
and Conservatives did not.
32 
While those who were behind the Claim of Right and the 
convention were a conservative, largely male group with a distinctly Protestant outlook, they 
did in effect represent many of the institutions of civil society in Scotland.33 In adopting an 
approach that encouraged Scotland's exercising popular sovereignty, the convention 
introduced proposals that would amount to a radical re-orienting of the constitutional 
framework of the state. 
The radical nature of the SCC's report and the impetus it gave to devolution has 
been repeatedly emphasised by Kenyan Wright, one of the convention's two eo-chairs. 
Wright argues that the coming together of civil society in the SCC achieved what no political 
party could have: it reached a consensus on the form and nature of devolution and a blueprint 
for a devolved Scottish Pari iament: 
That document was a historical and theological argument for a fundamental 
understanding of power and it was really because of that that the convention did not 
begin with its political aims, they were there, but they were clearly from the 
beginning set in the context of the initial statement of the Claim of Right, which was 
that the people had the sovereign right to determine how they would be governed, 
and that came directly out of Scottish civil society. No political party would have 
produced that for obvious reasons, and indeed it was one of the astonishing moments 
in my life when all of those politicians lined up to sign that. I still think many of 
them to this day don't know what they were signing. Certainly they don't realise the 
implications of what they were signing which was a view of power that directly 
challenges and contradicts the sovereignty of the Crown in Parliament. I don't think 
they quite saw that, but it was a watershed from which there was no retreat. There 
was no way back. We crossed the Rubicon that day.34 
31 Scottish Constitutional Convention, "Scotland's Parliament. Scotland's Right," (Edinburgh: 
Scottish Constitutional Convention, 1995), p. I 0. 
32 William L. Miller, "Modified Rapture All Round: The First Elections to the Scottish Parliament," 
Government and Opposition, vol. 34, no. 3 (Summer 1999), p. 308. 
33 Brown et al., p. 66. 
34 Interview with Rev. Kenyon Wright, Former Chair of the Executive Committee, The Scottish 
Constitutional Convention, Perth, 05.07.1999. 
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A clergyman in the Scottish Episcopal Church, Wright demonstrates a profound belief in the 
power of civil society to bring about political change. Clearly, the convention achieved 
something quite considerable, as Wright argues, in bringing together civil society to act as a 
force for constitutional change. What is notable about his comments is his particular view of 
sovereignty; it is a contested idea. Wright understands the SCC's project to be an exercise in 
popular sovereignty in which the determined will of the Scottish people to choose how they 
would be governed was voiced. Civil society in this instance was representative of the 
Scottish people. Wright argues that the actions of the convention and the arguments made in 
its report challenged the principle of parliamentary sovereignty and opined that Scottish 
popular sovereignty should be paramount. Although the Scotland Act, 1998 reasserted the 
sovereignty of the Westminster Parliament the act was made subject to a referendum, an 
exercise in popular sovereignty that gave the Scottish Parliament even greater legitimacy. It 
can and will be argued that popular sovereignty has played a role in devolution and that as a 
result the continued adherence to the constitutional doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty vis 
a vis the Scottish Parliament is highly problematic. 
The White Paper "Scotland's Parliament" 
The government's White Paper of 1997 that paved the way for the Scotland Act, 
1998 met Labour's manifesto commitment to devolution for Scotland through the 
establishment of a Parliament. In his preface to the White Paper, Tony Blair set out the goals 
of the Labour government in terms of constitutional reform: devolution to Scotland and 
Wales; an elected mayor for London and "more accountability in the regions of England"; 
the incorporation of the ECHR into UK law; a freedom of information act; and a referendum 
on electoral reform. All of this was to be accomplished with the wider aims of modernising 
British politics, decentralising power, and creating more open government.
35 
Furthermore, 
the position of Scotland as a nation was affirmed, with a clear emphasis being placed on its 
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continued presence within the UK: "Scotland is a proud historic nation in the United 
Kingdom and the plans that we put forward in this White Paper will give it an exciting new 
role within the United Kingdom."36 Again, Scotland was referred to explicitly as a nation and 
in a document published by the government at Westminster. Such an explicit reference to 
the existence of a minority nation is unlikely to be made by either the Canadian government 
in reference to Quebec or by the Spanish government in reference to Catalunya. In the 
British case the use of the term nation with regards to Scotland is not a loaded term that is 
employed by the SNP, nor does use of it somehow lead directly to the advancement of a 
nationalist or separatist agenda. The government's White Paper views the creation of a 
Scottish Parliament as the creation of a national institution. 
The White Paper went on to outline the structure of the Parliament, of the Scottish 
Executive made up of ministers and headed by the First Minister, the electoral system, the 
various areas of jurisdiction reserved to Westminster and those devolved to the Parliament, 
and the tax-varying power of the Parliament. In outlining the government's plans for 
Scottish devolution the White Paper embraced the vast majority of the Scottish 
Constitutional Convention's recommendations and endorsed its approach, yet the 
government did not fully embrace the convention's belief in popular sovereignty. The 
proposals were subject to a referendum among the Scottish electorate. This injected an 
element of popular sovereignty and legitimised the devolution process through an expression 
of popular will. However, it can be argued that the Labour government in the White Paper 
did not embrace fully popular sovereignty but held to the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty. In paragraph 4.2 the government made the following assertion: 
Under the Government's proposals, the UK Parliament will devolve wide-ranging 
legislative powers to the Scottish Parliament. Scotland will of course remain an 
integral part of the United Kingdom. The Queen will continue to be Head of state of 
the United Kingdom. The UK Parliament is and will remain sovereign in all 
35 The Scottish Office, "Scotland's Parliament," (Edinburgh: HMSO, 1997), p. v. 
36 Ibid. 
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matters: but as part of the Government's resolve to modernise the British 
constitution Westminster will be choosing to exercise that sovereignty by devolving 
legislative responsibilities to a Scottish Parliament without in any way diminishing 
its own powers [my emphasis]. The Government recognise that no UK Parliament 
can bind its successors. The Government however believe that the popular support 
for the Scottish Parliament, once established, will make sure that its future in the UK 
constitution will be secure.37 
The aim of the government is to preserve the integrity of the Union while at the same time 
responding to Scottish demands for a greater say in their own affairs through greater 
representation at the level of Scottish institutions. The creation of the Parliament also 
completed the process of administrative devolution, which had begun in the late nineteenth 
century with the establishment of the Scottish Office, by giving Scotland legislative and 
executive control over previously devolved fields. Yet, the Scottish Parliament is not legally 
sovereign in devolved areas and thus does not exercise complete control in devolved matters, 
a constitutional situation that the SNP views as entirely inadequate. As has been argued 
above, the Scottish Parliament can be understood to be politically sovereign in that it is 
unlikely that Westminster will interfere in the business of the Parliament due to its existence 
being legitimised through an expression of the popular will. In examining more closely the 
Scotland Act itself, the degree to which the balance of power in the UK has shifted can be 
analysed as well as the potential impact of devolution will be on the United Kingdom's 
constitutional framework. 
The Scotland Act, 1998 
The Scotland Act, 1998, is composed of 132 sections in six parts and 9 schedules. 
The sections of the Act are, in order: The Scottish Parliament, the Scottish Administration, 
Financial Provisions, the Tax-Varying Power, Miscellaneous and General, and a 
Supplementary part. The analysis undertaken here will concern itself largely with provisions 
contained in Part I and Schedules 4 to 6 insofar as they relate in particular to the balance of 
power within the UK, sovereignty, and specific judicial reforms brought about by 
37 Ibid., p. 12. 
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devolution. A broader discussion of the electoral system, the roles of ministers, the tax-
varying power, fiscal arrangements, and general administrative questions is beyond the scope 
of this chapter.
38 
However, it is worth noting that the proportional representation electoral 
system employed by the Scottish Parliament is a wholly novel arrangement within the UK, 
one that goes a long way in principle towards achieving greater representation of the range of 
political support. The tax-varying power is also a significant change in its granting of 
limited control over revenue-raising to the Parliament in Edinburgh. 
Section 1: Establishing the Parliament 
The expressed aim of the Scotland Act, 1998 is stated in Section 1 ( 1 ): "There shall 
be a Scottish Parliament."39 With this simple statement of intent the nature of the relationship 
of Scotland within the state is changed. Part II of the Act establishes the Scottish Executive 
headed by the First Minister who is appointed by the Queen upon the nomination of the 
Parliament. The model is one of responsible government based on the conventions of 
Westminster.40 In establishing the Scottish Parliament, Westminster has not only devolved 
legislative and executive power to Holyrood but has in fact divided power creating another 
centre of power in the Scottish Parliament.41 Along with Hazell, Bogdanor argues that the 
creation of the Scottish Parliament establishes a new political relationship between Holyrood 
and Westminster, quite different from the legal one. Again, the position of the Scottish 
Parliament as a national institution representing the Scottish people challenges 
Westminster's sovereign power: 
Constitutionally, then, the Scottish Parliament will be subordinate. Politically, 
however, unlike other statutory bodies such as local authorities or public 
38 For further reading regarding these aspects of devolution to Scotland see Alice Brown et al., The 
Scottish Electorate; P. Dunleavy et al. Devolution Votes- PR Elections in Scotland and Wales; 
articles in the special issue of Scottish Affairs, Understanding Constitutional Change; further entries in 
Robert Hazell, ed. Constitutional Futures. 
39 Scotland Act. 1998, s. 1 ( 1 ). 
4° C.M.G. Himsworth and C.R. Munro, The Scotland Act 1998 (Edinburgh: W. Green & Son Limited, 
1999), p. 60. 
41 Hazell, "The New Constitutional Settlement," p. 234. 
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corporations, it will be anything but subordinate. For the Scotland Act creates a new 
locus of political power. The most important power of the Scottish Parliament will 
be one not mentioned in the Act at all: that of representing the people of Scotland.42 
As will be argued here, the establishment of the Parliament as a new centre of power and the 
process of devolution in general will introduce many quasi-federal elements into the UK 
constitution. It will also create a complex asymmetrical relationship within the UK and will 
fundamentally undermine parliamentary sovereignty. 
Sections 28-30: The Legislative Power 
Sections 28 to 30 of the Scotland Act, 1998 cover the Parliament's power to legislate 
and define the Parliament's legislative competence. In s.28 the power of the Parliament to 
make law is established, subject to the provisions of s.29 which sets out that Acts of the 
Scottish Parliament may only be passed within areas of its competence. The path of 
legislation through the Parliament from bill to Royal Assent is outlined here and conforms to 
the norms of parliamentary practice.43 S. 29 outlines those cases in which a provision of an 
Act of the Scottish Parliament lies outwith its legislative competence. This section along 
with s.30 and Schedules 4 and 5 delineates the statutory limits imposed on the Parliament.44 
As s.29(2) states, the Parliament's legislative competence is limited under the following 
circumstances: 
29(2) A provision is outside that competence so far as any of the following 
paragraphs apply-
( a) it would form part of the law of a country or territory other than 
Scotland, or confer or remove functions exercisable otherwise than in or 
as regards Scotland, 
(b) it relates to reserved matters, 
(c) it is in breach of the restrictions in Schedule 4, 
(d) it is incompatible with any of the Convention rights or with Community 
law, 
42 Vernon Bogdanor, "Devolution: Decentralisation or Disintegration?," Political Quarterly, vol. 70, 
no. 2 (April-June 1999), p. 185. 
43 Scotland Act, 1998, s. 28(2)- 28(4). 
44 Himsworth and Munro, The Scotland Act 1998, p. 37. 
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(e) it would remove the Lord Advocate from his position as head of the 
systems of criminal prosecution and investigation of deaths in 
Scotland.45 
The following section puts into effect Schedule 5 which lists the powers reserved to 
Westminster. 
Schedule 5: The Reserved Powers 
Unlike the previous attempt at devolution in the Scotland Act, 1978 where the 
powers devolved to the assembly were enumerated in the Act, the powers reserved to 
Westminster are expressly stated and anything lying outwith these powers is thereby 
considered to be devolved to the Parliament. Schedule 5 establishes those matters outside 
the competence of the Scottish Parliament and thus reserved to Westminster; it is divided 
into three parts of which the first two are the most significant (see Appendix C). The first 
part contains general reservations: the constitution (including the Crown, Parliament, the 
Union, and the Scottish Courts), political parties, foreign affairs, the public service, defence, 
and treason.46 Part 11 establishes the specific reservations and categorises them into twelve 
heads: financial and economic matters, home affairs, trade and industry, energy, transport, 
social security, regulation of the professions, employment, health and medicines, media and 
culture, and miscellaneous reservations.47 The reserved powers given in Part 11 distinguish 
what are in fact exceptions to those matters devolved in broader terms to the Scottish 
Parliament. The devolved, or non-reserved matters implicit in the Scotland Act were 
highlighted in the government 1997 White Paper as essentially being those areas of 
jurisdiction already devolved administratively to the Scottish Office including: health, local 
government, school education, housing, inward investment, agriculture, and the legal 
system.48 
45 Scotland Act, 1998, s. 29(2). 
46 Ibid., sch. 5. 
47 1bid. 
48 The Scottish Office, "Scotland's Parliament," pp. 3-6. 
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Section 28(7): Establishing the Sovereignty of Westminster 
Along with the definition reserved powers the most significant provision in sections 
28-30 of the Act is in s.28(7), which affirms the full competence of Westminster to legislate 
in matters affecting Scotland, thus upholding the doctrine of the Parliament's sovereignty. 
This section originated in the 1997 White Paper's proposals: "This section does not affect 
the power of the Parliament of the United Kingdom to make laws for Scotland.',49 The 
implication is that Westminster will continue to legislate in matters reserved to it, but may 
also if it so chooses legislate in any of the matters specified in Schedule 5 of the Act as being 
devolved to the Parliament. The insertion of this subsection into the Scotland Act is 
significant, particularly in terms of the comparison being made here. Devolution is not 
federalism. Although the process of devolution incorporates many quasi-federal 
characteristics such as a division of powers and limited judicial review into the UK 
constitution, it does not put Scotland, or Wales for that matter, into a federal relationship 
with Westminster. Federalism cannot exist where none of the devolved bodies exercise 
sovereignty in the matters devolved to them. Constitutionally and therefore legally 
sovereignty continues to reside at the centre, at Westminster. 
As noted by Himsworth and Munro, s.28(7) gives statutory expression to the 
orthodox principle of parliamentary sovereignty.50 The government has already established 
the desire to have a convention emerge where Westminster would not legislate in areas 
devolved to the Scottish Parliament without the consent of the Parliament in Edinburgh. 5
1 
However, an important question is raised by Westminster's insistence on the preservation of 
this doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, a doctrine that is already being eroded by the loss 
49 Ibid., s. 28(7). 
50 Himsworth and Munro, The Scotland Act 1998, p. 36. 
51 Ibid. 
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of power to EU institutions. 5
2 
It will be very difficult for Westminster to legislate in 
devolved areas when the Scottish Parliament is understood to be representative, of, and to 
have been achieved largely through popular sovereignty. The Parliament's power and 
indeed its existence as a national institution within Scotland was legitimised by the 
devolution referendum of 1997 when 74o/o of the population voted in favour of the 
government's White Paper proposals for the establishment of a parliament and 63o/o for one 
with tax-varying powers. 
The role of s.28(7) is important in another respect as regards the Scotland Act as a 
whole. Under an orthodox, Diceyan interpretation of the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty Westminster has the power to amend any section of the Act or repeal it entirely 
without the consent of Edinburgh. Again, this is not likely since Westminster is constrained 
by political realities. The popular endorsement of the Scotland Act which gave it and the 
parliament it created tremendous legitimacy raises the question of whether the Act can be 
treated as fundamental law, and thus beyond the scope of Westminster to amend or repeal at 
will. Many commentators have argued that due to the way in which Holyrood was created 
the Scotland Act, 1998 is essentially unalterable without the consent of the Scottish 
Parliament. Bogdanor argues that the Scotland Act, 1998 could come to constitute 
fundamental law in that it would be impossible in practice for Westminster to alter it in the 
same way as other legislation. 53 Himsworth in an interview has made a similar argument 
that the Scotland Act is unique, although not fundamental law. 
A professor of public law at the University of Edinburgh, Himsworth embraces the 
principle of parliamentary sovereignty: 
I think that beyond that when you come to devolution, then I suppose I am one of 
those who would say in a strict sense, and I think it remains important to attach 
significance to this, in a strict sense because we are talking about devolution rather 
52 Robert Hazell, "Westminster: Squeezed from Above and Below," in Constitutional Futures: A 
History ofthe Next Ten Years, p. Ill. 
53 Bogdanor, "Devolution: Decentralisation or Disintegration?," pp. 187-88. 
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than a federal structure, because it is done at the hand of the Westminster Parliament 
on the whole we can continue to expect courts whether in Scotland or other parts of 
the United Kingdom to continue to pay respect to acts of Parliament even acts of 
Parliament which run counter to the terms and spirit of the Scotland Act. As long as 
we can expect that, then we can say in that respect that devolution has not dented the 
strict theory of the legislative supremacy of Parliament. 54 
Himsworth argues that legally speaking the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty remains 
intact. However, as has been argued, parliamentary sovereignty is subject to political 
considerations. While Scottish and UK courts will continue to respect acts of the 
Westminster Parliament this does not necessarily preclude an understanding of the Scotland 
Act as being in essence unalterable. Himsworth is in agreement with this position and 
argues that any sort of approval required of the Scottish Parliament for an amendment of the 
Act will in fact represent a limit on Westminster's sovereignty: 
I think I can be reasonably sure, that as a political fact, that the spirit of the Scotland 
Act is substantially unamendable, obviously in detail it will be. I am quite sure it 
' 
has already been amended by consent. One can't say it cannot be amended, it can be 
amended even by order, not even with an act of Parliament. But, obviously there 
will be some assumption under the conditions which we can reasonably call safe that 
a degree of consent at this end of the deal, the Scotland end of the deal, would be 
expected to be forthcoming and that obviously operates as some sort of restriction on 
the legislative freedom ofWestminster.55 
Himsworth qualifies his argument by addressing the political aspect of the Scotland Act, that 
its role in establishing the Scottish Parliament and devolving power from Westminster to 
Holyrood cannot be undermined through substantial amendment without the approval of the 
Scottish Parliament. Himsworth is referring here to the legitimacy the Scotland Act enjoys 
which, as argued by Bogdanor, is unlike other acts of the Westminster Parliament. Thus, as 
a result of the unique nature of the Scotland Act there is a check placed on Westminster's 
power to substantially amend any act of Parliament as it sees fit. The establishment of a 
popularly elected legislature in Edinburgh and a popularly approved scheme of devolution 
has dealt a considerable blow to the orthodox understanding of parliamentary sovereignty. 
54 Interview with Prof. Chris Himsworth, Department of Public Law, University of Edinburgh, 
Edinburgh, 26.06.1999. 
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As one of the drafters of the Scotland Act, 1998 Kenneth MacKenzie argues that the 
establishment of the Scottish Parliament has further undermined parliamentary sovereignty. 
It is his view that the demise of parliamentary sovereignty as the guiding force in the UK 
constitution is long and drawn out and began before devolution with the impact of the EU on 
Westminster's sovereignty and with the increasing role of the media in shaping policy.56 
Indeed, MacKenzie argues that devolution is one of a series of developments that have 
diminished, in practical terms, the sovereignty of Parliament: 
Of course you and I know that the sovereignty of Parliament in theory and in statute, 
in law, is undiminished and they could abolish the Scottish Parliament tomorrow. 
They could repeal the act, but the chances of that happening would be very, 
very ... well, because one of the few things that hasn't been said since the Scottish 
Parliament took over is: Can we not all just go back to where we were? Nobody, 
certainly not the Conservatives, is taking that view. So, I think that some of the old 
certainties that at the end of the day the sovereign Parliament at Westminster was the 
great anchor and lynch pin of the whole system have gone. It was being eroded in 
any case because of the transfer of sovereignty and power to the European Union. 
It's a constitutional change of much longer duration. 57 
Despite the view articulated by MacKenzie that the devolution process does not amount to 
radical constitutional reform, the continued undermining of parliamentary sovereignty is a 
significant constitutional development. Devolution has prompted a re-examining of the 
relationships between the constituent nations of the UK and Westminster, and the demise of 
parliamentary sovereignty impacts the understanding of political power within the state and 
where that power actually lies. 
The Scotland Act and its Impact on the UK 
There has been considerable debate since the tabling of the 1997 White Paper as to 
what sort of state would emerge from the process of devolving power to Scotland. While it 
is the argument of this chapter that devolution represents a highly significant constitutional 
ss Ibid. 
56 Interview with Mr. Kenneth MacKenzie, Head, Development Department, The Scottish Executive, 
Leith, 22.09.2000. MacKenzie argues that all too often government policy is announced on the Today 
show as he put it before it makes it to the House of Commons for debate. 
57 Ibid. ' 
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reform and does result in a shift in power away from Westminster there are alternative 
positions. Indeed, the continued emphasis on parliamentary sovereignty, in spite of what 
some argue is its slow demise, is considered by some to be a stabilising force within the 
devolutionary process. 
MacKenzie argues that devolution has formalised or better defined constitutional 
relationships within the UK. From his perspective, devolution has meant an extension of the 
already devolved administrative structures of the Scottish Office to legislative devolution 
through the Scottish Parliament. In an interview, MacKenzie stated that the Scotland Act, 
1998 was drafted with a "doomsday scenario" in mind where the SNP would form a 
government in the Parliament and encourage confrontation with Westminster over 
jurisdiction. 58 He later argued that since the doomsday scenario has failed to materialise as 
of yet that devolution has not, in fact, brought about any great constitutional change: 
I'll come back later to the point that the machinery in the Act and in the White Paper 
were both designed with the doomsday scenario of political confrontation. Because 
we haven't had that, there has been no dramatic change, it seems to me, in the 
constitutional relationships. But, we have actually formalised the fact that things in 
Scotland were administered and now legislated for separately ... The actual handling 
of business and the consultation and the awareness of what's happening in different 
parts of the UK has, if anything, been more defined than it was before. Perhaps 
that's what I mean by formalised, but it's not changed radically in its substance. 59 
MacKenzie makes an argument that has a particular legal perspective, that the Scotland Act 
has not brought about any real constitutional reform in terms of changing the balance of 
constitutional power in the UK. As he argues, what the Act has achieved is a formalising of 
new legislative arrangements between Westminster and the Scottish Parliament. These 
arrangements have been made based on "an awareness of what's happening in different parts 
of the UK", in other words on the need for asymmetry within the UK. It can be argued that 
MacKenzie understands devolution as a way of reorganising and expanding existing 
relationships within the UK while at the same time meeting the challenge posed by 
58 Ibid. 
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nationalists in Scotland to the integrity of the UK. However, as discussed the creation of the 
Scottish Parliament has tremendous political implications and cannot be understood purely in 
legal terms. As argued above, the establishment of the Scottish Parliament creates another 
political centre in the UK, one that cannot be ignored by Westminster despite a continuing 
emphasis being placed on the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. 
Many commentators have argued that devolution does bring about significant, if not 
dramatic changes in the constitutional relationships within the UK by transforming it into an 
asymmetrical state. This asymmetry goes beyond the historical recognition of difference 
between the constituent nations of the UK and creates a state where each one of them enjoys 
a different political relationship with Westminster and Whitehal1.60 The distribution of 
powers contained in the Scotland Act introduces into the UK constitution a quasi-federal 
element through its establishment of another centre of legislative power with the Scottish 
Pari iament. 
The importance of this constitutional reform cannot be emphasised enough in the 
context of the changing nature of the UK state; it has helped along with other reforms to 
introduce into the constitution a degree of quasi-federalism.61 Bogdanor, however, argues 
that the new legislative relationship between Westminster and the Scottish Parliament, as 
defined in the Scotland Act, is federal when compared to its relationship to England and 
Wales: 
59 Ibid. 
Only with respect to England will MPs continue to enjoy the power which, until 
now, they have enjoyed for the whole of the UK, that of scrutinising both primary 
and secondary legislation. Thus Westminster, from being a parliament for both the 
domestic and non-domestic affairs of the whole UK, will be transformed into a 
domestic parliament for England, part of a domestic parliament for Wales, and a 
federal parliament for Northern Ireland and Scotland.62 
60 Munro, Studies in Constitutional Law, p. 44. 
61 Robert Hazell, "Reinventing the Constitution: Can the state Survive?," Public Law, Spring, 1999, p. 
92. 
62 Bogdanor, "Devolution: Decentralisation or Disintegration?," p. 189. 
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However, in arguing that this asymmetry exists Bogdanor is speaking rather of a quasi-
federal, rather than a federal relationship since in federal constitutions there exists a division 
of power between the federal and sub-state governments and a division of legal and political 
sovereignty. As has been argued, this does not exists in the UK. Contrary to Bogdanor's 
argument, MacKenzie argues that the listing of reserved powers in schedule 5 of the 
Scotland Act is the only quasi-federal element in the Act.63 He does not agree that there has 
been any fundamental re-orienting of the constitutional framework of the UK. 
In contrast to the quasi-federal relationship of the Scotland Act, a federal division of 
power does exist in the Canadian case where the Constitution Act, 1867 in s.91 and s.92 
enumerates the heads of jurisdiction of the Canadian federal Parliament and the provincial 
legislatures respectively. In the Canadian case sovereignty is divided between the federal 
Parliament and the provincial legislatures with each being sovereign in their powers to 
legislate; this is not the case in the Scotland Act and so we must consider the division of 
powers here as being quasi-federal. In the Spanish Constitution of 1978, as has been 
demonstrated, there is a similar division of powers between the competencies of the state and 
those of the autonomous communities; sovereignty resides in the Spanish nation. As in the 
Scotland Act there exist in the Spanish constitution some quasi-federal elements despite the 
fact that Spain is a decentralised, regional state and not a federal one. In all three 
constitutions matters pertaining to the state such as defence, the constitution, and foreign 
affairs are the exclusive jurisdiction of the central state whereas matters of a local nature are 
given over to the sub-state legislature or parliament. This arrangement largely holds for the 
Scotland Act as well. Another point of comparison is where residuary power lies in each of 
the three constitutions. In both the Scotland Act and the Spanish Constitution those areas not 
specifically given to the central state are seen to be within the jurisdiction or competence of 
63 Interview with Mr. Kenneth MacKenzie, Head, Development Department, The Scottish Executive, 
Leith, 22.09.2000. 
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the Parliament at the sub-state level, even though there is overlapping jurisdiction in both 
cases. In the Canadian constitution the residuary power lies with the federal Parliament 
under s. 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867 except in subjects that are merely local or private in 
nature where the provinces shall exercise jurisdiction (s. 92( 16)). 
Although the exact nature of the state that devolution has helped to create is 
debatable, what is certain is that the Scottish Parliament has considerable legitimacy within 
the Scottish polity. The Parliament at Holyrood has emerged as a new national institution 
and, it can be argued, has established itself as the centre of political activity for Scotland as a 
nation. 
The Scottish Parliament as a National Institution 
In establishing the Parliament, Westminster has helped to give birth to a new 
national institution. Bogdanor draws a comparison between the Parliament and the ill-fated 
Stormont Parliament abolished by Westminster in 1972 when direct rule of the province was 
instituted: 
It [Scottish Parliament] will speak, moreover, not for an artificially created province 
in danger of being extruded from the kingdom against its wishes, but, as it conceives 
itself to be, the representative of a nation. Independence is therefore a very real 
option for Scotland, which it never was for Northern Ireland.64 
The prospect of Westminster legislating for Scotland in a devolved field without the consent 
of the Parliament is highly unlikely. However, the Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party 
is now an active participant in the Scottish Parliament having accepted the outcome of the 
1997 referendum and having put forward candidates for the 1999 Scottish Parliament 
elections. Indeed, the Scottish Conservative and Unionists elected all of their members in 
the 1999 elections through the additional member system of proportional representation, an 
electoral system they previously condemned. While under s.28(7) Westminster can legally 
64 Vemon Bogdanor, "The Start of a New Song," The Hume Lecture 1998, 19 November 1998, Hume 
Occasional Paper No. 55 (Edinburgh: The David Hume Institute, 1998), p. 5. 
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make laws for Scotland, the political reality is that to do so would be, as argued by the 
previous SNP leader A lex Salmond on another occasion, "unpardonable folly". 
At the time of writing it is difficult to know what conflicts, if any, might arise 
between the Scottish Parliament and Westminster and also to what extent the Parliament will 
exert what rights it has as a national institution to push for greater devolution. In its first two 
years of operation Holyrood has already diverged from Westminster in terms of policy; it has 
abolished tuition fees for Scottish university students and has chosen to fund care for the 
elderly. Nationalists in the SNP have argued that as the Parliament at Holyrood becomes 
more and more entrenched as a national institution the significance of Westminster will 
become less, regardless of parliamentary sovereignty. SNP MSP Michael Russell articulated 
this position in an interview: 
What we have walked into is Westminster withering on the vine and therefore its 
relevance will become less with each passing day until people don't think it exists. 
We'll wake up one morning and find out that we're not involved in it in any way 
because things have been transferred to Brussels, thing have been transferred to 
Edinburrsh. That's a possibility. It isn't even a possibility, that's just what will 
happen. 5 
Russell's position is that of a gradualist nationalist who argues that devolution is beneficial 
in that it improves the governance of the people of Scotland and is a step along the path to 
independence. Thus, he argues that devolution and the growing role of the EU are stripping 
Westminster of power so that it will eventually no longer be a centre of political power for 
Scotland. Russell's argument is representative of the SNP's opinion that Scotland should 
take its place as an independent state within Europe thereby separating Scotland from the rest 
of the UK and eliminating Westminster's powers to legislate in reserved matters. Since the 
SNP has argued in favour of expanding Holyrood's jurisdiction and enlarging the list of 
devolved matters, Russell foresees Westminster becoming irrelevant. He argues that greater 
devolution might mean that Holyrood would end up exercising jurisdiction in areas such as 
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broadcasting and relations with Europe as they pertained to Scotland. Furthermore, the SNP 
would most likely argue for greater fiscal autonomy and control over the taxation system.66 
For Russell, devolution and the presence of the Scottish Parliament as a national institution is 
all part of a longer process of which the inevitable result will be independence. 
In terms of the power of devolved parliaments and governmental institutions to 
mobilise national feeling and argue for greater jurisdiction a comparison can be drawn with 
the re-establishment of the Generalitat in Catalunya in the 1979 Catalan Statute of 
Autonomy. The Statute of Autonomy and the Spanish Constitution of 1978 worked in 
concert to establish the institutions of autonomous government in Catalunya, giving the 
Catalan Parliament legislative and executive powers over a wide range of devolved areas. 
Despite the fact that the Generalitat does not exercise sovereignty in the areas in which it has 
assumed competence by s. 1 of the Statute of Autonomy, the Generalitat has quickly become 
a powerful national institution within Catalunya and makes use of its status to extract further 
concessions from the state in areas of jurisdictional competence. Granted, for much of the 
1990s CiU held the balance of power in the Corts Generals and was able to have its demands 
met; such a situation is unlikely to arise at Westminster. Recently, Catalan nationalists have 
called for a greater transfer of powers to the Generalitat under the provisions of Article 
150(2) which permits the state to delegate or transfer further areas of state competence to an 
• 67 autonomous commumty. 
Impact of Judicial Review 
Along with a formal division of powers the further quasi-federal principle of 
judicial review has been introduced into the constitutional framework of the UK through 
sections 31-35 and Schedule 6 of the Scotland Act. Ins. 31 the member of the Scottish 
65 Interview with Mr. Michael Russell, Scottish National Party MSP, The Scottish Parliament, 
Edinburgh, 12.07.2000. 
66 1bid. 
67 Spanish Constitution, 1978, art. 150(2). 
262 
Seal/and~\' Conslitutiona/ Posilion 
Executive, as the cabinet has been styled under the Act, in charge of a bill must declare 
before its introduction whether it falls within the legislative competence of the Parliament 
subject to a ruling by the Presiding Officer, as the speaker has been styled.68 Sections 32 and 
33 establish the process by which a bill can be referred to the Judicial Committee of the 
Privy Council (JCPC) for scrutiny. Referral can be made by the Lord Advocate, the 
Attorney General, or the Advocate General. The position of the Advocate General as a law 
officer is a new one brought about by s. 48 and s. 87 of the Scotland Act which transfers the 
offices of Lord Advocate and Solicitor General from Westminster to the Scottish Executive; 
the Advocate General's role is to advise Westminster on matters of Scottish law. If a referral 
is made by the law officers to the JCPC in the pre-enactment stage of a bill, the Presiding 
Officer is not allowed to submit the bill for Royal Assent; this is done according to a 
particular timetable as laid out in s.33(2). Post-enactment judicial review is enumerated in 
Schedule 6 which outlines the procedures by which a "devolution issue" is subject to 
challenge in the courts. A "devolution issue" is defined as the following: "a question 
whether an Act of the Scottish Parliament or any provision of an Act of the Scottish 
Parliament is within the legislative competence of the Parliament."69 The effect of this is that 
legislation of the Scottish Parliament in either the pre-Royal Assent stage as a bill or post-
Royal Assent as an act is justiciable. Thus, the JCPC or another court in the UK can rule 
whether an act or bill is ultra vires, that is, outside the Parliament's competence. As it has 
already been demonstrated, such a form of judicial review of Westminster legislation is not 
possible nor is it tenable due to the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. With these 
powers, the JCPC will have an impact on not just Scotland, but the UK constitution as a 
whole. 
68 Scotland Act. 1998, s. 3 1. 
69 Ibid., sch. 6, para. 1. 
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The Role of the JCPC 
The JCPC exists along with the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords as 
generalist courts whose remit includes constitutional questions.70 The JCPC was established 
in 1833 as an appeals court which ruled on appeals from colonial, admiralty, and 
ecclesiastical courts.
71 
It evolved into an imperial court which heard appeals from across the 
British Empire and later the Commonwealth, and was the highest court of appeal for Canada 
until 1949 when the Supreme Court came to fulfil this role. The JCPC remains the highest 
court of appeal for New Zealand, Jamaica, Trinidad & Tobago and a number of other 
sovereign Caribbean states as well as British Dependent Territories such as Bermuda. Yet 
the JCPC has emerged as a constitutional court for resolving devolution issues thus 
representing an increase in the court's functions in adjudicating constitutional matters.72 
Lord Hope has argued that there is an advantage in having the JCPC over the House of 
Lords as a constitutional court. He bases this argument on two points. Firstly, it seems 
wrong that the upper house of the Westminster Parliament should rule on the validity of 
legislation emanating from the Scottish Parliament. Secondly, the JCPC enjoys a wider 
membership which includes the Scottish Lords of Appeal in Ordinary, retired Lords of 
Appeal in Ordinary, and Privy Councillors who have held high judicial office including the 
Lord President, the Lord Advocate, and the Lord Justice Clerk.73 This will provide a broader 
base of experienced members of the Scottish judiciary from which to constitute the JCPC to 
hear Scottish Appeals. It is also interesting to note that the Scotland Act in s. 95(2) provides 
that the Prime Minister in recommending to the Queen appointees to the offices of Lord 
President and Lord Justice Clerk may not do so unless they have been nominated by the First 
70 Andrew Le Sueur and Richard Comes, "What do the Top Courts do?" (London: The Constitution 
Unit, 2000), p. 22. 
71 Bradley and Ewing, p. 411. 
72 Le Sueur and Comes, p. 24. 
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Minister.
74 
What is most significant about JCPC decisions on constitutional matters is that 
they will bind all other courts, making it the highest court on constitutional issues -a de facto 
constitutional court for the UK.75 
The debate over the choice of the JCPC as the arbiter of disputes between 
Westminster and Holyrood rested very much on the need to demonstrate the independence of 
the institutions of devolution from Westminster. MacKenzie recalled that the Lord 
Chancellor, Derry Irvine, played a central role in choosing the JCPC and developing the 
procedure by which it would arbitrate disputes. MacKenzie argues that the choice of the 
JCPC was based on a number of issues not the least of which were strengthening the Crown 
in the devolution process and House of Lords reform: 
If they [the JCPC] sat in their capacity as members of the House of Lords, which is 
very clearly part of the UK Parliament from which this whole thing was supposed to 
becoming disassociated, would it look as if, ah, this is nasty old Westminster 
wanting to umpire in what would effectively be a tug-of-war between the two 
Parliaments ... Calling it the House of Lords would have that very clear association at 
the time when the government was tilting publicly at the House of Lords as a second 
chamber. So that turned to well, we can have the same people but in their capacity 
as the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council which sounds much more separate, 
doesn't have the label attached to it and is much more obscure to the public mind. 
Of course the reference with the Privy Council links it very closely to the monarchy 
and all of that and there was no doubt in the Lord Chancellor's mind that this would 
redefine the position of the Crown in all this, whatever controversies might surround 
the monarchy. Nevertheless, it was a safer bet, putting it crudely, to have it 
associated with the Judicial Committee than with the House of Lords, partly because 
of the obscurity but also because the Privy Council sounds more apolitical, more 
respectable, more the great, the good, and the grandees of yesteryear who made it to 
the Privy Council.76 
MacKenzie argues for the need to keep this de facto constitutional court separate from 
Westminster. From this perspective the JCPC fulfils a dual purpose. Not only does it act as 
a judicial forum in which disputes between the two parliaments can be resolved at a 
73 Lord Hope ofCraighead, "Working with the Scottish Parliament: Judicial Aspects of Devolution," 
The Hume Lecture 1997, 5 December 1997, Hume Occasion Paper No. 54 (Edinburgh: The David 
Hume Institute, 1998), pp. 16-17. 
74 Scotland Act. 1998, s. 95(2). 
75 Le Sueur and Comes, p. 26. 
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perceived distance from Westminster; it also manages to reinforce already existing 
constitutional structures such as the House of Lords and the monarchy. As the JCPC, the 
Law Lords are given a new function as a domestic constitutional court that enjoys a power of 
judicial review. As MacKenzie argues, by giving a new role to the Privy Council the 
position of the sovereign is confirmed within the new order, thus strengthening the position 
of the Crown in relation to the Scottish Parliament. Ultimately, it can be argued that the 
JCPC in its new capacity will come to play a role in the ongoing process of constitutional 
reform. 
The establishment of a court to deal with constitutional issues arising within the 
framework of the UK constitution is unique in the history of British jurisprudence. The 
functions performed by the JCPC are very similar to those performed by constitutional courts 
in federal countries such as Belgium, Germany and those with a common law tradition such 
as Canada, Australia, and South Africa. The establishment of the JCPC as a constitutional 
court has a federalising effect on the constitution.77 The long-term impact of the Judicial 
Committee on the constitution is difficult to gauge; yet its role in arbitrating Scottish 
devolution is a significant one: 
The courts, and ultimately the Privy Council will have a central role in interpreting 
the devolution settlement; and in adjusting it in the light of changing circumstances 
and changing political values. This may go further than purely marginal adjustment: 
in the first century of the Canadian federation a series of decisions by the Privy 
Council in London turned the intended division of powers between the federal and 
. . I . h d 78 provmcta governments on tts ea . 
And so the courts, particularly the JCPC, will play an important role in the determination of 
the Scottish Parliament's exercise of its legislative competence. It is to be expected that 
there will be a good deal of co-operation and communication between Westminster and the 
76 Interview with Mr. Kenneth MacKenzie, Head, Development Department, The Scottish Executive, 
Leith, 22.09.2000. 
77 Hazell, "Reinventing the Constitution: Can the state Survive?," p. 92. 
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Parliament in terms of legislative agendas. It could be anticipated that this would be 
accepted as convention, thus reducing the number of judicial decisions that could 
conceivably bring the two parliaments into repeated conflict with one another. The result of 
such a conflict could bring about a questioning of the exclusive sovereignty of Westminster 
in relation to Scotland and the perceived limits of the Parliament's legislative powers. 
A rival interpretation to Comes' is that of Himsworth who argues that the JCPC will 
not, most likely, turn the UK constitution on its head. He argues that the Canadian example 
should not be considered to any great degree as the JCPC will be more predictable in how it 
handles its domestic tasks than how it supposedly re-shaped Canadian federalism. 79 
Regarding the choice of the JCPC as a constitutional court, Himsworth questions the use of it 
as a constitutional court and thinks that at some stage it might no longer be suitable. He 
argues as well that it is very hard to speculate on what matters might arise before the JCPC: 
I find it very difficult to guess necessarily what sorts of issues are going to arise. I 
find it very difficult to guess which way they [the JCPC] will jump in relation to 
those issues. I don't know how far human rights issues are likely to dominate rather 
than the issues we would associate with reserved and devolved matters. It is difficult 
to guess quite what they are likely to do. If we are talking simply about the 
acceptability of that court presently dubbed with that name and with that particular 
composition then I can hardly believe there is anyone, in the Irish phrase, who would 
have started from there if they'd had the choice.80 
Through his argument Himsworth highlights one of the particular problems behind an 
examination and analysis of the structures of devolution such as the JCPC in that it is very 
hard to try and predict what may or may not happen. For Himsworth, the choice of the JCPC 
as a body to arbitrate disputes is a curious one, although he does not give reasons for why he 
finds it so or what other possible alternatives for such a court might exist. This illustrates the 
degree of uncertainty there is among certain observers over how devolution will function in 
78 Richard Comes, "Intergovernmental Relations in a Devolved United Kingdom: Mak~ng D:volution 
Work," in Constitutional Futures: A History of the Next Ten Years, p. 169. And Interview with Mr. 
Richard Comes, The Constitution Unit, University College London, London, 23.06.1999. 




the long term. Commentators such as Cornes are willing to argue that decisions of the JCPC 
could in the future bring about significant constitutional change similar to that of the first 
seventy years or so of Canadian federalism. Himsworth and other are less than willing to 
speculate that far. 
Relations with Westminster 
Having examined some of the fundamental constitutional reforms brought about by 
the provisions of the Scotland Act, 1998 and how a new constitutional framework is 
emerging in the UK, the question arises as to whether this structure in its current form is 
tenable over the long term. In many ways it is difficult to determine this at such an early 
stage. This new constitutional framework may become untenable if Westminster tries to 
limit the process of devolution in any way. Scottish nationalists in the SNP are particularly 
conscious of this and see any interference by Westminster as a vindication of their position 
that Scotland must be independent if it is to have full control over its own affairs. Russell 
argues that any controversial ruling by the JCPC against legislation emanating from the 
Scottish Parliament would be highly problematic: "The moment that kicks in they've 
[Westminster] had it. It will be interesting to see what happens the first time it's used 
because what will actually happen is that the impression will be given very strongly that the 
Scottish Parliament is being told what to do by somewhere else."81 Nationalists could argue 
that such a perception would generate greater support for independence among the Scottish 
population, who would see in a ruling against Holyrood the failure of devolution. For the 
SNP such a situation would demonstrate that devolution as established in the Scotland Act, 
1998 is untenable. Although much of this is speculative on the part ofthe SNP it is 
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As argued before, there is a new political and legal dynamic within the UK 
constitution and for devolution to succeed this dynamic must be allowed to take hold. 
Whether this dynamic will lead to the creation of a federal UK or more likely a quasi-federal 
UK based on asymmetrical relationships between Westminster, Scotland, Wales, and 
Northern Ireland depends largely on the development of an institutional framework to 
manage devo I uti on: 
Each initiative has been planned with little obvious regard to the other elements in 
the devolution package ... ; and with no sense of the package as a coherent whole. 
But as devolution is implemented in this piecemeal fashion there may be a growing 
need to develop a coherent framework, if only after the event, for practical and 
political reasons. Coherence need not mean symmetry or even federalism by another 
name; but it should imply, where appropriate, the development of common solutions 
to common problems, and a common institutional framework to cement the 
devolution settlement.82 
It has been argued by many, including Hazel!, that if and when disputes over jurisdiction 
arise between Scotland and Westminster it would be in the best interest of both Parliaments 
to develop an intergovernmental relations network. To a certain degree this process is 
already underway with the government's establishment of the Joint Ministerial Committee, 
whose membership consists of the UK government and representatives from the devolved 
bodies. Greater co-operation between Westminster and Holyrood has also been facilitated 
through the series of concordats reached between Whitehall departments in London and the 
Scottish Executive prior to the creation of the Scottish Parliament in 1999. The committee 
emphasises the need for co-operation and "provides institutional recognition of the fact that 
devolution creates a situation of interdependence rather than a separation of powers."83 From 
a comparative perspective the UK can look to Canada and Spain where there are elaborate 
networks of intergovernmental relations between the central government and the 
81 Interview with Mr. Michael Russell, Scottish National Party MSP, The Scottish Parliament, 
Edinburgh, 12.07.2000. . . 
82 Robert Hazell and Brendan O'Leary, "A Rolling Programme of DevolutiOn: Slippery Slope or 
Safeguard of the Union?," in Constitutional Futures: A History ofthe Next Ten Years, p. 21. 
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governments of the provinces and autonomous communities. One particular area of 
intergovernmental relations that will need to be developed in the near future are dispute 
settlement mechanisms. Cornes argues for the establishment of both formal and informal 
types of dispute settlement mechanisms to deal with particular areas where conflict may 
arise, including the enforceability of concordats, financing, foreign affairs negotiations, 
rights under intergovernmental agreements, and the right to secede.84 
To what degree the emerging constitutional framework of the UK functions as 
expected is difficult to ascertain at present. It is outside the scope of this thesis to speculate 
on the constitutional future of Scotland and the rest of the UK. However, the impact of 
devolution on the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty and the increasing role of judicial 
review in the constitution will be significant issues. Yet it must be stated that devolution has 
helped to resolve the issue of democratic accountability in the previous system of 
administrative devolution through the Scottish Office, which lacked a direct legislative check 
on its actions. Furthermore, devolution has done a great deal to alleviate the perceived 
democratic deficit that had been identified as a result of Scottish voters' support for the 
Labour Party during a period of eighteen years of Conservative government. While 
devolution is a considerable achievement, it is viewed by Scottish nationalists within the 
SNP who advocate an independent Scotland in Europe as being either insufficient or merely 
a stepping stone to independence. 
83 Vemon Bogdanor, Devolution in the United Kingdom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 
284. 
84 Comes, p. 173. 
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Character of Scottish Nationalism 
If one places Scottish nationalism in context alongside nationalism in Catalunya and 
Quebec it becomes obvious that there are some notable differences as well as some 
similarities. Nationalism in Scotland is not as diffuse as it is in Quebec or Catalunya in 
terms of the number of parties. In Quebec the Parti Quebecois is the provincial nationalist 
party whereas the Bloc Quebecois has been a party dedicated to promoting Quebec's 
interests and the goal of Quebec independence in the federal Parliament since 1991. The two 
parties are very closely tied in terms of strategy and ideology with the PQ taking the leading 
role. In Catalunya the existence of five nationalist parties, CDC, UDC, PSC, IC-Verds, and 
ERC, illustrates the diversity of nationalism in Catalunya with each party committed to a 
nationalist agenda but with differing approaches and ideologies. 
In both Scotland and Quebec there is a broader concept of nationalism when it 
comes to party support. In the first place there are those voters who, for the purposes of this 
chapter, can be described as soft nationalists -those who identify with the national character 
of Scotland or Quebec within the state and believe that its distinctiveness should be 
recognised by certain constitutional, political, or fiscal arrangements. Soft nationalists can 
support a federalist party in Quebec, for example the Quebec Liberal Party, and unionist 
parties in Scotland, either the Scottish Labour Party or the Scottish Liberal Democrats, both 
of which support and fought for home rule for Scotland. As discussed in chapter four, soft 
nationalists were to be found in the Conservative Party from 1969 to the mid-1970s when the 
Thistle Group argued the case for Scottish devolution.85 However, soft nationalists might 
also support hard nationalist, separatist parties such as the PQ, BQ, or SNP if they believe 
they can best represent the interests of Scotland or Quebec, although they might not support 
independence as a constitutional solution. For example, in the Scottish Election Survey of 
1997 over a third of SNP supporters, 34%, supported a Scottish Parliament within the UK as 
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their preferred constitutional option rather than the SNP's position of independence. The 
same poll showed that 23o/o of Labour supporters favoured some form of independence for 
Scotland
86 
Thus, it appears that the SNP does not enjoy the allegiance of all those 
nationalists in Scotland who support independence.87 It can be argued that soft nationalists 
in the Scottish case are those who support devolution as a means of recognising Scotland's 
right to enact legislation and govern in areas of concern to Scotland. The establishment of a 
Scottish Parliament, having jurisdiction over devolved matters, is a means of recognising the 
distinctiveness of Scotland as a nation within the UK. For nationalists in the SNP who 
advocate an independent Scottish state devolution cannot be an end in itself. 
The Position of the SNP 
The SNP is the only main party in Scotland that identifies itself as nationalist and 
that explicitly invokes the Scottish nation's right to self-determination -the right to exist as 
an independent state. The Scottish Socialist Party of MSP Tommy Sheridan also favours 
independence for Scotland. The SNP is a monolithic party in that it runs candidates in both 
Westminster and Scottish Parliament elections and does not divide the party by way of a 
federated structure as is the case with the Labour Party, the Liberal Democrats or the 
Conservatives who have separate party structures in Scotland. The SNP is the only party in 
Scotland advocating separatism: the creation of an independent Scottish state within Europe. 
The character of the SNP's nationalism is moderate and inclusive, and it embraces the 
principles of equality among all citizens who reside in Scotland.88 The party is moderate in 
that it has adopted a democratic and constitutional, and thus non-violent approach to try to 
reach its goal of Scottish independence: 
85 Andrew Marr, The Battle for Scotland, rpt. (London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1995), p. 125. 
86 Scottish Election Survey 1997 as cited in Alice Brown et al., Politics and Society in Scotland, p. 
162. 
87 McCrone, Understanding Scotland: the Sociology of a stateless Nation, p. 212. . 
88 Neil MacCormick, "Unrepentant Gradualism," in A Diverse Assembly: the Debate on a Scottish 
Parliament, ed. Lindsay Paterson (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998), p. 176. 
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The SNP has been devoutly and unshakeably constitutionalist and democratic 
throughout its history, and is so now. Even if there were shortcuts to its cherished 
goal of a free Scotland, the party has never shown any inclination towards them and 
rightly, s~nc~ attempts to dodge round either would put at profound risk the inte~rity 
of the objecttve sought. The general temper of Scottish politics in modern times 
provides its own guarantee against any successful adventures down such shortcuts.89 
The SNP is a moderate, democratic party but it is one which has been divided 
somewhat by the process that led up to the creation of the Scottish Parliament. The source of 
this division within the party lies in an ongoing, historical debate on whether the SNP should 
participate in and advocate devolution. Generally, there are considered to be two wings 
within the party, one gradualist and the other fundamentalist, who differ over the approach 
taken towards reaching the goal of an independent Scotland. The gradualist wing has 
embraced devolution as the first step on the road towards independence. Russell has 
articulated the gradualist position: 
There's a principled argument which is to say that any change in the governance of 
Scotland, that improves the governance of Scotland, is something that the SNP 
should support and on the SNP membership card you find two things: one is a belief 
in independence and the second one is to help further Scottish interests. Now 
therefore does not better governance for Scotland, even though it's not as good as we 
want, further Scottish interests? So for both reasons it was right to support the 
referendum and right to support devolution.90 
Russell's argument presents the view held by the current leadership of the SNP who see the 
Parliament as an effective tool for getting their message across. As Russell argues, the SNP 
working within Holyrood can show that devolution means good governance for Scotland and 
that they are willing to work within the system to further Scottish interests rather than 
outside where their impact would be diminished. 
The emphasis on good governance by those who embrace the gradualist position has 
found favour with some other commentators in Scotland, such as Kenyon Wright, who 
89 Ibid., p. 175. . . 
90 Interview with Mr. Michael Russell, Scottish National Party MSP, The Scottish Parhament, 
Edinburgh, 12.07.2000. 
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argues that devolution gives the SNP the opportunity to evolve and move away from a 
nationalism that focuses on creating and independent Scottish nation-state: 
... My hope would be that nationalism would go in the same direction as Catalan 
nationalism has gone, mainly the importance of an independent and totally separate 
nation-state would become less significant and the importance of Scottish identity 
and personality being revised, and indeed in expanding the powers of the Parliament, 
but not necessarily towards the direction of total nation-state independence which 
makes less and less sense when you're in Europe anyway.91 
Wright embraces the approach of CiU in Catalunya as a means of furthering the autonomy of 
the nation within the larger multinational state. His emphasis on Scottish personality and his 
own Christian ethos would tend to lead him to embrace a Christian democratic view of the 
nation as espoused by UDC. Certainly, for Wright the Catalan model is attractive as it 
shows how devolution and the establishment of powerful autonomous governmental 
institutions can further the interests of the minority nation. As one of the architects of 
devolution, Wright argues that the prefered option is to continue to expand the jurisdiction of 
Holyrood. He discounts the SNP's goal of independence in Europe, arguing that such a plan 
is unnecessary considering the evolution of the EU. From Wright's perspective, the success 
of devolution and its possible expansion could effectively render ineffectual the SNP's 
position on independence. 
The move towards a more gradualist position within the leadership of the SNP can 
be attributed to the leadership of Alex Salmond, who after rejecting the SCC, went on to 
steer the party towards participation in the 1997 referendum and the Scottish Parliament. 
The gradualists have been ascendant in the party during his leadership. Under the leadership 
of Salmond and his successor as Party Chairman John Swinney, the SNP has emerged as the 
Labour Party's main adversary in Scotland. In the 1999 elections to the Scottish Parliament 
the SNP won 35 seats, making it the second largest party behind Labour with 56.
92 
The 
91 Interview with Rev. Kenyon Wright, Former Chair of the Executive Committee, The Scottish 
Constitutional Convention, Perth, 05.07.1999. 
92 Miller, p. 307. 
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fundamentalist wing sees the Scottish Parliament and devolution as a diversion on the path 
towards independence, taking the SNP away from its overall goal. It was largely as a result 
of the influence of fundamentalists that the SNP withdrew from the Scottish Constitutional 
Convention in 1989 arguing that "it would not take independence seriously enough."93 
MacCormick, a gradualist within the party who is supportive of a European federal union in 
which Scotland would be a member, has argued that the SNP's rejection of the convention 
was misguided. In his view, non-participation in the convention's discussions on the 
devolution scheme was more damaging than the possible consequences of taking part. 
Fundamentalists saw these consequences as being the dilution of the independence message: 
Some will say that the very act of working out such a scheme would so dilute the 
SNP's commitment and demoralise its workers that it would be counter-productive. 
I doubt it. Further, when one takes it the other way and speculates on the morale and 
drawing power of a party which appears to have walked away from the attempt to 
articulate an all Scotland consensus as to one workable scheme, one is left doubting 
whether the course of non-participation in the convention is not the course which 
incurs by far the greater damage. I am sure it is.94 
As it was, the SNP stayed out of the convention but then when the 1997 White Paper was 
published and the referendum was fought the SNP campaigned as part of Scotland FORward 
and fought for the establishment of the Parliament. 
For the party the creation of a Scottish Parliament represents increased democracy 
and greater Scottish self-government: 
The new Parliament approved by the Scottish voters does not, of course, amount to 
Independence nor even to the construction of a federal state in the UK, since 
England is left untouched. It represents internal self-government for Scotland; but 
the changes do represent a significant advance for democracy and will bring back to 
Scotland powers over a whole range of important policies such as health, education, 
law & order and land use.95 
While the adoption of a gradualist strategy by the party leadership in the Scottish Parliament 
might be criticised by fundamentalists it does not necessarily represent a dilution of the 
93 Brown et. al., Politics and Society in Scotland, pp. 65-66. 
94 MacConnick, "Unrepentant Gradualism," p. 182. 
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party's message of independence in Europe. As many have argued, the gradualist approach 
has given the SNP a platform in the Scottish Parliament to argue for independence.96 
By examining party manifestos and policy documents we can get a better sense of 
how the SNP articulates its goals and what the party means when it advocates a policy of 
"Independence in Europe." The SNP believes that a "civilised divorce" from the UK would 
allow it to be an independent state within Europe where it argues Scotland can have a greater 
voice than in the UK and play a greater role along the lines of other small nations such as 
Denmark and Ireland: 
People here can see that, as a small independent country, Scotland can have 
considerable influence in a Europe in which all member states play an active and 
positive role. Independence would give Scotland voting power and negotiating 
influence as a member state of the European Union. Under international law, 
successor states inherit the treaty obligations of the old state. Maintaining 
membership of the European Union after independence for both Scotland and 
England, is therefore guaranteed.97 
Indeed, the SNP views the EU as a political unit that is more open to the interests of Scotland 
than the UK state. Scotland can achieve greater recognition as a small nation by becoming 
an independent state within the EU. Since its conversion to a pro-European stance in the 
early 1980's and its adoption of the "Independence in Europe" strategy at the 1988 party 
conference, the party has campaigned in European elections. From his perspective as an 
MSP Russell articulates what the SNP understands independence in Europe to mean: 
You could express independence in Europe by saying Scotland, or the SNP 
recognises that Scotland would be a better place to live in if we had direct 
relationships with nations and supra-national organisations and confederalist 
organisations than it is being part of an incorporating union at this particular stage in 
h. 98 our tstory. 
95 Allan Macartney, Scotland on the Move: a Guide to the International Policies and Priorities of the 
Scottish National Party (Edinburgh: Scottish National Party, 1998), p. 2. 
96 Hazel and O'Leary, p. 22. 
97 
Macartney, p. 12. . . 
98 Interview with Mr. Michael Russell, Scottish National Party MSP, The Scottish Parliament, 
Edinburgh, 12.07.2000. 
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Russell argues that the UK state as a union state is holding Scotland back and that by 
becoming an independent state within the EU Scotland's present condition would improve 
through "direct relationships" with other European nations and EU institutions. In the 
interview Russell contrasted what the SNP views as Westminster's understanding of the state 
and Scottish nationalists in the SNP's conceptions of the state. His argument rests upon the 
premise that the SNP has a 21st century, progressive understanding of the state where a small 
nation is able to "pool sovereignty" with other nations in the EU. In contrast, Westminster's 
perceived reticence towards Europe and continued emphasis on the Union is seen as static 
and thereby limiting Scotland. The SNP leadership and Russell would argue that 
independence for Scotland in Europe is the best way to end the incorporating union and 
separate Scotland from the rest of the UK. The SNP's advocating of"Independence in 
Europe" for Scotland has been central to their strategy for the thirteen years since the party 
conference of 1988. 
The SNP and Europe 
In the 1999 elections to the European Parliament the SNP further articulated its 
stance towards Europe. In its European elections manifesto the SNP sought to expand 
Scotland's presence in European institutions, notably through the establishment of a 
Scottish-European Joint Assembly made up of members of the Scottish Parliament and 
European representatives such as Scottish MEPs and members of the Committee of the 
Regions. The joint assembly would "coordinate Scotland's voice on issues of national 
importance."99 The party also declared its support for joining the Euro and the European 
common monetary policy, its belief in the principle of subsidiarity and the development of 
decentralised European democracy, and its position on a wide range of EU issues from 
fishing to the Common Agricultural Policy, regional aid, and transport. Throughout the 
99 Scottish National Party, Standing Up for Scotland: Scottish National Party Manifesto for the 
European Parliament Elections 10 June 1999 (Edinburgh: SNP, 1999), p. 3. 
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manifesto the SNP gradualist position is clear: an independent Scotland in Europe would 
flourish and prosper in Europe: 
With the Scottish Parliament established, and a new Europe emerging based on 
principles of inclusiveness and co-operation between independent member states, 
Westminster is left looking out-of-date and increasingly irrelevant to Scotland's 
future interests. As we open a new chapter in Scotland's history, there can be no 
better time for Scotland to redefine its status within the European Union by 
becoming an independent member state. Independence in Europe has never looked 
more attractive or more achievable. 100 
For the gradualist SNP leadership, the Parliament is viewed as a vehicle towards achieving 
independence with the European Union facilitating Scotland's exit from the union state. 
The SNP and the Scottish Parliament 
In its manifesto for the elections to the Scottish Parliament in the month prior to the 
European elections, the party claimed to be "Scotland's Party", the only party which could 
truly speak for Scotland. This assertion was based on the fact that the SNP is in no way tied 
to a Westminster party, thus painting their rivals in the Labour Party, in particular, as 
subservient to the wishes of 'new' Labour at Westminster: "Scotland's Parliament needs 
Scotland's Party. A party in tune with Scottish needs and hopes, and always with Scottish 
priorities at the forefront of our thinking. A party that does not dance to Westminster's 
tune." 101 In keeping with its social democratic tradition, the SNP centred its manifesto 
commitments around the themes of enterprise, compassion, and democracy. In an effort to 
meet its commitments to improving education, the health service, and housing the SNP 
stated that it would not increase the basic rate of tax but rather would not implement 
Westminster's 1 p tax cut thus making available additional funds. This "Penny for Scotland" 
strategy set the SNP apart from the other parties. The party argued that this policy addressed 
those Scots who were in favour of greater investment in public services. Again, the SNP 
positioned itself as being the one party that understood Scotland. 
100 Ibid., p. 5. 
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While the SNP came to form the second largest party in the Parliament following the 
1999 election the result was not a positive one for the party. It can be argued that the "Penny 
for Scotland" slogan lost the party votes as the Scottish electorate understood it as a tax 
increase, the infamous "Tartan Tax" as labelled by the former Conservative Secretary of 
State Michael Forsyth. As Miller argues, this test of Scottish voters' presumed support for 
higher taxes and greater spending proved to be a failure as it did not produce a net gain in 
votes for the SNP.
102 
Salmond's criticism of the NATO bombing ofKosovo, which he 
described as 'unpardonable folly', also damaged the party's fortunes as it was condemned by 
many as an inappropriate intervention. 103 In the election the SNP failed to meet its target of 
40 seats. It won only one more constituency seat than at the 1997 general election, owing 
the rest of its seats to the additional member electoral system. 104 
The SNP's manifesto for the Scottish Parliament election made a commitment to 
independence and embraced a gradualist position by arguing that the Parliament was a 
vehicle for achieving independence and that each commitment made by the party could best 
be achieved through independence. The SNP argued that independence would enable it to 
legislate on issues such as the constitution, defence, and foreign relations, all of which are 
reserved matters: 
On to INDEPENDENCE ... and the opportunity to make our own decisions on 
matters such as conflict resolution, international relations and foreign policy, such as 
the removal of the Trident missile system from Scotland. And we will be able to 
introduce a written Constitution and a Bill of Rights, making all Scots citizens, not 
subjects -guaranteeing their protection before the law and from unjustified 
. rfi . . bl . 105 government mte erence or mequtta e actiOn. 
101 Scottish National Party, Scotland's party for Scotland's Parliament: the Scottish National Party 
Manifesto for the Scottish Parliament Elections 6 May 1999 (Edinburgh: SNP, 1999), p. 1. 
102 Miller, p. 318. 
103 Ibid., p. 316. 
104 Ibid., p. 299. 
105 Scottish National Party, Scotland's Party for Scotland's Parliament: the Scottish National Party 
Manifesto for the Scottish Parliament Elections 6 May 1999, p. 31. 
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The SNP further committed itself to holding a referendum on independence within the first 
four-year term of the Parliament if it were elected to govern. 106 This commitment echoes that 
made by the Parti Quebecois when it came to power in 1976, promising to hold a referendum 
on sovereignty-association before the end of its mandate. The decision to hold a referendum 
on independence flows from the SNP's firm commitment to democracy, popular sovereignty, 
and constitutionalism. 
It can be argued that if an SNP administration were to hold a referendum, it would 
be very difficult for Westminster to ignore the result since the same process was used to 
legitimise the establishment of the Scottish Parliament. The Scottish Parliament does not 
have the power to change the UK constitution and so a unilateral declaration of 
independence by an SNP administration would not be constitutional. Nevertheless, given 
such an eventuality it would arguably be a great political mistake to ignore the popular 
will. 107 Again, a direct comparison can be drawn from the Canada-Quebec debate. The 
Supreme Court of Canada ruled in 1998 in the federal government's reference case on 
secession that Quebec could not unilaterally secede under Canadian constitutional law or 
under international law, but that the federal government would be bound to negotiate with 
Quebec in the event of a referendum vote in favour of sovereignty. The referendum result 
would have to be a clear majority on a clear question, though the court did not define what 
'clear' meant in these two cases. 
The SNP and Westminster 
In its election manifesto for the 1997 General Election, the SNP steered clear of 
specific constitutional proposals, choosing rather to argue the economic reasons for 
independence. The party's argument rests largely on two assertions: that Scotland is a 
wealthy nation but is not meeting its full potential in the Union, and that Scotland has 
106 Ibid., p. 1. 
107 Hazel and O'Leary, p. 23. 
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contributed more in taxes to Westminster than it has received back in public expenditure. 
The Treasury and independent economists have challenged this second assertion, particularly 
the SNP's figure of £27 billion. Whereas in the European and Scottish Parliament 
manifestos the SNP argued that the constitutional arrangements of the union state were 
responsible for holding back Scotland, here the argument is that it is the economic 
arrangements of the state that are responsible for Scotland's post-imperial decline: 
Scotland is a wealthy country. When our share of the wealth produced from North 
Sea oil and gas is taken into account, Scotland is the gth richest nation in the 
industrialised world, nestling between Canada and Austria. At the turn of the 
century we were the most prosperous nation in the world. In the intervening years, 
the steady decline of the United Kingdom has dragged Scotland down. 108 
In each of its manifestos the SNP advocates radical constitutional change: the dissolution of 
the Union and the establishment of an independent Scottish state. If independence is defined 
as exercising full political sovereignty over a geographic territory it is doubtful whether 
Scotland can truly be independent in the manner conceived of by the SNP. Since a great deal 
of the UK's own sovereignty has been ceded to the European Union it would be impossible 
for an independent Scotland to be fully sovereign within Europe. What the SNP argues in 
favour of is Scotland being able to exercise what limited sovereignty it has in a European 
context where the rights of smaller nations are seen to be acknowledged and better protected 
than in the context of the UK state. Such a position would fundamentally question the whole 
concept of independence being the exercise of sovereignty. 
In bringing about devolution Westminster responded to long-standing Scottish 
demands for greater self-government or home rule. It responded to the persistent criticism 
emanating from many sectors of Scottish civil society that Scotland as a nation was not 
having its concerns adequately addressed through the centralised institutions of the UK state. 
Westminster has not directly met any of the SNP's key demands as this would be seen as 
108 Scottish National Party, Yes We Can Win the Best for Scotland: The SNP General Election Budget 
1997 (Edinburgh: SNP, 1997), p. iii. 
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endorsing the SNP's position and conceding to it. From the perspective of the SNP the 
establishment of the Scottish Parliament and the devolution of power to it has been a positive 
step, but it is not an end in itself. Devolution alone is insufficient as a final solution for the 
SNP, as it does not afford the level of recognition desired by nationalists in that party. 
In the Scottish case, recognition of the nation within the UK state is unquestioned, 
yet the issue is more one of how much recognition is enough to meet the demands of some 
nationalists. Unlike Spain, there is not an explicit constitutional rejection of the existence of 
nations other than that identified with the UK state and the Union. Similarly in Canada there 
is no constitutional recognition of the state as being multinational-multicultural, bicultural 
and bilingual yes, but not multinational. As has already been demonstrated, the United 
Kingdom since the unions with Scotland in 1707 and Ireland in 1800 has acknowledged its 
multinational character and has embraced a degree of asymmetry through constitutional 
arrangements. This asymmetry has expanded considerably and has taken on a quasi-federal 
nature with devolution. The undermining of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty by the 
process of devolution has further contributed to an emerging quasi-federalism in the UK 
constitution. As has been argued in this chapter, the whole conception of Britain and the 
union state is being reshaped as devolution establishes in Scotland a new centre of political 
power in Holyrood, a Parliament that has emerged as a national institution. 
The changes brought about through the process of devolution, particularly the 
creation of new institutions in Scotland, have had an impact on the development of Scottish 
national identity. Britishness and Scottishness have existed side by side as two aspects of a 
national identity, and this dual identity is very much a factor in how Scots view themselves 
and their place within the UK. 109 McCrone has argued that national identities have 
historically been ambiguous within the UK and that only with the economic decline faced by 
the UK during the post-war period has there been a greater emphasis on particular national 
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interests.
110 
While both Catalans and Quebecois also share multiple identities with Spain and 
Canada, the majority within the state does not accept the primacy of the Catalan and 
Quebecois national identity within this duality. The majority within the state and its 
members frequently and openly contest the minority national identity. Although the UK 
accepts the idea of a differentiated and increasingly asymmetric state, there remains a debate 
among nationalists over the degree of recognition Scotland requires in order to assert itself 
fully as a nation. What impact devolution will have on the balance between Scottish and 
British identity is difficult to consider at this point. However, polling data demonstrates that 
a growing majority of Scots are more particularistic and identify with being Scottish or 
Scottish more than British. 111 Whether growing asymmetry and expanding quasi-federalism 
is strengthening or weakening this dual national identity is hard to confirm. However, it has 
the ability to bring about fundamental changes in how Scotland perceives itself as a nation 
and how the UK constitution strives to accommodate this reality. 
109 Brown et al., p. 209. . 
110 McCrone, Understanding Scotland: the Sociology of a stateless t:J~tiOn, p. 20~. . 




A Concluding Analysis 
The previous chapters of the thesis have examined theories of nationalism the 
' 
historical background to the nationalist movements in Catalunya, Scotland, and Quebec, the 
constitutional frameworks in which these nations exist, and nationalist arguments for change. 
The aim of these chapters was to present the issues, controversies, and arguments that 
surround the topic of nationalist perspectives on constitutional change in the three nations. 
In chapters five, six, and seven the views held by various particpant-observers shaped an 
analysis of constitutional arrangements, recent constitutional reforms, and nationalist 
arguments as articulated in party manifestoes and speeches by nationalist leaders. The 
principal goal of this concluding chapter is to extend the comparative analysis further by 
drawing together some of the common concepts that emerge out of this study. This chapter 
will also discuss the nature of the comparative approach and the effective use of data from 
participant-observer interviews to support a particular claim. 
The first part of the chapter will discuss aspects of the research method. This section 
will establish the claim as to why this thesis is unique, examine what it has added to broader 
knowledge, and discuss what the practical and theoretical significance of the research is. 
Particular attention will also be paid to looking at issues around the use of participant-
observer interviews. 
The subsequent part of the chapter discusses the use of the comparative approach 
and sets up a theory of comparative analysis. In conducting a comparative, qualitative 
analysis one comes across certain problems in research. In this particular analysis a research 
problem manifested itself in trying to compare and analyse certain concepts that were 
understood in very different ways depending upon which of the three cases was being 
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considered. This leads into a discussion of how to characterise apparent similarities and 
differences when comparing nationalist discourse, the views of participant-observers, and 
constitutional debates in Scotland, Quebec, and Catalunya. 
The third section of the chapter is concerned with the interviewees themselves. The 
reason behind choosing political and academic participant-observers as interviewees will be 
discussed, as will some of the challenges faced in working with participant-observers. Some 
attention will be paid to the role of these observers in their society, what their perceptions of 
the nation are, and finally what their views are of the world around them; in other words, 
how does their environment shape their views. 
The final section is devoted to a broader analysis of the qualitative data itself. The 
dominant argument of this thesis is that there exists a conflict between rival conceptions of 
the nation within multinational states with specific reference to Spain, the United Kingdom, 
and Canada. As has been argued, the Catalans, Quebecois, and Scots as minority national 
groups understand themselves to be nations and assert that Catalunya, Quebec, and Scotland 
constitute minority nations within a larger multinational state. This view of the nation 
conflicts with an identity that equates the state with the nation, an identity that is more or less 
embraced by the population of the state outside the minority nation. The argument of 
nationalists in these three cases under analysis is largely centred on the need for greater 
recognition of their national status. In the cases of Spain and Canada there is very little or no 
recognition given by the state that Catalunya and Quebec constitute nations within a 
multinational state. In the UK there is an explicit recognition of four constituent nations 
comprising the state, Scotland is one of them. However, despite the fact that devolution has 
greatly furthered the recognition of this fact, it has proved to be insufficient recognition in 
the eyes of nationalists in the Scottish National Party (SNP) who argue that independence 
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and Scotland's leaving the Union is the only way Scotland can achieve the full recognition of 
its national status. 
This conflict as it has been presented in the previous chapters centres on a series of 
common concepts. These concepts are recognition, asymmetry, and most importantly 
sovereignty. These are concepts that dominate the discourse of nationalists and other 
commentators and re-occur in each one of the cases being studied. Each one of these issues 
will be analysed in the context of how the partcipant-observers interviewed understood them. 
Particular focus will be paid to how these concepts relate to a particular understanding of 
nationalism and constitutional change in Scotland, Quebec, and Catalunya. 
The Research Claim and Method 
This thesis is based upon qualitative research on nationalist responses to 
constitutional change and, as such, it seeks to present an argument found in the language of 
nationalists and certain participant-observers and how they express and conceive of a set of 
ideas and controversies. As Buchanan argues: "Its [qualitative research] quality lies in the 
power of its language to display a picture of the world in which we discover something about 
ourselves and our common humanity."1 The data and its analysis in this thesis are what help 
to paint a particular ·picture. The analysis and presentation of this data enables this research 
project to be a significant contribution to the fields of nationalism and constitutional politics. 
This research has been conducted over a four-year period in which considerable changes 
have taken place in the constitutional politics of the UK, Canada, and Spain, particularly in 
the first two. The process of devolution and the creation of the Scottish Parliament have led 
to a fundamental reconfiguring of the constitutional framework of the UK. The Canadian 
Federal Government's obtaining of a judicial ruling on Quebec's inability to declare 
unilateral independence in the Reference Case on Quebec Secession has helped establish the 
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current parameters of the Canadian constitutional debate. It can be argued that political 
developments in Spain are less significant. However, the results of the 2000 general election 
saw the coalition Convergencia i Uni6 (CiU) of Jordi Pujollose its role as a power broker in 
the Corts Generals in Madrid, which had helped enable Catalunya to achieve a greater degree 
of autonomy over the last decade. The author's having had an opportunity to research these 
developments while they have been taking place, and to speak with many of those who have 
been part of the process, gives this thesis practical significance. From the theoretical 
perspective, this thesis illustrates how these changes are impacting on conceptions of the 
state and nation and their relationship, and also on ideas of political and legal sovereignty. 
This thesis, and this chapter in particular, demonstrates that even though Scotland, Quebec, 
and Catalunya are nations existing within three different constitutional frameworks, in each 
case the debate over conceptions of the nation is similar. 
As a research project based upon qualitative and comparative research this thesis has 
made use of data obtained from interviews conducted with participant-observers. As 
mentioned in the introduction, these observers were grouped into three categories: 
academics, civil servants, and political actors. The academics chosen were mostly political 
scientists, whose research interests lie in the field of nationalism and constitutional politics, 
and constitutional lawyers. The civil servant and political actor categories were made up of 
those officials, politicians, and former politicians who have been involved in developing 
constitutional policy or negotiating constitutional agreements. The data obtained from these 
interviews was used to inform and illustrate the arguments made in the thesis on issues of 
constitutional change, nationalist platforms, and the conceptions of nation and state. During 
the process of analysing this data many common concepts and perceptions emerged from the 
1 D.R. Buchanan, "An Uneasy Alliance: Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Research Methods," 
Health Education Quarterly (Spring 1992), p. 133. 
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arguments made by participant-observers on the above issues; these common concepts are 
discussed in the final section of this chapter. 
As this thesis is concerned with broad questions of nationalism and constitutional 
change in multinational states, it was detennined that participant-observers would be the best 
source of information to help inform the research questions and develop the research 
argument. As Johnson and Joslyn have argued, these interviewees are useful in the context of 
a research project such as this because of their position as an "insider" with valuable 
information to offer the researcher.2 Due to these observers having such specific knowledge 
they are given individualised treatment in interviews.3 The usefulness of this form of 
interviewing is found in the fact that the interviewees are familiar with interview techniques, 
as most of them have experience either conducting or giving interviews. This fact enables 
the interviewer to assume that the interviewee is familiar with styles of questioning and is 
also familiar with the topics being covered in the interview. While this is a benefit it can 
also be a disadvantage as interviewees will frequently assume ahead of time what the 
interviewer wishes to discuss and thus will come prepared with certain stock answers. It is 
principally for this reason that an open-ended style of interviewing was adopted, thus 
avoiding a "straigh~acket of standardised questions" which could have been view~d by 
interviewees as too limiting in scope.4 
While access to participant-observers is often a problem in this form of qualitative 
research, it was not a significant factor in this research project except in the case of Scotland. 
In Scotland, there has been for the last four years considerable interest expressed by media 
and social science researchers in the devolution issue. In Scotland, the advent of devolution 
with the double-Yes vote in the 1997 referendum and the subsequent political activity 
2 Janet Buttolph Johnson and Richard A. Joslyn, Political Science Research Methods (Washington: 
Congressional Quarterly Press, 1991 ), p. 193. . .. 
3 Jarol B. Manheim and Richard C. Rich, Empirical Political Analysis: Research Methods m Pohttcal 
Se ience (New York: Longman, 1991 ), p. 13 9. 
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leading up to the establishment of the Scottish Parliament in 1999 brought with it a 
tremendous boom in research activity. This increase in activity was evident in the number of 
research studies being conducted by graduate students and academics on related aspects of 
devolution, not to mention the great number of academic and other conferences on the 'New 
Scotland' or the 'New Scottish Politics'. There appeared to be a certain degree of interview 
fatigue on the part of some participant-observers who were involved in the devolution 
process. In a couple of cases, interviewees appeared apathetic to certain questions or 
frustrated at again being asked for their view on the nature of devolution in Scotland. 
Although this was problematic and on one occasion required the demonstration of 
considerable patience, most of the interviews did provide useful data that was analysed and 
incorporated in the thesis. In three or four cases requests for interviews were never 
responded to even after repeated attempts to contact the proposed interviewee. Many of 
these participant-observers, particularly those in the Scottish Parliament and Scottish 
Executive had what John son and Joslyn refer to as "gatekeepers", whose role was to limit 
access.
5 
This can be one of the more problematic aspects of interviewing. 
One danger to be overcome by any interviewer conducting interviews is the 
propensity to pick and choose preferred or convenient answers and thereby construct a 
particular analysis. A serious attempt was made to avoid this. On more than one occasion 
an interviewee would present an entirely new argument on a particular issue, or as in the case 
of an interview with a constitutional lawyer in Catalunya, encourage the interviewer to re-
think completely a particular interpretation ofCatalunya's position within Spain. The data 
obtained from the interviews has enabled a comparison to be made of Scotland, Catalunya, 
and Quebec from the perspective of participant-observers. More will be said of the data and 
4 lbid. 
5 Ibid., p. 194. 
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the interviewees themselves in the analysis of the common concepts that have emerged from 
this research. 
The Comparative Approach 
Comparative Theory and Method 
The thesis adopts a comparative approach in its qualitative analysis of the research 
data. The research project is in its very essence a comparative or multiple case study, in that 
it takes a particular phenomenon and analyses its existence in certain cases. The 
phenomenon, which has already been discussed in some depth, is that there is a conflict 
between rival conceptions of the nation within a multinational state. When the phenomenon 
was analysed in the cases of the three minority nations of Catalunya, Quebec, and Scotland a 
pattern emerged. This pattern indicated a series of common concepts present in each case: 
sovereignty, recognition, and asymmetry. As discussed above, these concepts informed the 
debate over nationalists' responses to constitutional change and also helped to account for 
the presence of the phenomenon in each case. By using several different means of data 
collection which are central to making empirical observations, including personal interviews 
with participant-observers and document analysis, the thesis develops an explanation for this 
phenomenon.6 The explanation rests on how each concept is understood and interpreted 
differently by nationalists and those who are unsympathetic to various nationalist claims. 
For example, a nationalist politician in Catalunya who is a member of CiU will be highly 
sympathetic to the promotion of an asymmetric, multinational Spain. In contrast, a Spanish 
political leader or commentator outside of Catalunya who embraces the idea that Spain 
constitutes the nation will view such a multinational and asymmetric conception of the state 
as anathema. 
6 Johnson and Joslyn, p. 169. 
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In contemplating a comparative analysis of different nationalisms and different 
constitutions it was expected that some clear similarities would be uncovered. As examples 
of similarities it was considered that nationalists might share common approaches to seeking 
greater recognition or view the lack of sufficient representation of the minority nation in 
state institutions as a central issue. As will be discussed the three cases being researched do 
share similarities such as these. Similarities of a more theoretical nature are drawn from the 
analysis of the various common concepts that shape the debate on the conflict between rival 
conceptions of nation. However, adopting a comparative approach does bring with it certain 
difficulties, in particular the problem of comparing nationalisms and constitutional 
frameworks that are different in many ways. 
Uniqueness of the Three Cases 
In comparing nationalisms and constitutional frameworks in Catalunya, Quebec, and 
Scotland, it is not feasible to adopt an approach that seeks to arrive at a nonnative rule for 
how minority nationalisms should behave in multinational states. While common concepts 
do exist, these three cases must be treated as sui generis, emphasising that their uniqueness 
has to be considered when drawing conclusions about how nationalist politics operate within 
the context of each nation. When conducting a comparative analysis of this sort it would be 
wrong to assume that all three nations fit neatly together and that all aspects of their 
nationalism and their place within their respective states' constitutional structure can be 
compared. Indeed, as Mackie and Marsh argue it is not fully possible to adopt a positivist 
approach to research when taking a comparative look at a number of countries: "it is rare, if 
not impossible, to find a country which is so similar to another on all except one variable, so 
the types of tightly-controlled experiment that characterise the natural sciences are very 
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unlikely."
7 
As has been shown, the three minority nations being examined are part of states 
that are at different stages of constitutional change. The nationalist movements in Scotland, 
Catalunya, and Quebec are also at different stages of development, with nationalist parties in 
the latter two only having been elected to power and having had considerable experience in 
government. There will always be substantial differences that should not be discounted but 
' 
rather discussed. In the context of this research, differences do exist in the nature of 
nationalism in Scotland, Quebec, and Catalunya and also in the constitutional framework of 
the states of which they are a part. 
Constitutional Frameworks 
In terms of the constitutional framework and structure of the states being discussed 
three types of state have been analysed here. 
Table 9.1 State Constitutional Structures 
State Type of State Organisation of Sovereignty1 Residuary 
State Power 
UK Constitutional Devolved-Union Exclusive to the state (Sovereign None7 
Monarchy Parliament at Westminster) 
Spain Constitutional Regional Exclusive to the state (Spanish Autonomous 
Monarchy nation) Communities 
Canada Constitutional Federal Divided between Federal Federal 
Monarchy Parliament and Provincial Parliament 
Legislatures 
1 
Sovereignty in the legal or constitutional context rather than political sovereignty. 
2 In a strict legal context, sovereignty lies exclusively at Westminster. However, any area not specifically reserved at 
Westminster is considered devolved to the Scottish Parliament under the Scotland Act, 1998. 
Each state's constitutional framework is unique and, as has been shown, is the result as much 
of political history as of local traditions of constitutional law. All three states are in the 
process of evolving, albeit the United Kingdom is moving considerably faster than the other 
two in that regard. The United Kingdom is a union state in which sovereignty, in a strictly 
legal context, continues to reside in the Westminster Parliament. The Treaty of Union of 
7 Tom Mackie and David Marsh, "The Comparative Method," in Theory and Methods in Political 
Science, eds. David Marsh and Gerry Stoker, Theory and Methods in Political Science (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1995), p. 180. 
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1707 that united the Parliaments of Scotland and England in a new union Parliament at 
Westminster remains a foundation of the UK's constitution. However, as argued in chapters 
four and seven, nationalism in Scotland, partly through the mobilisation of civil society, has 
succeeded in bringing about legislative devolution through the creation of the Scottish 
Parliament. This legislative devolution is in addition to the pre-existing devolved 
administrative structure. As has been shown, devolution has helped to undermine the 
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, a doctrine which is clearly protected ins. 28(7) of the 
Scotland Act, 1998. However, as argued in chapter seven, devolution has established a rival 
centre of political power to Westminster at Holyrood. As a rival centre of power, the 
Scottish Parliament has been legitimised through the 1997 referendum in which the Scottish 
electorate endorsed the devolution process. It can be argued, then, that as an institution the 
Scottish Parliament represents the Scottish people. This is the argument of people such as 
Kenyon Wright who focus on the perceived tradition of Scottish popular sovereignty. As a 
result of this legitimacy, the Scottish Parliament can be argued to exercise a practical 
equivalent of political sovereignty, although it does not have legal sovereignty under the 
constitution. As previously argued, this political sovereignty challenges the sovereignty of 
Westminster in that it effectively renders the Scotland Act, 1998 fundamentally unamendable 
without the consent of Holyrood. However, for Scottish nationalists who are members of the 
SNP devolution is merely a stepping stone on the path towards independence for Scotland 
within Europe. While the SNP leadership supports better governance for Scotland, and the 
Parliament goes some way to achieving this, it is not the final stage in the process of 
constitutional change. The current constitutional status quo in the UK is untenable in the 
opinion of the SNP. 
The Spanish constitution and Catalunya's position within its framework is a product 
of the transition from dictatorship under Franco to liberal democracy founded upon 
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constitutionalism and the rule of law. It is very different from both the UK and Canada 
because it is argued to be regional in structure having both federal elements and some of the 
unitary elements of the union state. Sovereignty is not divided in Spain and there are no 
constituent parts to the state as in a federal system. The autonomous communities were 
created through the 1978 constitution instead of coming together to form a new state. The 
Spanish nation is sovereign as stated in Article 2, yet there is the ambivalent recognition of 
regions and nationalities rather than the clearer declaration that Spain is a multinational state 
that is sought by Catalan nationalists. While the 1978 constitution does enumerate areas of 
jurisdiction between the state and the autonomous communities and does give residuary 
jurisdiction to the autonomous communities, sovereignty is not divided. Neither the Senate 
nor the constitutional court, the Tribunal Constitucional, are federal in composition. Others 
have argued that Spain is a federal state, citing the constitutionally entrenched nature of the 
system of financing the autonomous communities and the distribution of powers. Without a 
constitutional division of sovereignty between the state and its constituent parts there cannot 
be a federal arrangement. The critical issue for nationalists in Catalunya with the Spanish 
constitution is again a lack of recognition of their constituting a nation within a multinational 
Spain. For nationalists, the constitutional status quo is highly problematic if not completely 
unacceptable, and depending on the party there has to be either an explicit recognition of the 
multinational character of Spain and the reform of institutions to reflect this, or 
independence for Catalunya within the EU. 
The constitutional structure of Canada is entirely distinct from the other two in that it 
is the only one that is explicitly federal in nature. The degree to which it is truly federal is 
challenged by many Quebecois nationalists who argue that Ottawa's declaratory power, for 
example, which gives it the power to intervene in areas of provincial jurisdiction is more 
unitary than federal in character. Sovereignty is divided in the Constitution Act, 1867 
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between the Federal Parliament and the Provincial legislatures, including the National 
Assembly of Quebec. As has been argued in chapter five, this structure has its flaws. 
Nationalists in Quebec are largely unsatisfied with the constitutional status quo since 1982 
which has been imposed on them, the National Assembly never having approved the 
Constitution Act, 1982. Again, the desire for the constitutional recognition of Quebec as a 
nation, a distinct society within Canada, has not been realised due to the failure of both the 
Meech Lake Accord of 1987 and the Charlottetown Accord of 1992. Nationalists in Quebec 
argue for an end to the interference of the Federal government in areas of Quebec 
jurisdiction and either a significant reform of the constitution or the creation of a fully 
sovereign Quebec in a new economic and political relationship with Canada. 
Character of Nationalism 
While the constitutional structures are considerably different between these three 
states, the goals of nationalists in Scotland, Quebec, and Catalunya are roughly similar: 
greater recognition of the nation through constitutional reform or some form of 
independence. Although this is the goal of nationalists in each case, the nature of 
nationalism differs from nation to nation. Generally speaking, nationalism in Scotland, 
Quebec, and Catalunya is liberal, democratic, moderate, and inclusive, in that membership in 
the nation is based upon the basis of citizenship and participation within the political 
community, rather than of birth or ethnicity. The fundamental difference that exists between 
these three nationalisms is that Quebecois and Catalan nationalism are essentially language-
based whereas Scottish nationalism is not, and, as argued by McCrone, has few obviously 
distinct cultural traditions or a religious basis. Conversely, linguistic and cultural issues are 
of paramount importance to nationalists in Catalunya and Quebec. Through the exercise of 
governmental power, both Catalan and Quebecois nationalists have been able to promote 
Catalan and French respectively through language legislation, especially with reference to 
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primary and secondary education. In Scotland, language questions are of a relatively minor 
importance as there is a general consensus among all parties of the need to protect Gaelic 
and promote its use in the Gaidhealtachd of the Western Highlands and Islands. There has 
been recent debate on what status should be granted Gaelic by the Scottish Parliament with 
many SNP politicians arguing that it should be given the status of an official language and 
commensurate funding. 
While nationalism is diffuse in all three nations, it is only in Catalunya that several 
parties espousing different ideologies claim explicitly that they are nationalist. In Scotland 
and Quebec nationalists can be found in parties which do not label themselves as nationalist. 
Nationalists in the Scottish Labour Party or the Liberal Party of Quebec may identify 
themselves as such, but they are distinguished from those nationalists in the SNP or the Parti 
Quebecois (PQ) and Bloc Quebecois (BQ) who favour independence of some form for the 
minority nation. The following table therefore deals only with those parties that have been 
discussed in depth in the above chapters and are explicitly nationalist; it summarises what 
has been discussed in greater detail in chapters five, six, and seven. 
Table 9.2 Character of Nationalism in Scotland, Catalunya, and Quebec 
Nation Party ldeolo2Y Constitutional Option Level of Operation 
Scotland SNP Left/Social- Independence within EU Local councils, 
Democratic Holyrood, 
Westminster, EU 
Catalunya CDC Centre Reform of 1978 Local, Generalitat, 
Constitution, Autonomy Corts Generals, EU 
UDC' Centre-right/ Christian Reform of 1978 Local, Genera1itat, 
Democrat Constitution, Autonomy Corts Generals, EU 
PSC Left/Social- Federalism Local, Generalitat, 
Democratic Corts Generals, EU 
ERC Left!Neo-Marxist Independence within EU Local, Generalitat, 
Corts Generals, EU 
IC-Y Left-Green Federalism Local, Genera1itat, 
Corts Generals, EU 
Quebec PQ Centre-Left Sovereignty-Association Quebec National 
Assembly 
BQ Centre Sovereignty-Association Federal Parliament 
1 
Uni6 Democratica de Catalunya is in a governing coalition with Convergencia Democn\tica de Catalunya as C1U. 
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Having examined the general similarities and differences between the three case studies, it is 
important to reassert that in this comparative approach the expectation should not be to prove 
that they are all alike in terms of the responses made by nationalists to constitutional change. 
Rather, these similarities and differences can be analysed in an effort to explain the attitudes 
and responses in each case to the phenomenon of a conflict between rival conceptions of the 
nation. 
Interviewees 
This thesis is not concerned so much with popular attitudes to or conceptions of 
nationalism and constitutional change. The decision to interview academic and political 
participant-observers was made because the ideas being discussed in this thesis are largely 
elite concepts: nations, constitutions, nationalism, and sovereignty. The political scientists, 
constitutional lawyers, civil servants, and other political actors were seen to be the most 
qualified to discuss these concepts at both a theoretical and practical level. Many of those 
interviewed, particularly in the Scottish and Canadian cases, are intimately involved in the 
constitutional politics and nationalist debates being researched. Academics, political leaders, 
and cultural commentators have always played a dominant role in the development of 
nationalism as discussed in chapter one. They are also responsible for the development of 
constitutional theories as well as designing and reforming constitutions. In researching 
concepts of nation in particular the insight provided by academic participant-observers was 
valuable, in that they could perceive the nation from an abstract point of view and thus 
provide considerable data on theoretical aspects of the research. Political participant-
observers were able to discuss the practical aspects of constitutional reform and the 
responses made by states to nationalist arguments for change. 
As a result of their positions within society and the role that they play in 
disseminating and articulating ideas on nationalism and constitutional politics gives these 
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commentators a particular view of the world. It is also important to consider how their 
environments have shaped their views as well. While the topic of the interviews was the 
same in each case, constitutional change and the nationalist perspective, the interviewees 
would each approach the topic in a different way, affected by a variety of factors. These 
factors include nationality, and whether they were academics or non-academics. These 
factors impacted on how they understood c_oncepts such as sovereignty, recognition, and 
asymmetry. For example, a constitutional lawyer might have a very different conception of 
what sovereignty means compared to a political scientist with the former possibly focussing 
on sovereignty as a legal construct and the latter on the political issues affecting it. 
Similarly, a Scottish constitutional lawyer when considering the concept of sovereignty is 
more likely to view it from the perspective of parliamentary sovereignty whereas a 
Quebecois constitutional lawyer will probably consider the concept in a federal context first. 
Appreciating these different perspectives is essential when analysing how the different 
participant-observers emphasised the common concepts in the research. The qualitative data 
from the interviews reinforced the pattern that was evident from the document analysis: that 
certain concepts dominated academic, political, and other discourse on the research topic. 
Interview Data 
The remainder of the chapter will focus on an analysis of the data. This analysis will 
consider how participant-observer conceptions of recognition, asymmetry, and sovereignty 
help provide an explanation for the conflict that exists between rival concepts of nation that 
was found in each of the three cases. 
Recognition 
The level of recognition as nations enjoyed by Catalunya, Scotland, and Quebec is of 
concern to nationalists in each nation. It can be said to be of primary concern in Catalunya 
and Quebec where there is no constitutional or other explicit means of recognising them as 
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nations within a multinational state. The explicit recognition of Scotland as a constituent 
nation of the UK distinguishes it from the other two; however, the level of recognition is still 
contested by nationalists within the SNP. 
Quebecois nationalists argue for the recognition of Quebec's national status within 
Canada; its existence as a distinct society that is founded upon those characteristics that 
defines it as a nation: the French language and culture and its distinct system of civil law. As 
has been discussed, the constitutional entrenchment of this recognition would have helped to 
affirm the dominant understanding of the Canadian federal state held in Quebec. This 
understanding is based upon a concept of duality in which the Quebecois view Canada as 
having two founding peoples or nations: the French and the English, without mentioning the 
many aboriginal nations. The issue of recognition and the conflict between the dualistic 
conception of the state and the so-called Trudeauite conception of the state was argued by 
many interviewees to be the basis for nationalist criticism of the Canadian constitution. The 
Trudeauite conception of the state was presented as the antithesis of duality; it identifies the 
state as the nation and entrenches liberal values in the constitution establishing that all 
provinces are equal, as all citizens are equal. Interviewees focussed in particular on how the 
Trudeauite conception of the state enjoys a hegemony within Canada outside of Quebec and 
how this has severely hindered Quebec's acceptance as a nation. Interviewees who identified 
more strongly with the Trudeauite conception of the state argued that recognition of Quebec 
had been achieved through official bilingualism and the presence of Quebecois in many 
senior positions of power in the federal government. For many interviewees the issue of 
recognition remains unresolved. The desire for greater recognition as a nation was identified 
as a principal issue for nationalists in the BQ and PQ who desire a new arrangement between 
Quebec and the rest of Canada, one that is based on greater sovereignty for Quebec. 
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In the case of Catalunya there exists a similar debate to that in Quebec. The Spanish 
Constitution of 1978 recognises only one nation and that is Spain; hence the nation is 
equated with the state. The solidarity and indivisibility of the Spanish nation is established 
and sovereignty rests with the Spanish people. The constitution in Article 2 makes explicit 
reference to regions and nationalities rather than to nations, a provision that is challenged by 
nationalists not only in Catalunya but in Euskadi and Galicia as well. Article 2 and its 
failure to recognise Catalunya as a nation within Spain was cited by all interviewees as 
problematic for nationalists. In discussing the Spanish constitutional framework and 
nationalist responses to it, interviewees argued that the nationalist desire for greater 
recognition had two aspects to it. Firstly, nationalists argued that Catalunya must be 
recognised as a nation and secondly that there must be a broader recognition of Spain as a 
multinational state, a state that contains within it several minority nations. For Catalan 
nationalists recognition of their status as a nation is their central demand, yet as interviewees 
argued, this demand can be achieved in a variety of ways. Nationalists in the CiU favour 
greater autonomy for Catalunya within Spain and a constitutional recognition of the nation. 
The Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya (PSC) believes that a federal solution for Spain will 
accord Catalunya the greater recognition it seeks. Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya 
(ERC) argues that Catalunya can only achieve full recognition as a nation outside the 
Spanish state since the constitutional status quo is completely untenable. Recognition of 
Catalunya means accepting that Catalunya is distinct from the rest of Spain, and, as was 
argued by certain intervieweess, Madrid cannot accept this since it would negate that concept 
of the solidarity of the Spanish nation. There can be no differentiation within the state. 
Unlike Catalunya and Quebec, where there is no explicit recognition of 
multinationality, Scotland has been recognised as a nation in the UK context since 1707 with 
the UK as whole being understood to comprise four nations. The need for greater 
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recognition was not as strong a concept in the Scottish case; the majority of interviewees did 
not make reference to it. The devolution process was viewed as further establishing the 
distinctiveness of Scotland within the UK and reaffirming the need for the Scottish people to 
exercise greater control over their own affairs. Recognition was only raised as an issue by 
those who supported the SNP's position of advocating independence for Scotland in Europe. 
The recognition afforded to Scotland by the union state, even a devolved union state, 
remains insufficient from the perspective of the SNP. This position is very similar to that 
advocated by the PQ and BQ in Quebec and by ERC in Catalunya. All four parties argue 
that the constitution of the present state has failed to give the minority nation adequate 
recognition of its national status and so the only remedy that exists is separation. While for 
many fundamentalists in the SNP devolution may be unacceptable in the long-term, 
interviewees argued that it has improved the governance of Scotland. Some interviewees 
argued that what devolution had achieved was the gradual reconfiguring of the UK state and 
the introduction of greater asymmetry into the existing framework. 
Asymmetry 
It can be argued based on the data collected that asymmetry within a multinational 
state is a means of providing greater recognition to the minority national group. Asymmetry 
exists in a state when the state has a unique relationship with one or more of the constituent 
units, thus differentiating that unit or those units from others that comprise the state. These 
relationships can be administrative or legislative, constitutionally entrenched or not. 
Asymmetry and its promotion are central concepts in the three cases presented. However, 
participant-observers' views on asymmetry vary from case to case reflecting the particular 
stage of constitutional development that each state is at. 
Asymmetry is a highly contested concept in Quebec and in the rest of Canada. 
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Asymmetry exists largely at the administrative level where the Federal Government and the 
Government of Quebec have negotiated a number of agreements over the years that devolve 
certain federal responsibilities to Quebec, for example pensions, immigration, and manpower 
training. Quebec exercises greater jurisdiction in these areas than other provinces, although 
the other provinces may do so if they choose. As argued above, this establishes an 
asymmetrical relationship on an administrative level between Ottawa and Quebec. For 
nationalists in Quebec these arrangements have given Quebec greater control over their local 
affairs and helped to reduce federal encroachment in areas of provincial jurisdiction; this 
remains a contentious issue for nationalists. However, these administrative agreements have 
not brought about the greater recognition of Quebec as a nation that nationalists in Quebec 
seek. Interviewees who accept a dualistic conception of the Canadian state and acknowledge 
that Quebec is a nation within a multinational Canada argued that there is insufficient 
asymmetry within Canada. Many raised the concept of the 'distinct society' as an example 
of how asymmetry could be entrenched in the constitution and thus recognise Quebec's 
distinctiveness. Various models of constitutional reform have been advocated for Canada, 
many of which were supported by interviewees including a con federal Canada and a Canada 
where there was a high degree of asymmetry that recognised the national claims of not only 
Quebec but also of aboriginal peoples. Several interviewees argued that the hegemony of the 
Trudeauite conception of Canada means that achieving a greater degree of constitutional 
asymmetry in which Quebec would be recognised as distinct from the other provinces is 
increasingly unlikely. From the Trudeauite perspective, greater asymmetry in the Canadian 
constitution runs counter to the liberal ideals of individual equality and by extension the 
equality of the provinces enshrined in the Constitution Act, 1982. This is a view which 
denies the distinctiveness of Quebec. 
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Asymmetry is a contested idea in the Catalan case as well. The Spanish Constitution 
of 1978 grants all regions and nationalities in Spain the collective right to autonomy and all 
autonomous communities may accede to a wide range of competences that are devolved 
from the state to their governments. Catalunya and Euskadi have achieved a high degree of 
autonomy by choosing to exercise competence in most areas devolved to the autonomous 
communities. However, their doing this does not in fact differentiate them from the other 
autonomous communities who, if they chose to, could achieve the same level of autonomy 
by choosing to exercise competence in more areas. Theoretically, then, the seventeen 
autonomous communities that comprise Spain are undifferentiated, in other words no one 
can have an intrinsic right to more extensive jurisdiction than any other. Interviewees as 
well as many nationalist party documents argued that this lack of asymmetry amounts to 
insufficient recognition of Catalunya's status as a nation and thus provides a platform for 
nationalists to criticise the Spanish state. As in Quebec's case, the desire for greater 
recognition as a nation is linked to an argument in favour of a greater asymmetrical state 
where in the Spanish case a nation such as Catalunya is differentiated from a region like 
Extremadura. In interviews, Catalan participant-observers made explicit links between a 
more asymmetrical Spain, recognition of Catalunya as a nation, and the reinterpretation of 
Spain as a multinational state. Asymmetry for Catalan nationalists, apart from those in ERC, 
is thus seen as one of the key building blocks of a new constitutional order. 
There has been considerable discussion of an evolving asymmetry in Britain as a 
result of the creation of the Scottish Parliament. The fact that there has always been an 
explicit recognition of four distinct nations in the United Kingdom demonstrates a degree of 
asymmetry, especially when considering the existence, since the late nineteenth century, of a 
separate bureaucracy for Scotland in the Scottish Office. A number of those interviewed in 
Scotland argued that devolution was encouraging the evolution of an increasingly 
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asymmetrical state where Scotland through its Parliament enjoys a new, quasi-federal 
relationship with Westminster. The Scottish Parliament has control over Scottish domestic 
issues whereas Westminster retains control over non-domestic issues and the constitution. 
The establishment of the Scottish Parliament reinforces the differentiated nature of the 
British constitution by setting up an asymmetrical arrangement with Westminster, an 
arrangement that is unique in the UK. Asymmetry is not treated as a contested concept in 
the UK in the same way as it is in Canada and Spain. This asymmetry has been legitimised 
by the Scottish people through the referendum result of 1997 that led to the passage of the 
Scotland Act, 1998. It has been argued, based on the data obtained, that this increased 
degree of asymmetry has further promoted Scotland as a distinct nation within the UK. 
In each of the three cases there appear some linkages between the concepts of 
recognition and asymmetry, a link that was frequently made by interviewees in discussing 
these concepts. The most significant common concept that links these three cases is 
sovereignty. Debates over sovereignty and the role that sovereignty plays in the conflict 
between rival concepts of nation were found to be significant in the research data. 
Sovereignty has a variety of meanings in each case and is a complex, and again, contested 
concept. 
Sovereignty 
In the context ofCatalunya, Scotland, Quebec and their position within their 
respective states, the concept of sovereignty has a number of different connotations. It can 
be argued that at its most basic level sovereignty is about power, who or what holds it, where 
it is exercised, and the freedom to exercise it in a variety of spheres. From the data obtained 
it is clear that nationalists in minority nations within multinational states frequently have a 
very different conception of sovereignty and how it should be exercised from those operating 
at the state level. The presence of sovereignty as a contested concept in these three cases 
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helps to explain why the phenomenon of a conflict between rival conceptions of nation 
exists. 
As has already been discussed and argued in chapter six, the Spanish conception of 
sovereignty as entrenched in the 1978 constitution is highly problematic for Catalan 
nationalists. Since sovereignty rests in an indivisible Spanish nation, any Catalan claim to 
sovereign nationhood is denied. A number of Catalan interviewees contrasted what they 
termed a Jacobin conception of the state held by Madrid where the state is the nation with the 
Girondin conception held by Catalan nationalists where the state can incorporate a 
multiplicity of nations. A majority of interviewees saw the constitution's understanding of 
sovereignty as being characteristic of a unitary state. It was argued that the problem with the 
Spanish constitution was that it failed to accept the reality of the Spanish state: that it is 
multinational and not unitary. The nationalist response to this conception of sovereignty has 
been varied. CiU argues for a reform of the present constitution in which the multinational 
character of Spain would be explicitly stated, and as discussed, there would be greater 
asymmetry and thus greater autonomy for Catalunya. The PSC and IC-Verds argue in 
favour of a federal reform of the constitution that would incorporate a division of 
sovereignty as in other federal states. ERC rejects the constitution in favour of an 
independent, sovereign Catalunya within the European Union. It was argued by all that from 
a nationalist perspective the present conception of sovereignty entrenched in the 1978 
constitution was highly problematic. 
In the Quebec case sovereignty has a paradoxical meaning. From a constitutional 
perspective, Canada is a federal country and therefore sovereignty is divided between the 
Federal Government and the ten provincial legislatures, of which Quebec is one. This view 
of sovereignty is uncontested, although its practical application is. Interviewees sympathetic 
to Quebecois nationalism identified one of the main criticisms of nationalists as being the 
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Federal Government's continual interference in Quebec's areas of sovereign jurisdiction. 
This has led nationalists in favour of separation to argue for a renewed partnership between 
Quebec and the rest of Canada, an arrangement frequently termed sovereignty-association, or 
more recently, sovereignty-partnership. In this case sovereignty is understood to mean 
separation or independence from Canada and has led to those advocating this view being 
called sovereigntists. For nationalists in the PQ and BQ the exercising of Quebec's 
'sovereignty' implies that it is being done outside the present constitutional framework. 
Nationalists argue that in achieving its sovereignty through a referendum process and 
subsequent negotiations with the rest of Canada, Quebec would resolve the conflict between 
rival conceptions of nation by exiting from the state that does not recognise its conception. 
This highlights the contested nature of the term sovereignty in the Quebec-Canada context. 
In Scotland and in the rest of the UK the devolving of power from Westminster to 
the Scottish Parliament has challenged ideas of sovereignty within the UK constitution. The 
creation of the Parliament at Holyrood as another political centre has had an impact on the 
doctrine of the legislative supremacy of the Westminster Parliament, a doctrine enshrined in 
the Scotland Act, 1998. Chapter seven presents the argument that the presence of a Scottish 
Parliament, with political legitimacy founded upon a popular expression of will, undermines 
Westminster's claim to be sovereign. Interviewees were largely divided on the importance 
of this and the degree to which it was, in fact, a significant change, with one arguing that it 
was part of an ongoing process in which the idea of parliamentary sovereignty was being 
challenged by other factors such as the growing importance of EU institutions. The debate 
that emerges is one between sovereignty in a legal or constitutional sense and sovereignty in 
a political sense. While arguing that in a purely legal conception of parliamentary 
sovereignty Westminster would, for instance, have the power to abolish the Scottish 
Parliament or significantly amend the Scotland Act, in political terms it could not do so 
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without the prior approval of Holyrood. This implies that Holyrood exercises a certain 
political sovereignty that acts as a check on Westminster; it is a sovereignty that one 
interviewee saw as resting with the Scottish people as represented in their Parliament. 
Sovereignty in the Scottish and UK context is evolving to reflect the changes taking place in 
the constitution as new centres of power are established and greater asymmetry is introduced 
into the organisation of the state. 
Sovereignty, recognition, and asymmetry are common concepts that emerge from 
the research undertaken on the conflict between rival conceptions of nation within 
multinational states. The way in which these concepts are interpreted in each of the three 
case studies helps to give a better understanding of why this conflict exists. Considerable 
differences do exist in the character of Catalan, Scottish, and Quebecois nationalism and in 
the constitutional frameworks of Spain, the United Kingdom, and Canada. This chapter has 
demonstrated how, despite these differences that often defy narrow comparisons, there is a 
pattern that emerges in the discourse that is made up of common concepts. Sovereignty, 
recognition, and asymmetry inform an understanding of the phenomenon that lies at the core 
of this thesis argument. The comparative approach is indeed very fruitful in identifying how 
nationalist perspectives on constitutional change are shaped by these common concepts, and 
in many cases by common goals. 
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This thesis has adopted a comparative approach in analysing participant-observer 
perspectives on nationalism in Scotland, Quebec, and Catalunya and the link between 
nationalism and constitutional change within the broader nation-states of the United 
Kingdom, Canada, and Spain. This study is unique in that it was conducted over the course 
of four years, from 1997 to 2001, during which time the United Kingdom and Scotland in 
particular have undergone a period of considerable constitutional reform. The creation of the 
Scottish Parliament is a centrepiece of the Labour government's constitutional package and 
has had a significant impact on constitutional structures within the UK. In an arguably less 
dramatic, though still important way, the Supreme Court of Canada's judgement on Quebec's 
right to unilateral secession has impacted on Ottawa-Quebec constitutional relations and will 
play a role in shaping them for the foreseeable future. In Spain, the re-election of the Partido 
Popular with a majority government in Madrid has the potential to reduce the political 
influence of the Catalan nationalists at the level of the Spanish state. 
These political developments have to a greater or lesser extent determined the path 
taken by this thesis. However, this thesis is much more than an effort to explain these 
events. It is a qualitative analysis of the attitudes of participant-observers in Catalunya, 
Scotland and Quebec towards nationalist movements in these nations and their impact on 
constitutional politics. From the outset, some explanation has been sought for a particular 
phenomenon that relates to how these minority nations are understood within the context of 
the multinational state. In the multinational states of which these nations are a part there is a 
conflict over different conceptions of the nation, one held by Catalan, Scottish and 
Quebecois nationalists and one that is dominant in the rest of the state. 
Conclusion 
After a consideration of nationalist theories and Kymlicka's arguments on the 
relationship between minority national groups and multinational states, a broader analysis 
and discussion of the growth of nationalist movements in Catalunya, Scotland, and Quebec 
was undertaken. In chapters two, three, and four the role of particular leaders and 
polemicists in the construction of nationalist movements was the particular focus as was the 
various strands of nationalism that evolved and coalesced around particular ideologies in 
each nation. These three chapters brought the discussion up to the point at which the current 
constitutional framework of each state emerged. This corresponded with the passage of the 
1978 Spanish constitution and the Catalan Statute of Autonomy in 1980, the passage of the 
Constitution Act, 1982 in Canada and the subsequent failure of the Meech Lake and 
Charlottetown constitutional accords in 1990 and 1992 respectively, and the passage of the 
Scotland Act, 1998. These constitutional events were the points of departure for the 
following three chapters on nationalist perspectives on constitutional change. Chapters five, 
six, and seven dealt more specifically with the conflict between ideas of nations and analysed 
how nationalists understand the present constitutional framework in which their nations 
operate and how this is problematic. Considerable attention was paid to the critical 
arguments made by interview subjects regarding the constitutional positions of the state and 
of nationalists in the minority nations. The final substantive chapter, chapter eight, drew 
together many of the similarities and differences between the three cases and argued for the 
existence of a pattern of shared concepts that informed the broader discussion on how rival 
conceptions of the nation come into conflict. 
Through an analysis of data obtained from personal interviews with academic and 
political participant-observers, and from constitutional and political party documents, an 
explanation for the existence of this phenomenon was offered. In studying this question of 
how the nation is conceived of and how it is recognised within the state, a pattern emerged 
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from the data. Several concepts that were common to the discourse in all three cases 
informed this explanation: sovereignty, asymmetry, and recognition. These concepts were 
highly important to participant-observers, particularly to nationalists as they determined the 
relationship of the minority nation to the state, the way the minority nation is conceived, and 
finally, the constitutional approach adopted by nationalists and non-nationalists. The 
concepts are also interwoven in that the level of recognition afforded to the minority nation 
is dependent on the level and form of sovereignty it enjoys and whether its distinctiveness is 
reflected in constitutional arrangements. While the three cases of Scotland, Catalunya, and 
Quebec are different in many ways, both in the character of their nationalist movements and 
in the constitutional structures of their respective states, nationalists in each nation are all 
seeking greater recognition. 
In conclusion, there is great room for speculation when considering the current 
constitutional situations in these three nations and how their relationship with the rest of 
Canada, Spain, and the UK will evolve in the long term. Many of the subjects interviewed 
and many commentators have advocated the idea that a greater degree of constitutional and 
non-constitutional, or administrative, asymmetry within each multinational state would be a 
positive step towards reconciling differing conceptions of nation. It has been argued by 
many that greater asymmetry and the promotion of these three states, particularly Spain and 
Canada, as differentiated, multinational states is the best means available for discouraging 
the secessionist goals of some nationalists. In the cases of Catalunya and Quebec, greater 
recognition should be promoted through the constitutional entrenchment of clauses that 
acknowledge their distinct status as nations and recognise the state as multinational and 
differentiated. Such a solution could face considerable opposition on the part of the other 
autonomous communities and provinces. In the Canadian context, one approach that could 
be adopted would be to offer greater asymmetry to all provinces on a rolling basis. This 
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would be a modification of the Spanish model in which sections 92 of the Constitution Act, 
1867 could be expanded and modified so that provinces are permitted to exercise jurisdiction 
in as many or as few of the new areas as they chose. Most likely Quebec and the other 
larger, wealthier provinces would choose to exercise control over the maximum number of 
jurisdictions, whereas the smaller provinces would leave many areas under the continued 
jurisdiction of the Federal Government. 
Such a model of rolling devolution could be made applicable to the UK. Hazell and 
O'Leary have already mooted the idea of what they call rolling devolution for the United 
Kingdom, arguing that it could be one method of maintaining the Union while achieving a 
high degree of progressive constitutional reform. 1 A system of rolling asymmetry in the UK, 
moving on from the asymmetry that already exists with Scotland, Northern Ireland, Wales, 
and London, could be a highly effective means of devolving administrative and possibly 
legislative power to regions which desire it. The evolution of a system such as this would 
promote greater subsidiarity in the UK and at the same time maintain the Union. Any 
department or office of intergovernmental affairs that evolves would administer the 
transferral of powers to devolved institutions and promote similar principles of flexibility as 
in the case of Spain. The UK's ongoing evolution into a quasi-federal state is positive as it 
reflects changing conceptions of what sovereignty means vis-a-vis both devolved institutions 
and the European Union. As the sovereignty of Parliament is increasingly challenged, a 
viable and constitutionally progressive form of asymmetry could lead to a unique form of 
federalism that fully embraces the multinational character of the UK through some transfer , 
of sovereignty to devolved institutions. 
Advocating approaches such as these is somewhat prescriptive and speculates on 
what direction constitutional politics will take in Canada and the UK. However, these 
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approaches derive from arguments made in this thesis and from the possible solutions that 
have been presented by a variety of participant-observers. This thesis has articulated a view 
of the constitutional dynamics within multinational states where minority nations strive for 
recognition and nationalists in these nations argue in favour of a variety of constitutional 
options to achieve this recognition. The conflict that exists between rival conceptions of the 
nation should not be ignored as it points to a significant element in the political reality of 
these multinational states. 
At the beginning of this thesis Kymlicka's argument on the recognition of minority 
national cultures in multinational states served as a point of departure. It makes sense, then, 
to return to Kymlicka and his conclusion that multinational states cannot exist unless the 
diversity of national groups within those states have an allegiance to the larger political 
community they inhabit.
2 
In the preceding chapters the argument has been made that in the 
multinational states of the UK, Spain, and Canada there exists this rival conception of what 
the nation is. If looked at from the perspective ofKymlicka, it can be argued that Catalan, 
Scottish, and Quebecois nationalists do have an allegiance to the multinational state, yet it is 
more an identification with the state in comparison to the strong allegiance they feel to their 
minority national groups. Indeed, this thesis has gone to demonstrate that from the 
viewpoint of participant-observers there exists a disconnect between the concepts of "nation" 
and "state" in these multinational states. In each cases of Catalan, Scottish, and Quebecois 
nationalism, political conceptions diverge into these two incompatible definitions of what the 
nation is, with the majority of the population within the minority nation identifying with it as 
the nation and the greater majority of the population outside the minority nation identifying 
with the state as nation. Ultimately, the problem that this creates is that nationalists in the 
1 See Robert Hazell and Brendan O'Leary, "A Rolling Programme of Devolution: Slippery Slope or 
Safeguard of the Union?" in Constitutional Futures: A History ofthe Next Ten Years, ed. Robert 
Hazell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 21-46. 
2 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 13. 
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minority nation do not find themselves represented in the state, even if they did at one time 
as in the case of Scotland within the British Empire. The minority nation is therefore driven 
to define its interests as best it can outside the existing constitutional structure, either by 
seceding from the state or be redefining its relationship within the state so that it can truly 
claim to be represented in the state. As argued above, a response to this problem or 
phenomenon is greater recognition partially through increased asymmetry within the state, 
which would allow the minority nation to find expression as a willing part of the state 
instead of in opposition to it. In other words, nationalists are calling for a re-conceptualising 
of sovereignty. Such a re-conceptualisation could lead to greater recognition and greater 
asymmetry that arguably would respond to the tensions that result from this disconnect 
between nation and state in Canada, Spain, and the UK. 
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Articles 137- 151 of the Spanish Constitution, 1978 
Title VIII Territorial Organization 
Chapter I General Principles Article 137 [Municipalities, Provinces, 
Autonomous Communities] 
The State is organized territorially into municipalities, provinces, and the Autonomous 
Communities which may be constituted. All these entities enjoy autonomy for the 
management of their respective interests. 
Article 138 [Economic Balance] 
( 1) The State guarantees the effective realization of the principle of solidarity vested in 
Article 2, insuring the establishment of a proper and just economic balance among the 
various parts of Spanish territory, with particular attention to the status of the island 
possessions. 
(2) The differences between the Statutes of the various Autonomous Communities may in no 
case imply economic or social privileges. 
Article 139 [Equal Rights, Free Movement] 
( 1) All Spaniards have the same rights and obligations in any part of the territory of the 
State. 
(2) No authority may adopt measures which directly or indirectly hinder the freedom of 
movement and establishment of persons and the free movement of goods throughout Spanish 
territory. 
Chapter 11 Local Administration 
Article 140 [Municipalities] 
The Constitution guarantees the autonomy of the municipalities. These enjoy full legal 
personality. Their government and administration is the responsibility of their own city 
governments which are made up of the mayors and councilmen. The councilmen shall be 
elected by the residents of the municipality via universal equal, free, direct, and secret 
suffrage in the manner established by law. The mayors shall be elected by the councilmen or 
by the residents. The law shall regulate the conditions under which the system of an open 
council may proceed. 
Article 141 [Provinces] 
( 1) The province is a local entity with its own legal personality determined by the collection 
of municipalities and territorial division for the fulfillment of the activities of the State. Any 
alteration in the provincial limits must be approved by the Parliament by means of an organic 
law. 
(2) The government and Autonomous Administration of the provinces shall be trusted to 
Deputations or Corporations of a representative nature. 
(3) Groupings of different municipalities of the province may be created. 
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( 4) l.n the archipel~gos, each island shall also have their own administration in the form of 
Cabiidos or councils. 
Article 142 [Financial Autonomy] 
The loc~l treasuries must h~ve the means necessary for carrying out the functions which the 
law attnbutes to the re~pecttve corporations and they shall be supported basically by their 
own taxes and by shanng those of the State and the Autonomous Communities. 
Chapter Ill Autonomous Communities 
Article 143 [Autonomy Initiative] 
( 1) In the e.xerc.ise of the right to autonomy recognized in Article 2, bordering provinces with 
common htstoncal, cultural, and economic characteristics, the island territories, and the 
provinces with a historical regional unity may accede to self-government and constitute 
themselves into autonomous communities in accordance with the provisions of that Title and 
the respective statutes. 
(2) The initiative for the autonomous process belongs to all the interested deputations or to 
the pertinent inter-island body and to two-thirds of the municipalities whose population 
represents at least the majority of the electorate of each province or island. These 
requirements must be fulfilled within a period of six months from the first agreement 
adopted on the subject by one of the interested local corporations. 
(3) The initiative, in case it does not prosper, can only be repeated after the passage of five 
years. 
Article 144 [Authority Authorization] 
The Parliament, by means of an organic law, may for reasons of national interest: 
a) authorize the establishment of an Autonomous Community when its territorial area does 
not exceed that of a province and does not have the conditions set forth in Article 143; 
b) authorize or accord, depending on the case, a statute of autonomy for territories which are 
not integrated into the provincial organization; and 
c) substitute the initiative of the local corporations to which Article 143(2) refers. 
Article 145 [Restricted Cooperation] 
( 1) In no case shall the federation of Autonomous Communities be allowed. 
(2) The statutes may specify the conditions, requirements, and terms under which the 
Autonomous Communities may establish agreements among themselves for the 
administration and rendering of services pertaining to them, as well as the nature and 
purposes of the corresponding communication of them to the Parliament. Under other 
conditions, cooperation agreements between Autonomous Communities shall require the 
authorization ofthe Parliament. 
Article 146 [Statute of Autonomy] 
The draft of the statute shall be prepared by an assembly consisting of members of the 
Deputation or inter-insular organ of the affected provinces and by the Deputies and Senators 
elected in them and shall be forwarded to the Parliament for its enactment into law. 
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Article 147 [Adopting the Statute] 
( 1) Within the terms of the present Constitution, the statutes shall be the basic institutional 
norm of each Autonomous Community and the State shall recognize them and protect them 
as an integral part of its juridical order. 
(2) The Statutes of autonomy must contain: 
a) The name of the Community which best corresponds to its historical identity. 
b) The delimitation of its territory. 
c) The name, organization, and seat of its own autonomous institutions. 
d) The competences assumed within the framework of the Constitution and the bases 
for the transfer of the corresponding services to them. 
(3) The reform of statutes shall be in accordance with the procedure established in them and 
shall in any case require the approval of the Parliament by means of an organic law. 
Article 148 [Competences] 
( 1) The Autonomous Communities may assume competences in the following: 
1) organization of their institutions of self-government; 
2) alterations of the municipal boundaries contained within its area, and in general 
the functions which belong to the State Administration concerning local corporations and 
whose transfer is authorized by the legislation on Local Governments; 
3) regulation of the territory, urbanism, and housing; 
4) public works of interest to the Autonomous Community in its own territory; 5) 
railways and highways whose itinerary runs completely in the territory of the Autonomous 
Community and within the same boundaries and transportation carried out by these means or 
by cable; 
6) ports of refuge, recreational ports, airports, and generally those which do not carry 
out commercial activities; 
7) agriculture and livestock raising in accord with the general regulations; 
8) woodlands and forestry; 
9) activities in matters of environmental protection; 
1 0) water projects, canals, and irrigation systems of interest to the Autonomous 
Community and mineral and thermal waters; 
11) fishing in inland waters, hunting, and river fishing; 
12) interior fairs; 
13) promotion of the economic development of the Autonomous Community within 
the objectives marked by the national economic polity; 
14) hand icrafts; 
15) museums, libraries, and conservatories of interest to the Autonomous 
Community; 
· 16) monuments of interest to the Autonomous Co~munity; . 
17) promotion of culture, research, and, when applicable, the teachmg of the 
language of the Autonomous Community; 
18) promotion and regulation of tourism within its territorial area; 
19) promotion of sports and adequate utilization of leisure; 
20) social assistance; 
21) health and hygiene; and . . . 
22) the custody and protection of its buildings and installatiOns, th~ coordmat10n and 




(2) After ~.ve years have elapsed a~d through the reform of its statutes, the Autonomous 
Co~muntttes may then expand thetr competences within the framework established in 
Arttcle 149. 
Article 149 [State Competences] 
(I) The State holds e~clusive competence over the following matters: 
. I) .the regulatt?n of the .ba~ic conditions which guarantee the equality of all 
Spantards tn the exerctse ofthetr nghts and fulfillment of their constitutional duties· 2) 
nationality, immigration, emigration, alienage, and the right of asylum· ' 
3) international relations; ' 
4) defense and the Armed Forces· 
' 5) administration of Justice; 
6) mercantile.' p:nal, a~d ~riso~ legislation, procedural legislation, without prejudice 
to the n~cessary spectalttes whtch m thts order may derive from the particularities of the 
substanttve law of the Autonomous Communities· 
' 
7) labor legislation, without prejudice to its execution by the organs of the 
Autonomous Communities; 
8) civil legislation, without prejudice to the preservation, modification, and 
development by the Autonomous Communities of civil "fueros", or special nights, where 
they may exist; in any case, the rules relative to the application and effectiveness of legal 
norms, civil-legal relations having to do with the form of matrimony, regulation of registers 
and public instruments, the bases for contractual obligations, norms for resolving the 
conflicts of laws, and the determination of the sources of the law, in this last case, with 
respect to the norms of the "fueros" and special law; 
9) legislation concerning intellectual and industrial property; 
1 0) system of customs, tariffs, and foreign trade; 
11) monetary system, foreign credits, exchange and convertibility; the general bases 
for the regulation of credit, banking, and insurance; 
12) legislation on weights and measures, determination of the official time; 13) 
bases and coordination of general planning and economic activity; 
14) general finance and debt of the state; 
15) promotion and general coordination of scientific and technical research; 16) 
external health; bases and general coordination of health; legislation concerning 
pharmaceutical products; 
17) basic legislation and economic system of social security, without prejudice to the 
execution of its services by the Autonomous Communities; 
18) the bases of the legal system of the public administrations and the statutory 
system for its officials which shall in every case guarantee that the administered will receive 
a common treatment by them; a common administrative procedure, without prejudice to the 
specialties deriving from the particular organization of the Autonomous Communities; 
legislation on forcible expropriation; basic legislation on contracts and administrative 
concessions, and the system of responsibility of all public administration; 
19) maritime fishing, without prejudice to the competences attributed to the 
Autonomous Communities in the regulation of the sector; 
20) merchant marine and the ownership of ships; lighting of coasts and maritime 
signals; ports of general interest, airports of general interest, control of the air space, transit 
and transport, meteorological service and registration of aircraft; 
21) rail roads and land transport which crosses through the territory of more than one 
Autonomous Community; general communications system, traffic, and movement of motor 
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vehicles;. ma!l and telecommunications; aerial cables, submarine cables, and radio 
commumcat10n; 
22) the legislation, regulation, and concession of water resources and projects when 
the w~ters. run thr?ugh more than one Autonomous Community and the authorization of 
electncal mstallatJOns when their use affects another community or when the transport of 
energy goes beyond its territorial area; 
23) basic legislation on environmental protection without prejudice to the faculties 
of t.he ~utonomous Communities to establish additional standards of protection; basic 
legtslatJOn on woodlands, forestry projects, and livestock trails; 
24) public works of general interest or whose realization affects more than one 
Autonomous Community; 
25) bases of the mining and energy system; 
26) system of production, sale, possession, and use of arms and explosives; 27) 
basic norms of the system of press, radio, and television and, in general, of the other means 
of social communication, without prejudice to the faculties which in their development and 
execution belong to the Autonomous Communities; 
28) protection of the cultural, artistic, and monument patrimony of Spain against 
exportation and exploitation; museums, libraries, and archives belonging to the State without 
prejudice to their management by the Autonomous Communities; 29) public security, 
without prejudice to the possibility of the creation of police by the Autonomous 
Communities in the manner which may be established in the respective statutes within the 
framework of the provisions of the organic law; 
30) regulations of the conditions for obtaining, issuing, approving, and standardizing 
academic and professional degrees and basic norms for carrying out Article 27 in order to 
guarantee compliance with the obligations of the public powers in this matter; 
3 1) statistics for State purposes; and 
32) authorization for the convocation of popular consultations via referendum. (2) 
Without prejudice to the competences which the Autonomous Communities may assume, the 
state shall consider the service of culture a duty and essential attribute and shall facilitate 
cultural communication among the Autonomous Communities in agreement with them. 
(3) The matters not attributed expressly to the state by this Constitution belong to the 
Autonomous Communities by virtue of their respective statutes. Authority over matters not 
assumed by the Statutes of Autonomy shall belong to the state, whose norms shall prevail in 
case of conflict over those of the Autonomous Communities in everything which is not 
attributed to their exclusive competence. The law of the State shall in every case be 
supplementary to the law of the Autonomous Communities. 
Article 150 [Granting and Retaining Authority] 
(1) The Parliament, in matters within the competence of the State, may grant to all or one of 
the Autonomous Communities the authority to dictate for itself legislative norms within the 
framework of the principles, bases, and directives established by a state law. Without 
prejudice to the competence of the Courts, within the framework of every law shall be 
established the method of control by the Parliament over these legislative norms of the 
Autonomous Communities. 
(2) The State may transfer or delegate to the Autonomous Comm~nities by an orga~ic law 
those faculties on matters within the competence of the State, whtch because ofthetr own 
nature are susceptible to transference or delegation. The law shall in each case contain the 




(3) The. State m~y. dictate laws which establish the principles necessary to harmonize the 
normative, provisions of the Autonomous Communities even in the case of matters attributed 
to their compet.en~e when the general interest so demands. It is up to the Parliament, by the 
absolute maJOrity m each Chamber, to evaluate this necessity. 
Article 151 [Immediate Autonomy] 
( 1) It shall not b~ ~e~e~sary to wait for the five-year period referred to in Article 148(2) to 
elapse when the Initiative for the autonomous process is agreed upon within the time limit 
specified in Article 143(2), not only by the corresponding Provincial Deputations or inter-
island bodies, but also by three-quarters of the Municipalities of each province concerned, 
representing at least the majority of the electorate of each one, and said initiative is ratified 
by means of a referendum by the affirmative vote of the absolute majority of the electors in 
each province, under the terms to be established by an organic law. 
(2) In the case provided for in the foregoing paragraph, the procedure for drafting the statute 
shall be as follows: 
1) The Government shall summon all the Deputies and Senators elected in the 
electoral districts within the territorial area seeking self-government in order to constitute 
themselves into an Assembly for the sole purpose of drawing up the corresponding draft 
statute for self-government, to be adopted by the absolute majority of its members. 
2) Once the draft statute has been passed by the assembly, it shall be remitted to the 
Constitutional Commission of the House of Representatives which shall examine it within 
the time of two months with the concurrence and assistance of a delegation from the 
Assembly which has proposed it, in order to decide in cofllmon agreement upon its definitive 
formulation. 
3) If such an agreement is reached, the resulting text shall be submitted in a 
referendum of the electoral corps of the provinces within the territorial area to be covered by 
the proposed statute. 
4) If the draft statute is approved in each province by the majority of validly cast 
votes, it shall be referred to the Parliament. Both Chambers, in plenary assembly, shall 
decide upon the text by means of a vote of ratification. Once the statute has been approved, 
the King shall sanction it and shall promulgate it as law. 
5) If the agreement referred to in Subparagraph 2) is not reached, the draft statute 
shall be treated like a draft law in the Parliament. The text approved by them shall be 
submitted in a referendum of the electoral corps of the provinces within the territorial area to 
be covered by the draft statute. In the event that it is passed by the majo~ity o~ the validly . 
cast votes in each province, it shall be promulgated under the terms outlmed m the foregomg 
subparagraph. . . 
(3) In the cases described in Subparagraphs 4) and 5) of the fore~omg paragraph, ~all~re to 
pass the draft statute by one or several of the provinces shall not Impede the constitutJO~ of 
the remaining provinces into an Autonomous Community in the form as shall be established 




Catalan Statute of Autonomy, 1979 Articles 9-20 
SECTION ONE 
Jurisdiction of the "Generalitat" 
Article 9 
The "Ge~era.litat" o.f Catalo~ia ~ha~l have sole jurisdiction over the following matters: 
1. Orgamzatton of Its own mstttuttons of self-government, within the framework of this 
Statute. 
2. Preservation, modification and development of Catalan civil law. 
3. ~rocedural laws and laws concerning administrative procedure arising from the 
particular features of the substantive law of Catalonia or from the special characteristics 
of the organization of the "Generalitat". 
4. Culture. 
5. Historical, artistic, monumental, architectural, archaeological and scientific heritage, 
without prejudicing the provisions laid down under point 28 of paragraph 1 of article 149 
of the Constitution. 
6. Archives libraries, museums, newspaper libraries and other centres of cultural 
reference not under State control. Conservatories of Music and Fine Arts services of 
interest to the Self-Governing Community. 
7. Research, without prejudicing the stipulations laid down under point 15 of paragraph 1 
of article 149 of the Constitution. Those Academies whose seat is in Catalonia. 
8. Local Government, without prejudicing the provisions laid down under point 18 of 
paragraph 1 of article 149 of the Constitution. Alterations to municipal boundaries and 
the official names of municipalities and other place names. 
9. Territorial and coastline planning, housing and town planning. 
10. Woodland, forestry resources and services, livestock trails and pastures, specially 
protected natural and mountain are&s, in accordance with the provisions laid down under 
point 23 of paragraph 1 of article 149 of the Constitution. 
11. Health, taking into account the stipulations of article 17 of this Statute. 
12. Tourism. 
13. Public works not legally classified as being of general interest to the State or whose 
execution does not affect any other Self-Governing Community. 
14. Roads and highways whose routes are entirely contained within the territory of 
Catalonia. 
15. Railways, transport by land, sea, river and cable; ports, heliports, airports and the 
Meteorological Service of Catalonia, without prejudicing the provisions laid down under 
points 20 and 21 of paragraph 1 of article 149 of the Constitution. Hiring centres and 
loading terminals for transport services. 
16. Hydraulic projects, canals and irrigation works, whenever the waters flow entirely 
within the territory of Catalonia; installations for the production, distribution ~nd . 
transportation of energy, whenever such transportation does not leave the terrttory and 1ts 
use does not affect any other province or Self-Governing Community; mineral, thermal 
and underground waters. All of these without prejudicing the provisions laid down under 
point 25 of paragraph 1 of article 149 of the Constitution. 
17. Fishing in inland waters, the shellfish industry, aquaculture, hunting and lake and 




19. Pharmaceutical reg~lations, without prejudicing the provisions laid down under point 
16 of paragraph 1 of arttcle 149 of the Constitution. 
20. Setting u? and planning of centres for dealings in commodities and securities in 
accordance wtth commercial legislation. ' 
21: Co-operatives, ~utual b~n~fit ~ocieties not included in the Social Security system 
and other co-operattve associatiOns m accordance with commercial legislation. 
22 .. Re~l. Estate Cha~~ers, C~ambers of Commerce, industry and Shipping, without 
preJU~tct~g the provtstons latd down under point 10 of paragraph 1 of article 149 of the 
ConstitutiOn. 
23 .. Pr?f~ssional As~o.ciations and the exercise of degree-qualified professions, without 
prejudtctng the provtstons of articles 36 and 139 of the Constitution. 
24. Foundations and associations of an educational, cultural, artistic, charitable, welfare 
or similar nature, whose activities are carried on chiefly in Catalonia. 
25. Social welfare. 
26. Youth. 
27. Promotion of women. 
28. Public institutions for the protection and guardianship of minors, with constant 
respect for civil, penal and penitentiary legislation. 
29. Sport and leisure. 
30. Advertising, without prejudicing the laws passed by the State for specific sectors and 
media. 
3 1 . Entertainment. 
32. Casinos, gaming and betting, excluding the state system of sports betting for charity 
(football pools). 
33. Statistics of interest to the "Generalitat". 
34. Other matters expressly stated in this Statute as being under the sole jurisdiction of 
the "Generalitat" and those of a similar nature which are transferred to it by the State 
through an Organic law. 
Article 10 
1. Within the framework of the basic legislation of the State and, when appropriate, 
under the terms established therein, it is incumbent upon the "Generalitat" to develop and 
implement legislation in the following areas: 
1) Juridical system and system of liability of the administration of the "Generalitat" 
and the public bodies dependent on it, in addition to the Statute of their civil 
servants. 
2) Compulsory expropriation, administrative contracts and concessions, within the 
area under the jurisdiction of the "Generalitat"' 
3) Retention for the public sector of essential resources or services, especially in the 
case of monopolies, and the auditing of companies when the general interest so 
demands. 
4) Planning of credit, banking and insurance. 
5) Mining and energy organization. 
6) Protection of the environment, without prejudicing the powers of the "Generalitat" 
to lay down additional standards of protection. 
7) Fisheries planning. . . 
2. It is incumbent on the "Generalitat" to develop the legtslatJOn of the system of 
Municipal Popular Consultations within the area of ~atalonia, in a~cordance with the 





cle .149 of the Constitution, it being the responsibility of the State to authorize such 
consu tattons. 
Article 11 
It is i.ncumbent on the "Generalitat" to implement State legislation in the following areas: 
1. Pnsons. 
2. Labour aff~irs, assuming the powers, jurisdiction and services currently held in this 
area ~t executtve ~eve I b~ the State in respe.ct of labour relations, without prejudicing the 
States powers of mspectton. The State retams all powers as regards internal and external 
population movement and national employment funds, without prejudicing whatever 
State laws may lay down on these matters. 
3. Copyright and patents. 
4. Appointment of bill brokers, stockbrokers and commercial brokers. Intervention, 
when appropriate, in drawing up the corresponding demarcations. 
5. Weights and measures. Hallmarks. 
6. International fairs held in Catalonia. 
7. Museums, archives and libraries under State management when the State does not re-
serve this management for itself. 
8. Ports and airports classified as being of general interest, whenever the State does not 
reserve their direct management for itself. 
9. Planning of the transportation of goods and passengers whose points of departure and 
destination lie within the territory of the Self-Governing Community, even though such 
transportation may be effected on infrastructures belonging to the State, as referred to 
under point 21 of paragraph 1 of article 149 of the Constitution, without prejudicing such 
direct implementation as the State may reserve for itself. 
10. Rescue work at sea and dumping of industrial waste and pollutants in State territorial 
waters off the Catalan coast. 
11. Other questions expressly stated in this Statute as coming under the jurisdiction of 
the "Generalitat" and those of this nature which may be transferred to it by the State 
through an organic law. 
Article 12 
1. In accordance with the bases and planning of the general economic activity and 
monetary policy of the State, it is incumbent on the "Generalitat", under the terms of 
the provisions of articles 38, 131 and points 11 and 13 of paragraph 1 of article 149 
of the Constitution, 17 to hold sole jurisdiction over the following areas: 
1) Planning of economic activity in Catalonia. 
2) Industry, without prejudicing whatever State laws may determine for reasons of 
safety, health or military interest, and the regulations concerning industries su~ject to 
legislation on mines, hydrocarbons and nuclear power. The power to authonze the 
import of foreign technology lies solely with the State. 
3) The development and implementation in Catalonia of plans drawn up by the State 
for the restructuring of industrial sectors. 
4) Agriculture and livestock farming. . . . . 
5) Internal trade, protection of the consumer and user, witho~~ pr~~udicmg. the 
general policy on prices and legislation on defence from competitiOn. AppelatiOns 
controlees" in collaboration with the State. 
6) Corporate, public and territorial credit instit~tio~s .and Savings ~a~ks. . 
7) The public economic sector of the "Generahtat , m so far as this IS not envisaged 
under other laws in this Statute. 
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2. The "?eneralit~t" shall al~o participate in the management of the State's public 
economtc sector, m appropnate cases and activities. 
Article 13 
1. T~e "Generalitat" may set up an Autonomous Police Force within the framework 
oftht~ St~tute and that of the Organic Law provided for in article 149, 1.29 of the 
Constttutton for matters not specifically regulated in the former. 
2. The Autonomous Police Force of the "Generalitat" shall have the following 
functions: 
a) The protection of property and persons and the maintaining of law and order. 
b) The guarding and protecting of the buildings and installations of the "Generalitat". 
c) The remaining functions provided for in the Organic Law referred to in paragraph 
1 of this article. 
3. It is incumbent on the "Generalitat" to exercise overall command of the 
Autonomous Police Force and to co-ordinate the activities of Local Police Forces. 
4. The State Security Forces and Corps under State control shall have sole 
responsibility for police services of an extra- and supra-community nature, such as 
guarding ports, airports, coasts and frontiers, customs, controlling the entry and exit 
from national territory of Spaniards and foreigners, the legal framework for foreign 
residents, extradition and expulsion, emigration and immigration, passports, national 
identity cards, traffic of arms and explosives, fiscal protection of the State, 
smuggling and tax fraud and other functions directly assigned to them by article 104 
of the Constitution and by the Organic Law which is to develop it further. 
5. The Judiciary Police and Corps which perform this function shall depend on the 
judges, the Courts and the Office of the Public Prosecutor in respect of the functions 
set out in article 126 of the Constitution 20 and in the terms provided for in the 
procedural laws. 
6. The Security Council is hereby set up, comprising an equal number of representatives 
of the State Government and the "Generalitat", for the purpose of co-ordinating the 
activities of the "Generalitat" Police and the State Security Forces and Corps. 
7. The Security Council shall determine the Statute, Regulations, staff, numbers and 
recruitment of the Police Force of the "Generalitat", whose commanding officers shall be 
appointed from among the Chiefs and Officers of the State Armed Forces and State 
Security Forces and Corps who, while serving in the Police Force of the "Generalitat", 
shall be placed in the administrative situation to be established in the Organic Law 
referred to in paragraph 1 of this article or in the situation that the State Government may 
determine, and while in this situation shall not be subject to military law. Licences for 
arms shall in all cases be the responsibility of the State alone. 
Article 14 
1. Using the powers and exercising the jurisdiction assigned to it by the Constitution, 
the Government shall take control of all the services included in the previous article 
and the Security Forces and Corps may intervene in functions ascribed to the Police 
Force of the "Generalitat", in the following cases: 
a) When called upon to do so by the "Generalitat". Intervention shall cease at the 
request of the "Generalitat". 
b) On their own initiative, when they consider that the State interest is gravely 
endangered, and with the approval of the Security Council. 
In cases of particular urgency, the State Security Forces and Corps may intervene 
under the sole responsibility of the State Government, which shall report to the 
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"Cort~s Generales". The "Cortes Generales", through constitutional procedures, may 
exercise the powers vested in them. 
2. In the event of the declaration of states of alarm, exceptions or siege, all police 
Forces. ~nd Corps shall be place? under the direct order, of the civil or military 
authonties, as the case may be, m accordance with the legislation regulating such 
matters. 
Article 15 
It is fully within the jurisdiction of the "Generalitat" to reaulate and administer 
~d~ca~io.n in al.l its scop~, levels, degrees, kinds and speci:lities, within the area of its 
JUnsdictJOn, Without prejudicing the provisions of article 27 of the Constitution and 
Organic Law~ which, in accordance with the first paragraph of article 81 therein, 
may develop It, or the powers assigned to the State under point 30 of paragraph 1 of 
article 149 of the Constitution 2 and the inspection necessary for its proper 
implementation and safeguarding. 
Article 16 
1. Within the framework of the basic laws of the State, it is the responsibility of the 
"Generalitat" to develop and implement legislation for the system of radio and 
television broadcasting in the terms and cases established by the law which is to 
regulate the Legal Statute for Radio and Television. 
2. It is also incumbent on it, within the framework of the basic laws of the State, to 
develop and implement legislation for the press system and, in general, that of all the 
media for social communication. 
3. In the terms established in the foregoing paragraphs of this article, the 
"Generalitat" may regulate, create and maintain its own television, radio and press 
and, in general, ail the media for social communication used for the accomplishing 
of its ends. 
Article 17 
1. It is the responsibility of the "Generalitat" of Catalonia to develop and implement 
the basic legislation of the State on internal health matters. 
2. With regard to Social Security, it shall be incumbent on the "Generalitat" of 
Catalonia to: 
a) Develop and implement the basic legislation of the State, except for the laws 
which constitute the Social Security's economic organization. 
b) Manage the said economic organization of the Social Security 
3. The "Generalitat" shall also be responsible for the implementation of State 
legislation on pharmaceutical products. 
4. Within its territory, the "Generalitat" of Catalonia may organize and administer 
for these purposes all the services connected with the matters expressed above and 
shall supervise institutions, organizations and foundatio~s conne~ted wi~h Heal~~ . 
and Social Security matters. The State shall reserve for Itself the mspect10n facilities 
which shall enable it to fulfil the duties and powers contained in this article. 
5. The "Generalitat" of Catalonia shall adapt the exercise of the powers it may 
assume in Health and Social Security matters to criteria of democratic participation 
on the part of all those involved, and also of the Employees' Union, and Employers' 




~s regards the administration of justice, except for military justice, it shall be 
mcumbent on the "Generalitat": 
1. To exercise. all the yo~~rs which the Organic Laws of the Judiciary and the 
General Counctl of the JUdtctary recognize or assign to the State Government. 
2. To. establish th~ boundaries of the territorial divisions of the jurisdictional 
agenctes of Catalonta and to determine their seat. 
3. To contribute to the organization of common law and traditional courts and to the 
setting up of magistrates, courts in all cases in accordance with the provisions of the 
Organic law of the judiciary. 
Article 19 
The High Court of Justice of Catalonia, with which the present Territorial Court of 
Barcelona shall be merged, is the organ of justice which shall embody judicial 
organization in its territorial area and before which all procedural appeals are to be 
heard under the terms of article 152 of the Constitution 24 and in accordance with 
this Statute. 
Article 20 
1. The jurisdiction of the judicial authorities in Catalonia extends: 
a) In civil cases, to all instances and degrees, including appeals for case review and 
High-Court appeals in matters ofCatalan Civil Law. 
b) In penal and social cases, to all instance, and degrees, with the exception of 
High-Court appeals and appeals for case review. 
c) In cases of administrative litigation, to all instances and degrees, whenever acts 
handed down by the Executive Council or Government or by the Administration of 
the "Generalitat" are involved, in matters where legislation is the sole responsibility 
of the Self-Governing Community and in the first appeal, when acts handed down by 
the State Administration in Catalonia are involved. 
d) To questions of jurisdiction among the different judicial organs of Catalonia. 
e) To appeals concerning the classification of documents referring specifically to 
Catalan law which shall have access to Real Estate Registers. 
2. In other matters, appeals may be lodged, when appropriate, with the Supreme 
Court. Such appeals shall comprise the High Court appeal, or whichever is 
appropriate according to State Law, including the appeal for revision. The Supreme 
Court shall also solve disputes affecting powers and jurisdiction between the Courts 










1. The following aspects of the constitution are reserved matters that is-
( a) the Crown, including succession to the Crown and a regency' 
(b) the Uni?n of the Kingdoms of Scotland and England, ' 
(c) the Parliament of the United Kingdom, 
(d) the continued existence of the High Court of Justiciary as a criminal court of first 
instance and of appeal, 
(e) the continued existence of the Court of Session as a civil court of first 
instance and of appeal. 
2. - ( 1) Paragraph 1 does not reserve-
( a) Her Majesty's prerogative and other executive functions, 
(b) functions exercisable by any person acting on behalf of the Crown, or 
(c) any office in the Scottish Administration. 
(2) Sub-paragraph (1) does not affect the reservation by paragraph 1 of honours and 
dignities or the functions of the Lord Lyon King of Arms so far as relating to the 
granting of arms; but this sub-paragraph does not apply to the Lord Lyon King of 
Arms in his judicial capacity. 
(3) Sub-paragraph (1) does not affect the reservation by paragraph 1 of the 
management (in accordance with any enactment regulating the use of land) of the 
Crown Estate. 
( 4) Sub-paragraph (1) does not affect the reservation by paragraph 1 of the functions 
of the Security Service, the Se~ret Intelligence Service and the Government 
Communications Headquarters. 
3. - ( 1) Paragraph 1 does not reserve property belonging to Her Majesty in right of 
the Crown or belonging to any person acting on behalf of the Crown or held in trust 
for Her Majesty for the purposes of any person acting on behalf of the Crown. 
(2) Paragraph 1 does not reserve the ultimate superiority of the Crown or the 
superiority of the Prince and Steward of Scotland. 
(3) Sub-paragraph ( 1) does not affect the reservation by paragraph 1 of-
( a) the hereditary revenues of the Crown, other than revenues from bona vacantia, 
ultimus haeres and treasure trove, 
(b) the royal arms and standard, 
(c) the compulsory acquisition of property held or used by a Minister of the Crown 
or government department. 
4. - ( 1) Paragraph 1 does not reserve property held by Her Majesty in Her private 
capacity. 
(2) Sub-paragraph (1) does not affect the reservation by paragraph 1 of the 
subject-matter of the Crown Private Estates Acts 1800 to 1873. 
5. Paragraph 1 does not reserve the use of the Scottish Seal. 
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. . Political parties 
6. The registratiOn and funding of political parties is a reserved matter. 
Foreign affairs etc. 
7 · .- ( 1) International relations, including relations with territories outside the United 
Kmg~om? the Europe~n Communities (and their institutions) and other international 
org~msat10ns, regulation of international trade, and international development 
assistance and co-operation are reserved matters. 
(2) Sub-paragraph (1) does not reserve-
( a) observ.ing and implementing international obligations, obligations under the 
Huma~ ~Ights ~~nvention and obligations under Community law, 
(b) assistmg Mmisters of the Crown in relation to any matter to which that sub-
paragraph applies. 
Public service 
8.- (1) The Civil Service ofthe State is a reserved matter. 
(2) Sub-paragraph ( 1) does not reserve the subject-matter of-
( a) Part I of the Sheriff Courts and Legal Officers (Scotland) Act 1927 (appointment 
of sheriff clerks and procurators fiscal etc.), 
(b) Part Ill of the Administration of Justice (Scotland) Act 1933 (officers of the High 
Court of Justiciary and of the Court of Session). 
Defence 
9. - ( 1) The following are reserved matters-
( a) the defence of the realm, 
(b) the naval, military or air forces of the Crown, including reserve forces, 
(c) visiting forces, 
(d) international headquarters and defence organisations, 
(e) trading with the enemy and enemy property. 
(2) Sub-paragraph ( 1) does not reserve-
( a) the exercise of civil defence functions by any person otherwise than as a 
member of any force or organisation referred to in sub-paragraph (1 )(b) to (d) or 
any other force or organisation reserved by virtue of sub-paragraph ( 1 )(a), (b) 
the conferral of enforcement powers in relation to sea fishing. 
Treason 
10. Treason (including constructive treason), treason felony and misprision of 




1. The matters to which any of the Sections in this Part apply are reserved 
matters for the purposes of this Act. . . . 
2. A Section applies to any matter described or referred to m It ~hen read with any 
illustrations, exceptions or interpretation pro~isions i~ ~hat ~ect10n .. 
3. Any illustrations, exceptions or interpretatiOn provisions m a Section relate only 





. I! eat/ A- Financial and Economic Matters 
A 1. F1scal, econom1c and monetary policy 
~1. Fi~cal, ec~nomic and monetary policy Fiscal, economic and monetary policy 
mcludl~g the Issue ~nd circulation of money, taxes and excise duties, government ' 
borrowmg and lendmg, control over United Kingdom public expenditure the 
exchange rate and the Bank of England. ' 
Exception Local taxes to fund local authority expenditure (for example council 
tax and non-domestic rates). ' 
A2. The currency 
A2. The currency Coinage, legal tender and bank notes. 
A3. Financial services 
A3. Financial services Financial services, including investment business 
banking and deposit-taking, collective investment schemes and insurance~ 
Exception The subject-matter of section 1 of the Banking and Financial Dealings 
Act 1971 (bank holidays). 
A4. Financial markets 
A4. Financial markets Financial markets, including listing and public offers of 
securities and investments, transfer of securities and insider dealing. 
AS. Money laundering 
AS. Money laundering The subject-matter of the Money Laundering 
Regulations 1993, but in relation to any type of business. 
Head B -Home Affairs 
B 1. Misuse of drugs 
Bl. Misuse of drugs The subject-matter of-
( a) the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, 
(b) sections 12 to 14 of the Criminal Justice (International Co-operation) Act 1990 
(substances useful for manufacture of controlled drugs), and 
(c) Part V of the Criminal Law (Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 1995 (drug 
trafficking) and, so far as relating to drug trafficking, the Proceeds of Crime 
(Scotland) Act 1995. 
B2. Data protection 
B2. Data protection The subject-matter of-
( a) the Data Protection Act 1998, and 
(b) Council Directive 95/46/EC (protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data). 
Interpretation If any provision of the Data Protection Act 1998 is not in force on the 
principal appointed day, it is to be treated for the purposes of this 
reservation as if it were. 
B3. Elections 
B3. Elections Elections for membership of the House of Commons, the European 
Parliament and the Parliament, including the subject-matter of-
( a) the European Parliamentary Elections Act 1978, . 
(b) the Representation of the People Act 1983 and the RepresentatiOn of the 
People Act 1985, and 
(c) the Pari iamentary Constituencies Act 1986, . 
so far as those enactments apply, or may be applied, in respect of such membership. 




B4. Firearms The subject-matter of the Firearms Acts 1968 to 1997 
B5. Entertainment · 
BS. Entertainment The subject-matter of-
( a) the Video Recordings Act 1984, and 
(b) sectio?s 1 t? 3 and 5 to 16 of the Cinemas Act 1985 (control of exhibitions). 
T~e ~lasstficat10n of films for public exhibition by reference to their suitability for 
vtewmg by persons generally or above a particular age, with or without any advice 
as to the desirability of parental guidance. 
B6. Immigration and nationality 
B6. Immigration and nationality Nationality; immigration, including asylum and 
the status and capacity of persons in the United Kingdom who are not British 
citizens; free movement of persons within the European Economic Area; issue of 
travel documents. 
B7 .Scientific procedures on live animals 
B7.Scientific procedures on live animals The subject-matter of the Animals 
(Scientific Procedures) Act 1986. 
B8. National security, interception of communications, official secrets and 
terrorism 
B8. National security, interception of communications, official secrets and 
terrorism 
National security. 
The interception of communications; but not the subject-matter of Part Ill of the 
Police Act 1997 (authorisation to interfere with property etc.) or surveillance not 
involving interference with property. 
The subject-matter of-
( a) the Official Secrets Acts 1911 and 1920, and 
(b) the Official Secrets Act 1989, except so far as relating to any information, 
document or other article protected against disclosure by section 4(2) (crime) and 
not by any other provision of sections 1 to 4. 
Special powers, and other special provisions, for dealing with terrorism. 
B9. Betting, gaming and lotteries 
B9. Betting, gaming and lotteries Betting, gaming and lotteries. 
B 10. Emergency powers 
BlO. Emergency powers Emergency powers. 
B 11. Extradition 
Bll. Extradition Extradition. 
B 12. Lieutenancies 
B12. Lieutenancies The subject-matter of the Lieutenancies Act 1997. 
Head C- Trade and Industry 
C 1. Business associations . . . 
Cl. Business associations The creation, operation, regulatiOn and dtssolutJOn of 
types of business association. . . . 
Exceptions The creation, operation, re~ulatto? and dtssol~tton of-
( a) particular public bodies, or pubhc bodtes of a parttcular type, 
established by or under any enactment, and 
(b) charities. · d · · d 1) 
Interpretation "Business association" means any perso.n (other t~an an m tvt ua 
established for the purpose of carrying on any kmd ofbusmess, 
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whether or not for profit; and "business" includes the provision of 
benefits to the members of an association. 
C2. Insolvency 
C2. Insolvency In relation to business associations-
( a) the modes of, t~~ ~roun~s f?r and the general legal effect of winding up, and the 
persons who may Initiate wmdmg up, 
(b) liability to contribute to assets on winding up, 
(c) ?owers of ~ourts in relation to proceedings for winding up, other than the power 
to Sist proceedmgs, 
(d) arrangements with creditors, and 
(e) procedures giving protection from creditors. 
Preferred or preferential debts for the purposes of the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 
1985, the Insolvency Act 1986, and any other enactment relating to the 
. .sequestration of the estate of any person or to the winding up of business 
associatiOns, the preference of such debts against other such debts and the extent of 
their preference over other types of debt. 
Regulation of insolvency practitioners. 
Co-operation of insolvency courts. 
Exceptions In relation to business associations-
( a) the process of winding up, including the person having responsibility for the 
conduct of a winding up or any part of it, and his conduct of it or of that part, 
(b) the effect of winding up on diligence, and 
(c) avoidance and adjustment of prior transactions on winding up. 
Floating charges and receivers, except in relation to preferential debts, 
regulation of insolvency practitioners and co-operation of insolvency 
courts. 
Interpretation "Business association" has the meaning given in Section Cl of this Part of 
this Schedule, but does not include any person whose estate may be sequestrated 
under the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985 or any public body established by or 
under an enactment. 
"Winding up", in relation to business associations, includes winding up 
of solvent, as well as insolvent~ business associations. 
C3. Competition 
C3. Competition Regulation of anti-competitive practices and agreements; abuse of 
dominant position; monopolies and mergers. 
Exception Regulation of particular practices in the legal profession for the 
purpose of regulating that profession or the provision of legal services. 
Interpretation "The legal profession" means advocates, solicitors and qualified 
conveyancers and executry practitioners within the meaning of Part 11 of the Law 
Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1990. 
C4. Intellectual property 
C4. Intellectual property Intellectual property. 
Exception The subject-matter of Parts I and 11 of the Plant Varieties Act 1997 
(plant varieties and the Plant Varieties and Seeds Tribunal). 
CS. Import and export control 
C5. Import and export control The subject-matter of the Import, Export and 
Customs Powers (Defence) Act 1939. . 
Prohibition and regulation of the import and export of endangered species of 
animals and plants. 
Exceptions Prohibition and regulation of movement into and out of Scotland of-
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(a) foo~, animals, ani~al products, plants and plant products for the purposes of 
protectmg human, am mal or plant health, animal welfare or the environment or 
obser~ing or im.plementing o~l~gations under the Common Agricultural Policy, and 
(b) ammal.feedmg stuffs, fertilisers and pesticides for the purposes of protecting 
human, antmal or plant health or the environment. 
C6. Sea fishing 
C6. Sea fishing Regulation of sea fishing outside the Scottish zone (except in 
relation to Scottish fishing boats). 
Interpretation "Scottish fishing boat" means a fishing vessel which is registered in the 
register maintained under section 8 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1995 and whose 
entry in the register specifies a port in Scotland as the port to which the vessel is to 
be treated as belonging. 
C7. Consumer protection 
C7. Consumer protection Regulation of-
(a) the sale and supply of goods and services to consumers, 
(b) guarantees in relation to such goods and services, 
(c) hire-purchase, including the subject-matter of Part III of the Hire-Purchase Act 
1964, (d) trade descriptions, except in relation to food, 
(e) misleading and comparative advertising, except regulation specifically in 
relation to food, tobacco and tobacco products, 
(t) price indications, 
(g) trading stamps, 
(h) auctions and mock auctions of goods and services, and 
(i) hallmarking and gun barrel proofing. 
Safety of, and liability for, services supplied to consumers. 
The subject-matter of-
( a) the Hearing Aid Council Act 1968, 
(b) the Unsolicited Goods and Services Acts 1971 and 1975, 
(c) Parts I to III and XI of the Fair Trading Act 1973, 
(d) the Consumer Credit Act 1974, 
(e) the Estate Agents Act 1979, 
( t) the Timeshare Act 1992, · . 
(g) the Package Travel, Package Holidays and Package Tours Regulations 1992, and 
(h) the Commercial Agents (Council Directive) Regulations 1993. 
Exception The subject-matter of section 16 of the Food Safety Act 1990 (food 
safety and consumer protection). 
CS. Product standards, safety and liability . 
CS. Product standards, safety and liability Technical standards and requ~rements 
in relation to products in pursuance of an obligation under Commumty law. 
Product safety and liability. 
Product labelling. 
Exceptions Food, agricultural and h~~icultural pro?~ce, fish and fish products, 
seeds, animal feeding stuffs, fertthsers and pesttctdes. . 
In relation to food safety, materials which come into contact wtth food. 
C9. Weights and measures . 
C9. Weights and measures Units ~nd st~da:ds ofwetg?t and measu~e~ent. 
Regulation of trade so far as involvmg wetghmg, measurmg and quantities. 
C 10. Telecommunications and wireless telegraphy 
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The subject-matter of Part 11 of the Wireless Telegraphy Act 1949 
(electromagnetic disturbance). 
Excepti~n Th~ subject-matter of Part Ill of the Police Act 1997 (authorisation to 
mterfere wtth property etc.). 
C 11. Post Office, posts and postal services 
Cll. Post Office, posts and postal services The Post Office, posts (including 
post~ge stamps, postal orders and postal packets) and regulation of postal 
servtces. 
C 12. Research Counci Is 
C12. Research Councils Research Councils within the meaning of the Science and 
Technology Act 1965. 
The subject-matter of section 5 of that Act (funding of scientific research) so far as 
relating to Research Councils. 
C 13. Designation of assisted areas 
C13. Designation of assisted areas The subject-matter of section 1 of the 
Industrial Development Act 1982. 
Cl4. Industrial Development Advisory Board 
C14. Industrial Development Advisory Board The Industrial Development 
Advisory Board. 
C 15. Protection of trading and economic interests 
C15. Protection of trading and economic interests The subject-matter of- (a) 
section 2 of the Emergency Laws (Re-enactments and Repeals) Act 1964 (Treasury 
power in relation to action damaging to economic position of United Kingdom), 
(b) Part 11 of the Industry Act 1975 (powers in relation to transfer of control of 
important manufacturing undertakings), and 
(c) the Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980. 
Head D- Energy 
D 1. Electricity 
Dl. Electricity Generation, transmission, distribution and supply of electricity. 
The subject-matter of Part 11 of the Electricity Act 1989. 
Exception The subject-matter of Part I of the Environmental Protection Act 1990. 
gas, 
D2. Oil and gas 
D2. Oil and gas Oil and gas, including-
( a) the ownership of, exploration for and exploitation of deposits of oil and natural 
(b) the subject-matter of section 1 of the Mineral Exploratio~ and Investment <?rants 
Act 1972 (contributions in connection with mineral exploratiOn) so far as relatmg to 
exploration for oil and gas, 
(c) offshore installations and pipelines, . . . 
(d) the subject-matter of the Pipe-lines Act ~96~ (mcl~dt~g sectiOn~ (deemed. 
planning permission)) so far as relating to ptpehnes wtthm the meanmg of sectton 65 
of that Act, . . 
(e) the application of Scots law and the jurisdiction ofthe Scottish courts m 
relation to offshore activities, 
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(f) pollution relating .to .oil and gas exploration and exploitation, but only outside 
controlled waters (wtthm the meaning of section 30A(1) of the Control of Pollution 
Act 1974), 
(g) the subject-matter of Part 11 of the Food and Environment Protection Act 1985 so 
far.a~ ~elating.to oil and gas exploration and exploitation, but only in relation to 
acttvtttes outstde such controlled waters 
' 
(h) restrictions on navigation, fishing and other activities in connection with 
offshore activities, 
(i) liquefaction of natural gas, and 
U) the conveyance, shipping and supply of gas through pipes. 
Exceptions The subject-matter of-
( a) sections 10 to 12 ofthe Industry Act 1972 (credits and grants for 
construction of ships and offshore installations), 
(b) the Offshore Petroleum Development (Scotland) Act 1975, other 
than sections 3 to 7, and 
(c) Part I of the Environmental Protection Act 1990. 
The manufacture of gas. 
The conveyance, shipping and supply of gas other than through pipes. 
03. Coal 
D3. Coal Coal, including its ownership and exploitation, deep and opencast coal 
mining and coal mining subsidence. 
Exceptions The subject-matter of-
( a) Part I of the Environmental Protection Act 1990, and 
(b) sections 53 (environmental duties in connection with planning) and 54 
(obligation to restore land affected by coal-mining operations) of the Coal Industry 
Act 1994. 
04. Nuclear energy 
D4. Nuclear energy Nuclear energy and nuclear installations, including-
( a) nuclear safety, security and safeguards, and 
(b) liability for nuclear occurrences. 
Exceptions The subject-matter of-
( a) Part I of the Environmental .Protection Act 1990, and 
(b) the Radioactive Substances Act 1993. 
05. Energy conservation 
DS. Energy conservation The subject-matter of the Energy Act 1976, other than 
section 9. 
Exception The encouragement of energy efficiency other than by prohibition or 
regulation. 
Head E- Transport 
E 1. Road transport 
El. Road transport The subject-matter of-
( a) the Motor Vehicles (International Circulation) Act 1952, 
(b) the Public Passenger Vehicles Act 1981 and th~ Transport Act 1985, so far as 
relating to public service vehicle operat~r licensing, . . . 
(c) section 17 (traffic regulation on spectal roads), sectton 25 (pedestrtan cr?ssmgs), 
Part v (traffic signs) and Part VI (speed limits) of the Road Traffic RegulatiOn Act 
1984, 
(d) the Road Traffic Act 1988 and the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988, 
(e) the Vehicle Excise and Registration Act 1994, 
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(f) the Road Traffic (New Drivers) Act 1995, and 
(g) the <?oods Vehicles (Licensing of Operators) Act 1995. 
RegulatiOn of proper hours or periods of work by persons engaged in the carriage of 
passengers or goods by road. 
The conditions under which international road transport services for passengers or 
goods may be undertaken. 
Regulation of the instruction of driv.ers of motor vehicles. 
Exceptions. . The subject-matter of sections 39 and 40 (road safety information and 
trammg) and 157 to 159 (payments for treatment of traffic casualties) 
of the Road Traffic Act 1988. 
E2. Rail transport 
E2. Rail transport Provision and regulation of railway services. 
Rail transport security. 
The subject-matter of the Channel Tunnel Act 1987. 
The subject-matter of the Railway Heritage Act 1996. 
Exceptions Grants so far as relating to railway services; but this exception does not 
apply in relation to-
( a) the subject-matter of section 63 of the Railways Act 1993 
(government financial assistance where railway administration orders 
made), 
(b) "railway services" as defined in section 82(l)(b) of the Railways 
Act 1993 (carriage of goods by railway), or 
(c) the subject-matter of section 136 of the Railways Act 1993 (grants 
and subsidies). 
Interpretation "Railway services" has the meaning given by section 82 of the 
Railways Act 1993 (excluding the wider meaning of "railway" given 
by section 81(2) of that Act). 
E3. Marine transport 
E3. Marine transport The subject-matter of-
( a) the Coastguard Act 1925, 
(b) the Hovercraft Act 1968, except so far as relating to the regulation of noise and 
vibration caused by hovercraft,. 
(c) the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1971, 
(d) section 2 of the Protection of Wrecks Act 1973 (prohibition on approaching 
dangerous wrecks), 
(e) the Merchant Shipping (Liner Conferences) Act 1982, 
(f) the Dangerous Vessels Act 1985, . . 
(g) the Aviation and Maritime Security Act 1990, other than Part I (aviatiOn 
security), 
(h) the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992, 
(i) the Merchant Shipping Act 1995, 
G) the Shipping and Trading Interests (Protection) Act 1995, and. . 
(k) sections 24 (implementation of international agreements relatmg t? prote~t~on of 
wrecks), 26 (piracy) and 27 and 28 (international bodie.s concerned With mantime 
matters) of the Merchant Shipping and Maritime Secunty Act 1997. 
Navigational rights and freedoms. . . 
Financial assistance for shipping services which start or fimsh or both outside 
Scotland. 
Exceptions Ports, harbours, piers and boatslips, ex~ept in relation to the matters 
reserved by virtue of paragraph (d), (f), (g) or (I). 
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Regulati_on of works which may obstruct or endanger navigation. 
The s~bJect-r:natter of the Highlands and Islands Shipping Services Act 
1960 t.n relatiOn to financial assistance for bulk freight services. 
E4. Atr transport 
E4 .. Air transport Regulation of aviation and air transport, including the 
subject-matter of-
( a) the Carriage by Air Act 1961, 
(b) the Carriage by Air (Supplementary Provisions) Act 1962 
(c) the Carriage by Air and Road Act 1979 so far as relating t~ carriage by air 
(d) the Civil Aviation Act 1982 ' 
' (e) the Aviation Security Act 1982, 
(f) the Airports Act 1986, and 
(g) s~cti~ns 1 (endangering safety at aerodromes) and 48 (powers in relation to 
certam atrcraft) of the Aviation and Maritime Security Act 1990, 
and arrangements to compensate or repatriate passengers in the event of an air 
transport operator's insolvency. 
Exceptions The subject-matter of the following sections of the Civil Aviation Act 
1982-
(a) section 25 (Secretary of State's power to provide aerodromes), 
(b) section 30 (provision of aerodromes and facilities at aerodromes by 
local authorities), 
(c) section 31 (power to carry on ancillary business in connection with 
local authority aerodromes), 
(d) section 34 (financial assistance for certain aerodromes), 
(e) section 35 (facilities for consultation at certain aerodromes), 
(f) section 36 (health control at Secretary of State's aerodromes and 
aerodromes of Civil Aviation Authority), and 
(g) sections 41 to 43 and 50 (powers in relation to land exercisable in connection 
with civil aviation) where land is to be or was acquired for the purpose of airport 
development or expansion. 
The subject-matter of Part II (transfer of airport undertakings of local 
authorities), sections 63 and 64{airport byelaws) and 66 (functions of 
operators of designated airports as respects abandoned vehicles) of the 
Airports Act 1986. 
The subject-matter of sections 59 (acquisition of land and rights over 
land) and 60 (disposal of compulsorily acquired land) of the Airports 
Act 1986 where land is to be or was acquired for the purpose of airport 
development or expansion. 
E5. Other matters 
ES. Other matters Transport of radioactive material. 
Technical specifications for public passenger transport for disabled persons, 
including the subject-matter of-
( a) section 125(7) and (8) of the Transport Act 1985 (Secr:tary of Stat~'s guidance 
and consultation with the Disabled Persons Transport Advtsory Commtttee ), and 
(b) Part V of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (public transport). 
Regulation of the carriage of dangerous goods. . . . 
Interpretation "Radioactive material" has the same meamng as m sectiOn 1(1) of the 
Radioactive Material (Road Transport) Act 1991. 
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Head F- Social Securi(v 
F 1. Social security schemes 
Fl. ~ocial ~ecurity schemes Schemes supported from central or local funds which 
provide assistance for social security purposes to or in respect of individuals by way 
of benefits. 
Requiring persons to-
( a) establish an~ administer schemes providing assistance for social security 
purposes to or m respect of individuals, or 
(b) make payments to or in respect of such schemes, 
and to keep records and supply information in connection with such schemes. The 
circumstances in which a person is liable to maintain himself or another for the 
purposes of the enactments relating to social security and the Child Support Acts 
1991 and 1995. 
The subject-matter of the Vaccine Damage Payment Scheme. 
Illustrations National Insurance; Social Fund; administration and funding of 
housing benefit and council tax benefit; recovery of benefits for 
accident, injury or disease from persons paying damages; deductions 
from benefits for the purpose of meeting an individual's debts; sharing 
information between government departments for the purposes of the 
enactments relating to social security; making decisions for the 
purposes of schemes mentioned in the reservation and appeals against 
such decisions. 
Exceptions The subject-matter of Part 11 of the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 
(social welfare services), section 2 of the Chronically Sick and 
Disabled Persons Act 1970 (provision of welfare services), section 50 
of the Children Act 1975 (payments towards maintenance of children), 
section 15 of the Enterprise and New Towns (Scotland) Act 1990 
(industrial injuries benefit), and sections 22 (promotion of welfare of 
children in need), 29 and 30 (advice and assistance for young persons 
formerly looked after by local authorities) of the Children (Scotland) 
Act 1995. 
Interpretation "Benefits" includes pensions, allowances, grants, loans and any other 
form of financial assistance. 
Providing assistance for social security purposes to or in respect of 
individuals includes (among other things) providing assistance to or in 
respect of individuals-
( a) who qualify by reason of old age, survivorship, disability, sickness, 
incapacity, injury, unemployment, maternity or the care of children or 
others needing care, 
(b) who qualify by reason of low income, or 
(c) in relation to their housing costs or liabilities for local taxes. 
F2. Child support 
F2. Child support The subject-matter of the Child Sup~ort Acts 1991 and 1995. 
Exception The subject-matter of sections 1 to 7 of the Family Law (Scotland) Act 
1985 (aliment). . 
Interpretation If section 30(2) of the Child Support. Act 1991 ( collec!IO~ of payments 
other than child support maintenance) is not m force o~ the prm~Ipal 
appointed day, it is to be treated for the purposes of this reservation as 
if it were. 
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F3. Occupational and personal pensions 
F3. Occupational and per~onal pensions The regulation of occupational pension 
schemes and personal pension schemes, including the obligations of the trustees or 
managers of such schemes. 
Provision about pensions payable to, or in respect of, any persons, except- (a) the 
persons referred to in section 81 (3), 
(b) in relation to a Scottish public authority with mixed functions or no reserved 
function~, persons who are or have been a member of the public body, the holder of 
the public office, or a member of the staff of the body, holder or office. 
The subject-matter of the Pensions (Increase) Act 1971. 
Schemes for the payment of pensions which are listed in Schedule 2 to that Act, 
except those mentioned in paragraphs 38A and 38AB. 
Where pension payable to or in respect of any class of persons under a public service 
pension scheme is covered by this reservation, so is making provision in their case-
( a) for compensation for loss of office or employment, for their office or 
employment being affected by constitutional changes, or circumstances arising from 
such changes, in any territory or territories or for loss or diminution of emoluments, 
or 
(b) for benefits in respect of death or incapacity resulting from injury or disease. 
Interpretation 11 Pension11 includes gratuities and allowances. 
F4. War pensions . 
F4. War pensions Schemes for the payment of pensions for or in respect of 
persons who have a disablement or have died in consequence of service as 
members of the armed forces of the Crown. 
The subject-matter of any scheme under the Personal Injuries (Emergency 
Provisions) Act 1939, sections 3 to 5 and 7 of the Pensions (Navy, Army, Air Force 
and Mercantile Marine) Act 193 9 or section 1 of the Po !ish Resettlement Act 194 7. 
Illustration The provision of pensions under the Naval, Military and Air Forces 
Etc. (Disablement and Death) Service Pensions Order 1983. 
Interpretation 11Pension11 includes grants, allowances, supplements and gratuities. 
Head G- Regulation of the Professions 
G 1. Architects 
G 1. Architects Regulation of the profession of architect. 
G2. Health professions 
G2. Health professions Regulation of the health professions. 
Exceptions The subject-matter of- . 
(a) section 21 of the National Health Servtce (Scotland) Act 1978 
(requirement of suitable experience for medical practitioners), and 
(b) section 25 of that Act (arrangements fo~ the pro~i~ion of general 
dental services), so far as it relates to vocatiOnal trammg and 
disciplinary proceedings. . 
Interpretation 11The health professions" means the professiOns regulated by-
( a) the Pharmacy Act 1954, .. 
(b) the Professions Supplementary to Med1cme Act 1960, 
(c) the Veterinary Surgeons Act 1966, 
(d) the Medical Act 1983, 
(e) the Dentists Act 1984, 
337 
Appendix 
(f) the Opticians Act 1989 
(g) the Osteopaths Act 1993, 
(h) the Chiropractors Act 1994 and . ' 
(1) the Nurses, Midwives and Health Visitors Act 1997 
03. Auditors · 
G3. Auditors Regulation of the profession of auditor. 
Head H- Employment 
H 1. Employment and industrial relations 
Hl. Employment and industrial relations Employment rights and duties and 
industrial relations, including the subject-matter of-
( a) the Employers' Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Act 1969, 
(b) the Employment Agencies Act 1973, 
(c) the Pneumoconiosis etc. (Workers' Compensation) Act 1979, 
(d) the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 1981, 
(e) the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, 
(f) the Industrial Tribunals Act 1996, 
(g) the Employment Rights Act 1996, and 
(h) the National Minimum Wage Act 1998. 
Exception The subject-matter of the Agricultural Wages (Scotland) Act 1949. 
H2. Health and safety 
H2. Health and safety The subject-matter of the following Parts of the Health and 
Safety at Work etc. Act 1974-
(a) Part I (health, safety and welfare in connection with work, and control of 
dangerous substances) as extended or applied by section 36 of the Consumer 
Protection Act 1987, sections 1 and 2 of the Offshore Safety Act 1992 and section 
117 of the Railways Act 1993, and 
(b) Part 11 (the Employment Medical Advisory Service). 
Exception Public safety in relation to matters which are not reserved. 
H3. Job search and support 
H3. Job search and support The subject-matter of-
( a) the Disabled Persons (Employment) Act 1944, and 
(b) the Employment and Training Act 1973, except so far as relating to training for 
employment. 
Exception The subject-matter of-
( a) sections 8 to lOA of the Employment and Training Act 1973 
(careers services), and 
(b) the following sections of Part I of the Enterprise and New Towns 
(Scotland) Act 1990 (Scottish Enterprise and Highlands and Islands 
Enterprise)-
(i) section 2(3)(c) (arrangements for the purpose of assisting persons to 
establish themselves as self-employed persons), and 
(ii) section 12 (disclosure of information). 
Head J- Health and Medicines 
J 1. Abortion 




J2. Xenotransplantation Xenotransplantation. 
J3. Embryology, surrogacy and genetics 
J3. E~bryology, surrogacy and genetics Surrogacy arrangements, within the 
meanmg of the Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985, including the subject-matter of 
that Act. 
The subject-matter of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990. 
Human genetics. 
J4. Medicines, medical supplies and poisons 
J4. Medicines, medical supplies and poisons The subject-matter of-
( a) the Medicines Act 1968, the Marketing Authorisations for Veterinary Medicinal 
Products Regulations 1994 and the Medicines for Human Use (Marketing 
Authorisations Etc.) Regulations 1994, 
(b) the Poisons Act 1972, and 
(c) the Biological Standards Act 1975. 
Regulation of prices charged for medical supplies or medicinal products which (in 
either case) are supplied for the purposes of the health service established under 
section 1 of the National Health Service (Scotland) Act 1978. 
Interpretation "Medical supplies" has the same meaning as in section 49(3) of the 
National Health Service (Scotland) Act 1978. 
"Medicinal products" has the same meaning as in section 130(1) of the 
Medicines Act 1968. 
J5. Welfare foods 
J5. Welfare foods Schemes made by regulations under section 13 of the Social 
Security Act 1988 (schemes for distribution of welfare foods). 
Head K- Media and Culture 
K 1. Broadcasting 
Kl. Broadcasting The subject-matter of the Broadcasting Act 1990 and the 
Broadcasting Act 1996. 
The British Broadcasting Corporation. 
K2. Public lending right · 
K.2. Public lending right The subject-matter of the Public Lending Right Act 1979. 
K3. Government Indemnity Scheme 
K3. Government Indemnity Scheme The subject-matter of sections 16 and 16A of 
the National Heritage Act 1980 (public indemnities for objects on loan to museums, 
art galleries, etc.). 
K4. Property accepted in satisfaction of tax . . 
K4. Property accepted in satisfaction of tax The subJeCt-matte~ of sectiOns 8 and 9 
of the National Heritage Act 1980 (payments to Inland Revenue m respect of 
property accepted in satisfaction of tax, and disposal of such property). 
Head L- Miscellaneous 
L 1. Judicial remuneration . 
Ll. Judicial remuneration Determination of the remuneratiOn of-
( a) judges of the Court of Session, 
(b) sheriffs principal and sheriffs, 
(c) members of the Lands Tribunal for Scotland, and 
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(d) the Chairman of the Scottish Land Court. 
L2. Equal opportunities 
L2. Equal opportunities Equal opportunities, including the subject-matter of- (a) 
the Equal Pay Act 1970, 
(b) the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 
' (c) the Race Relations Act 1976, and 
(d) the Disability Discrimination Act 1995. 
Exceptions ~~e encou~agem~nt (other than by prohibition or regulation) of equal 
opportuntt1es, and m part1cular of the observance of the equal opportunity 
requirements. Imposing duties on-
( a) any office-holder in the Scottish Administration, or any Scottish 
public authority with mixed functions or no reserved functions, to 
make arrangements with a view to securing that the functions of the 
office-holder or authority are carried out with due regard to the need to 
meet the equal opportunity requirements, or 
(b) any cross-border public authority to make arrangements with a 
view to securing that its Scottish functions are carried out with due 
regard to the need to meet the equal opportunity requirements. 
Interpretation "Equal opportunities" means the prevention, elimination or regulation of 
discrimination between persons on grounds of sex or marital status, on racial grounds, 
or on grounds of disability, age, sexual orientation, language or social origin, or of 
other personal attributes, including beliefs or opinions, such as religious beliefs or 
political opinions. 
"Equal opportunity requirements" means the requirements of the law for the time 
being relating to equal opportunities. 
"Scottish functions" means functions which are exercisable in or as regards Scotland 
and which do not relate to reserved matters. 
L3. Control ofweapons 
L3. Control of weapons Control of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and 
other weapons of mass destruction. 
L4. Ordnance survey 
L4. Ordnance survey The subject-matter of the Ordnance Survey Act 1841. 
L5. Time 
LS. Time Timescales, time zones and the subject-matter of the Summer Time Act 
1972. The calendar; units of time; the date of Easter. 
Exceptions The computation of periods oftime. 
The subject-matter of-
( a) section 1 of the Banking and Financial Dealings Act 1971 (bank 
ho 1 idays ), and 
(b) the Tenn and Quarter Days (Scotland) Act 1990. 
L6. Outer space 
L6. Outer space Regulation of activities in outer space. 
PART Ill 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Scottish public authorities . . . 
1. _ ( 1) This Schedule does not reserve any Scottish public a~t~onty tf some of 1ts 
functions relate to reserved matters and some do not, unless 1t IS a cross- border 
public authority. 
(2) Sub-paragraph ( 1) has effect as regards-
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(a) the constitution of the auth 'ty · 1 d' . . t d I. b'l' . . or~ 'me u mg Its establishment and dissolution its asse s an .I a 1 1t1es an~ 1ts fundmg and receipts, ' 
(b )hco~ferrmg or removmg any functions specifically exercisable in relation to the aut onty. 
(3) S~b-par~graph ~2)(b) does ~ot apply to any function which is specifically 
exerc.Isable m relatiOn to a particular function of the authority if the articular 
function relates to reserved matters. p 
( 4) A~ autho~ity to w~ich t~is p~ragraph applies is referred to in this Act as a 
Scottish public authonty With mixed functions. 
2. Par~grap? I of P~rt I of this Schedule does not reserve any Scottish public 
authonty With. funct1o?s none of which relate to reserved matters (referred to in this 
Act as a Scottish public authority with no reserved functions). 
Reserved bodies 
3 · - ( 1) The reservation of any body to which this paragraph applies has effect to 
reserve-
( a) its constitution, including its establishment and dissolution its assets and 
liabilities and its funding and receipts, ' 
(b) conferring functions on it or removing functions from it, 
(c) conferring or removing any functions specifically exercisable in relation to it. 
(2) This paragraph applies to-
( a) a body reserved by name by Part II of this Schedule, 
(b) each of the councils reserved by Section C 12 of that Part, 
(c) the Commission for Racial Equality, the Equal Opportunities Commission and 
the National Disability Council. 
Financial assistance to industry 
4. - ( 1) This Schedule does not reserve giving financial assistance to commercial 
activities for the purpose of promoting or sustaining economic development or 
employment. 
(2) Sub-paragraph (1 )-
(a) does not apply to giving financial assistance to any activities in pursuance of a 
power exercisable only in relation to activities which are reserved, 
(b) does not apply to Part I of this Schedule, except paragraph 9, or to a body to 
which paragraph 3 of this Part of this Schedule applies, 
(c) is without prejudice to the exceptions from the reservations in Sections E2 and 
E3 of Part II ofthis Schedule. 
(3) Sub-paragraph (1) does not affect the question whether any matter other than 
financial assistance to which that sub-paragraph applies is reserved. 
Interpretation 
5. - ( 1) References in this Schedule to the subject-matter of any enactment are to be 
read as references to the subject-matter of that enactment as it has effect on the 
principal appointed day or, if it ceased to have effect at .any t~me wi~hin the peri~d 
ending with that day and beginning with the day on which thts Act ts passed, as tt 
had effect immediately before that time. . . . 
(2) Subordinate legislation under section 129(1) may, m relatiOn t? the operatiOn of 
this Schedule at any time before the principal appointed day, modtfy the references 




The Clarity Bill 
2nd Session, 36th Parliament, 48-49 Elizabeth 11, 1999-2000 
The House of Commons of Canada 
BILL C-20 
An Act to give e~fect to the requirement for clarity as set out in the opinion of the Supreme 
Court of Canada m the Quebec Secession Reference 
Preamble 
~HER~AS the Supreme Court of Canada has confirmed that there is no right, under 
mternat10nallaw or under the Constitution of Canada, for the National Assembly, legislature 
or government of Quebec to effect the secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally; 
WHEREAS any proposal relating to the break-up of a democratic state is a matter of the 
utmost gravity and is of fundamental importance to all of its citizens; 
WHEREAS the government of any province of Canada is entitled to consult its population 
by referendum on any issue and is entitled to formulate the wording of its referendum 
question; 
WHEREAS the Supreme Court of Canada has determined that the result of a referendum on 
the secession of a province from Canada must be free of ambiguity both in terms of the 
question asked and in terms of the support it achieves if that result is to be taken as an 
expression of the democratic will that would give rise to an obligation to enter into 
negotiations that might lead to secession; 
WHEREAS the Supreme Court of Canada has stated that democracy means more than 
simple majority rule, that a clear majority in favour of secession would be required to create 
an obligation to negotiate secession, ano that a qualitative evaluation is required to determine 
whether a clear majority in favour of secession exists in the circumstances; 
WHEREAS the Supreme Court of Canada has confirmed that, in Canada, the secession of a 
province, to be lawful, would require an amendment to the Constitution of Canada, that such 
an amendment would perforce require negotiations in relation to secession involving at least 
the governments of all of the provinces and the Government of Canada, and that those 
negotiations would be governed by the principles of federalism, democracy, 
constitutionalism and the rule of law, and the protection of minorities; 
WHEREAS, in light of the finding by the Supreme Court of Canada that it would be for 
elected representatives to determine what constitutes a clear question and what constitutes a 
clear majority in a referendum held in a province on secession, the House of Commons, as 
the only political institution elected to represent all Canadians, has an important role in 
identifying what constitutes a clear question and a clear majority sufficie?t for the . 
Government of Canada to enter into negotiations in relation to the secession of a provmce 
from Canada; 
AND WHEREAS it is incumbent on the Government of Canada not to enter into 
negotiations that might lead to the secession of a province from Canada, and that could 
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co~sequ~ntly entail.the termination of citizenship and other rights that Canadian citizens 
resident m the provmce enioy as fi 11 rt. · · 
. ~ . u pa ICipants m Canada, unless the population of that 
provmce has clearly expressed Its democratic WI.II that th · d fi 
e provmce sece e rom Canada; 
NOW THEREFORE He M . ty b d · · 
' ' r aJes , Y an With the advice and consent of the Senate and 
House of Commons of Canada, enacts as follows: 
House of Commons to consider question 
1. (I) ~h~ Hou~e o~ Commons shall, within thirty days after the government of a province 
table~ m I~s legislati~e assembly or otherwise officially releases the question that it intends to 
submit to Its ~oters m a ref~rendum relating to the proposed secession of the province from 
Canada, consider the question and, by resolution, set out its determination on whether the 
question is clear. 
Extension of time 
(2) Where the thirty days referred to in subsection (1) occur, in whole or in part, during a 
general election of members to serve in the House of Commons, the thirty days shall be 
extended by an additional forty days. 
Considerations 
(3) In considering the clarity of a referendum question, the House of Commons shall 
consider whether the question would result in a clear expression of the will of the population 
of a province on whether the province should cease to be part of Canada and become an 
independent state. 
Where no clear expression of will 
( 4) For the purpose of subsection (3), a clear expression of the will of the population of a 
province that the province cease to be part of Canada could not result from 
(a) a referendum question that merely focuses on a mandate to negotiate without soliciting a 
direct expression of the will of the population of that province on whether the province 
should cease to be part of Canada; or 
(b) a referendum question that envisages other possibilities in addition to the secession of the 
province from Canada, such as economic or political arrangements with Canada, that 
obscure a direct expression of the will of the population of that province on whether the 
province should cease to be part of Canada. 
Other views to be considered 
(5) In considering the clarity of a referendum question, the. House of Commons shall take 
into account the views of all political parties represented in the legislative assembly of the 
province whose government is proposing the referendum on secession, any formal 
statements or resolutions by the government or legislative assembly of any province or 
territory of Canada, any formal statements or resolutions by the Senate, any formal 
statements or resolutions by the representatives of the Aboriginal peoples of Canada, 
especially those in the province whose government is proposing the referendum on 
secession, and any other views it considers to be relevant. 
No negotiations if question not clear . 
(6) The Government of Canada shall not enter into negotiations on the terms. on whtch a 
province might cease to be part of Canada if the House of Commons determmes, pursuant to 
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this section that a referendum q e t' · 1 
1 
' . . u s ton ts not c car and, for that reason, would not result in a 
chear expressiOn of the wtll of the population of that province on whether the province 
s ould cease to be part of Canada. 
House of Commons to consider whether there is a clear will to secede 
2. ( 1) Whe~e the government of a province, following a referendum relating to the secession 
of th~ provt.nce from Canada, seeks to enter into negotiations on the terms on which that 
provm~e mtght cease to be ~art of Canada, the House of Commons shall, except where it has 
determ~ned pursua~t to sectt~n 1. that a referendum question is not clear, consider and, by 
resolutt?n, set out. tts determmat10n on whether, in the circumstances, there has been a clear 
expressiOn of a wtll by a clear majority of the population of that province that the province 
cease to be part of Canada. 
Factors for House of Commons to take into account 
(2) In consi.dering whet~er there has been a clear expression of a will by a clear majority of 
the population of a provmce that the province cease to be part of Canada, the House of 
Commons shall take into account 
(a) the size of the majority of valid votes cast in favour of the secessionist option; 
(b) the percentage of eligible voters voting in the referendum; and 
(c) any other matters or circumstances it considers to be relevant. 
Other views to be considered 
(3) In considering whether there has been a clear expression of a will by a clear majority of 
the population of a province that the province cease to be part of Canada, the House of 
Commons shall take into account the views of all political parties represented in the 
legislative assembly of the province whose government proposed the referendum on 
secession, any formal statements or resolutions by the government or legislative assembly of 
any province or territory of Canada, any formal statements or resolutions by the Senate, any 
formal statements or resolutions by the representatives of the Aboriginal peoples of Canada, 
especially those in the province whose government proposed the referendum on secession, 
and any other views it considers to be relevant. 
No negotiations unless will clear 
(4) The Government of Canada shall not enter into negotiations on the terms on which a 
province might cease to be part of Canada unless the House of Commons determines, 
pursuant to this section, that there has been a clear expression of a will by a clear majority of 
the population of that province that the province cease to be part of Canada. 
Constitutional amendments 
3. ( 1) It is recognized that there is no right under the Constitution of Canada to effect the 
secession of a province from Canada unilaterally and that, therefore, an amendment to ~he . 
Constitution of Canada would be required for any province to secede from Canada, whtch m 
turn would require negotiations involving at least the governments of all of the provinces 
and the Government of Canada. 
Limitation 
(2) No Minister of the Crown shall propose a constitutional amendment to effect the . . 
secession of a province from Canada unless the Government. of Canada ha~ addr~ssed, m tts 
negotiations, the terms of secession that are relevant in the ctrcumstanc~s, mclud~ng the 
division of assets and liabilities, any changes to the borders of the provmce, the nghts, 
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Quebec Bill 99 
AN ACT RESPECTING THE EXERCISE OF THE 
FU~DAMENTAL RIGHTS AND PREROGATIVES OF THE 
QUEBEC PEOPLE AND THE QUEBEC STATE 
WHERE~~ the Quebec people, in the majority French-speaking, possesses specific 
charactensttcs and a deep-rooted historical continuity in a territory over which it exercises its 
~ights ~hrough. a modern national state, having a government, a national assembly and 
tmparttal and m dependent courts of justice ; 
WHEREAS the constitutional foundation of the Quebec State has been enriched over the 
years by the passage of fundamental laws and the creation of democratic institutions specific 
to Quebec; 
WHEREAS Quebec entered the Canadian federation in 1867 ; 
WHEREAS Quebec is firmly committed to respecting human rights and freedoms ; 
WHEREAS the Abenaki, Algonquin, Attikamek, Cree, Huron, Innu, Malecite, Micmac, 
Mohawk, Naskapi and Inuit Nations exist within Quebec, and whereas the principles 
associated with that recognition were set out in the resolution adopted by the National 
Assembly on 20 March 1985, in particular their right to autonomy within Quebec; 
WHEREAS there exists a Quebec English-speaking community that enjoys long-established 
rights; 
WHEREAS Quebec recognizes the contribution made by Quebecers of all origins to its 
development ; 
WHEREAS the National Assembly is composed of Members elected by universal suffrage 
by the Quebec people and derives its legitimacy from the Quebec people in that it is the only 
legislative body exclusively representing the Quebec people ; 
WHEREAS it is incumbent upon the National Assembly, as the guardian ?fthe historical. 
and inalienable rights and powers of the Quebec people, to defend the Quebec people agamst 
any attempt to despoil it of those rights or powers or to undermine them; 
WHEREAS the National Assembly has never adhered to the Constitution Act, 1982, which 
was enacted despite its opposition ; 
WHEREAS Quebec is facing actions by the federal government, ~ncludi.ng a l~gislative 
initiative, that challenge the legitimacy, integrity and valid operation of tts natiOnal 
democratic institutions ; 
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WHEREAS it is necessary to reaffi th fi d · · 
c-. t t k I f. Irm e un am ental prtnciple that the Quebec people is 
1 ree o a e c 1arge o Its own destin d t · · · · 
. I d I· Id I y, e ermme Its poltttcal status and pursue its economic socia an cu tura eve opment; ' 
WHEREAS this p~inciple has applied on several occasions in the past notably in the 
referendums held m 1980, 1992 and 1995 ; ' 
WHERE~S ~he Supreme ~o.urt of Canada rendered an advisory opinion on 20 August 1998, 
and considermg the recogmtton by the Government of Quebec of its political importance ; 
WHER~~~ .it is necessa~ to reaffirm the collective attainments of the Quebec people, the 
re~ponsibtltties of the Quebec State and the rights and prerogatives of the National Assembly 
With respect to all matters affecting the future of the Quebec people; 
THE PARLIAMENT OF QUEBEC ENACTS AS FOLLOWS: 
CHAPTER I 
THE QUEBEC PEOPLE 
1. The right of the Quebec people to self-determination is founded in fact and in law. The 
Quebec people is the holder of rights that are universally recognized under the principle of 
equal rights and self-determination of peoples. 
2. The Quebec people has the inalienable right to freely decide the political regime and legal 
status of Quebec. 
3. The Quebec people, acting through its own political institutions, shall determine alone the 
mode of exercise of its right to choose the political regime and legal status of Quebec. 
No condition or mode of exercise of that right, in particular the consultation of the Quebec 
people by way of a referendum, shall have effect unless determined in accordance with the 
first paragraph. 
4. When the Quebec people is consulted by way of a referendum under the Referendum Act, 
the winning option is the option that obtains a majority of the valid votes cast, namely fifty 
percent of the valid votes cast plus one. 
CHAPTERll 
THE QUEBEC STATE 
5. The Quebec State derives its legitimacy from the will of the people inhabiting its territory. 
The will of the people is expressed through the election of Members to the National 
Assembly by universal suffrage, by secret ballot under the one person, one vote system 
pursuant to the Election Act, and through referendums held pursuant to the Referendum Act. 
Qualification as an elector is governed by the provisions of the Election Act. 
6. The Quebec State is sovereign in the areas assigned to its jurisdiction within the scope of 
constitutional laws and conventions. 
The Quebec State also holds, on behalf of the Quebec people, any right established to its 
advantage pursuant to a constitutional convention or obligation. 
It is the duty of the Government to uphold the ex~rcise and ?efend ~e integrity of those 
prerogatives, at all times and in all places, includmg on the mternat10nal ~cene. . . 
7. The Quebec State is free to consent to be bound by any treaty, convention or mternat10nal 
agreement in matters under its constitutional jurisdiction. 
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No ~reaty, convention or agreement in the areas under its jurisdiction may be binding on the 
Quebec State unless ~he consent of the Quebec State to be bound has been formally 
expr~s~ed by the National Assembly or the Government, subject to the applicable legislative 
prOVISIOnS. 
T~e Que~ec State may, ~n the areas under its jurisdiction, establish and maintain relations 
w1th foreign States and mternational organizations and ensure its representation outside 
Quebec. 
8. The French language is the official language of Quebec. 
The Qu~bec State must promote the quality and influence of the French language. 
The Quebec State shall pursue those objectives in a spirit of fairness and 
open-mindedness, respectful of the long-established rights of Quebec's 
English-speaking community. 
The status of the French language in Quebec, and the related duties and obligations, are 
established by the Charter of the French language. 
CHAPTER Ill 
THE TERRITORY OF QUEBEC 
9. The territory of Quebec and its boundaries cannot be altered except with the consent of the 
National Assembly. 
The Government must ensure that the territorial integrity of Quebec is maintained and 
respected. 
10. The Quebec State exercises, throughout the territory of Quebec and on behalf of the 
Quebec people, all the powers relating to its jurisdiction and to the Quebec public domain. 
The State may develop and administer the territory of Quebec and, more specifically, 
delegate authority to administer the territory to local or regional mandated entities, as 
provided by law. The State shall encourage local and regional communities to take 
responsibility for their development. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE ABORIGINAL NATIONS OF QUEBEC 
11. In exercising its constitutional jurisdiction, the Quebec State recognizes the existing 
aboriginal and treaty rights ofthe aboriginal nations of Quebec. 
12. The Government undertakes to promote the establishment and maintenance of 
harmonious relations with the aboriginal nations, and to foster their development and an 
improvement in their economic, social and cultural conditions. 
CHAPTER V 
FINAL PROVISIONS . 
13. No other parliament or government may reduce the powers, authority, s?ver.eignty or 
legitimacy of the National Assembly, or impose constraint on the democratic w1ll of the 
Quebec people to determine its own future. . 
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